Page No.# 1/14 GAHC010007602014 2026:GAU-AS:7073 THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH) Case No. : WP(C)/1665/2014 ON THE DEATH OF GURMEET SINGH HIS LEGAL HEIRS MRS. INDER PAL KAUR W/O LT. GURMEET SINGH, R/O BHORE CAMP UNDER SATWARI P.S. IN THE STATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR, INDIA. VERSUS THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 13 ORS REP. BY THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM, MINISTRY OF HOME AND POLITICAL AFFAIRS, DISPUR,-6. 2:THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM MINISTRY OF HOME AND POLITICAL AFFAIRS DISPUR-6. 3:THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM HEALTH AND FAMILY WELFARE DEPARTMENT GOVT. OF ASSAM DISUR GUWAHATI-6. 4:THE ADDITIONAL DIRECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE ASSAM B.K. KAKATI ROAD ULUBARI GUWAHATI- 781007 ASSAM. 5:THE DEPUTY INSPECTOR OF POLICE Page No.# 2/14 A B.K. KAKATI ROAD ULUBARI GUWAHATI- 781007 ASSAM. 6:THE SENIOR SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE SSP ANANDA RAM BARUAH ROAD PAN BAZAAR GUWAHATI- 781001 ASSAM. 7:SRI AMITAVA SINHA ADDITIONAL S.P. CRIME CITY RESERVE POLICE QUARTER UNDER PALTAN BAZAR P.S. IN THE DIST. OF KAMRUP ASSAM GUWAHATI. 8:SRI MADHAB CHANDRA DEKA SUPERINTENDENT OF CENTRAL JAIL GUWAHATI. 9:SRI LOKNATH DEKA INSPECTOR INVESTIGATION OFFICER BASISTHA POLICE STATION GUWAHATI. 10:THE GAUHATI MEDICAL COLLEGE AND HOSPITAL REP. BY THE SUPERINTENDENT BHANGAGARH GUWAHATI-28. 11:THE REGISTRAR GENERAL GAUHATI HIGH COURT GUWAHATI-1. 12:THE REGISTRAR JUDICIAL GUWAHATI HIGH COURT GUWAHATI-1. 13:THE PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICER Page No.# 3/14 GUWAHATI HIGH COURT GUWAHATI-1. 14:THE ASSAM HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION REP. BY ITS SECRETARY CUM CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF THE STATE COMMISSION B E F O R E HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE DEVASHIS BARUAH Advocates for the petitioner(s) : Ms. N Choudhury Advocates for the respondent(s) : Mrs. M Hazarika Senior Advocate Ms. D Das Ms. S Sarma Standing Counsel, Health & Family Welfare Department, Govt. of Assam Mr. HK Das, Senior Standing Counsel, Gauhati High Court Mr. NK Sarma Mr. D Nath, Senior Govt. Advocate Date on which Judgment is reserved: N/A Date of Pronouncement of Judgment : 21.05.2026 Whether the Pronouncement is of the : NA Operative Part of the Judgment Whether the Full Judgment has been : Yes Pronounced Page No.# 4/14 JUDGMENT & ORDER(ORAL) Heard Ms. N Choudhury, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner. Also heard Mr. D Nath, the learned Senior Govt. Advocate, Assam who appears on behalf of the respondent Nos.1, 2, 4, 5 and 6; Ms. S Sharma, the learned counsel who appears on behalf of the respondent Nos.3 and 10; Mrs. M Hazarika, the learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Ms. D Das, the learned counsel who appears on behalf of the respondent No.7 and Mr. HK Das, the learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr. NK Sarma, who appears on behalf of the respondent Nos.11, 12 and 13. 2. The present writ petition was filed by one Gurmeet Singh, (since deceased), seeking the following reliefs which are reproduced hereinunder: (i). Set aside and quash the order dated 23.09.2013 passed by the Assam Human Right Commission Case No. 828/9/13-14. (ii). Set aside and quash the impugned Communication No. H.C.III-36/2013/4925/G dated 20.11.2013 passed by the Registrar (Judicial) Gauhati High Court. And/or as to why a writ in the nature of Mandamus shall not be issued to. (iii). Directing the Respondent No.1 and more particularly the Respondent Nos.7 and 9 to pay exemplary and adequate compensation to the petitioner for the Custodial Violence meted out on him. (iv). Directing the Respondent Nos.1, 2, 4 and 5 to initiate immediate Departmental enquiry and criminal proceeding against the Respondents No.7 and 9 for preparing and submitting false reports of the Petitioner before the Court below. Page No.# 5/14 (v). Directing the Respondent Nos.1 to 4 to initiate immediate Departmental enquiry against the Respondents Nos.7 and 9 for the custodial violence meted out on the petitioner while he was in police custody. (vi). Direct the Respondent Nos. 2 and 10 to initiate Departmental and criminal proceedings against the concerned doctors for preparing and submitting false reports of the Petitioner before the Court. (vii). Initiate Contempt Proceedings against the Respondents Nos. 7 and 9 for violation of the principles laid down in D.K Basu Vs. State of West Bengal and Others (1997) 1 SCC 416. (viii). Direct the Respondents No. 11,12 and 13 to provide the information sought for by the Petitioner through his application made under the Right to Information Act, 2005. (ix). Impose the Penalties as laid down in Section 20 of the Right to Information Act, 2005 on the Respondent Nos.11 and 13 for non-furnishing the information sought for by the Petitioner in his Application under the Right to Information Act, 2005. (x). Direct the Respondent Nos. 1 , 7 and 9 to pay the cost and expenses of this entire instant litigation. 