JUDGMENT : Johnson John, J. The writ petitioner is the applicant in O.A. No. 211 of 2024 on the file of the Armed Forces Tribunal, Regional Bench, Kochi and he is challenging the order dated 17.02.2025 of the Tribunal, whereby the Tribunal rejected the claim of the petitioner for disability pension. 2. Heard Smt. K.R. Renju, the learned counsel for the petitioner and Smt. M. Shajna, the learned Central Government Counsel for the respondents. 3. The petitioner was enrolled in the Indian army on 26.04.1991 and was discharged from the army service on 10.04.2019 on completion of the term of service in low medical category due to ‘Apical Hypertrophic Cardiomyopathy’. In the Medical Board examination on 11.12.2017, it was found that the petitioner is having the disability of ‘Apical Hypertrophic Cardiomyopathy’ at 20% and he was placed in low medical category fit to be released from service in LMC S1H1A1P2(P)E1. But, the Release Medical Board opined that the disability is neither attributable to nor aggravated by military service. 4. Aggrieved by the denial of disability element of pension, the petitioner filed the Original Application before the Tribunal. But, the Tribunal found that the onset of the disease was in a peace station and he continued to serve in peace station till his discharge from service and that the Tribunal cannot interfere with the opinion of the medical board that the disease was neither attributable to nor aggravated by the military service. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the Release Medical Board has not stated the reasons in support of the conclusion that the disability is neither attributable to nor aggravated by military service and the Tribunal reiterated the findings of the statutory authorities that the onset of the disease is in peace station, without considering the relevant column in the opinion of the medical board in part V of the report of the medical board dated 11.12.2017. It is also argued that the Tribunal has not properly considered the effect of Rule 7 of the Entitlement Rules for Casualty Pensionary Awards, 2008 (‘Rules, 2008’ for short) and that the mere fact that at the time of onset of the disease, military service was being rendered in peace locations or that the disease is a lifestyle disease would not by itself be a sufficient reason to deny attributability of disease to military service. 6. 6. The learned Central Government Counsel argued that the statutory authorities have concurrently arrived at the finding that the disability is neither attributable to nor aggravated by military service and that there is no causal connection between the onset of the disease and the military service and there is no illegality or impropriety in the impugned order of the Tribunal. 7. Part V of the report of the Release Medical Board dated 11.12.2017 is extracted below for convenient reference: PART V OPINION OF THE MEDICAL BOARD (Not to be communicated to the individual) 1. Casual relationship of the disability with service conditions otherwise Disability Attributable to service (Y/N) Aggravated by service (Y/N) Not connect ed with service (Y/N) Reasons/Cause/Specific condition and period in service (a) APICAL HYPERTROPHIC CARDIOMYOPAT HY- ICD CODE (I-42.2) No No Yes Not related to service conditions, Diagnosed during evaluation of ECG abnormality detected during PME. Hence NANA (Para 08, CHVI of GMO-2008). Sd/- Record Officer for OIC EME Records Note : A disability “Not connected with service” would be neither attributable nor aggravated by service. (This is in accordance with instructions contained in Guide to Medical Officers (Mil Pension 2002). 8. Rule 7 of Rules, 2008 is extracted below for convenient reference: “7. Onus of proof: Ordinarily the claimant will not be called upon to prove the condition of entitlement. However, where the claim is preferred after 15 years of discharge/ retirement/invalidment/release by which time the service documents of the claimant are destroyed after the prescribed retention period, the onus to prove the entitlement would lie on the claimant.” 9. The Honourable Supreme Court explained the meaning of word "ordinarily” in Rule 7 under the Rules, 2008 as follows in State of A.P. v. V. Sarma Rao [ (2007) 2 SCC 159 ]. “19. … The expression “ordinarily” may mean “normally”, as has been held by this Court in Kailash Chandra v. Union of India [ (1962) 1 SCR 374 : AIR 1961 SC 1346 ] and Krishan Gopal v. Prakashchandra [ (1974) 1 SCC 128 ] but, the said expression must be understood in the context in which it has been used. “Ordinarily” may not mean “solely” or “in the name”, and thus, if under no circumstance an appeal would lie to the Principal District Judge, the court would not be subordinate to it. “Ordinarily” may not mean “solely” or “in the name”, and thus, if under no circumstance an appeal would lie to the Principal District Judge, the court would not be subordinate to it. When in a common parlance the expression “ordinarily” is used, there may be an option. There may be cases where an exception can be made out. It is never used in reference to a case where there is no exception. It never means “primarily”. In Kailash Chandra v. Union of India [ (1962) 1 SCR 374 : AIR 1961 SC 1346 ] it is stated: (SCR p. 379) “This intention is made even more clear and beyond doubt by the use of the word ‘ordinarily’. ‘Ordinarily’ means ‘in the large majority of cases but not invariably’.” 