1 2026:CGHC:17149-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 1536 of 2025 Rahul Sonwani S/o Mukesh Sonwani Aged About 22 Years R/o Nayakbandha, P.S. Abhanpur, District - Raipur (C.G.) ... Appellant(s) versus State of Chhattisgarh Through The District Magistrate, District - Raipur (C.G.) ...Respondent(s) (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Appellant : Mr. M.P.S. Bhatia, Advocate. For Respondent/State : Mr. Sourabh Sahu, Panel Lawyer. Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice . 15.04.2026 1. Heard Mr. M.P.S. Bhatia, learned counsel for the appellant, and Mr. Sourabh Sahu, learned Panel Lawyer, appearing for the State/respondent. 2. Though the matter is listed today for hearing on I.A. No. 1 of 2025 (application for suspension of sentence and grant of bail), with the BRIJMOHAN MORLE Digitally signed by BRIJMOHAN MORLE Date: 2026.04.20 18:26:01 +0530 2 consent of learned counsel for the parties, the appeal is taken up for final hearing. 3. Learned State counsel submits that notice issued to the mother of the victim (PW-2) has been duly served; however, no one has appeared on behalf of the victim to contest the present appeal. 4. The present criminal appeal, preferred under Section 415(2) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), is directed against the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 04.06.2025 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, 2nd Fast Track Special Court (POCSO), Raipur, District Raipur (C.G.) (for short, ‘learned trial Court’) in Special Criminal Case No. 36 of 2021, whereby the appellant has been convicted and sentenced as follows: Conviction Sentence Section 363 of the the Indian Penal Code (for short, ‘IPC’) Rigorous imprisonment (for short, ‘R.I.’) for 03 years and fine of Rs.500/-, in default of payment of fine, 01 month R.I. more. Section 366 of the IPC R.I. for 10 years and fine of Rs. 500/-, in default of payment of fine, 01 month R.I. more. Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (for short, ‘POCSO Act’) R.I. for 20 years and fine of Rs.500/-, in default of payment of fine, 01 month R.I. more. All the sentences shall run concurrently. 3 5. The prosecution’s case, in brief, is that the victim is a 14-year-old minor girl. On the intervening night of 21.12.2020, between 12:00 a.m. and 1:00 a.m., the victim (PW-1) left her house without informing anyone. Despite searches being conducted at home and among family members and relatives, her whereabouts could not be traced. Thereafter, the victim’s mother (PW-2) lodged a missing person report at Police Station Abhanpur. On the basis of the said report, a First Information Report (FIR) (Ex.P/7) was registered at Police Station Abhanpur against an unknown person under Section 363 of the IPC. The mark-sheet of the victim’s Class I was seized, and a seizure memo (Ex.P/9) was prepared. A spot map (Ex.P/8) of the place of occurrence was also prepared. Upon recovery of the victim, a recovery panchnama (Ex.P/1) was drawn. With the consent of the victim and her mother, applications (Exs.P/20 and P/21) were prepared for her medical examination and for examination of the clothes seized from her, and she was sent to the Government Hospital, Abhanpur, Raipur. There, Dr. Sumitra Uraon (PW-4) examined the victim and the seized clothes and submitted her reports (Exs.P/15 and P/16). 6. The statement of the victim was recorded, wherein she disclosed that the accused had enticed her away and repeatedly established physical relations with her. A letter (Ex.P/27) was sent to the Judicial Magistrate First Class for recording her statement under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. Statements of other witnesses were also recorded. 7. With regard to the age of the victim, the admission register was 4 obtained from the Headmaster, and a seizure memo (Ex.P/12) was prepared. The accused was arrested, and an arrest memo (Ex.P/28) was drawn. The vaginal slide and underwear of the victim, brought by Woman Constable Neetu Bandhe, were seized vide seizure memo (Ex.P/24). The seized articles were sent through the Superintendent of Police, along with a forwarding letter, to the State Forensic Science Laboratory, Raipur. An acknowledgment of receipt was obtained, and after examination, the report (Ex.P/30) was received. 8. Statements of the witnesses under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. were recorded by the Police. After completion of the entire investigation, charge-sheet was filed before the learned trial Court under Sections 363, 366, 376(2)(<) of the IPC and Sections 4 and 6 of the POCSO Act against the appellant. 9. The learned trial Court framed charges against the appellant under Sections 363, 366, 376(3), 376(2)(<)/376(2) of the IPC and Sections 4 and 6 of the POCSO Act. The charges were read over and explained to him, but he denied the same and prayed for trial. 10. To prove its case, the prosecution examined 09 witnesses and exhibited 31 documents. The appellant neither examined any witness in his defence nor produced any document. 11. The statement of the appellant was recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., in which he denied all incriminating circumstances appearing against him and asserted that he was innocent and had been falsely implicated. 