Page No.# 1/13 GAHC010263102023 2026:GAU-AS:6779 THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH) Case No. : WP(C)/6778/2023 KUSHAL BAWRI S/O- LATE SHANKAR LAL BAWRI, R/O- JYOTI NAGAR, P.O., P.S. AND DIST. DIBRUGARH, ASSAM, PIN- 786001. VERSUS THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 3 ORS REPRESENTED BY THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF ASSAM, DEPARTMENT OF URBAN DEVELOPMENT, DISPUR, GUWAHATI-6. 2:THE DIBRUGARH MUNICIPAL BOARD REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN DIBRUGARH MUNICIPAL BOARD DIBRUGARH ASSAM PIN- 7856001. 3:THE EXECUTIVE OFFICER DIBRUGARH MUNICIPAL BOARD DIBRUGARH DIST. DIBRUGARH ASSAM PIN- 786001. 4:SMTI. DOLA DUTTA D/O- RABI RANJAN DUTTA R/O- ASHIT NAGAR P.O. P.S. AND DIST. DIBRUGARH ASSAM PIN- 786001 Page No.# 2/13 BEFORE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE DEVASHIS BARUAH For the Petitioner(s) : Mr. N. N. Upadhyaya, Advocate For the Respondent(s) : Ms. S. Sharma, Advocate : Mr. G. Bokolial, Government Advocate · Date on which Judgment was reserved : N/A · Date of Pronouncement of Judgment : 15.05.2026 · Whether the pronouncement is of the Operative Part of the Judgment : No · Whether the full Judgment has been Pronounced : Yes JUDGMENT AND ORDER (ORAL) Heard Mr. N. N. Upadhyaya, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner and Mr. G. Bokolial, the learned Government Advocate appearing on behalf of the Respondent No.1. I have also heard Ms. S. Sharma, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent No.4. None appears on behalf of the Respondent Nos. 2 and 3. 2. The present writ petition has been filed assailing the order dated 11.08.2023 passed by the Chairperson of the Dibrugarh Municipal Board, whereby it was opined that both the Petitioner as well as the Respondent No.4 would continue their possession and occupation upon their individual site premises subject to the condition that they will remain within their Page No.# 3/13 respective site premises. It was also opined that the Petitioner as well as the Respondent No.4 shall have to abide by the terms and conditions as well as the rules and regulations of the Dibrugarh Municipal Authority in force and any other terms and conditions to be enforced by the Authority. 3. It is relevant to take note of that the said order dated 11.08.2023 was passed pursuant to certain directions passed by this Court. To appreciate that, this Court finds it relevant to take note of the brief facts which led to the filing of the present writ petition. 4. It is the case of the Petitioner that the Dibrugarh Municipality, as it then was, leased out a plot of land admeasuring 21 ft. x 50 ft i.e. 1,050 square feet included in Dag No.618 of Periodic Patta No.91(new) within the Marwaripatty Ward, Dibrugarh Town, Sadar Sub-Division of Dibrugarh in the District of Dibrugarh to the grandfather of the Petitioner. 5. It is the further case of the Petitioner that his grandfather had constructed a shop house over the said plot of land and the said shop house was covered by a Municipal Holding No.276 of Ward No. 11 of Dibrugarh Municipality. The said shop house was rented out to the Respondent No.4 on monthly rent basis on the condition that the Respondent No.4 would vacate and deliver possession of the said shop house to the Petitioner as and when required. 6. Pursuant thereto, in the year 1995, a fresh lease deed was entered into by and between the Petitioner’s father and the Dibrugarh Municipality in Page No.# 4/13 respect to the said plot of land and the area was specifically identified as Site No.15 in a map enclosed to the lease deed. The period of the lease was 20 years with effect from 01.04.1995 to 31.03.2015. 7. It is the further case of the Petitioner that on the night of 06.06.1989, a devastating fire broke in by which the shop of the Petitioner was gutted and the Petitioner thereupon constructed the same with the due permission of the Dibrugarh Municipality. Upon reconstruction, some part of the shop was again rented out to the Respondent No.4. However, in the year 1997, a notice was issued by the Executive Officer of the Dibrugarh Municipality asking the Petitioner to show cause as to why the lease agreement should not be terminated upon certain allegations. The Petitioner submitted the show cause notice and further came to learn that the show cause notice was issued at the instance of the Respondent No.4. 8. It is the further case of the Petitioner that the Respondent No.4 also defaulted in making payment. 