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2026 DAILYLAW 6921 (CHH)

ARPITA JAIN v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH

WPC/2188/2020 · 2026-04-15

Shri Amitendra Kishore Prasad

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Judgment text

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1 2026:CGHC:17466 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPC No. 2188 of 2020 1 - Arpita Jain W/o Yogesh Varylani, Aged About 28 Years R/o Shailendra Nagar, Raipur, District - Raipur (Chhattisgarh), District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh 2 - Harakhchand Jain, S/o Shri Bhanwarlal Pugaliya, Aged About Years, R/o Shailendra Nagar, Raipur, District - Raipur (Chhattisgarh), District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh ... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Secretary, Dept. Of Revenue, Mahanadi Bhawan, Nawa Raipur Atal Nagar, District - Raipur (Chhattisgarh), District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh 2 - National Highway Authority Of India, Through Its Chairman, G-5 And G-6, Sector - 10, Dwarika, New Delhi, District : New Delhi, Delhi 3 - Sub Divisional Officer (Revenue) (Competent Authority Under National Highway Act 1956), Dhamtari, District - Dhamtari (Chhattisgarh), District : Dhamtari, Chhattisgarh 4 - Collector, District - Dhamtari (Chhattisgarh), District : Dhamtari, Chhattisgarh 5 - Union Of India, Through Secretary, Department Of Road Transport And Highways, Government Of India, Transport Bhavan, Sansad Marg, New Delhi, District : New Delhi, Delhi ... Respondent(s) (Cause Title is taken from CIS System) For Petitioners : Mr. Kashif Shakeel, Advocate For State : Mr. Ujjawal Choubey, Panel Lawyer For NHAI : Mr. Dhiraj Kumar Wankhede, Advocate Digitally signed by SHAYNA KADRI 2 Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad Order on Board 16/04/2026 1. The petitioners have filed this writ petition seeking following reliefs: “10.1 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to call for the entire record pertaining to the proceedings, for its kind perusal. 10.2 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue an appropriate writ quashing and setting aside the order dated 14.11.2019 in Revenue Case No. 07/A-82/15-16 (Annexure P/2) passed by the Respondent No. 3 holding it to be illegal. 10.3 That, this Hon'ble Court may further kindly be pleased to issue an appropriate writ and direct the Respondents to pay the Compensation amount for the acquisition of the subject land as calculated in the Original Award dated 12.07.2016 (Annexure P/1) by applying the multiplier factor of TWO and to pay the same along with interest as well as penal interest. 10.4 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to grant any other relief, 3 along with the cost of petition, as it may deem fit.” 2. Facts of the case, as projected in the petition, are that the petitioners are joint owners of the subject agricultural land bearing Khasra No. 243/2, admeasuring 0.0198 hectare, situated at Village Birejhar, Tahsil Kurud, District Dhamtari. The said land was earlier recorded in the name of one Shiv Kumar, who was the previous owner, and subsequently, upon culmination of civil proceedings, ownership came to be vested in the present petitioners. In the year 2015, the National Highways Authority of India initiated acquisition proceedings for the purpose of widening/extension of National Highway No. 30 (Raipur to Dhamtari stretch from Km 32.230 to 59.230) under the provisions of the National Highways Act, 1956. In furtherance thereof, notifications under Section 3A were issued and published in the Gazette on 13.03.2015 and in local newspapers on 19.04.2015. Thereafter, declaration under Section 3D(1) was published in the Gazette of India on 08.01.2016, followed by publication under Section 3G(3) in local newspapers on 25.01.2016 and 26.01.2016. Ultimately, the Competent Authority passed an award dated 12.07.2016 determining compensation for the acquired land. While passing the original award dated 12.07.2016, the Competent Authority applied a multiplier factor of two for rural areas in accordance with the notification dated 09.02.2016 issued by the Ministry of Rural Development, Government of India under 4 the provisions of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013. Consequently, compensation for the petitioners’ land was assessed at Rs. 16,26,768/-. However, due to pendency of a civil dispute between the previous owner Shiv Kumar and the present petitioners, the compensation amount was not disbursed at that time. Subsequently, in the year 2019, the civil suit was decided in favour of the petitioners, and their names were duly mutated in the revenue records. Thereafter, the petitioners approached the authorities seeking release of compensation along with applicable interest. However, instead of releasing the awarded amount, the Competent Authority passed a fresh order dated 14.11.2019, whereby the compensation was