5 12. After appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence adduced by the prosecution, the learned trial Court convicted the appellant and sentenced him as detailed in paragraph 04 of this judgment. Hence, the present appeal. 13. Learned counsel for the appellant vehemently submits that the appellant has been falsely implicated and that the prosecution has miserably failed to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It is contended that the entire prosecution case is riddled with material contradictions, omissions, and inconsistencies, which go to the root of the matter and render the case wholly unreliable. It is further urged that the learned trial Court has committed a grave error in convicting the appellant under the provisions of the POCSO Act, inasmuch as the prosecution has utterly failed to prove that the victim was a minor at the time of the alleged incident. The reliance placed on the Admission- Discharge Register (Ex. P/11C), wherein the age of the victim is recorded as 14 years, 2 months, and 16 days, is wholly misconceived. The Principal (PW-3), in his cross-examination, has categorically admitted that he is neither the author of the said entry nor can he vouch for its correctness. 14. It is also significant that the mother of the victim (PW-2) has not deposed anything definite regarding the age of the victim and has merely made a vague statement that the victim was about 12–13 years of age at the relevant time. In the absence of any cogent and reliable documentary evidence, the prosecution ought to have conducted a 6 radiological examination to conclusively determine the age of the victim. The failure to do so creates a serious dent in the prosecution case and renders the applicability of the POCSO Act highly doubtful. 15. Learned counsel further submits that the conduct of the victim, as emerging from her cross-examination (paragraph 7), casts serious doubt on the prosecution story. The victim has stated that she accompanied the appellant on foot to Bade Urla village and thereafter travelled with him by bus to Raipur; however, she did not raise any alarm or seek help from any person at any stage, despite having ample opportunity to do so. This unnatural conduct materially weakens the prosecution case. 16. It is further contended that the medical evidence does not support the prosecution version. As per the MLC report (Ex.P/15), the Doctor has found no injuries on the private parts of the victim, and no definite opinion has been expressed regarding forceful sexual intercourse. The absence of any medical corroboration, coupled with the inconsistencies in the prosecution evidence, creates serious doubt regarding the veracity of the allegations. In such circumstances, the appellant is entitled to the benefit of doubt. Accordingly, it is prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the appellant be acquitted of all the charges. 17. Per contra, learned State counsel has opposed the aforesaid submissions and supported the impugned judgment. It is submitted that the offences alleged are grave and heinous in nature, and the learned trial Court has rightly recorded the conviction after a thorough and 7 proper appreciation of the evidence on record. 18. It is further contended that the testimony of the victim is cogent, consistent, and inspires confidence, and it is a settled principle of law that conviction can be based solely on the testimony of the victim, if found reliable, without the need for corroboration. It is also submitted that the learned trial Court has duly considered all the contentions raised on behalf of the appellant, and the findings recorded are based on sound reasoning and evidence. Therefore, it is urged that no illegality, perversity, or infirmity is discernible in the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the learned trial Court, warranting interference by this Court, and the appeal being devoid of merit deserves to be dismissed 19. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and have perused the entire record of the learned trial Court with due care and circumspection. 20. The foremost question that arises for consideration in the present appeal is whether the victim was a minor, i.e., below 18 years of age, on the date of the alleged incident. 21. For the purpose of determining the age of the victim, we have carefully examined the evidence available on record. The prosecution has primarily relied upon the entry in the Admission–Discharge Register (Ex.P/11C), the progress report of the victim (Article ‘A’), and the testimony of the victim (PW-1). As per the Admission–Discharge Register, the date of birth of the victim is recorded as 05.10.2006. 8 22. In her deposition, the victim (PW-1) stated that her date of birth is 05.10.2006. However, the victim’s mother (PW-2), in her testimony, deposed in a vague manner that the victim was about 12–13 years of age at the time of the incident, without specifying any exact date of birth. 23. The Principal (PW-3) of Om Shanti Niketan High School, Abhanpur, District Raipur (C.G.), deposed that the particulars of the victim were recorded at Serial No. 470 in the Admission–Discharge Register (Ex.P/11C), and that the victim was admitted to Class I on 24.06.2013. According to the said register, the date of birth of the victim is recorded as 05.10.2006. However, in his cross-examination, he honestly admitted that the relevant entries in the Admission–Discharge Register were not made by him, and he was unable to state the basis or the document on which the date of birth of the victim had been recorded. This admission significantly weakens the evidentiary value of the said document. 