Page No.# 1/22 GAHC010017712023 2026:GAU-AS:7458 THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH) Case No. : Crl.A./25/2023 JAGADISH BARMAN S/O MANMOHAN BARMAN, VILL.- BATLAGURI, P.O. AND P.S.- PUNDIBARI, DIST.- COOCH BEHAR, WEST BENGAL, PIN- 736165. VERSUS THE STATE OF ASSAM REP. BY P.P. 2:ANIMA RAI D/O SUKUMAR ROY VILL.- PARBATINAGAR P.S. TEZPUR DIST.- SONITPUR PIN- 784001 Advocate for the Petitioner : G UDDIN, MR. T HUSSAIN,MS N DEKARAJA,MR. Y S MANNAN,MR. T HUSSAIN,MR P AGARWAL,MS. P ADHIKARI,MR A K AZAD,MR A H SARKAR Advocate for the Respondent : PP, ASSAM, MR. K P PATHAK(AMICUS CURIAE) BEFORE HON’BLE MRS. JUSTICE MITALI THAKURIA Date on which judgment is reserved : 23.04.2026 Date of pronouncement of judgment : 29.05.2026 Page No.# 2/22 Whether the pronouncement is of the : N/A. operative part of the judgment? Whether the full judgment has been : Yes. pronounced? J UDGMENT & O RDER Heard Mr. Y.S. Mannan, learned counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. K. Baishya, learned Addl. P.P., Assam for the State respondent No.1 and Mr. K.P. Pathak, learned Amicus Curiae appearing for the respondent No.2. 2. This appeal has been preferred by the accused appellant against the judgment and order dated 09.01.2023, passed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, FTC, Sonitpur at Tezpur in Sessions Case No.198/2019, whereby the appellant was convicted and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 (ten) years and fine of Rs.10,000/- (Rupees Ten Thousand), for committing an offence under Section 376 of the IPC and to undergo simple imprisonment for one year for committing an offence under Section 417 of the IPC and both the sentences to run concurrently and the period of detention, undergone by the accused appellant during the trial and investigation shall be set of. 3. The prosecution case, as revealed from the ejahar (FIR) lodged by the informant/the victim of the case is that on 19.03.2018, the informant Smti. ‘X’ (name withheld) lodged an FIR before the Officer-in-Charge of Tezpur Police Station, alleging inter alia that since last two years of lodging of the ejahar, there was love affairs between the informant and the accused appellant Jagadish Barman, who is serving as a BSF Jawan and on the false promise to Page No.# 3/22 marry the informant, he committed rape on her forcefully. Subsequently, the accused refused to marry the informant and tried to marry another girl and thereby the accused cheated her. 4. On receipt of the ejahar, the Tezpur P.S. Case No.560/2018 was registered under Sections 420/376 of the IPC and started investigation. The investigating officer visited the place of residence of the victim, recorded the statement of the witnesses including the statement of victim under Section 164 of the CrPC and the victim was medically examined. After completion of the investigation and having found sufficient evidence against the accused person, submitted the charge sheet against him under the said sections of law. As the offence was exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions; the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate committed the case to the Court of Sessions, Sonitpur at Tezpur. Accordingly, on appearance of the accused appellant, the learned Trial Court took cognizance of the offence and on appearance of the accused appellant before the learned Trial Court, the charges were framed against him under Sections 420/376 of the IPC and the charges were read over and explained, to which the accused appellant pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 5. During the trial, the prosecution examined as many as seven (7) witnesses including the informant/vicim as well as the investigating officer and exhibited some documents in support of its case. The accused person was examined under Section 313 of the CrPC and he denied the allegation made by the prosecution. The accused/appellant had declined to adduce any evidence in his defence and after recording his statement under section 313 of the CrPC, wherein the accused/appellant took the plea that the allegations brought against him are false and baseless. Thereafter, the learned Trial Court, after Page No.# 4/22 hearing the parties and upon perusing the materials on record, passed the impugned judgment and order dated 09.01.2023 and being highly aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned conviction and sentence, the appellant has preferred this appeal. 6. Mr. Y.S. Mannan, the learned counsel for the accused/appellant during the course of argument had submitted that the learned Trial Court committed grave errors of law as well as of facts, in convicting and sentencing the appellant under Sections 376 & 417 of the IPC and hence, the impugned judgment and order is liable to be set aside and quashed. 7. Mr. Mannan, the learned counsel for the appellant also submitted that the victim girl was not minor at the time of incident and without corroborating her evidence with the medical evidence as well as the evidence of her mother, the learned Trial Court below had passed this order of conviction. The learned Addl. Sessions Judge, FTC, Sonitpur also failed to appreciate the fact of consent of a major girl and hence the impugned judgment is liable to be set aside and quashed. 