Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:11859-DB IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI L.P.A. No. 173 of 2026 1. Vijay Kumar Mahto, aged about 39 years, S/o Tekochand Mahto, R/o Vill- Poraiya, P.O. & P.S.- Poraiya, Dist- Giridih, Jharkhand. 2. Birendra Prasad, aged about 39 years, S/o Chetlal Mahto, R/o Vill-Kalhabad, P.O. & P.S.- Kalhabad, Dist- Hazaribagh, Jharkhand. 3. Kaushal Kishore, aged about 40 years, S/o Pashupati Jha, R/o Ward No. 28, P.O. & P.S.- Lohaiya Nagar, Dist- Begusarai, Bihar. 4. Sanjeev Kumar, aged about 39 years, S/o Rup Narayan Mishra, R/o Vill- Kaithahi West, P.O.- Kaithahi, P.S.- Rajnagar, Dist- Madhubani, Bihar. 5. Asim Kumar, aged about 39 years, S/o Arun Nath Mishra, R/o Mohalla Rajhat, P.O. & P.S.- Banmankhi, Dist- Purnea, Bihar. 6. Sunil Kumar Sah, aged about 44 years, S/o Nagendra Prasad Sah, R/o Near GPO Patna, P.O. & P.S.- Patna, Dist- Patna, Bihar. 7. Chandra Kant Prasad, aged about 42 years, S/o Jagat Pati Prasad, R/o Vill- Nohsa, P.O. & P.S.- Fulwari Sharif, Dist- Patna, Bihar. 8. Mukesh Kumar, aged about 44 years, S/o Kapil Deo Prasad, R/o House No. 630KA, Behind Civil Surgeon, P.O. & P.S.- Bihar Sharif, Dist- Nalanda, Bihar. 9. Sharwan Kumar, aged about 44 years, S/o Rambalak Prasad, R/o Naya Bazar, Mahatma Gandhi Road, P.O. & P.S.- Lakhisarai, Dist-Lakhisarai, Bihar. 10. Shamser Alam, aged about 41 years, S/o Md. Mahmood Alam, R/o Unchri (Ward-01), P.O. & P.S. & Dist- Garhwa, Jharkhand. 11. Ashish Kumar Das, aged about 40 years, S/o Late Nandlal Das, R/o Jamdehi, P.O.- Karaya, P.S. Bindapathar, Dist- Jamtara, Jharkhand. 12. Rajiv Ranjan, aged about 40 years, S/o Nand Kishore Prasad Yadav, R/o H. No. 599, Ward-14, Yadu Bans Nagar, P.O. & P.S.- Chas, Dist- Bokaro, Jharkhand. 13. Vijay Kumar Malviya, aged about 39 years, S/o Birendra Kumar Malviya, R/o Assam Road, Vill- Simariya, P.O. & P.S.- Jasidih, Dist-Deoghar, Jharkhand. ... Petitioners/Appellants Versus Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:11859-DB 1. The State of Jharkhand through the Chief Secretary at project Building, P.O. + PS.- Dhurwa, Dist-Ranchi, Jharkhand (834004). 2. The Secretary, Department of Health, Medical Education & Family Welfare, Govt. of Jharkhand, having its office at Ground Floor, Nepal House, P.O. & P.S. Doranda, Dist- Ranchi, Jharkhand (834002). 3. The Secretary, Department of Personnel and Administrative Reforms, Govt. of Jharkhand, having its office at project Building, P.O. + PS.- Dhurwa, Dist-Ranchi, Jharkhand (834004). 4. The Secretary, Jharkhand Public Service Commission, having its office at Circular Road, P.O. & P.S- Lalpur, Dist-Ranchi, Jharkhand. 5. The Controller of Examination, Jharkhand Public Service Commission, having its office at Circular Road, P.O. & P.S- Lalpur, Dist- Ranchi, Jharkhand. … Respondents/Respondents 6. Rahul Kumar, aged about 29 years, S/o Sunil Singh, R/o Vill- Ramchandarpur, P.O. & P.S.- Pipariya, Dist- Lakhisarai, Bihar 7. Nilesh Kumar, aged about 37 years, S/o Jai Prakash Prasad Baranwal, R/o Post Office Road, Jainamore, Bandhdih, P.O. & P.S.-Jaina, Dist-Bokaro, Jharkhand … Petitioners/Performa Respondents --------- CORAM: HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR --------- For the Appellants: Mr. Anup Kumar, Advocate Mr. Vishnu Prabhakar Pathak, Advocate For the Resp./State: Mr. Piyush Chitresh, A.C. to A.G. For the JPSC: Mr. Sanjay Piprawall, Advocate Mr. Rakesh Ranjan, Advocate Mr. Jay Prakash, Advocate Mr. Prince Kumar, Advocate --------- 02/Dated: 22.04.2026 1. Heard the learned counsel for the parties. 2. This appeal is directed against the learned Single Judge’s order dated 25.02.2026 dismissing W.P.(S) No. 1152 of 2026 and declining the petitioners’ prayer that the respondents grant them a Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:11859-DB 12-year age relaxation or in the alternate, this Court should, exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution grant , a 12-year age relaxation to the petitioners, thereby entitling them to participate in the process for recruitment of Drug Inspectors under the Jharkhand State Drug Control Service Rules, 2023 and the Central Drug Rules, 1945. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that for 15 long years the vacancies were not filled in, even though, the rules require filling up of vacancies each year. In such circumstances, he submitted that the denial of age relaxation was most unreasonable and, in any event, defied the doctrine of legitimate expectations. He submitted that the unreasonable denial of age relaxation would violate Article 14 of the Constitution and, therefore, a mandamus should issue to the respondents to grant such relaxation or, in the alternative, this Court, to remove the inequality and unreasonableness, grant the age relaxation of 12 years in the facts of the present case. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Dr. Ami Lal Bhat v. State of Rajasthan and Others, (1997) 6 SCC 614 and, High Court of Delhi Vs. Devina Sharma, (2022) 4 SCC 643, to support the above contentions. He also placed reliance upon the Hon’ble Supreme Court order dated 27.02.2026 in the case of Ajay Kumar & Ors Vs. Delhi Subordinate Services Selection Board (DSSSB) & Anr in W.P. (Civil) No. 901 of 2025 to submit that in similar circumstances, relief of age relaxation was granted by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:11859-DB 5. The learned counsel for the petitioners further submitted that in certain other cases, these very respondents, after taking cognisance of the fact that vacancies were being filled with considerable delay, have granted age relaxation for recruitment to civil service and other posts. He submitted that the denial of age relaxation to the petitioners, therefore, amounted to discrimination under Article 14 of the Constitution. He submitted that this contention was raised before the learned Single Judge but has not been considered. 6. On the above grounds, the learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that this appeal be admitted and interim relief be granted, enabling the petitioners to participate in the recruitment process without claiming any equities. 7. Mr. Sanjay Piprawall and Mr. Piyush Chitresh, the learned counsel for the JPSC and the State Government, opposed the admission of this appeal by submitting that there is no error in the learned Single Judge’s order. They submitted that neither were there any pleadings regarding discrimination nor was this issue of discrimination argued before the learned Single Judge. They submitted that in any event, the record, i.e. the learned Single Judge’s order, must be held as conclusive as to what transpired before the Court, and such record cannot be challenged before the appeal court. They relied on the decisions referred to in the learned Single Judge’s order and the decisions of this Court in the cases of Krishna Kumar Mishra v. The State of Jharkhand & Others with connected matters, 2018 Supreme (Jhk) 130, and NIraj Kumar Pandey and Others v. The State of Jharkhand and Others with Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:11859-DB connected matters, L.P.A. No.202 of 2026 judgment and order dated 15.04.2026. 8. The learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the rule referred to by the learned counsel for the petitioners does not mandate filling up of vacancies each year. They distinguished the decisions in Dr. Ami Lal Bhat (supra), Devina Sharma (supra) and Ajay Kumar & Ors (supra) and submitted that this appeal may be dismissed. 9. The rival contentions now fall for our determination. 10. The petitioners are seeking a writ of mandamus to grant age relaxation. Normally, no Mandamus is issued directing the respondents to grant a relaxation unless a very clear case of discrimination or manifest arbitrariness is made out. 11. Granting or refusing age relaxation is essentially a policy matter, and as long as the policy is not ex facie arbitrary, unreasonable, or vitiated by mala fides, there is no question of issuing a writ to grant a relaxation, simply because a relaxation can never be claimed as a matter of right. 