24. Upon an overall consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case, as well as the evidence on record, it becomes evident that the prosecution has failed to produce cogent, reliable, and legally admissible evidence to conclusively establish the date of birth or age of the victim so as to hold that she was below 18 years of age on the date of the incident. Mere reliance on the school Admission–Discharge Register (Ex.P/11C) and the progress report of the victim (Article ‘A’), in the absence of proof regarding their authenticity and the source of the 9 recorded date of birth, would not be sufficient to safely conclude that the victim was a minor. 25. Furthermore, the oral testimonies of the prosecution witnesses on the aspect of age are neither consistent nor definite and fail to inspire confidence. In such circumstances, this Court is not inclined to accept the prosecution’s assertion that the victim’s date of birth was 05.10.2006 or that she was a minor at the relevant time. 26. In the matter of Ravinder Singh Gorkhi Vs. State of UP, (2006) 5 SCC 584, relying upon its earlier judgment in case of Birad Mal Singhvi Vs. Anand Purohit, 1988 supp. SCC 604, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under :- “26. To render a document admissible under Section 35, three conditions must be satisfied, firstly, entry that is relied on must be one in a public or other official book, register or record; secondly, it must be an entry stating a fact in issue or relevant fact; and thirdly, it must be made by a public servant in discharge of his official duty, or any other person in performance of a duty specially enjoined by law. An entry relating to date of birth made in the school register is relevant and admissible under Section 35 of the Act but the entry regarding the age of a person in a school register is of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the person in the absence of the material on which the age was recorded." 27. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraphs 40, 42, 43, 44 and 48 of its judgment in Alamelu and Another Vs. State, represented by Inspector of Police, 2011(2) SCC 385, has observed as under: “40. Undoubtedly, the transfer certificate, Ex.P16 indicates that the girl's date of birth was 15th June, 10 1977. Therefore, even according to the aforesaid certificate, she would be above 16 years of age (16 years 1 month and 16 days) on the date of the alleged incident, i.e., 31st July, 1993. The transfer certificate has been issued by a Government School and has been duly signed by the Headmaster. Therefore, it would be admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act. However, the admissibility of such a document would be of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the girl in the absence of the material on the basis of which the age was recorded. The date of birth mentioned in the transfer certificate would have no evidentiary value unless the person, who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined. 42. Considering the manner in which the facts recorded in a document may be proved, this Court in the case of Birad Mal Singhvi Vs. Anand Purohit1, observed as follows:- "The date of birth mentioned in the scholars' register has no evidentiary value unless the person who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined....Merely because the documents Exs. 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 were proved, it does not mean that the contents of documents were also proved. Mere proof of the documents Exs. 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 would not tantamount to proof of all the contents or the correctness of date of birth stated in the documents. Since the truth of the fact, namely, the date of birth of Hukmi Chand and Suraj Prakash Joshi was in issue, mere proof of the documents as produced by the aforesaid two witnesses does not furnish evidence of the truth of the facts or contents of the documents. The truth or otherwise of the facts in issue, namely, the date of birth of the two candidates as mentioned in the documents could be proved by 11 admissible evidence i.e. by the evidence of those persons who could vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue. No evidence of any such kind was produced by the respondent to prove the truth of the facts, namely, the date of birth of Hukmi Chand and of Suraj Prakash Joshi. In the circumstances the dates of birth as mentioned in the aforesaid documents 1988 (Supp) SCC 604 have no probative value and the dates of birth as mentioned therein could not be accepted." 