1 2026:CGHC:17562 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR SA No. 353 of 2013 Kanshiram S/o Dukuram Sahu Aged About 53 Years R/o Badhiyatola, Tah. Dongargarh, Distt. Rajnandgaon C.G., Chhattisgarh ... Appellant(s) versus 1. Kachru And Ors S/o Jhadu Marar Aged About 45 Years R/o Badhiyatola, Tah. Dongargarh, Distt. Rajnandgaon C.G., Chhattisgarh 2.a.Chamru S/o Sukalu Aged About 55 Years R/o Badhiyatola, Tah. Dongargarh, Distt. Rajnandgaon C.G., District : Rajnandgaon, Chhattisgarh 2.b. Mukti Bai W/o Chain Aged About 53 Years R/o Andi, Tah. Dongargarh, Distt. Rajnandgaon C.G., District : Rajnandgaon, Chhattisgarh 2.c. Amru S/o Sukalu Aged About 53 Years R/o Badhiyatola, Tah. Dongargarh, Distt. Rajnandgaon C.G., District : Rajnandgaon, Chhattisgarh 2.d. Sajan Bai W/o Manharan Aged About 49 Years R/o Itwaribazar, Khairagarh, Distt. Rajnandgaon C.G., District : Rajnandgaon, Chhattisgarh 2.e. Surju S/o Sukalu Aged About 47 Years R/o Bhimnagar, Dongargarh, Distt. Rajnandgaon C.G., District : Rajnandgaon, Chhattisgarh 2.f. Surajbai W/o Jagdish Aged About 45 Years R/o Near House Of Gram Sewak, Bhadiyatola, Dongargarh, Distt. Rajnandgaon C.G., District : Rajnandgaon, Chhattisgarh 2.g. Surati S/o Sukalu Aged About 43 Years R/o Bhimnagar, JYOTI SHARMA Digitally signed by JYOTI SHARMA Date: 2026.04.21 11:28:48 +0530 2 Dongargarh, Distt. Rajnandgaon C.G., District : Rajnandgaon, Chhattisgarh 2.h.Surjin Bai W/o Hemu Aged About 41 Years R/o Dokrabhata, Chuikhadan, Distt. Rajnandgaon C.G., District : Rajnandgaon, Chhattisgarh 2.i. Bitawan Bai W/o Pardesi Aged About 39 Years R/o Bichbasti, Pandadah, Tah. Khairagarh, Distt. Rajnandgaon C.G., District : Rajnandgaon, Chhattisgarh 3. Ramsukh S/o Chaitram Kalar Aged About 57 Years R/o Bhadiyatola, Tah. Dongargarh, Distt. Rajnandgaon C.G., District : Rajnandgaon, Chhattisgarh 4. Khedi Bai W/o Jhaduram Aged About 65 Years R/o Badhiyatola, Tah. Dongargarh, Distt. Rajnandgaon C.G., District : Rajnandgaon, Chhattisgarh 5. State Of Chhattisgarh W/o Thru- District Magistrate, Tah. Dongargarh, Distt. Rajnandgaon C.G., District : Rajnandgaon, Chhattisgarh 6. Bharat S/o Jhadu Marar R/o Gaajmarra, Tah. Dongargarh, Distt. Rajnandgaon C.G., District : Rajnandgaon, Chhattisgarh ... Respondent(s) For Appellant(s) : Mr. Pallav Mishra, Advocate For Respondent/ State : Mr. Anand Gupta, Dy. G.A. Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru, Judge Judgment on Board 17.04.2026 1. The plaintiff/appellant, has preferred this second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for brevity CPC) against the judgment & decree dated 3 15.03.2013 passed by the Learned Additional District Judge, Dongargarh, C.G. in Civil Appeal No. 15-A/2007 (Kanshiram Vs. Kachru & Ors.) arising out of the judgment and decree dated 14.02.2006 passed by the Trial Court in Civil Suit No. 18-A/2000 (Kanshiram Vs. Kachru & Ors.) whereby the learned trial Judge has dismissed the suit of the plaintiff/ appellant. For the sake of convenience, the parties would be referred as per their status before the learned trial Court. 2. The plaintiff instituted the suit seeking declaration that the registered sale deed dated 25.08.1998 (Ex.D/2) executed in favour of defendant No.3 be declared ineffective and not binding upon him, along with a decree for specific performance of the prior agreement of sale pleading inter alia that suit property is agricultural land bearing Khasra No. 308/1, area 0.12 acre, situated at Village Badhiyatola, Tahsil Dongargarh, District Rajnandgaon, recorded in the names of defendant No. 1 (Kachru), defendant No. 2 (Sukalu), defendant No. 4 (Khedibai) and deceased Phulbati Bai. According to the plaintiff, in a prior family partition between defendants Jhaddu (father of Kachru) and Sukalu, the suit land fell to the share of defendant No.2 Sukalu, who became its exclusive owner and was in possession thereof. It was pleaded that on 31.03.1994 (Ex. P-4) defendant No.2 Sukalu agreed to sell the suit land to the plaintiff for a consideration of 4 Rs.6,750/-, executed a written receipt/agreement in the presence of witnesses, received the full sale consideration and delivered possession to the plaintiff, with an assurance that a registered sale deed would be executed whenever demanded. Since the plaintiff was a marginal farmer and used to work as a labourer at Nagpur, he could not immediately get the sale deed registered. The plaintiff further pleaded that he later came to know, upon receiving notice from the Tahsildar on 23.10.1999 in proceedings initiated by defendant No.3 Ramsukh, that defendant No.3 had obtained a registered sale deed dated 25.08.1998 in his name, by playing fraud upon defendants No.1 and 2. It was alleged that Ramsukh, along with others, misrepresented to the vendors that the sale deed was being executed in favour of the plaintiff, obtained their thumb impressions/signatures, and thereafter got the deed registered in his own name and mutated his name in the revenue records. The plaintiff contended that since he had already paid the entire sale consideration and obtained possession in 1994, only the formality of execution of the registered sale deed remained, and therefore the subsequent sale deed in favour of defendant No.3 was void and ineffective against his rights. 