10. The meaning of the word ‘ordinarily’ is also explained by the Honourable Supreme Court in Union of India v. Hemraj Singh Chauhan [ (2010) 4 SCC 290 ] as follows: “ 41. The word “ordinarily”, of course, means that it does not promote a cast-iron rule, it is flexible (see Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar [ (1976) 1 SCC 671 ] at SCC p. 682, para 35). It excludes something which is extraordinary or special (Eicher Tractors Ltd. v. Commr. of Customs [ (2001) 1 SCC 315 ] at SCC p. 319, para 6). The word “ordinarily” would convey the idea of something which is done “normally” (Krishan Gopal v. Prakashchandra [ (1974) 1 SCC 128 ] at SCC p. 134, para 12) and “generally” subject to special provision (Mohan Baitha v. State of Bihar [ (2001) 4 SCC 350 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 710] at SCC p. 354).” 11. In Union of India and others v. Bhaskaran [2024 KHC 7223], this Court held in paragraph 45 as follows: “45. By employing the word 'ordinarily', the rule making authority has obviously diluted the rigor of the burden which was on the establishment under the Rules of 1982. The intention is very clear that in all cases and under all circumstances it shall no longer be the burden of the establishment to show that the employee is not entitled for the benefit. In appropriate cases the employee shall discharge the onus of proof to seek the benefit. The intention is very clear that in all cases and under all circumstances it shall no longer be the burden of the establishment to show that the employee is not entitled for the benefit. In appropriate cases the employee shall discharge the onus of proof to seek the benefit. The learned Senior Central Government Counsel placed emphasis on this Rule and argued that the same has made a drastic change in the matter of onus of proof. According to the learned counsel, claimants cannot no longer raise a demand and leave it to the establishment to rebut. We shall now examine this contention. We note that the second part of R.7 opens with the expression 'however' and the said sentence operates like a proviso carving out exception to the general rule found in the previous sentence. Reason for providing the exception is also clear from the latter sentence that; when claim is preferred after 15 years, by that time, the service documents of the claimant would be destroyed. Hence, ostensibly, the rule making authority altered the tenor of the rule regarding onus of proof in view of the fact that when belated claims are raised the establishment will not be in possession of the relevant records and in such situations the employee may obtain undue advantages. Unscrupulous persons waiting for destruction of records and raising claims thereafter is also a conceivable situation. Nonetheless, the intention of the rule makers regarding claims made within 15 years discernible from the language employed, is that the onus will continue to be primarily on the Department. We therefore hold with respect to R.7 of the Entitlement Rules of 2008 that the said provision does not exonerate the establishment totally from the burden of proof and in all cases in which the claim is raised within 15 years from the date of discharge/retirement/invalidment/release, the onus of proof will be primarily on the Department. Only in cases wherein claims are raised after 15 years, the burden will be entirely on the claimant. While holding thus, we have kept in mind the observation of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India and others v. 3989606 P, Ex - Naik Vijay Kumar (supra) that the Entitlement Rules are beneficial in nature and ought to be liberally construed.” (emphasis supplied) 12. While holding thus, we have kept in mind the observation of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India and others v. 3989606 P, Ex - Naik Vijay Kumar (supra) that the Entitlement Rules are beneficial in nature and ought to be liberally construed.” (emphasis supplied) 12. In this case, it is not in dispute that immediately after the rejection of the disability element of pension by the adjudicatory authority and the appellate authorities, the petitioner approached the Tribunal under Section 14 of the Armed forces Tribunal Act, 2007 and therefore, we find force in the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that since the claim is raised within 15 years from the date of discharge, the onus of proof will be primarily on the Department. 13. The learned counsel for the petitioner also cited the decision of the Delhi High Court in Union of India and others v. Col. Balbir Singh (Retd.) and other connected matters [2025 SCC OnLine Del 7873], wherein it was held as follows in paragraphs 66 to 71 and 73: “ 66. It would also be important to note the provision relevant to attributability, that is, Regulation 423 of the Regulations for the Medical Services of the Armed Forces, 2010. The said provision reads as under: “423.(a). For the purpose of determining whether, the cause of a disability or death resulting from disease is or not attributable to Service. It is immaterial whether the cause giving rise to the disability or death occurred in an area declared to be a Field Area/Active Service area or under normal peace conditions. It is however, essential to establish whether the disability or death bore a causal connection with the service conditions. xxx 67. This provision was summarized in Rajumon T.M. (supra), wherein it was observed as under: “17. A careful examination of Regulation 423 of the Regulation for Medical Services for Armed Forces would reveal the following aspects: 1. It is immaterial whether the cause giving rise to the disability or death occurred in an area declared to be a field service/active service area or under normal peace conditions 2. It is, however, essential to establish that the disability or death bore a casual connection with the service conditions. 