12. The law on the subject has been digested by a Coordinate Bench in Krishna Kumar Mishra (supra). The summary of principles set out in paragraph 5(XVIII) of this decision is transcribed below for the convenience of reference: - “(i) The choice of date as a basis for classification fixed by the legislature or its delegate cannot always be dubbed as arbitrary, even if, no particular reason is forthcoming for the Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:11859-DB choice unless, it is shown to be capricious or whimsical in the circumstances, (ii) The cut-off date, to attain the minimum or maximum age, must be specific and determinate on a particular date and it cannot be allowed to depend upon any fluctuating or uncertain date, because it may lead to consequences, anomalies and uncertainties. (iii) Mere errors of government in fixing of cutoff date, which may be unjust and oppressive are not subject to judicial review, it is only its palpable arbitrary exercise which can be declared void. (iv) It is the discretion of the rule-making authority or employer, to fix a cut-off date for determining the maximum or minimum age prescribed for a post and it cannot be, per se arbitrary, unless the cut-off date, is as wide off the mark, as to make it wholly unreasonable. (v) A cut-off date cannot be fixed with any mathematical precision. As soon as a cut-off date is fixed there will be some persons who fall on the right side of the cut-off date and some persons fall on the wrong side of the cut-off date and the persons falling on the wrong side cannot challenge the same, unless, it is as capricious or whimsical as to be wholly unreasonable. (vi) There cannot be any “wholesale relaxation” on the ground that the advertisement is delayed unless, there is an allegation of any mala fides in connection with delay in Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:11859-DB issuing an advertisement. This wholesale relaxation would make total uncertainty in determining the maximum age of a candidate and it might be unfair for large number of similarly situated candidates who may not apply, thinking that they are age-barred. (vii) A cut-off date can be provided in terms of the provisions of statute or executive order and if any hardship is caused to some persons or a section of society that may by itself cannot be a ground for holding that the cut-off date so fixed is ultra vires to Article 14 of the constitution. (viii) The fixing of cut-off dates is within the domain of the executive authority. There may be various considerations in the mind of the executive authorities due to which a particular cut-off date is fixed. These considerations can be financial, administrative or other considerations. Therefore the court should not normally interfere with the fixation of cut-off date by the executive authority unless such order appears to be on the face of it blatantly discriminatory and arbitrary.” 13. The Coordinate Bench, after considering several decisions on the subject of fixing of cut-off date and the scope of challenges thereto including the decision in the case of Dr. Ami Lal Bhat (supra), has inter alia held that there cannot be any wholesale relaxation on the ground that advertisement is delayed, unless there is an allegation of any mala fides in connection with the delay in issuing an advertisement. This wholesale relaxation would induce total uncertainty in determining the maximum age of a candidate and Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:11859-DB it might be unfair to many similarly situated candidates who may not apply, thinking that they are age-barred. 14. The Coordinate Bench has held that fixing of cut-off dates is within the domain of the Executive authority. There may be various considerations that lead to a particular cut-off date being fixed. These considerations can be financial, administrative, or other. Therefore, the Court should not normally interfere with the fixation of a cut-off date by the executive authority unless such an order appears to be, on the face of it, blatantly discriminatory or arbitrary. 15. In this case, the learned counsel for the petitioners confirmed that there was neither any pleading nor any contention about mala fides in connection with the delay in issuing the advertisement. On perusal of the memo of the petition, it is apparent that no mala fides have been alleged. 16. Insofar as the argument of discrimination now raised in the appeal court, again, we find that in the petition, there are no pleadings worth the name to allege such discrimination. Such pleadings were necessary if this discrimination argument had to be considered. The petitioner had to plead the cases in which these respondents had granted age relaxation and how those cases were not materially different from the present case. In the absence of any such pleadings and credible material to back the same, the plea of discrimination cannot be entertained at this stage. 