9. The Petitioner on 09.07.1997 was served with a copy of an order passed by the Executive Officer, Dibrugarh Municipality dated 26.05.1997, wherein it was informed that the registered deed entered into by and between the Petitioner and the Dibrugarh Municipality was partly cancelled to the extent of 13 ft x 50 ft area which was under the occupation of the Respondent No.4 who was a tenant of the Petitioner. 10. Being aggrieved, the Petitioner filed a suit before the Court of the Page No.# 5/13 learned Munsiff No.1 at Dibrugarh which was registered and numbered as Title Suit No.10/2009 seeking for declaration that the order dated 26.05.1997 passed by the Executive Officer, Dibrugarh Municipality, in favour of the Respondent No. 4 granting him lease of the property mentioned in the schedule thereby cancelling partly the Petitioner's lease agreement dated 31.08.1995 was null and void; for cancellation of the lease granted in favour of the Respondent No.4 which have been mentioned in the order dated 26.05.1997 as well as for recovery of possession of the leased out premises by the Petitioner from the Respondent No.4. 11. The said suit was decreed in favour of the Petitioner vide a judgment and decree dated 21.03.2013 whereby the Court of the learned Munsiff No.1, Dibrugarh declared that the order dated 26.05.1997 passed by the Executive Officer, Dibrugarh Municipality, whereby the lease granted to the Petitioner was partly cancelled to be null and void and the Dibrugarh Municipality was directed to restore the possession of the Petitioner over the suit premises. Further to that, the Respondent No.4 was also directed to deliver vacant possession of the suit premises to the petitioner. 12. Being aggrieved, the Respondent No.4 filed an Appeal before the Court of the learned Civil Judge at Dibrugarh, which was registered and numbered as Title Appeal No.32/2013. The learned First Appellate Court vide the judgment and decree dated 17.08.2017 upheld the findings of the learned Trial Court insofar as the Issue No.(iv) i.e. as regards the legality and validity of the order dated 26.05.1997. However, insofar as the decision pertaining to as to whether the Respondent No.4 was a tenant of the Petitioner, was Page No.# 6/13 interfered with. The learned First Appellate Court vide the said judgment and decree dated 17.08.2017 directed the Dibrugarh Municipality to call upon the Respondent No.4 as well as the legal representatives of the Plaintiff (the Petitioner herein) by giving sufficient time and after giving them reasonable opportunities of hearing to review the impugned order dated 12.06.1997 and thereupon pass a Speaking Order afresh. It was further directed that the said process be completed within 3 (three) months from the date of receipt of the copy of the judgment and decree. 13. The record reveals that the said judgment and decree dated 17.08.2017 passed in Title Appeal No.32/2013 had not been put to challenge by filing a Second Appeal. Subsequent thereto, it is seen that on 01.03.2019, a lease deed was entered into by and between the Respondent No.2 with the Respondent No.4. The records further reveal that the Executive Officer of the Respondent No.2 issued a notice dated 18.11.2020 to both the Petitioner as well as the Respondent No.4. It is under such circumstances, the Respondent No.4 had approached this Court by filing a writ petition which was registered and numbered as WP(C) No.5638/2020 challenging the notice dated 18.11.2020. This Court vide a judgment and order dated 11.11.2022, had disposed of the said writ petition holding inter alia that the lease deed which was entered into by and between the Respondent No.2 with the Respondent No.4 was contrary to the directions passed by the learned First Appellate Court in the judgment and decree dated 17.08.2017 in Title Appeal No.32/2013 and under such circumstances, this Court interfered with the lease deed dated 01.03.2019. The analysis and determination by this Court in the judgment and order dated 11.11.2022 is Page No.# 7/13 contained at Paragraph Nos. 12 and 13 which being relevant are reproduced herein under: “12. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials on record. It appears from the judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court that there was a specific direction given to the Dibrugarh Municipal Board to review the order dated 12.06.1997 by giving a reasonable opportunity of hearing to both the parties and thereupon to pass a speaking order afresh. It was specifically directed that the whole process be completed within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of the said judgment and order. The petitioner has not filed any order passed by the Dibrugarh Municipal Board in pursuance of the direction passed by the Court of the Civil Judge at Dibrugarh in Title Appeal No.32/2013. On the other hand, the respondent No.4 has placed on record the minutes of the hearing which was held on 15th November, 2017 wherein the respective contentions of were taken note of. It further appears from the communication dated 16.11.2017 issued by the Chairman, Dibrugarh Municipal Board that there was a request seeking extension for holding the review hearing with regard to the direction passed in the judgment and decree in Title Appeal No.32/2013 and thereby to grant another 90 days in that regard. Thereupon abruptly it appears that the Lease Deed was entered into with the petitioner on 01.03.2019. When the petitioner filed an application before the Chairman, Dibrugarh Municipal Board seeking a copy of the order so passed in pursuance of the direction passed in Title appeal No.32/2013, Page No.# 8/13 the Chairman, Dibrugarh Municipal Board rather than serving a copy of the said order had only provided a copy of the Lease Deed dated 01.03.2019. Thereupon when the matter came up to the attention before the Executive Officer, Dibrugarh Municipal Board he sought to comply with the direction passed by the First Appellate Court in Title Appeal No.32/2013 and accordingly had issued the impugned notice. The petitioner who is already the beneficiary of the action of the Dibrugarh Municipal Board therefore has filed the instant writ petition challenging the said action on the ground that the Dibrugarh Municipal Board has already adjudicated the said matter and granted a fresh lease dated 01.03.2019. The said case made out by the petitioner challenging the notice issued in 18.11.2020 on the face of it do not call for any interference on the ground that the Dibrugarh Municipal Board has not passed any speaking order as directed by the First Appellate Court in Title Appeal No.32/2013 dated 17.08.2017. It has to be taken note of that the First Appellate Court was categorical in passing the directions to pass a speaking order. As none of the parties could produce the order, the very edifice of the petitioner’s case does not exist for which the instant petition is devoid of any merits and consequently dismissed. The interim order passed earlier on 18.12.2020 accordingly stands vacated. 13. Before concluding, this Court would further like to observe and direct the Dibrugarh Municipal Board, Dibrugarh to forthwith take appropriate action as directed in the judgment and decree dated 17.08.2017 in Title Appeal No.32/2013 by giving an opportunity to both Page No.# 9/13 the parties and thereupon pass an order in accordance with law. This exercise be completed within a period of 2 (two) months from the date a certified copy of the instant order is served upon the Chairman, Dibrugarh Municipal Board, Dibrugarh. Taking into account that there was no compliance to the judgment and decree dated 17.08.2017, the Lease Deed dated 01.03.2019 is also interfered with.” 14. The records further reveal that in pursuance thereto, the impugned order was passed on 11.08.2023 which is the subject matter of the present dispute. 15. This Court has taken note of that upon the filing of the present writ petition, this Court vide an order dated 24.11.2023 issued notice. 16. The Respondent No.4 has filed a detailed affidavit-in-opposition thereby supporting the order dated 11.08.2023. This Court has duly perused the contents of the said affidavit-in-opposition as well as the enclosures to the said affidavit-in-opposition. 17. In the backdrop of the above, this Court has also heard the learned counsels appearing on behalf of the parties and has duly perused the materials on record. 18. From a perusal of the impugned order dated 11.08.2023, it is seen that the Respondent No.2 after taking into account the documents which were placed by the parties, i.e. the Petitioner as well as the Respondent No.4, Page No.# 10/13 came to a categorical findings that both the parties had reconstructed the shop building thereon at their individual site premises at their own cost after the permission was granted on 14.06.1991. It was further mentioned that individual lease deeds were executed by the Dibrugarh Municipal Authority in favour of the Petitioner as well as the Respondent No.4. Insofar as the Respondent No.4 is concerned, lease deed was entered into on 24.06.1997, 31.10.2008 and again on 01.10.2019 (sic 01/03/2019). Insofar as the Petitioner is concerned, lease deed was entered into on 02.08.1976 and thereupon on 1st day of April, 1995. On the basis of the above, it was opined that both the parties continue their possession and occupation upon their individual site premises subject to the condition that they would remain within their respective site premises. 