8. It is contended by the learned counsel for the accused appellant that so far to constitute an offence under Section 417 of the IPC is concerned, the allegation that the act of deception by the accused to get consent was not charged and also not framed any charge initially in this case for alleged sexual intercourse but the learned Session's Judge at the time of passing the judgment, convicted him by treating a part of the offence along with section 376 of the IPC and as such no fair trial or opportunity is given to the accused before his conviction under Section 417 IPC. Page No.# 5/22 9. Moreover, when there is a conviction recorded for the offence under section 417 of the IPC, there cannot be any separate conviction under Section 376 of the IPC and hence the conviction and sentence imposed on the accused under Sections 376/417 of the IPC, is liable to be set aside. 10. Mr. Mannan, the learned counsel for the accused/appellant further submitted that from the moment of filling the FIR till the examination of witnesses projected that the informant/victim (PW-1) had love affairs with the accused since last two years and with the promise of marriage, the accused person had committed rape upon her. The pleaded case of the defence is that the victim was a major, aged about 25 years at the time of offence and she voluntarily made relation with the accused person and as such there are no ingredients to attract the commission of offence punishable either under Section 376 or 420 of the IPC, as charged against the accused. Furthermore, from the medical report it reveals that after registration of the case, she was medically examined and from the medical report as well as from the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, it is clear that the victim refused to be examined by the Doctor. Had it been a forceful assault of rape, she might have examined herself to prove the offence under Section 376 of the IPC. Accordingly, it can be held that the victim is a consenting party from the very beginning. However, the learned judge misread and misinterpreted the provisions, while passing the impugned order and as such impugned judgment is liable to be set aside and quashed. 11. Mr. Mannan, the learned counsel for the accused/appellant also contended that after marshalling of the aforesaid evidences and cross examinations of prosecution of witnesses as well as pleadings of the accused, it can draw two Page No.# 6/22 basic points for decision of the case: (I) Whether any forceful act from the part of accused to attract offence under section 376/420 IPC and (II) Whether any act from the part of accused suggesting for any promise/pretext to marry so as attract offences under provision of section 376 as per meaning and interpretation of section 90 of IPC i.e. misconception of fact as regard to consent. Answer may be ‘no’ as per understanding from the case of the prosecution but learned court misinterpreted the law laid down by Hon'ble supreme court in this regard and took a negative view. As such the prosecution has not able to established a case of either amounting to rape or any cheating as per ingredient of sections 375, 376, and section 417, 420 read with section 90 IPC. Hence prosecution has failed to establish a case beyond reasonable doubt and accused is entitled for acquittal. However, the learned judge misread and misinterpreted the provisions, while passing the impugned order and as such impugned judgment is liable to be set aside and quashed. 12. Mr. Mannan, the learned counsel for the accused/appellant further submitted that from the statement made by the victim under Section 183 of the CrPC also it reveals that there is no allegation of forceful intercourse or rape on her. Further, the victim also refused to go for medical examination and in spite of physical relationship with the accused for such a long period, she never reported the same to any of her family member or friends, nor there is any evidence that she met him only because he promised to marry her or there was any promise of marriage at the outset of their physical relationship. It was purely a consensual relationship wherein both the victim as well as the accused/ Page No.# 7/22 appellant had intimate relationship and there is no evidence that the appellant had forceful sexual intercourse or her consent was taken under mis- representation or fact to fulfill the ingredients of Section 375 of the IPC to convict the accused appellant under Section 376 of the IPC. 13. In support of his submission, Mr. Mannan, the learned counsel for the appellant relied upon the following decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court: (1) Mahesh Damu Khari vs. State of Maharashtra reported in 2024 INSC 897 and (2) Lalu Yadav vs. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in SLP (Crl.) No.9371/2018. In the case of Mahesh Damu Khari (Supra), in para 21 and 25, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under: 21. The complainant had taken the plea that the appellant had physical relationship with her against her consent by making a false promise that he would marry her. In this regard, it has to be considered whether making a false promise to marry amounts to an offence. If a false promise of marriage is made to a woman by a man, thus deceiving the woman leading her to engage in sexual relations, it may amount to misconception of fact, in which case the consent given by the woman may be vitiated. In this regard one may refer to the decision of this Court in Niam Ahmed v. State (NCT of Delhi)5, “20. The bone of contention