JUDGMENT : MOHAMMED NIAS C.P., J. The above Execution Second Appeal is filed against the judgment and decree in AS No. 24 of 2024 of the Subordinate Judge, Sulthan Bathery, dated 15.06.2024, confirming the order in EP 76 of 2018 in E.A.Nos.15 of 2019 and 3 of 2022 dated 09.04.2024 of the Munsiff/Magistrate, Sulthan Bathery. 2. The appellants filed E.A. 15 of 2019 in EP. 76 of 2018 for executing the final decree in OS No.460 of 2001 of the Munsiff/Magistrate, Sulthan Bathery, which was for delivering the property allotted to decree holders therein. When the case was posted for the counter of the judgment debtors, EA Nos. 15 of 2019 and 3 of 2022 were filed, and both were tried jointly. 3. The contention of the appellants herein, namely the petitioners in EA 15 of 2019, is that they were not parties to the earlier proceedings and that they are the wife and children of the third judgment debtor. They contended that the property scheduled in the petition was trespassed upon by the third defendant/judgment debtor in the year 1970, and thereafter, he has been in absolute possession and enjoyment of the said property, wherein they have constructed a house using the money of the first petitioner. Petitioners, along with the third judgment debtor, were residing in the property for the last 30 years, and it is contended that the father of the third judgment debtor had obtained 2.1718 hectares of dry land by virtue of WCS Patta 315/1970 on the eastern side of the petition schedule property. 4. One Kuttikrishnan Nair, who is the father of the third judgment debtor, had filed a suit for partition, in which the court had passed a preliminary and later a final decree, and at the time of final decree application, the advocate commissioner wrongly included the property scheduled in the petition, which absolutely belonged to the petitioners as though it was part of the partible property, by identifying 6 acres 20 cents of land, including the property of the petitioners, as part of the decree schedule in OS 460 of 2001. 5. This, according to the petitioners, adversely affects their right obtained by the judgment debtor in his personal capacity, and which is not part of the partible property covered by WCS 315/1970. 5. This, according to the petitioners, adversely affects their right obtained by the judgment debtor in his personal capacity, and which is not part of the partible property covered by WCS 315/1970. Thus, contending that the final decree passed is not binding on the petitioners, and that they came to know about the allotment of shares to the judgment debtors only on 08.11.2019 from the third judgment debtor, the applications were filed to exclude the property of the petitioners from the property sought to be delivered. 6. The decree holders, the respondents, have filed a counter denying the entire averments contenting that the rights of the third and the fourth judgment debtors were finally adjudicated in OS 460 of 2001 and since the petitioners are the wife and children of the third judgment debtor, their petitions are barred under Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, since the title regarding the petition schedule properties have already been adjudicated by the trial court. They contended that the petitions were the result of a collusion between the judgment debtors, and that the property which is scheduled in the petition is that of Kuttikrishnan Nair and is part of the partible property. The appeal preferred by the third judgment debtor against the order in the final decree proceedings was also dismissed. Accordingly, the petitioners did not have any right, much less in the absence of producing any evidence to show the same. 7. The Execution Court, after considering the rival contentions, found that the petitioners had no independent right and that they were claiming rights through the third judgment debtor as his legal representatives. The specific case of the petitioners is that the third respondent had trespassed into the vacant land long years ago and taken possession of the same, and perfected their title by adverse possession. Ext. X1 series also showed that the petitioners had tried to obtain a patta but could not obtain the same due to the pendency of the civil proceedings. It is the same petition schedule property which was part of the property scheduled in the original suit, where the trial court had adjudicated as to whether the same is partible, and though the judgment debtors preferred an appeal, the same was confirmed by the first appellate court in A.S.22 of 2014 dated 05.10.2017. It is the same petition schedule property which was part of the property scheduled in the original suit, where the trial court had adjudicated as to whether the same is partible, and though the judgment debtors preferred an appeal, the same was confirmed by the first appellate court in A.S.22 of 2014 dated 05.10.2017. Thus, the right and claim of the third judgment debtor over the petitioner's property stands adjudicated by the trial court and confirmed by the first appellate court, and as such, the petitions were devoid of merit. 8. The trial court also found that all the petitioners claimed that they had trespassed into government land and converted those properties into their possession, and that is the reason why the petitioners never mounted the box or subjected them to cross-examination by the decree holders. On the above grounds, the execution court found that there was no merit in EA.15 of 2019, and accordingly, the application was dismissed. 9. Aggrieved by the dismissal of the application, AS.24 of 2024 was filed, wherein the appellate court affirmed the findings of the execution court and clearly found that the claim petitioners and wife were the legal representatives of the third defendant in OS 460 of 2001, who is also the third judgment debtor in EA. 15 of 2019 in EP. 76 of 2018. The claim of the petitioners in the claim petition that the plaint schedule property is in the possession and enjoyment of the third defendant and that he had applied for patta, was not considered as the claim petitioners had no independent right over the plaint schedule property and even going by their contention, their right depended only on the right of the third defendant, or in other words, they were litigating under the same title. 10. That apart, their pleadings that the third defendant had trespassed on the vacant land in the year 1970 were also taken note of while finding that there was no independent right claimed by the petitioners. It was also found that the claim raised by the petitioners over the property was earlier raised by the third defendant in the final decree proceedings in OS. 460 of 2001, and which was elaborately discussed and adjudicated by the trial court in Ext. B4, which is the order of the trial court in I.A. 699 of 2011 in OS 460 of 2011 dated 31.07.2012. 460 of 2001, and which was elaborately discussed and adjudicated by the trial court in Ext. B4, which is the order of the trial court in I.A. 699 of 2011 in OS 460 of 2011 dated 31.07.2012. Since the right and claim of the third defendant over the scheduled property were already adjudicated by the trial court, which was confirmed by the first appellate court, their claim was held to be barred by the principles of res judicata. 11. Their contention based on the application for patta was also taken note of by the appellate court, and it was found that no patta was granted to the third defendant/third judgment debtor or to the second petitioner so far. The reliance placed on Ext. C2 commission report also did not confer any right to prove the claim of the petitioners over the plaint schedule property. Though it was argued that the first petitioner had constructed a house, in the absence of any evidence and non- examination, adverse influence was drawn against them. On these findings, the appeal was dismissed, confirming the order of the execution court. 12. The learned counsel for the appellants attacking the above orders contended that the claim schedule properties ought to have been excluded from execution proceedings as not partible. It is also argued that the claim for partition was based on a patta for an extent of 5.38 acres, whereas the advocate commissioner had identified a property measuring 6.2 acres. 13. After hearing the learned counsel on both sides and perusing the records, it is clear that no independent right was ever claimed by the claim petitioners. Their contention was that the third defendant had occupied a property 30 years ago. As noted above, the claim of the third defendant was already adjudicated, and the same cannot be disputed, as the proceedings/records reveal the same. There is no evidence let in, not even oral, to prove the contentions in the claim petition. The execution court in the first instance, as well as the appeal court, considered the contentions raised in the claim petitions, and in the absence of any independent right shown and based on the finding that the right of the third defendant/judgment debtor, under whom the petitioners claimed, had already been adjudicated and confirmed in appeal, found no merit in the claim petitions. No material is produced to dislodge the factual findings in the impugned orders. 14. On a perusal of the judgments/orders of the court below and in the absence of any material to show any independent right of the claimants and taking note of the fact that the rights of the third judgment debtor have already been admittedly adjudicated, the orders of the court below call for no interference. I do not find any question of law, much less any substantial question of law, warranting interference in this second appeal. Resultantly, the Execution Second Appeal will stand dismissed.