17. Besides, from the perusal of the learned Single Judge’s order, we do not find that any such contention was raised. The complaint that such contention was indeed raised but not considered cannot Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:11859-DB normally be made before the appeal court. If at all, it was for the appellants to have taken appropriate steps before the same Court in terms of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak & Another and other connected matters, AIR 1988 SCC 1531 : (1998) 2 SCC 602. 18. The rule referred to by the learned counsel for the appellants is also not entirely clear, and from it we cannot say with certainty that there was any mandate to fill the vacancies each year. The rule in this case merely states that the vacancies for each year until 1st January will be calculated, and the Government will send the requisition to the Commission by 28th/29th February of the calendar year. This position is in stark contrast to the position in the case of Devina Sharma (supra), where, in terms of the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Malik Mazhar Sultan v. U.P. Public Service Commission & Others, (2008) 17 SCC 703, there was a continuing mandamus to fill the vacancies each year. 19. The decision in the case of Ajay Kumar (supra), even assuming that the same was not an order made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court exercising its power to do complete justice under Article 142 of the Constitution, proceeds on a different set of facts not comparable to those in this petition. There, the recruitment process was set in motion, but due to several litigations, it could not be completed at an early date. Thus, for no fault of their own, the petitioners, who were eligible when the process commenced, stood to be excluded from consideration. In those peculiar circumstances, the Hon’ble Supreme Court allowed such petitioners to participate in the Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:11859-DB selection process. The position here, as noted earlier, differs in the present matter. 20. Based on the pleadings, we are unable to detect any manifest arbitrariness in the fixing of the cut-off date. The arguments now canvassed have been considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the decisions referred to by the learned Single Judge and by the Coordinate Bench in Krishna Kumar Mishra and analogous cases (supra). The learned Single Judge has noted that the rules do not provide for any power of relaxation. 21. In the case of Niraj Kumar Pandey (supra), again, we have considered but rejected a challenge to the fixing of the cut-off date. Therein, we have also considered the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sivanandan C.T. and Others v. High Court of Kerala and Others, (2024) 3 SCC 799, in the context of the doctrine of legitimate expectations. 22. In this case, we do not think the doctrine of legitimate expectation is attracted because, even on a prima facie basis, the rules did not make any provision for age relaxation. This is also not the case where any representation was held out to the petitioners, or any expectations were created in them that the age would be relaxed. 23. Besides, this is not a case in which the petitioners, based on their interpretation of the rule, petitioned this Court when the vacancies, according to them, arose. No case was filed urging that such vacancies be filled, as otherwise the petitioners would stand the risk of being age-barred. Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:11859-DB 24. For all the above reasons, we cannot hold that the learned Single Judge’s order is erroneous or otherwise warrants any interference in the facts of the present case. The appeal is accordingly dismissed, without any order for costs. 25. The interim applications do not survive after the disposal of the appeal. They are consequently disposed of. (M. S. Sonak, C.J.) (Rajesh Shankar, J.) April 22, 2026 A.F.R. Manoj/Sharda/Cp.2 Uploaded on 23-Apr-26