raised on behalf of the respondents is that the prosecutrix had given her consent for sexual relationship under the misconception of fact, as the accused had given a false promise to marry her and subsequently he did not marry, and therefore such consent was no consent in the eye of law and the case fell under the Clause. - Secondly of Section 375 IPC. In this regard, it is pertinent to note that there is a difference between giving a false promise and committing breach of promise by the accused. In case of false promise, the accused right from the beginning would not have any intention to marry the prosecutrix and would have cheated or deceited the prosecutrix by giving a false promise to marry her only with a view to satisfy his lust, whereas in case of breach of promise, one cannot deny a possibility that the accused might have given a promise with all seriousness to marry her, and subsequently might have encountered certain circumstances unforeseen by him or the circumstances beyond his control, which prevented him to fulfill his promise. So, it would be a folly to treat each breach of promise to marry as a false promise and to prosecute a person for the offence under Section 376.” 25. In the present case, even assuming that the appellant had made the promise since Page No.# 8/22 2008 when they met for the first time, the fact that they remained unmarried for a long period till 2017 without there being any protest or objection by the complainant, does not indicate the intention at the initial stage itself to make the promise falsely to marry the complainant. Making an allegation of non-fulfilment of promise to marry without undue delay by the promissee would, on the other hand, be an indicator of a false promise being made from the initial stage. In the present case, what is not in dispute is that the physical relationship between the appellant and the complainant continued for a long period of about a decade and as such it is difficult to infer that the appellant had made a false promise since the initial stage and continued to make false promises to marry her on the basis of which she also continued to have physical relationship with him.” 14. In Lalu Yadav (Supra) reported in para 14 and 15 of the said judgment, the Hon’ble Apex Court held that: “14. Now, having bestowed our anxious consideration to the decisions referred supra with reference to the factual situations obtained in the case at hand, we are of the considered view that the High Court has palpably gone wrong in not considering the question whether the allegations in the complaint reveals prima facie case that the complainant had given her consent for the sexual relationship with the appellant under misconception of fact, as alleged, or whether it reveals a case of consensual sex. Firstly, it is to be noted that the subject FIR itself would reveal that there occurred a delay of more than 5 years for registering the FIR; secondly, the very case of the complainant, as revealed from the FIR, would go to show that they lived for a long period as man and wife and thirdly, the facts and circumstances obtained from the subject FIR and other materials on record would reveal absence of a prima facie case that the complainant viz., respondent No. 4 had given her consent for sexual relationship with the appellant under misconception of fact. At any rate, the allegations in the FIR would not constitute a prima facie case of false promise to marry from the inception with a view to establish sexual relationship and instead they would reveal a prima facie case of long consensual physical relationship, during which the complainant addressed the appellant as her husband. Moreover, it is also the case of the complainant, revealed from the subject FIR and the other materials on record that she went along with the appellant to Varanasi with the knowledge of her family and stayed with him in hotels during such visits. The subsequent refusal to marry the complainant would not be sufficient, in view of the facts and circumstances obtained in the case at hand, by any stretch of imagination to draw existence of a prima facie case that the complainant had given consent for the sexual relationship with the appellant under misconception of fact, so as to accuse the appellant guilty of having committed rape within the meaning of Section 375, IPC. 15. The long and short of the above discussion is that the case at hand is a befitting case where the High Court should have exercised the power available under Section 482, Cr.P.C. to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. Now that the allegation of offence Page No.# 9/22 under Section 313, IPC is omitted, there is absolutely no prima facie case for proceeding further against the appellant on the allegation of commission of offence punishable under Section 376, IPC. We are of the considered view that the High Court should have exercised its inherent power.” 15. By citing the above judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, Mr. Mannan, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in the instant case also there is no evidence that the victim indulged in the physical relationship with the accused appellant only for the false promise of marriage and there is no evidence to show that the physical relationship was purely because of the promise of marriage made by the accused appellant. Accordingly, Mr. Mannan, the learned counsel for the accused appellant submitted that it is a fit case wherein the accused appellant is entitled for acquittal. 