43. The same proposition of law is reiterated by this Court in the case of Narbada Devi Gupta Vs. Birendra Kumar Jaiswal2, where this Court observed as follows:- "The legal position is not in dispute that mere production and marking of a document as exhibit by the court cannot be held to be a due proof of its contents. Its execution has to be proved by admissible evidence, that is, by the "evidence of those persons who can vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue." 44. In our opinion, the aforesaid burden of proof has not been discharged by the prosecution. The father says nothing about the transfer certificate in his evidence. The Headmaster has not been examined at all. Therefore, the entry in the transfer certificate can not be relied upon to definitely fix the age of the girl. 48. We may further notice that even with reference to Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, a public document has to be tested by applying the same standard in civil as well as criminal proceedings. In this context, it would be appropriate to notice the observations made by this Court in the case of Ravinder Singh Gorkhi Vs. State of U.P.4 held as follows:- 12 "The age of a person as recorded in the school register or otherwise may be used for various purposes, namely, for obtaining admission; for obtaining an appointment; for contesting election; registration of marriage; obtaining a separate unit under the ceiling laws; and even for the purpose of litigating before a civil forum e.g. necessity of being represented in a court of law by a guardian or where a suit is filed on the ground that the plaintiff being a minor he was not appropriately represented therein or any transaction made on his behalf was void as he was a minor. A court of law for the purpose of determining the age of a (2006) 5 SCC 584 party to the lis, having regard to the provisions of Section 35 of the Evidence Act will have to apply the same standard. No different standard can be applied in case of an accused as in a case of abduction or rape, or similar offence where the victim or the prosecutrix although might have consented with the accused, if on the basis of the entries made in the register maintained by the school, a judgment of conviction is recorded, the accused would be deprived of his constitutional right under Article 21 of the Constitution, as in that case the accused may unjustly be convicted.” 28. In case of Rishipal Singh Solanki Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others, 2022 (8) SCC 602, while considering various judgments, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed in para 33 as under:- “33. What emerges on a cumulative consideration of the aforesaid catena of judgments is as follows: 33.2. If an application is filed before the 13 Court claiming juvenility, the provision of sub-section (2) of section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015 would have to be applied or read along with sub-section (2) of section 9 so as to seek evidence for the purpose of recording a finding stating the age of the person as nearly as may be. XXXX XXXX XXXX 33.3. That when a claim for juvenility is raised, the burden is on the person raising the claim to satisfy the Court to discharge the initial burden. However, the documents mentioned in Rule 12(3)(a)(i), (ii), and (iii) of the JJ Rules 2007 made under the JJ Act, 2000 or sub- section (2) of section 94 of JJ Act, 2015, shall be sufficient for prima facie satisfaction of the Court. On the basis of the aforesaid documents a presumption of juvenility may be raised. 33.4. The said presumption is however not conclusive proof of the age of juvenility and the same may be rebutted by contra evidence let in by the opposite side. 33.5. That the procedure of an inquiry by a Court is not the same thing as declaring the age of the person as a juvenile sought before the JJ Board when the case is pending for trial before the concerned criminal court. In case of an inquiry, the Court records a prima facie conclusion but when there is a determination of age as per sub-section (2) of section 94 of 2015 Act, a declaration is made on the basis of evidence. Also the age recorded by the JJ Board shall be deemed to be the true age of the person brought before it. Thus, the standard of proof in an inquiry is different 14 from that required in a proceeding where the determination and declaration of the age of a person has to be made on the basis of evidence scrutinized and accepted only if worthy of such acceptance. 33.6. That it is neither feasible nor desirable to lay down an abstract formula to determine the age of a person. It has to be on the basis of the material on record and on appreciation of evidence adduced by the parties in each case. 33.7. This Court has observed that a hypertechnical approach should not be adopted when evidence is adduced on behalf of the accused in support of the plea that he was a juvenile. 33.8. If two views are possible on the same evidence, the court should lean in favour of holding the accused to be a juvenile in borderline cases. This is in order to ensure that the benefit of the JJ Act, 2015 is made applicable to the juvenile in conflict with law. At the same time, the Court should ensure that the JJ Act, 2015 is not misused by persons to escape punishment after having committed serious offences. 33.9. That when the determination of age is on the basis of evidence such as school records, it is necessary that the same would have to be considered as per Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, inasmuch as any public or official document maintained in the discharge of official duty would have greater credibility than private documents. 