re- determined by applying a multiplier factor of one, purportedly in light of a State Government circular dated 25.05.2017. As a result, the compensation amount was drastically reduced to Rs. 8,44,668/-, almost half of the originally determined amount, without affording any notice or opportunity of hearing to the petitioners. It is further the case that an earlier State notification dated 04.12.2014 prescribing multiplier factor of one had already been challenged before this Court and was set aside in a batch of writ petitions. Although certain observations in the said judgment were later modified in review proceedings, subsequent judicial pronouncements, including in the case of Mahadev Gond vs. Union of India, have upheld the applicability of multiplier factor of 5 two for rural land acquisition pertaining to National Highways. The petitioners, therefore, challenge the impugned order dated 14.11.2019 as being illegal, arbitrary, and without jurisdiction. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the impugned action of the respondents in revising the compensation amount after a lapse of three years from the date of the original award is wholly illegal, arbitrary, and violative of settled principles of law. It is contended that once the award was passed on 12.07.2016 under Section 3G of the National Highways Act, 1956, the same attained finality, and the Competent Authority became functus officio, having no jurisdiction to review, modify, or alter the said award. It is further argued that the National Highways Act, 1956 does not confer any power upon the Competent Authority to reopen or reassess compensation once finally determined. Therefore, the impugned order dated 14.11.2019, whereby the original award has been modified by applying a different multiplier, is without authority of law and liable to be set aside on this ground alone. Learned counsel also submits that the reduction of multiplier from two to one is based on a State Government circular dated 25.05.2017, which is not only subsequent to the award but also legally unsustainable. It is contended that such circular cannot be applied retrospectively to alter vested rights of the petitioners arising from the final award. Moreover, the said circular is pari materia to an earlier notification dated 04.12.2014, which has already been struck down by this Court as arbitrary and 6 unconstitutional. It is further contended that although acquisitions under the National Highways Act are governed by its own provisions, the determination of compensation in the present case has admittedly been made by relying upon the provisions of the Act of 2013. Therefore, the principles laid down in judicial pronouncements interpreting the 2013 Act, including the requirement of applying an appropriate multiplier factor, would squarely apply. The counsel submits that the First Schedule of the 2013 Act contemplates a variable multiplier ranging from 1.00 to 2.00 depending upon the distance from urban areas, and prescribing a uniform multiplier of one for rural areas defeats the very object of the beneficial legislation. It is also argued that the State Government, by issuing executive instructions or circulars, cannot override or amend the statutory provisions contained in the First Schedule of the Act of 2013. Such action amounts to excessive delegation and is contrary to the legislative intent of ensuring fair and adequate compensation to landowners. The fixation of multiplier factor of one for rural areas, which is the minimum in the prescribed scale, without considering relevant factors such as remoteness and nature of acquisition, is manifestly arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. Learned counsel further submits that the Central Government, in exercise of its statutory powers, has prescribed multiplier factor of two for rural areas, and the same has been consistently upheld by judicial pronouncements. Reliance is placed on decision in the 7 matter of Mahadev Gond vs. Union of India, wherein it has been affirmed that landowners whose lands are acquired for National Highways in rural areas are entitled to compensation computed by applying multiplier factor of two. It is also contended that the impugned action has resulted in hostile discrimination, inasmuch as similarly situated landowners, whose lands were acquired under the same notification, have been paid compensation as per the original award applying multiplier of two, whereas the petitioners alone have been deprived of the same benefit. Lastly, it is submitted that the Act of 2013 is a beneficial legislation enacted with the object of ensuring just, fair, and reasonable compensation to landowners. Any interpretation or administrative action which results in reduction of compensation would be contrary to the spirit and object of the Act. The respondents, by arbitrarily reducing the compensation amount, have deprived the petitioners of their legitimate entitlement, thereby causing grave injustice. On these grounds, learned counsel prays that the impugned order dated 14.11.2019 be quashed and the respondents be directed to release the compensation to the petitioners in terms of the original award dated 12.07.2016 along with applicable interest. 