16. Mr. Baishya, the learned Addl. P.P., Assam submitted in this regard that the learned Trial Court below had rightly arrived at the decision by scrutinizing the evidence on record in its true perspective and there is no any reason to make any interference in the judgment and order passed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge. Mr. Baishya further submitted that the statement made by the victim under Section 164 of the CrPC as well as at the time of recording her evidence goes consistent and the defence could not rebut the evidence of the prosecutrix to disbelieve her statement that she had the physical relationship with the accused only for the false promise of marriage made by the appellant. He further submitted that it is not a case that there was forceful intercourse with the victim but the only issue is to be decided as to whether the consent of the victim was taken under misrepresentation of fact. From the evidence on record, it clearly reveals that under the false promise of marriage, the accused appellant had physical relationship with the victim and subsequently he refused Page No.# 10/22 to marry her and from the very beginning, he had the intention to deceive the prosecutrix and only with the false promise of marriage, he maintained the relationship with her and thus, the entire evidence on record fulfils the ingredients of Section 375 of the IPC to convict the accused appellant accordingly. 17. Mr. Pathak, the learned Amicus Curiae appearing for the respondent No.2/the informant victim submitted that from the evidence of the PW.1 itself, it is evident that the accused appellant had made promise of marriage on the night itself when he forcibly committed rape on her, assuring that he would marry her. Thus, it is seen that at the very beginning of their physical relationship, the accused made the false promise of marriage. More so, from the evidence of the victim as PW.1, it is also seen that when she came to know from her friends that the accused appellant is looking for another girl for marriage, she immediately went to the Head Quarter of BSF at Shillong and met the Commanding Officer but she could not meet the accused appellant, as he was not available in the station. On the next day morning, she again went to Shillong and appraised him about the details of the incident when the Commanding Officer made an inquiry and during that time only, the accused appellant produced some fake documents before the Commanding Officer showing that he was already married someone. This fact of the case also establishes that the accused never had any intention to marry the victim and from the very first day of their relationship, the accused appellant only had the intention to deceive the victim and had physical relationship with her only with a false promise of marriage. Mr. Pathak, the learned Amicus Curiae accordingly submitted that the learned Addl. Sessions Judge had rightly passed the judgment and order convicting the accused appellant, after scrutinizing the Page No.# 11/22 evidence on record and specially, the evidence of the prosecutrix. 18. Mr. Pathak, the learned Amicus Curiae further submitted that the testimony of the prosecutrix stands on a par with that of an injured witness and hence, it is not necessary to insist for corroboration, if the evidence of the prosecutrix inspires confidence. To substantiate the same, the learned Amicus Curiae placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Wahid Khan vs. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in (2010) 2 SCC 9 and basically relied on para 17 and 18 of the said judgment which reads as under: 17. It is also a matter of common law that in Indian society any girl or woman would not make such allegations against a person as she is fully aware of the repercussions flowing therefrom. If she is found to be false, she would be looked by the society with contempt throughout her life. For an unmarried girl, it will be difficult to find a suitable groom. Therefore, unless an offence has really been committed, a girl or a woman would be extremely reluctant even to admit that any such incident had taken place which is likely to reflect on her chastity. She would also be conscious of the danger of being ostracized by the society. It would indeed be difficult for her to survive in Indian society which is, of course, not as forward looking as the western countries are. 18. Thus, in a case of rape, testimony of a prosecutrix stands at par with that of an injured witness. It is really not necessary to insist for corroboration if the evidence of the prosecutrix inspires confidence and appears to be credible. However, in the case in hand, even without the examination of doctor, the evidence of prosecutrix stands fully corroborated by the evidence of P.W.3-B.B. Subba Rao, Sub-inspector of the police station who had virtually caught the appellant red-handed. Thus, even if doctor had not been examined it would not throw or completely discard the prosecution story. The evidence of prosecution witnesses is fully trustworthy and there is no reason to doubt genuineness thereof. 