3. The aforementioned reliefs were sought for by Late Gurmeet Singh by filing the writ petition on the basis that the private respondents herein upon the remand being granted administered third degree torture upon him when he was in police custody, which was in violation to the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of D.K. Basu Vs. State of West Bengal and Others, reported in (1997) 1 SCC 416. 4. It is further relevant to take note that on account of the torture meted out to Late Gurmeet Singh while he was in police custody, a Page No.# 6/14 separate criminal proceedings was initiated against respondent No.7 under Sections 326/331/34 of the Indian Penal Code. The said criminal proceeding was registered and numbered as CR Case No. 3451C/2013. While the said proceedings were ongoing, Late Gurmeet Singh filed the present writ petition seeking various reliefs as aforenoted. 5. During the pendency of the instant writ petition, the Court of the learned Additional Sessions Judge No. 1, Kamrup (Metro) at Guwahati, convicted respondent No. 7 vide the judgment dated 21.06.2018 and sentenced the respondent No.7 to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 2(two) years and to pay a fine of Rs.50,000/-, and in default, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 3 months. 6. An appeal against the judgment dated 21.06.2018 was filed by respondent No.7 before this Court, which has been registered and numbered as Criminal Appeal No.198/2018. The said appeal has been admitted vide the order dated 02.07.2018 and is presently pending. 7. Unfortunately, during the pendency of the present writ petition, the original petitioner, Gurmeet Singh expired on 20.11.2018. 8. The records reveal that on an application filed in the year 2022 by the wife of Late Gurmeet Singh who is the present petitioner was Page No.# 7/14 registered and numbered as I.A.(C)No.508/2022. The learned Coordinate Bench of this Court substituted the present petitioner. 9. Before proceeding further, this Court finds it pertinent to take note of a relevant fact that the present petitioner had filed two applications one before the Police Accountability Commission and the other before the Assam Human Rights Commission complaining about the torture meted out to her husband and for taking appropriate action against the concerned Police Officers. 10. The records reveal that the Police Accountability Commission did not take any steps on the complaint filed by the present petitioner and the Assam Human Rights Commission had dropped the said proceedings on the ground that a criminal proceedings was pending before the competent Court of Criminal jurisdiction. 11. In the background of the above, this Court takes note of an additional affidavit filed by respondent No. 7 before this Court, raising a question on the maintainability of the writ petition on the principles of Actio personalis moritur cum persona meaning thereby, a cause of action which is personal to a person dies with his death. 12. It is the case of respondent No. 7 that the reliefs which have been sought for in the instant proceedings cannot be granted upon the Page No.# 8/14 death of Late Gurmeet Singh, inasmuch as, the reliefs so sought were personal to Late Gurmeet Singh and are not saved by any statutory enactment. 13. A reply thereagainst was filed by the present writ petitioner stating inter alia that it is not a personal wrong which was caused to Late Gurmeet Singh during his lifetime. Rather, it was a constitutional infraction thereby violating the mandate of Article 21 of the Constitution of India, as has been laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of D.K. Basu (Supra). 14. It is also contended by the present petitioner that as the wrong which was committed upon Late Gurmeet Singh was a public wrong, the same cannot come to an end with the death of Late Gurmeet Singh. 15. This Court has heard the learned counsels appearing on behalf of the parties and has duly taken note of the reliefs which have been sought for by the original writ petitioner in the instant proceedings. 16. It is pertinent to take note of that the incident complained of was sometime in the year 2013, and thereupon the present writ petition was filed in the year 2014. The materials on record do not show, or for that matter, the present petitioner has not placed any materials Page No.