33.10. Any document which is in consonance with public documents, such as matriculation certificate, could be accepted by the Court or the JJ Board provided such public document is credible and authentic as per the provisions of the 15 Indian Evidence Act viz., section 35 and other provisions. 33.11. Ossification Test cannot be the sole criterion for age determination and a mechanical view regarding the age of a person cannot be adopted solely on the basis of medical opinion by radiological examination. Such evidence is not conclusive evidence but only a very useful guiding factor to be considered in the absence of documents mentioned in Section 94(2) of the JJ Act, 2015.” 29. Recently, in case of P. Yuvaprakash Vs. State represented by Inspector of Police, 2023 (SCC Online) SC 846, Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in paras 14 to 17 as under : “14. Section 94 (2)(iii) of the JJ Act clearly indicates that the date of birth certificate from the school or matriculation or equivalent certificate by the concerned examination board has to be firstly preferred in the absence of which the birth certificate issued by the Corporation or Municipal Authority or Panchayat and it is only thereafter in the absence of these such documents the age is to be determined through "an ossification test" or "any other latest medical age determination test" conducted on the orders of the concerned authority, i.e. Committee or Board or Court. In the present case, concededly, only a transfer certificate and not the date of birth certificate or matriculation or equivalent certificate was considered. Ex. C1, i.e., the school transfer certificate showed the date of birth of the victim as 11.07.1997. Significantly, the transfer certificate was produced not by the prosecution but instead by the court summoned witness, i.e., CW-1. The burden is always upon the prosecution to establish what it alleges; therefore, the prosecution could not have been fallen back upon a document which it had never relied upon. Furthermore, DW-3, the concerned Revenue Official (Deputy Tahsildar) had stated on oath that the records 16 for the year 1997 in respect to the births and deaths were missing. Since it did not answer to thedescription of any class of documents mentioned in Section 94(2) (i) as it was a mere transfer certificate, Ex C-1 could not have been relied upon to hold that M was below 18 years at the time of commission of the offence. 15. In a recent decision, in Rishipal Singh Solanki vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. this court outlined the procedure to be followed in cases where age determination is required. The court was dealing with Rule 12 of the erstwhile Juvenile Justice Rules (which is in pari materia) with Section 94 of the JJ Act, and held as follows: "20. Rule 12 of the JJ Rules, 2007 deals with the procedure to be followed in determination of age. The juvenility of a person in conflict with law had to be decided prima facie on the basis of physical appearance, or documents, if available. But an inquiry into the determination of age by the Court or the JJ Board was by seeking evidence by obtaining: (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available and in the absence whereof; (ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other than a play school) first attended; and in the absence whereof; (iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat. Only in the absence of either (i), (ii) and (iii) above, the medical opinion could be sought from a duly constituted Medical Board to declare the age of the juvenile or child. It was also provided that while determination was being made, benefit could be given to the child or juvenile by considering the age on lower side within the margin of one year." 16. Speaking about provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, especially the various options in Section 94 (2) of 17 the JJ Act, this court held in Sanjeev Kumar Gupta vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors that: "Clause (i) of Section 94 (2) places the date of birth certificate from the school and the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the 2021 (12) SCR 502 [2019] 9 SCR 735 concerned examination board in the same category (namely (i) above). In the absence thereof category (ii) provides for obtaining the birth certificate of the corporation, municipal authority or panchayat. It is only in the absence of (i) and (ii) that age determination by means of medical analysis is provided. Section 94(2) (a)(i) indicates a significant change over the provisions which were contained in Rule 12(3)(a) of the Rules of 2007 made under the Act of 2000. Under Rule 12(3)(a) (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificate was given precedence and it was only in the event of the certificate not being available that the date of birth certificate fromthe school first attended, could be obtained. In Section 94(2)(i) both the date of birth certificate from the school as well as the matriculation or equivalent certificate are placed in the same category. 17. In Abuzar Hossain @ Gulam Hossain Vs. State of West Bengal, this court, through a three-judge bench, held that the burden of proving that someone is a juvenile (or below the prescribed age) is upon the person claiming it. Further, in that decision, the court indicated the hierarchy of documents that would be accepted in order of preference.” 