19. The learned Amicus Curiae further submitted that from the evidence of the prosecutrix it is evident the accused appellant had made a false promise of at the very inception of their relationship, when she was forced to have sexual intercourse with him on the false pretext of marriage and thus it bears a direct nexus to the decision of the prosecutrix to engage herself in the sexual act. In that context, Mr. Pathak, the learned Amicus Curiae had relied on the decision of Page No.# 12/22 the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Pramod Suryabhan Pawar vs. State of Maharashtra and another reported in (2019) 9 SCC 608, wherein in para 18 of the said judgment the Hon’ble Apex Court had held that: “18. To summarise the legal position that emerges from the above cases, the “consent” of a woman with respect to Section 375 must involve an active and reasoned deliberation towards the proposed act. To establish whether the “consent” was vitiated by a “misconception of fact” arising out of a promise to marry, two propositions must be established. The promise of marriage must have been a false promise, given in bad faith and with no intention of being adhered to at the time it was given. The false promise itself must be of immediate relevance, or bear a direct nexus to the woman’s decision to engage in the sexual act.” 20. Mr. Pathak, the learned Amicus Curiae accordingly submitted that there is no need of any interference in the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court below which is well reasoned order and passed after proper appreciation of evidence on record. 21. Hearing the submissions made by the learned counsel for both sides, I have also perused the case record, the evidence of the prosecution witnesses vis-à-vis the judgment and order passed by the learned Assistant Sessions Judge. 22. To arrive at a just decision, let us scrutinize the statement of the prosecution witnesses. 23. It is the case of the prosecutrix that she was forced to have sexual intercourse with the accused appellant only on the false promise of marriage and thus her consent was obtained under misrepresentation of fact. The prosecutrix as PW.1 had deposed in her evidence that she came to know the Page No.# 13/22 accused appellant when she met him in a marriage ceremony and thereafter, he collected her mobile number from her aunt and then he also made several phone calls to the prosecutrix/PW.1. While talking with the accused appellant over telephone, they developed the friendship and thereafter, he came to Tezpur without informing her in the year 2017. After reaching Tezpur, he also informed her and also asked her to make some arrangements for his stay. Thereafter, she herself accompanied with her friend, she went to meet the accused appellant and he stayed in their house for a day and thereafter, he proposed to take her to his resident at Koch Bihar for a pleasure trip. But after reaching at Koch Bihar, the PW.1 was allowed to stay in the house of the accused appellant and on the said night itself, taking advantage of absence of parents of the accused in the house, he forcibly committed rape on her with a promise to marry her. 24. On the next day, however the accused appellant brought her to Tezpur and again made the assurance of to marry her. Thereafter, the accused appellant took leave for one month and came to Tezpur wherein the accused appellant took the PW.1 to Hotels, where they stayed together and during that period, the accused appellant also asked her to take some tablets for safety measures and then again kept her in the hotels for two nights, wherein they maintained physical relationship with each other. In such way, whenever the accused appellant came to Tazpur from Shillong, they used to stay in various Hotels as husband and wife and thereafter, she took some papers/forms of Court marriage and asked the accused for solemnization of their Court marriage but the accused appellant by showing some problems of construction of his residence etc., he declined to put his signatures on the forms of the Court marriage and rather sought time for solemnization of marriage after construction of his residence. Page No.# 14/22 25. But subsequently, the PW.1 came to know from Koch Bihar that the accused appellant went on leave for two months and he was staying in Koch Bihar, looking another girl for his marriage. Thereafter, she confirmed the news and then went to the Head Quarter of the BSF at Shillong to meet the Commanding Officer and to appraise everything in that regard. On the day she went to Shillong, she could not meet the accused but on the next day, she again went to Shillong Head Quarter, wherein the accused appellant produced some papers before the Commanding Officer stating that he has already married someone. Thereafter, only the Commanding Officer advised her to approach the legal forum and then, the prosecutrix lodged the FIR in the Tezpur Police Station. From her cross-evidence it is seen that she was major at the time of lodging the FIR and at that time, they had the relationship for more than two years. She further stated in her cross-evidence that in the first time the accused appellant committed rape on her forcibly but thereafter, as the accused appellant promised to marry her, she continued to live with the accused appellant whenever he asked and maintained the physical relationship with him. She further stated that she was brought for medical examination but no medical examination was conducted after the discussion between the Doctor and the lady Police Officer who took her before the Doctor. She also denied when suggested that the accused never promised to marry her. 26. PW.2 is the mother of the informant/victim and as per her, after four months of the marriage of her relative, the accused appellant made a phone call to her and told that he intends to come to Tezpur and the accused appellant being the relative, the PW.2 could not refuse. Thereafter, the accused arrived at Tezpur and stayed for a night and proposed to take her daughter to Koch Bihar for a pleasure trip. Although the PW.2 refused to the said proposal but somehow Page No.