# 9/14 which would show that on account of the alleged torture committed by the private respondents, it led to the death of Late Gurmeet Singh. 17. The alleged torture which was meted out upon Late Gurmeet Singh was personal to him, which, though had violated the fundamental rights of Late Gurmeet Singh under Article 21 of the Constitution, however, it is the opinion of this Court that in the present circumstances, the principle of Actio personalis moritur cum persona would apply. 18. The death of Late Gurmeet Singh cannot be traced to the alleged incident of torture. Under such circumstances, the exceptions culled out by the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855, the Legal Representatives Suits Act, 1855, as well as the Indian Succession Act, 1925 etc., cannot be applied for permitting the wife of the deceased (the present petitioner) to continue with the present proceedings. 19. This Court finds it profitable at this stage to refer to a recent judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Kumud Lall Vs. Suresh Chandra Roy (Dead) through LRs & Ors., reported in 2026 INSC 443, wherein the Supreme Court culled out the principles as to when a right to sue survives. Paragraphs 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, and 64 of the said judgment in Kumud Lall (supra), being relevant, are reproduced hereinunder: Page No.# 10/14 59. From the above, it is clear that the exceptions provided under Section 306 of 1925 Act have to be limited to those espousing personal cause which do not continue once the plaintiff dies, such as personal claims arising ex delicto like defamation, personal injury etc., however, any claim on pecuniary interest of the deceased estate continues. In order to explain the classification of 50 rights, jurisprudentially, Salmond classified proprietary rights and personal rights as under- “Proprietary and personal rights. Another important distinction is that between proprietary and personal rights. The aggregate of a man’s proprietary rights constitutes his estate, his assets, or his property in one of the many senses of that most equivocal or legal term. The sum total of a man’s personal rights, on the other hand, constitutes his status or personal condition, as opposed to his estate. If he owns land, or chattels, or patent rights, or the goodwill of a business, or shares in a company, of if debts are owing to him, all these are rights pertain to his estate. But if he is a free man and a citizen, a husband and a father, the rights which he has as such pertain to his status or standing in the law.” 60. This Court in Vinayak Purshottam Dube Vs. Jayashree Padamkar Bhat, while deciding the liability of legal heirs of the deceased opposite party-developer to provide completion certificate, conveyance deed etc., to the complainant in addition to the monetary payment arising out of a development agreement, made the following classification between proprietary and personal rights – Proprietary Rights Personal Rights 1. Proprietary rights mean a person's right in relation to his own property. Proprietary rights have some economic or monetary value. Personal rights are rights arising out of any contractual obligation or rights that relate to status. 2. Proprietary rights are valuable. Personal rights are not valuable in monetary terms. 3. Proprietary rights are not residual in character. Personal rights are the residuary rights which remain Page No.# 11/14 after proprietary rights have been subtracted. 4. Proprietary rights are transferable. Personal rights are not transferable. 5. Proprietary rights are the elements of wealth for man. Personal rights are merely elements of his well-being. 6. Proprietary rights possess not merely judicial but also economic importance. Personal rights possess merely judicial importance. In the light of the above, it is clear that in distinction to an individual’s personal right which is attached to his status, the proprietary right relates to his estate. On the other hand, personal right or claim usually includes damages for loss of reputation, pain, and suffering, etc. 61. A contrary interpretation wherein any claim (inclusive of personal and proprietary claim) concerning defamation, assault, and other personal injuries not causing the death of the party, being barred under Section 306 of 1925 Act, would entail different standards being adopted for institution of suits under Legal Representative’s Suits Act, 1855 and continuation of pre-existing suit. The law has to be read harmoniously. There is no logical or legal reasoning which can support a contrary interpretation to not allow estate claims with respect to the categories of exceptions identified above. 