4. Learned State counsel submits that the land belonging to the petitioners was acquired for the purpose of widening and upgradation of National Highway No. 30, covering the stretch from Raipur to Dhamtari (Km 32.230 to Km 59.230). It is contended 8 that the entire acquisition process was carried out strictly in accordance with the provisions of the National Highways Act, 1956, and after due publication of notifications under Sections 3A, 3D and 3G of the Act, the Competent Authority for Land Acquisition (CALA), i.e., the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue), Kurud, passed a final award dated 12.07.2016 in Land Acquisition Case No. 07/A-82/2015-16. It is further submitted that the acquisition proceedings were initiated pursuant to a proposal made by the Project Director, Project Implementation Unit, National Highways Division, Raipur, for acquisition of private lands, including that of the petitioners. The State authorities, acting as prescribed authority under the Act of 1956, completed the acquisition proceedings and passed the award, and compensation was duly determined and paid to the petitioners in accordance with the applicable rehabilitation policy. At the time of passing of the award, the multiplier factor of two was applied. Learned State counsel, however, submits that subsequently, the State Government, through its Department of Revenue and Disaster Management, issued a circular dated 25.05.2017 clarifying that for acquisition of land within the State, the multiplier factor as determined by the appropriate Government, i.e., the State Government, would be applicable. It is contended that the State Government had already notified multiplier factor of “one” for rural areas, and therefore, the earlier application of multiplier factor of two in the award dated 12.07.2016 was inadvertent and 9 contrary to the prevailing State notification dated 04.12.2014. It is thus submitted that in order to rectify the said error, the competent authority passed the impugned order dated 14.11.2019, whereby the compensation was re-determined by applying multiplier factor of one instead of two. According to the State, such modification was justified and necessary to bring the award in conformity with the applicable legal position prevailing at the relevant time. Learned counsel further submits that the petitioners have challenged the impugned order primarily on the ground that the competent authority becomes functus officio after passing of the award and has no power to alter the same. However, it is contended that the amendment in the present case was carried out in light of the State Government’s circular and to correct an inadvertent error in the original award. It is also argued that the circular dated 25.05.2017 is binding upon the authorities, and its application cannot be said to be without jurisdiction. It is further submitted that the petitioners have also relied upon the judgment in Anita Agrawal vs. State of Chhattisgarh and subsequent cases; however, the State contends that the said judgment cannot be applied retrospectively so as to reopen settled awards and impose a substantial financial burden upon the State. It is emphasized that reopening concluded matters would adversely affect public finances and ongoing welfare schemes. Learned State counsel submits that in compliance with the directions issued by the Court in the said judgment, the State Government has already enacted 10 the Chhattisgarh Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement (Determination of Multiplying Factor in Case of Rural Areas) Act, 2019, notified on 02.05.2019, whereby multiplier factor of two has been prescribed for rural areas. However, it is contended that the said enactment operates prospectively and does not govern awards passed prior to its enforcement. It is further contended that the petitioners have an efficacious alternative statutory remedy under the National Highways Act, 1956, by approaching the Arbitrator (Commissioner, Revenue) for redressal of their grievance relating to compensation. The petitioners, having failed to avail such remedy within the stipulated time, cannot invoke writ jurisdiction at this belated stage. The present petition is also liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches, as the claim sought to be raised pertains to matters which had already attained finality. Learned State counsel also submits that the legal issue regarding applicability of multiplier factor has been subject matter of challenge before higher courts. It is pointed out that the judgment in Mahadev Gond vs. Union of India relied upon by the petitioners has been set aside by the Hon’ble Supreme Court by order dated 22.04.2022. Therefore, the reliance placed by the petitioners on the said judgment