# 15/22 the accused appellant forcibly took her daughter to Koch Bihar. Thereafter, her daughter informed her over telephone that the family members of the accused appellant was annoyed and then she asked the accused appellant to bring back her daughter to their residence. After some days only she came to know about the love affairs between her daughter and the accused appellant and she also came to know that her daughter used to meet the accused appellant with a pretext that she is visiting to the residents of her friends and also came to know that her daughter and the accused appellant used to live together in various hotels in Tezpur. The PW.2 also came to know from her daughter that the accused appellant maintained physical relationship with her daughter with false promise of marriage. 27. In her cross-evidence, the PW.2 stated that the love relationship between her daughter and the accused appellant was beyond her knowledge and the accused appellant altogether came twice to their residence at Tezpur. But the PW.2 never saw the accused appellant and her daughter living together by her own eyes. 28. PW.3 was serving as the Manager of Hotel Your Room situated at Ranu Sing Road, Tezpur and backside of Anowar Hall since 2015—2019. During that period, one Jagadish Barman was residing in their hotel for the night and he being the manager of the Hotel, entered the name and address of the accused appellant in the daily register of the hotel. The PW.3 also brought the daily register of their Hotel, while deposing before the Court. From his evidence, it reveals that the accused appellant booked the hotel room on 2/3 occasions. 29. PW.4 is the manager of “Hotel Metro”. This witness also brought the Page No.# 16/22 register of Hotel Metro and accordingly, deposed that as per the daily entry register, on 03.08.2017, at about 2:30 pm, one Jagadish Barman, accompanied with his wife Anima Rai came to their hotel and asked for room for their stay. Accordingly, the room No.111 of the hotel was allotted to them and they stayed there for two days as husband and wife. Again on 22.08.2017, at 7:00 pm, said Jagadish Barman along with his came to their hotel and he being the manager of the hotel, allotted the said room No.111 and they stayed together for three days in the hotel. From his cross-evidence, it is see that both of them gave their identity proof and after getting their identity cards only, the room was allotted to them. However, only Jagadish Barman put his signature in the daily entry register of the hotel who came along with his wife. 30. PW.5 is the son of the proprietor of Hotel Metro and he also deposed that the PW.4 being the hotel manager, used to maintain the Daily Inmates Register during his tenure. The PW.5 also brought the Daily Inmates Register, which was exhibited as Exhibit No.4, during his examination. 31. PW.6 is also a manager of Hotel Uruka situated at Jankin Road near ASTC Bus stand at Tezpur Town who accordingly appeared after receiving summons with his Daily Inmates Register and but he could not produce the hotel register of 2017, as it was maintained by one manager, namely, Sakreswar Kalita who expired. 32. PW.7 is the I.O. who was entrusted with the investigation of the case by the Officer-in-Charge of the Tezpur Police Station, after receiving the FIR lodged by the PW.1. Accordingly, he visited the residence of the victim, recorded her statement and other witnesses and also sent the victim for medical examination Page No.# 17/22 by issuing requisition and thereafter, the victim was brought before the Magistrate for recording her statement under Section 164 of the CrPC. During the investigation, the I.O. made search of the accused and came to know that at that time, the accused was serving at Shillong, Meghalaya and hence, he sent WT message asking him to appear before him in connection with this case. But the accused did not turn up and after obtaining the order of bail from the High Court, he appeared before him. 33. During inquiry, it is also come to the knowledge of the I.O. that the accused kept the victim with him in the hotels, namely, Hotel Your Room, Hotel Metro and Hotel Uruka, keeping the identity of the victim as his wife. To ascertain the said fact, the I.O. also recorded the statement of the Hotel Manager of the concerned hotels and after completion of the investigation, he submitted the charge sheet against the present accused petitioner. In his cross- evidence, he submitted that the victim denied to go for medical examination. 34. So from the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, it is seen that the PW.2/the mother of the victim who came to know about the relationship of the accused appellant and the victim subsequently, but from her evidence it is seen that the accused stayed in their house for two nights but she was not aware about the stay in the hotels by the accused appellant and her daughter/the victim. 