62. It needs to be cleared that suppose a decree stands during an appeal process in favor of the plaintiff and the defendant dies, then the entire claim is maintainable in appeal. As the decretal amount has to be satisfied from the estate of the deceased, then the legal representatives/executors/Administrator of the deceased defendant may have to prosecute the appeal. However, in case the plaintiff does not have a decree on the date of his death, then right to continue necessarily have to be determined is terms of Section 306 of 1925 Act. 63. We may note that this Court herein is only answering the question on interpretation Page No.# 12/14 of the applicable law and not expounding on the normative requirement as to whether the policy adopted by the law applicable is correct or there is a need to change. English law appears to have gone further to preserve tortious liabilities of the deceased defendant. To this count, even judgments and Haryana Law Commission have also taken a view to recommend amendments. We feel that it is appropriate to engage policy experts to debate the need and necessity of expanding scope of Section 306 of 1925 Act. The policy consideration is best left to the Law Commission to see whether there is a need to have a re-look at these provisions for future. 64. What falls from the above discussion are as under – i. The common law maxim ‘actio personalis moritur cum persona’ in India has been statutorily modified by various statutory instruments such as Fatal Accidents’ Act of 1855, Legal representatives’ Suits Act of 1855, Indian Succession Act of 1925, etc.; ii. That the legal representative of the deceased can institute a fresh suit or be sued afresh in terms Legal Representatives Suits Act, 1855 or in terms of Section 306 of Indian Succession Act, 1925; iii. Continuation of suit by or against the legal representative of the deceased has to be in terms of Section 306 of Indian Succession Act, 1925 (substantive law); iv. Procedural prescription under Order XXII of CPC, concerning substitution of legal representative of the deceased party should be harmoniously construed with Section 306 of Indian Succession Act. v. The continuation of ‘right to sue’ under Order XXII Rule 2 read with Rule 4 is to be seen on the date of death. vi. Generally, all rights and liabilities to maintain a suit are carried to the legal representative under Section 306 of Indian Succession Act, 1925. However, when adjudicating claims under 1st exception to Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, personal injury claims abate, while claims for or against the estate of the deceased survive.” 20. In view of the principles of law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Page No.# 13/14 Court as quoted hereinabove, the present writ petition cannot be proceeded with at the instance of the substituted petitioner i.e. the present petitioner and accordingly, this Court dismisses the instant writ petition. 21. Before parting with the record, this Court, however, finds it very pertinent to observe that the present writ petitioner, on her own had submitted applications before the State Police Accountability Commission as well as the Assam State Human Rights Commission. The Police Accountability Commission did not take any steps in pursuance to the application filed by the present petitioner and the Assam State Human Rights Commission dropped the proceedings on the ground of pendency of the criminal proceedings. These applications which were filed by the present petitioner constituted independent of the causes of action. 22. Under such circumstances, dehors the dismissal of the present writ petition, it shall not bar the present petitioner to approach the Police Accountability Commission in furtherance to the earlier application so filed and challenge the decision of the Assam Human Rights Commission, if so advised. 23. The above liberty is given to the present petitioner for the simple reason that there exists a difference in the standing of a substituted Page No.# 14/14 petitioner with that of a petitioner espousing an independent cause of action. The substituted petitioner’s rights flow from the original petitioner’s rights and if those rights were personal to the original petitioner, the substituted petitioner is not invested with any right upon the death of the original petitioner to carry forward the claim of the original petitioner. 24. It is further observed that in terms with the liberty so granted, it shall not be a bar for the petitioner to approach this Court again and the dismissal of the present writ petition would not act as a res- judicata. 25. With the above observations, the writ petition stands closed. JUDGE Comparing Assistant