is wholly misconceived. It is further submitted that once the earlier notification dated 04.12.2014 was in force at the time of passing of the award, the compensation ought to have been determined in accordance with the said notification, and the 11 subsequent correction made by the impugned order is legally valid. The State asserts that there is no illegality or arbitrariness in the action of the authorities warranting interference by this Court. In conclusion, learned State counsel submits that the writ petition is not maintainable, suffers from delay and laches, and is devoid of merits. The petitioners have failed to avail the statutory remedy available under the Act, and the impugned order has been passed in accordance with law. Accordingly, it is prayed that the writ petition deserves to be dismissed. 5. Learned counsel for respondent No. 2, at the outset, submits that the present writ petition is wholly misconceived and not maintainable in law. It is contended that upon completion of the acquisition proceedings and passing of the award, the statutory mandate under Section 4 of the National Highways Act, 1956 comes into operation, whereby the acquired land vests absolutely in the Union of India free from all encumbrances. In such circumstances, the petitioners cannot challenge the acquisition or consequential proceedings by way of a writ petition, as the process has attained finality under the statutory scheme. It is further submitted that it is a well-settled principle of law that once an award has been passed, the same cannot ordinarily be interfered with in exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, except in cases involving fraud or patent illegality apparent on the face of the record. According to the respondent, neither of these exceptional circumstances is pleaded 12 or established in the present case. The grievance of the petitioners is confined merely to dissatisfaction with the quantum of compensation, which does not warrant interference in writ jurisdiction. Learned counsel submits that the National Highways Act, 1956 is a complete code in itself and provides a comprehensive mechanism for redressal of grievances relating to compensation. Specific reliance is placed upon Section 3G(5), (6) and (7) of the Act, which provide for reference of disputes regarding compensation to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government. It is contended that if the amount determined by the Competent Authority is not acceptable to either party, the aggrieved party has a statutory right to seek re-determination through arbitration, and thereafter, further remedies are also available under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. It is emphatically argued that when an efficacious and adequate alternative remedy is available under the statute itself, the petitioners ought to have availed the same instead of directly invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court. The respondent submits that the plea of inefficacy of the alternative remedy is untenable, as Section 3G(7) itself lays down detailed parameters for determination of compensation, including market value, damages due to severance, injurious affection, and other consequential losses. Learned counsel further submits that a plain reading of the writ petition reveals that the entire case of the petitioners revolves around the issue of calculation of 13 compensation. There is no challenge to the acquisition proceedings per se, nor is there any allegation of jurisdictional error or fraud. Therefore, the proper forum for adjudication of such dispute is the statutory mechanism provided under Section 3G of the Act, and not a writ petition before this Court. On facts, it is submitted that the land in question forms part of a larger acquisition undertaken for widening and development of National Highway No. 30 (Raipur–Dhamtari stretch). The acquisition proceedings were conducted strictly in accordance with the provisions of the Act, 1956. Notifications under Section 3A were duly published in the Gazette of India on 13.03.2015 and in local newspapers on 19.04.2015. Opportunity was provided to interested persons to file objections under Section 3C within the prescribed time, and the statutory procedure was duly followed. It is further submitted that upon completion of the process under Sections 3A, 3C and 3D, the land vested absolutely in the Central Government free from all encumbrances upon publication of the declaration under Section 3D dated 08.01.2016. Thereafter, public notice under Section 3G(3) was issued inviting claims, and the award dated 12.07.2016 was passed determining compensation for the acquired lands. The respondent contends that the award was passed after following due process of law and cannot now be reopened in writ proceedings. With regard to the impugned order dated 14.11.2019, learned counsel submits that the same was passed in continuation of the earlier proceedings and in 14 compliance with the judgment and decree