35. As discussed above, PW.3, 4 & 6 are the hotel mangers of different hotels who established the fact that both the victim and the accused appellant had stayed together in their hotels as husband and wife. Page No.# 18/22 36. So the PW.1/the prosecutrix is the only vital witness of the prosecution. From her evidence, it is seen that both the victim and the accused appellant had maintained physical relationship with each other and though in the first night it was forcible intercourse with the victim but subsequently she gave her consent for their physical relationship, as the accused appellant promised to marry her and from the evidence of the prosecutrix, it is seen that from the first night itself, when the victim was with the accused at Koch Bihar, he had physical relationship with her saying that he will marry her and on that belief, the victim also indulged herself in the sexual activities. But it is an admitted fact that there is no evidence for any forcible intercourse with the victim. Rather they had consensual relationship and stayed together in different hotels as husband and wife. 37. So, it is to be seen as to whether the accused had any intention of deceiving her from the very first day or very first inception of their physical relationship. It is a fact that both the victim and the accused appellant had developed friendship and subsequently, love relationship between them and the accused appellant also came to Tezpur and stayed in the house of the victim for one night. But thereafter, the victim was taken to Koch Bihar to his residence wherein, in absence of his parents, the accused appellant forcibly made physical relationship with her, with the promise of marriage. Thus, it is seen that on the very inception of their physical relationship, the accused appellant made the promise of marriage and in that pretext of marriage only, the victim also continued her relationship with the accused appellant. But from the evidence of the prosecutrix, it further reveals that during their relationship, she asked the accused appellant for court marriage and to that extent, she also brought some forms of Court Marriage asking the accused appellant to put his signature on Page No.# 19/22 those forms, so that they can entered into a legal marriage/court marriage. The accused appellant then refused to put his signature on those forms stating that he would marry her socially and during that time, he had some issues of construction of house, etc. But subsequently it had come to the knowledge of the prosecutrix that he is looking for another girl for marriage. Thus, it is seen that on one hand, the accused appellant had physical relationship with the victim only on the pretext of marriage but when the victim raised the issue of marriage, even for court marriage, he simply denied to put his signatures and immediately, he looked for another girl for marriage, which otherwise prove the intention of the accused appellant of deceiving the victim from the very inception of their relationship. 38. Coming to the subsequent part of the evidence of the PW.1/victim, it is seen that when she came to know about that the accused appellant is looking for another girl for marriage, she immediately went to meet the Commanding Officer, BSF at Shillong and in her presence, the accused appellant had produced some fake documents stating that he is a married person and had already married another girl. This kind of activities of the accused appellant shows that he had no intention to marry the victim and had the intention to deceive her from the very beginning or at the very commencement of their relationship. 39. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Pramod Suryabhan Pawar (Supra) has expressed the view that there is distinction between false promise of marriage which is given on understanding by the maker and the breach of promise, which is made in good faith but subsequently not fulfilled. But here in the instant case it is seen that the physical relationship with the victim had Page No.# 20/22 started on the very first day of inception of their physical relationship, promise of marriage was made by the accused appellant. But from the subsequent event, as referred above, it reveals that the accused appellant had never any intention to marry the victim and the consent was obtained from the victim only under misrepresentation of fact of false promise of marriage, which amounts to rape under Section 375 of the IPC. 40. Further, from the evidence of the prosecutrix, it is seen that the defence could not rebut her evidence neither by cross-examining nor by adducing any defence evidence and her statement in respect of physical relationship with the accused appellant with false promise of marriage as well as the inducement made by the accused appellant to have sexual intercourse with the victim, goes unrebuted and in the same time, from the subsequent development, it is also seen that the accused appellant refused to marry the victim rather he never had any intention to marry the victim which shows from the subsequent conduct of the accused appellant. The entire evidence in that aspect goes unrebuted. It is a fact that there is no other supporting evidence who saw the incident and the mother of the prosecutrix also had no earlier knowledge about the physical relationship between the victim and the accused appellant, though her daughter met the accused appellant on various occasions. It is very obvious that the victim might have suppressed the relationship between her and the accused appellant and they used to meet and stay together in different hotels as husband and wife, which has already been proved by the Hotel Managers of the concerned Hotel. 