19. Mr. N. N. Upadhyay, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner submitted that the Dibrugarh Municipality had not decided as per the judgment and decree dated 17.08.2017 passed in Title Appeal No. 32/2013 inasmuch as, the learned First Appellate Court had already upheld the decision of the learned Trial Court whereby the order dated 26.05.1997 was held to be null and void. 20. The learned counsel for the Petitioner therefore submitted that it was the incumbent duty of the Respondents Nos.2 and 3 to decide as to whether the Respondent No.2 without cancelling the subsisting agreement dated 01.04.1995, which was valid up till 31.03.2015 could have unilaterally cancelled partly the lease and grant a lease in favour of the Respondent Page No.# 11/13 No.4. The learned counsel submitted that the Dibrugarh Municipality completely failed to take into account that the lease dated 24.06.1997 was on the basis of the order dated 26.05.1997 which was already declared to be null and void and therefore there was a duty cast upon the Dibrugarh Municipality to decide the same. 21. Per contra, Ms. S. Sharma, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent No.4 submitted that the impugned order which have been passed duly takes note of that the Respondent No.4 had established the shop in the present premises wherein it is functioning since the year 1985 and this would be apparent from a perusal of the order dated 11.08.2023 and more particularly the finding No.2. She therefore submitted that these are questions of fact which have been adjudicated by an authority and this Court may not like to interfere with the order dated 11.08.2023. In that regard, the learned counsel referred to the various documents enclosed to the affidavit-in-opposition in support of the Respondent No.4’s claim over the premises. 22. This Court has given an anxious consideration to the respective submissions. 23. The issue which arises in the present writ petition is whether the Respondent No.4’s shop is within Site No.15 which is the land leased out to the Petitioner in terms with the lease deed dated 01.04.1995. 24. This Court had duly taken note of the order dated 11.08.2023 and there Page No.# 12/13 is nothing decided by the Dibrugarh Municipality in respect to the said issue. In fact, in terms with the judgment and decree dated 17.08.2017 passed by the learned First Appellate Court, the Dibrugarh Municipality was required to decide this very aspect. Under such circumstances, it is the opinion of this Court that the impugned order dated 11.08.2023 passed by the Chairperson of the Respondent No.2 as well as the Respondent No.3 is contrary to the judgment and decree dated 17.08.2017 passed in Title Appeal No. 32/2013 as well as the directions so passed by this Court in the order dated 11.11.2022 in WP(C) No.5638/2020. 25. Accordingly, the instant writ petition stands disposed of with the following observations and directions: (i) The impugned order dated 11.08.2023 passed by the Chairperson of the Respondent No.2 as well as by the Respondent No.3 is set aside and quashed. (ii) The Respondent Nos.2 and 3 are directed to decide the question as to whether the leased out premises to the Respondent No.4 is a part of the land which was leased out to the father of the Petitioner vide the lease deed dated 01.04.1995 and the area specifically described in the Schedule to the lease deed dated 01.04.1995 with specific reference to Site No.15 of the site map enclosed to the said lease deed. (iii) Upon arriving at the decision on the issue directed to be decided as per Clause (ii) hereinabove, the Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 thereupon shall Page No.# 13/13 comply with the directions passed by the learned Appellate Court in the judgment and decree dated 17.08.2017 in Title Appeal No.32/2013. (iv) While carrying out the adjudication, the Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 shall give an opportunity of hearing to both the parties i.e. the Petitioner and the Respondent No.4. (v) The said exercise be completed within a period of 4 (four) months from the date a certified copy of the instant judgment is served upon the Respondent No.3. (vi) No costs. J U D G E Comparing Assistant