30. Upon consideration of the evidence on record, it emerges that the victim (PW-1) has stated her date of birth as 05.10.2006. PW-2, the mother of the victim, has deposed that the victim was about 12–13 years of age at the time of the incident; however, she has not stated the exact date of birth. PW-3, the Principal, referred to the Admission– 18 Discharge Register (Ex.P/11C), wherein the date of birth of the victim is recorded as 05.10.2006. However, in his cross-examination, PW-3 admitted that the relevant entries were not made by him and that he could not state on the basis of which document the said date of birth had been recorded. 31. In view of the aforesaid evidence, this Court is of the considered opinion that the prosecution has failed to produce reliable, cogent, and legally admissible evidence to conclusively establish the age of the victim. The age of the victim, therefore, has not been proved in accordance with law, giving rise to a serious doubt in the prosecution case on this crucial aspect. 32. Apart from the aforesaid evidence, no other primary or foundational document, such as a birth certificate or any contemporaneous public record (e.g., Kotwari Register), has been produced by the prosecution to establish that the victim was below 18 years of age on the date of the incident. The oral testimonies of PW-1 (victim) and PW-2 (mother of the victim), coupled with the school records, including the Admission–Discharge Register (Ex.P/11C), and the progress report of the victim (Article ‘A’), do not inspire confidence in the absence of proof regarding the source or basis of the recorded date of birth. 33. In the absence of any foundational evidence, it cannot be ruled out that the date of birth recorded in the school documents was based on approximation or assumption. The prosecution has also failed to 19 produce the documents on the basis of which such entries were originally made in the school records. Consequently, the evidence relating to the age of the victim falls short of the standard required to conclusively establish her minority. Despite these deficiencies, the learned trial Court proceeded to hold the victim to be a minor, which, in the opinion of this Court, is not sustainable in law. 34. The next question that arises for consideration is whether the appellant has committed rape upon the victim. 35. The victim (PW-1) deposed that she knew the accused, who was her neighbour. She stated that on 20.12.2020, during a village fair (Madai), the accused called her on her sister’s mobile phone and asked her to come near his house. Upon reaching there, he allegedly threatened her with a knife and took her inside his house, where he committed forcible sexual intercourse with her. She further stated that thereafter the accused took her to Raipur to his mother’s house, where she stayed for one day and one night, and subsequently, she was taken to the police station. She denied having any love affair with the accused and stated that the act was committed under threat and on the pretext of marriage. 36. In her cross-examination, the victim admitted that there was a crowd of about 500–600 people at the fair and orchestra and that her house and the accused’s house are situated opposite each other. She further admitted that after receiving a phone call from the accused at about 1:00 a.m., she went alone to meet him without informing her 20 family members. She also admitted that she travelled with the accused on foot to Urla and thereafter by bus to Raipur and reached a crowded place (Pachpedi Naka), yet she did not raise any alarm or inform any person about the alleged incident. She further admitted that she stayed at the house of the accused’s mother for one day and one night, where other family members were present, but did not disclose the incident to anyone or attempt to escape. She also admitted that she did not inform any co-passenger in the bus or any person at public places, despite having opportunities to do so. 37. The mother of the victim (PW-2) corroborated the statements made by the victim, affirming the accuracy and consistency of her account. 38. Dr. Sumitra Urao (PW-4), who examined the victim on 22.12.2020, deposed that the victim was conscious, oriented, and physically normal, with fully developed secondary sexual characteristics. No injury or abrasion was found on any part of her body. On genital examination, the external genitalia were healthy, with no injury or marks of violence; a whitish discharge was noted. On internal examination, the hymen was found absent, but no injury, abrasion, or redness was present. Two vaginal slides were prepared and sent for chemical examination. The doctor opined that no definite conclusion could be drawn regarding sexual intercourse. On the same day, the victim’s maroon-colored underwear containing a marked stain was examined, sealed, and sent for chemical analysis. The reports are Exs.P/15 and P/16. 21 39. Dr. Umesh Vishwas (PW-5), who examined the appellant on 23.12.2020, deposed that the appellant, aged about 22 years, was of normal physique, conscious and oriented, with normal vital parameters, and had fully developed primary and secondary sexual characteristics with cremasteric reflex present. He opined that the appellant was not incapable of performing sexual intercourse (Ex.P/17). On the same day, he examined a sealed packet containing a cotton underwear marked “Stone 80 cm” (waist approx. 