3. It is immaterial whether the cause giving rise to the disability or death occurred in an area declared to be a field service/active service area or under normal peace conditions 2. It is, however, essential to establish that the disability or death bore a casual connection with the service conditions. 3. All evidence, both direct and circumstantial, will be taken into account and benefit of reasonable doubt, if any, will be given to the individual.… … … …” 68. From a plain reading of Regulation 423(a) of the Regulations for the Medical Services of the Armed Forces, 2010, it is clear that whether a disability or death occurs in a Field/Active service area or under normal Peace conditions is immaterial. 69. Nonetheless, it must be noted that even in Peace Stations, military service is inherently stressful due to a combination of factors such as strict discipline, long working hours, limited personal freedom, and constant readiness for deployment. The psychological burden of being away from family, living in isolated or challenging environments, and coping with the uncertainty of sudden transfers or duties adds to this strain. Additionally, the toll of continuous combat training further contributes to mental fatigue. Despite the absence of active conflict or the challenges of hard area postings, the demanding nature of military life at peace stations can significantly impact the overall well-being of personnel. 70. Undisputably, even when not on the front lines or in hard areas, soldiers are aware that the threat is never far away. This environment, where danger is a constant reality for their peers and could become their own at any moment, creates a persistent state of mental and emotional strain that cannot be overlooked. Thus, military service, whether in peace locations or operational zones, inherently carries stress that may predispose Force personnel to medical conditions such as hypertension. 71. Moreover, it must be noted that lifestyle varies from individual to individual. Therefore, a mere statement that a disease is a lifestyle disorder cannot be a sufficient reason to deny the grant of Disability Pension, unless the Medical Board has duly examined and recorded particulars relevant to the individual concerned. xxx 73. A reading of the above reinforces that disability pension cannot be denied solely on the ground that the onset of the disability occurred while the Force personnel were posted at Peace Station. xxx 73. A reading of the above reinforces that disability pension cannot be denied solely on the ground that the onset of the disability occurred while the Force personnel were posted at Peace Station. Furthermore, it is evident that when Force personnel have rendered prolonged military service, there exists a substantial onus on the RMB to establish that the hypertension is not attributable to or aggravated by military service.” (emphasis supplied) 14. Regulation 423 of the Regulation for Medical Services for Armed Forces, 1983 (‘Regulations, 1983’ for short) provides as to how a disability can be attributed to service and the said provision is extracted below for convenient reference: "423. Attributability to service.-- (a) For the purpose of determining whether the cause of a disability or death is or is not attributable to service, it is immaterial whether the cause giving rise to the disability or death occurred in an area declared to be a Field Service/Active service area or under normal peace conditions. It is, however, essential to establish whether the disability or death bore a casual connection with the service conditions. All evidence, both direct and circumstantial, will be taken into account and benefit of reasonable doubt, if any, will be given to the individual. The evidence to be accepted as reasonable doubt, for the purpose of these instructions, should be of a degree of cogency, which though not reaching certainty, nevertheless carry the high degree of probability. In this connection, it will be remembered that proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond a shadow of doubt. If the evidence is so strong against an individual as to leave only a remote possibility in his favour, which can be dismissed with the sentence 'of course it is possible but not in the least probable' the case is proved beyond reasonable doubt. If on the other hand, the evidence be so evenly balanced as to render impracticable a determinate conclusion one way or the other, then the case would be one in which the benefit of doubt could be given more liberally to the individual, in cases occurring in Field Service/Active Service areas. (b) The cause of a disability or death resulting from wound or injury, will be regarded as attributable to service if the wound/injury was sustained during the actual performance of 'duty' in Armed Forces. (b) The cause of a disability or death resulting from wound or injury, will be regarded as attributable to service if the wound/injury was sustained during the actual performance of 'duty' in Armed Forces. In case of injuries which were self - inflicted or due to an individual's own serious negligence or misconduct, the board will also comment how far the disability resulted from self – infliction, negligence or misconduct. (c) The cause of a disability or death resulting from a disease will be regarded as attributable to service when it is established that the disease arose during Service and the conditions and circumstances of duty in the Armed Forces determined and contributed to the onset of the disease. Cases, in which it is established that service conditions did not determine or contribute to the onset of the disease but influenced the subsequent course of the disease, will be regarded as aggravated by the service. A disease which has led to an individual's discharge or