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2026 DAILYLAW 6826 (UTT)

SURESH CHANDRA PARGAI v. STATE OF UTTARAKHAND

WPCRL/669/2026 · 2026-06-12

Alok Mahra

body2026

Judgment text

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2026:UHC:4764 SL. No. Date Office Notes, reports, orders or proceedings or directions and Registrar’s order with Signatures COURT’S OR JUDGE’S ORDERS WPCRL No.669 of 2026 Hon’ble Alok Mahra, J. Mr. Sanjay Bhatt and Mr. Prem Prakash Bhatt, Advocates for the petitioner. Mr. J.P. Kandpal, Brief Holder for the State of Uttarakhand. Ms. Poorvi Chaudhary, Advocate, holding brief of Mr. Saurav Adhikari, Standing Counsel for Union of India. 2. This writ petition has been filed by the petitioner for quashing the impugned order No.UK-HLD-01-2026 dated 24.02.2026 passed by Sub Inspector, Police Station, Haldwani and the order dated 24.03.2026 passed by Competent Authority & Administrator SAFEM (FOP), 1976 & NDPS Act, 1985, Government of India, Ministry of Finance Department, New Delhi, whereby the vehicle of the petitioner was confiscated. Further prayer has been made for a direction to the respondents to release forthwith Maruti Ertiga Car bearing registration no.UK04-TB-5931 registered in the name of the petitioner. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned confiscation proceedings have been initiated solely on the ground that the petitioner's father was arrested in connection with F.I.R. No. 0359 of 2025 registered under Sections 8 and 20 of the N.D.P.S. Act, 1985. It is contended that the petitioner was neither named as an accused in the aforesaid F.I.R. nor arrested during the course of investigation, and no charge-sheet has been filed against him. It is further submitted that the petitioner has no criminal antecedents whatsoever. It is also submitted that the vehicle in question is the exclusive property of the petitioner, having been purchased by him from his own 2026:UHC:4764 resources, partly through a loan obtained from a nationalized bank and partly through financial assistance arranged from his relatives and friends. According to the petitioner, there is no material on record to establish that the vehicle was acquired from any illicit source or that it was used by the petitioner in connection with any offence under the N.D.P.S. Act. Therefore, the confiscation of the vehicle is stated to be arbitrary, illegal and violative of the provisions of the Act. 4. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for respondent no.2 submits that the vehicle has been validly seized and confiscated in exercise of powers conferred under Section 68F of the N.D.P.S. Act, 1985. It is further submitted that against the impugned order of confiscation, the petitioner has an efficacious statutory remedy of appeal before the Appellate Tribunal constituted under the Act, which has not been availed by him. Therefore, the present writ petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of availability of an alternative remedy. 5. Section 68F of the NDPS Act, 1985 is quoted below: “68F. Seizure or freezing of illegally acquired property.—(1)Where any officer conducting an inquiry or investigation under section 68E has reason to believe that any property in relation to which such inquiry or investigation is being conducted is an illegally acquired property and such property is likely to be concealed, transferred or dealt with in any manner which will result in frustrating any proceeding relating to forfeiture of such property under this Chapter, he may make an order for seizing such property and where it is not practicable to seize such property, he may make an order that such property shall not be transferred or otherwise dealt with, except with the prior permission of the officer making such order, or of the competent authority and a copy of such order shall be served on the person concerned: Provided that the competent authority shall be duly informed of any order made under this sub-section and a copy of such an order shall be sent to the competent authority within forty-eight hours of its 2026:UHC:4764 being made. (2) Any order made under sub-section (1) shall have no effect unless the said order is confirmed by an order of the competent authority within a period of thirty days of its being made.” 6. Learned State Counsel adopted the submissions advanced on behalf of respondent no. 2. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned confiscation proceedings are vitiated in law as no show cause notice was ever issued to the petitioner prior to passing the order of confiscation, thereby violating the mandatory principles of natural justice. It is contended that issuance of a notice and affording an adequate opportunity of hearing are indispensable prerequisites before depriving a person of his property. Learned counsel further submits that forfeiture of property under Chapter V-A of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 can be ordered only upon establishing a direct and proximate nexus between the property sought to be forfeited and the illegally acquired property, namely, property derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, from activities constituting contravention of the provisions of the NDPS Act. In support of the said contention, reliance has been placed upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Aslam Mohammad Merchant Vs. Competent Authority & Others, reported in (2008) 14 SCC 186, wherein it has been held that the competent authority is required to record a satisfaction based on relevant material demonstrating such nexus before initiating forfeiture proceedings. It is further submitted that the mandatory requirements prescribed under Sections 68F and other relevant provisions of Chapter V-A of the Act were not complied with by the authorities while proceeding against the petitioner's vehicle. No material has been brought on record to establish that the 2026:UHC:4764 vehicle constituted illegally acquired property or was purchased from proceeds generated through any offence under the NDPS Act. Consequently, the very initiation of confiscation proceedings and the resultant order of confiscation are without jurisdiction, arbitrary and contrary to the statutory scheme. Learned counsel thus submits that since the confiscation order suffers from patent illegality and has been passed in violation of the mandatory provisions of law as well as the principles of natural justice, the petitioner has rightly invoked the extraordinary writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for redressal of his grievance. 8. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. Upon consideration of the rival submissions, this Court finds that the respondents have failed to place any cogent material on record to establish a direct and proximate nexus between the vehicle in question and any proceeds derived from activities constituting an offence under the NDPS Act. There is nothing on record to demonstrate that the vehicle was purchased, financed, or otherwise acquired from income or assets generated through illicit trafficking or any contravention of the provisions of the NDPS Act. In the absence of such foundational material establishing that the vehicle constituted "illegally acquired property" within the meaning of Chapter V-A of the Act, the action of confiscation cannot be sustained in law. Mere suspicion or the involvement of a relative of the owner in an NDPS case, without establishing a clear link between the property and the alleged illegal proceeds, is insufficient to justify forfeiture or confiscation of the property. 9. In view of the foregoing discussion, the writ petition is allowed and the impugned orders are quashed so far it 2026:UHC:4764 relates to the petitioner’s vehicle. The competent authority is directed to release the aforesaid vehicle in favour of the petitioner/registered owner forthwith, subject to his furnishing adequate bonds and sureties to the satisfaction of the Court concerned and upon his undertaking that: (i) he shall produce the vehicle as and when required during investigation or trial; (ii) he shall not transfer, alienate, or create any third-party interest in the vehicle without prior permission of the Court; and (iii) he shall maintain the vehicle in proper condition. It is made clear that such release shall not prejudice the trial pursuant to F.I.R. No.0359 of 2025. (Alok Mahra, J.) 12.06.2026 Arpan ARPAN JAISWAL Digitally signed by ARPAN JAISWAL DN: c=IN, o=HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND, ou=HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND, 2.5.4.20=eabb68a3895e41937c266c23964c0485365445e3a20dddb7 393398f9fe45ba3e, postalCode=263001, st=UTTARAKHAND, serialNumber=060FC17022BEAE3DE215D68D9D454C5109CB987446 351E4DF04AADAA2C2CEA66, cn=ARPAN JAISWAL Date: 2026.06.15 13:28:37 +05'30'