12 inches), on which three whitish stains were found; the same was sealed and sent for chemical examination (Ex. P/18). 40. As per the report of the State Forensic Science Laboratory (Ex.P/30), which has been admitted by the State, no semen stains or human spermatozoa were detected on the vaginal smear slides of the victim, her underwear, or the underwear of the accused. The complete absence of any forensic indication of sexual activity strikes at the root of the prosecution case and materially weakens its version. 41. Upon an overall and cumulative evaluation of the evidence on record, this Court finds that the prosecution case is fraught with serious inconsistencies and inherent improbabilities. Though the victim (PW-1) has alleged forcible sexual intercourse, her conduct, as elicited in cross- examination, appears wholly unnatural and does not inspire confidence. Despite having traversed through several public places, including a crowded fair, thereafter proceeding to another village and travelling by public transport to Raipur, and even reaching a busy locality like 22 Pachpedi Naka, she admittedly did not raise any alarm or disclose the alleged incident to any person. Even during her stay for one day and one night at the house of the appellant’s mother, where other family members were present, she did not make any complaint or attempt to escape. Such conduct strikes at the very root of the prosecution case and renders it highly doubtful. 42. The medical evidence also fails to lend any assurance to the prosecution case. The testimony of Dr. Sumitra Urao (PW-4) clearly establishes that no external or internal injuries, marks of violence, or signs suggestive of forcible sexual intercourse were found on the body or private parts of the victim. The doctor has further opined that no definite conclusion regarding sexual intercourse could be drawn. In the backdrop of the doubtful version of the victim, the absence of any medical corroboration assumes considerable significance and materially weakens the prosecution case. 43. The prosecution case is further undermined by the forensic evidence. As per the report of the State Forensic Science Laboratory (Ex.P/30), no semen stains or human spermatozoa were detected on the vaginal smear slides of the victim, her underwear, or the underwear of the appellant. The complete absence of any forensic trace, particularly in a case alleging repeated sexual intercourse, creates a serious dent in the prosecution case and renders it unsafe to place reliance upon it. 44. It is a settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that the 23 prosecution must prove its case beyond reasonable doubt by leading cogent, reliable, and unimpeachable evidence. Suspicion, however strong, cannot take the place of proof. In the present case, the cumulative effect of the doubtful conduct of the victim, absence of medical and forensic corroboration, and the inconsistencies in the prosecution evidence gives rise to a clear and reasonable doubt regarding the guilt of the appellant. 45. It is equally well settled that a conviction in cases of sexual assault can be based solely on the testimony of the victim, provided that such testimony is found to be wholly reliable and inspires confidence. However, where the testimony suffers from material inconsistencies and does not inspire confidence, it would be unsafe to base a conviction thereon. In the present case, the testimony of the victim does not meet the standard of reliability required for sustaining a conviction. 46. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the considered opinion that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt against the appellant. The appellant is, therefore, entitled to the benefit of doubt. 47. Consequently, the appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 04.06.2025 are hereby set aside. The appellant is acquitted of all the charges levelled against him. He is reported to be in custody and shall be released forthwith, if not required in any other case. 48. In view of the final disposal of the appeal, I.A. No. 1 of 2025 24 (application for suspension of sentence and grant of bail) does not survive for consideration and is accordingly disposed of. 49. Keeping in view the provisions of Section 437-A of the CrPC (now Section 481 of the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023), the appellant is directed to forthwith furnish a personal bond in terms of Form No. 45 prescribed in the Code of Criminal Procedure of sum of Rs.25,000/- with one surety in the like amount before the Court concerned which shall be effective for a period of six months along with an undertaking that in the event of filing of Special Leave Petition against the instant judgment or for grant of leave, the aforesaid appellant on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 50. The learned trial Court record along with the copy of this judgment be sent back immediately to the trial court concerned for compliance and necessary action. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Brijmohan