41. Thus the evidence of the prosecutrix is not to be disbelieved, wherein she made specific allegation against the present accused appellant of inducing her Page No.# 21/22 to have sexual intercourse with her and her consent was also taken on misrepresentation of fact. 42. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Moti Lal Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, reported in 2008 0 AIR (SC) 882, has held in paragraph Nos. 9 as under: "9. A prosecutrix of a sex-offence cannot be put on par with an accomplice. She is in fact a victim of the crime. The Evidence Act nowhere says that her evidence cannot be accepted unless it is corroborated in material particulars. She is undoubtedly a competent witness under Section 118 and her evidence must receive the same weight as is attached to an injured in cases of physical violence. The same degree of care and caution must attach in the evaluation of her evidence as in the case of an injured complainant or witness and no more. What is necessary is that the Court must be conscious of the fact that it is dealing with the evidence of a person who is interested in the outcome of the charge leveled by her. If the Court keeps this in mind and feels satisfied that it can act on the evidence of the prosecutrix. There is no rule of law or practice incorporated in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short Evidence Act) similar to illustration (b) of Section 114 which requires it to look for corroboration. If for some reason the Court is hesitant to place implicit reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The nature of evidence required to lend assurance to the testimony of the prosecutrix must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. But if a prosecutrix is an adult and of full understanding the Court is entitled to base a conviction on her evidence unless the same is own to be infirm and not trustworthy. If the totality of the circumstances appearing on the record of the case discloses that the prosecutrix does not have a strong motive to falsely involve the person charged, the Court should ordinarily have no hesitation in accepting her evidence. This position was highlighted in State of Maharashtra v. Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain (1990 91) scc 550)." 43. In State of Himachal Pradesh v. Raghubir Singh, reported in (1993) 2 SCC 622; 1993 SCC (Cri) 674, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that there is no legal compulsion to look for any other evidence to corroborate the evidence of the prosecutrix before recording an order of conviction. Evidence has to be weighed and not counted. Conviction can be recorded on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix, if her evidence inspires confidence and there is absence of circumstances which militate against her veracity. A similar view has been reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Wahid Khan v. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in (2010) 2 SCC 9; AIR 2010 SC 1, placing reliance an earlier Page No.# 22/22 judgment in Rameshwar S/o Kalian Singh v. State of Rajasthan, reported in AIR 1952 SC 54. Thus the law that emerges on the issue is to the effect that the statement of prosecutrix, if found to be worthy of credence and reliable, requires no corroboration. The Court may convict the accused on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix. 44. So from the entire discussions made above, it is seen that the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, FTC, Sonitpur at Tezpur had rightly arrived at the decision that the prosecution could establish the charges against the present accused appellant under Sections 376/417 of the IPC. It is also seen that at the time of pronouncement of judgment, the charges were altered to Section 417 of the IPC, as there was no elements of Section 420 of the IPC, under which initially charge was framed against the accused appellant. Thus, applying the provision under Section 222 of the CrPC, the accused appellant has been convicted under the minor Section 417 of the IPC, altering the charge accordingly. Further, it is seen that at the time of passing the order of sentence, the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, FTC, Sonitpur at Tezpur also considered all the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and passed the conviction and sentence accordingly and hence, this Court is of the opinion that there is no need of interference in the present appeal against the conviction and sentence passed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, FTC, Sonitpur at Tezpur and accordingly the Appeal stands dismissed and disposed of. JUDGE Comparing Assistant Manoranja n Barman Digitally signed by Manoranjan Barman DN: c=IN, o=Personal, postalCode=781353, l=Nalbari, st=Assam, street=12/190 GOPALBAZAR, Sandheli, Pachim Nalbari Assam India 781353 NEAR GOPAL THAN, title=2306, 2.5.4.20=29db4acf51a76f18a8b02da116d99d9a830067d0e1e e9ade3211eba147de7638, serialNumber=f62c6d212ff0a19bb91eb2be0de18d2d5675f85 15740ee4f44960ef878267138, email=barmanm1974@gmail.com, cn=Manoranjan Barman Date: 2026.05.29 14:53:05 +05'30'