death will ordinarily be deemed to have arisen in Service if no note of it was made at the time of the individual's acceptance for service in the Armed Forces. However, if medical opinion holds, for reasons to be stated that the disease could not have been detected on medical examination prior to acceptance for service, the disease will not be deemed to have arisen during service. (d) The question, whether a disability or death is attributable to or aggravated by service or not, will be decided as regards its medical aspects by a Medical Board or by the medical officer who signs the death certificate. The Medical Board/Medical officer will specify reasons for their/ his opinion. The opinion of the Medical Board/ Medical Officer, insofar as it relates to the actual cause of the disability or death and the circumstances in which it originated will be regarded as final. The question whether the cause and the attendant circumstances can be attributed to Service will, however, be decided by the pension sanctioning authority. (e) To assist the medical officer who signs the death certificate or the medical board in the case of an invalid, the CO unit will furnish a report on:- (i) AFMS F - 81 in all cases other than those due to injuries. (ii) IAFY - 2006 in all cases of injuries other than battle injuries. (e) To assist the medical officer who signs the death certificate or the medical board in the case of an invalid, the CO unit will furnish a report on:- (i) AFMS F - 81 in all cases other than those due to injuries. (ii) IAFY - 2006 in all cases of injuries other than battle injuries. (f) In cases where award of disability pension or reassessment of disabilities is concerned, a Medical Board is always necessary and the certificate of a single medical officer will not be accepted except in case of stations where it is not possible or feasible to assemble a regular Medical Board for such purposes. The certificate of a single medical officer in the latter case will be furnished on a Medical Board form and countersigned by the ADMS (Army)/ DMS (Navy) /DMS (Air)." 15. In the present case, it is undisputed that no note of any disease has been recorded at the time when the petitioner enrolled for military service. The respondents have no case that any document is available to indicate that the petitioner was under treatment for such a disease or by hereditary, he is suffering from such a disease. Therefore, in the absence of any medical opinion or records to indicate that the disease could not have been detected on medical examination prior to acceptance for service, the petitioner is entitled for the benefit of the statutory presumptions, especially in view of sub clause (c) of Regulation 423 of the Regulations, 1983. 16. In Union of India and others v. Col. Balbir Singh (Retd.) and other connected matters [2025 SCC OnLine Del 7873], it was held that disability pension cannot be denied solely on the ground that the onset of the disability occurred while the Armed Force personnel was posted at a peace station. 17. In Rajumon T.M. v. Union of India and others [2025 SCC OnLine SC 1064], the Honourable Supreme Court held that if the opinion of the medical board is devoid of reasons, the act of the authority based on mere opinion sans reasons can certainly be questioned. 18. In Maniben Maganbhai Bhariya v. Distt. Development Officer, Dahod [ (2022) 16 SCC 343 ], the Honourable Supreme Court held thus: “55. 18. In Maniben Maganbhai Bhariya v. Distt. Development Officer, Dahod [ (2022) 16 SCC 343 ], the Honourable Supreme Court held thus: “55. When social security legislations are being interpreted, it always has to be interpreted liberally with a beneficial interpretation and has to be given the widest possible meaning which the language permits, known as beneficial interpretation. When a statute is meant for the benefit of a particular class and if a word in the statute is capable of two meanings i.e. one which would preserve the benefits and one which would not, then the former is to be adopted.” 19. The learned Central Government Counsel argued that since the Release Medical Board failed to record reasons in support of their opinion, the petitioner can be directed to appear before a Resurvey Medical Board for re-assessment of his disabilities; but the learned counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the Release Medical Board has already assessed permanent disability of 20% for life and in the absence of any request from the individual for a review, a re-assessment by Resurvey Medical Board cannot be ordered and also cited the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in Commander Rakesh Pande v. Union of India and others [Order dated 28.11.2019 in Civil Appeal No.5970 of 2019]. Further, as per clause (a) of Regulation 423 of the Regulations, 1983, for the purpose of determining whether the cause of a disability or death is or is not attributable to service, it is immaterial whether the cause giving rise to the disability or death occurred in an area declared to be a field service/active service area or under normal peace conditions. 20. The denial of disability pension based on a medical opinion without providing full reasons to support the opinion cannot be said to be valid. Therefore, we find that the petitioner is entitled for the disability element of pension. Hence, the impugned order of the Tribunal is set aside. In the result, the writ petition is allowed and the respondents are directed to issue a corrigendum PPO granting disability pension to the petitioner at the earliest, at any rate, within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment, failing which the unpaid arrears would carry interest at 7% per annum.