passed by the Civil Court in the dispute between the petitioners and the previous owner. It is contended that the subsequent determination does not suffer from any illegality warranting interference. Refuting the reliance placed by the petitioners on the judgment in Smt. Anita Agrawal vs. State of Chhattisgarh, it is submitted that the said judgment is distinguishable on facts and law. The said case pertained to challenge to a State Government notification under the Act of 2013, whereas in the present case, the acquisition is under the National Highways Act, 1956. Moreover, in the said batch of cases, neither the National Highways Authority of India nor the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways was a party. It is further pointed out that certain observations in the said judgment, particularly paragraph 12, were subsequently deleted in review proceedings, thereby diluting the reliance placed by the petitioners. Learned counsel also submits that the issue relating to applicability of multiplier factor has not attained finality, as the judgments relied upon by the petitioners, including in Mahadev Gond vs. Union of India, are presently under challenge before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Special Leave Petitions filed both by the State of Chhattisgarh and the Union of India. It is highlighted that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has granted interim stay of the impugned judgments, and therefore, the legal position remains unsettled. In such circumstances, the petitioners cannot claim any vested right on the basis of those judgments. It is further 15 contended that in view of the pendency of the matter before the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the interim stay granted therein, reliance on the said judgments is wholly misplaced. The respondent submits that until the issue is conclusively decided by the Apex Court, no relief can be granted to the petitioners on the basis of those precedents. Lastly, learned counsel relies upon judicial precedents, including the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India vs. Tarsem Singh and of the Delhi High Court in Anubhav Chand Kathuria vs. Union of India, to contend that disputes relating to compensation under the National Highways Act are to be adjudicated through arbitration as provided under Section 3G, and writ jurisdiction should not be invoked in such matters. On these grounds, it is prayed that the writ petition, being not maintainable and devoid of merit, deserves to be dismissed. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have also perused the documents enclosed along with the petition. 7. The issue involved in the present case pertains to the action of the Competent Authority for Land Acquisition in revising its own award dated 12.07.2016 by passing the subsequent impugned order dated 14.11.2019, whereby the compensation earlier determined has been substantially reduced by altering the multiplier factor from “two” to “one”. The reduction in the compensation under the original award has been effected solely on account of change in 16 the multiplier factor applied while determining the amount payable to the petitioners for acquisition of their land. 8. An identical issue had come up for consideration before this Court in a batch of writ petitions, the leading case being WPC No. 665/2019 decided on 14.09.2020 (reported in 2020 SCC Online Chh 759), wherein this Court has categorically held that once an award is passed under the provisions of the National Highways Act, 1956, the Competent Authority becomes functus officio and does not retain any jurisdiction to review, modify or alter the said award, unless the matter is remitted back by a competent superior forum in accordance with law. In the present case also, it is not in dispute that the original award dated 12.07.2016 had attained finality and thereafter, after a lapse of considerable time, the same has been modified by the impugned order dated 14.11.2019 on the basis of a subsequent circular issued by the State Government. Such an exercise, in the considered opinion of this Court, is without jurisdiction and contrary to the settled position of law as already laid down in the aforesaid batch of cases. 9. In view of the fact that the controversy involved in the present writ petition is squarely covered by the judgment rendered by this Court in WPC No. 665/2019 and other connected matters, this writ petition also deserves to be and is accordingly allowed. Consequently, the impugned order dated 14.11.2019 passed in Revenue Case No. 07/A-82/2015-16 is hereby set aside/quashed. The original award dated 12.07.2016 stands restored. 17 10. It is made clear that setting aside of the impugned revised award would not preclude the respondents from taking recourse to such remedies as may be available to them under law, subject to the provisions governing the same. 11. The writ petition is accordingly allowed. Sd/- (Amitendra Kishore Prasad) Shayna Judge