3. Defendants No.1 and 4, in their written statement, while admitting certain formal facts, denied the plaint allegations 5 and contended that the suit land bearing Khasra No.308/1, area 0.12 acre, situated at Village Badhiyatola, was originally recorded in the names of defendants No.1, 2, 4 and 6, sons of Jhadu, and was validly purchased by defendant No.3 through a registered sale deed dated 25.08.1998. It was pleaded that defendant No.2 as well as defendant No.3 had signed the sale deed and that defendants No.4 Khedibai and Bharat (defendant No. 5) had also consented to the transaction. Pursuant thereto, the name of defendant No.3 was duly mutated in the revenue records and he became the lawful owner of the suit land. They further denied that the plaintiff was present at the time of registration or that any fraud had been committed. According to them, the plaintiff never purchased the land from defendant No.2. Since the suit land was adjoining the badi of the plaintiff, he intended to purchase it but could not do so. When defendant No.3, being a neighbour, purchased the property and got his name mutated, the plaintiff became aggrieved and, in collusion with defendant No.2 Sukalu, concocted a false case to grab the land. It was also pleaded that the suit was barred by limitation, no cause of action had arisen, and insufficient court fee had been paid. 4. Defendant No.2 and his legal representatives, in a separate written statement, supported the case of the plaintiff and 6 admitted the plaint averments. They pleaded that defendant No.3 Ramsukh, along with Bisauha and Kaluram, had deceived Sukalu and fraudulently got the sale deed executed in favour of defendant No.3. It was further stated that on the basis of the said fraudulent sale deed, defendant No.3 got his name mutated in the revenue records without any public proclamation or notice to Sukalu. Defendant No.2 asserted that he had objected before the Patwari and had also lodged a complaint with the police regarding the fraudulent registration. It was further alleged that the Tahsildar, without notice or consent of defendant No.2, ordered mutation of the suit land in favour of defendant No.3 on 04.12.1998, knowledge whereof was later obtained during proceedings under Section 250 of the Land Revenue Code. Accordingly, defendant No.2 prayed that the reliefs sought by the plaintiff be granted. 5. Defendant No.3, also filed in his written statement, denied the plaint allegations except such facts as were specifically admitted. He pleaded that the suit land originally stood recorded in the names of defendants No.1, 2 and 4 and 6. About 35–40 years earlier, upon a family partition between Jhadu and Sukalu, the suit land had fallen to the share of defendant No.2 Sukalu. Thereafter, on 25.08.1998, defendant No.2 validly sold the suit land to defendant No.3 by 7 a registered sale deed, to which defendant No.4 Khedibai and defendant No. 6 Bharat had also consented. On the basis of the said sale deed, the name of defendant No.3 was duly mutated in the revenue records and he became the lawful owner of the suit property. Defendant No.3 further contended that the plaintiff never purchased the suit land from defendant No.2, nor was he ever delivered possession thereof. It was asserted that the allegations of fraud, deception and collusion were false, imaginary and concocted. According to defendant No.3, the plaintiff had no right to seek re-execution of any sale deed in his favour, as no prior agreement or enforceable right existed. It was further pleaded that the suit was baseless, contrary to law, barred by limitation, unsupported by sufficient cause of action, and insufficiently valued for the purposes of court fee. Accordingly, dismissal of the suit with costs was prayed for. In support of his defence, defendant No.3 produced the registered sale deed dated 25.08.1998, the consent/ratification documents, revenue records including B1 and Khasra entries, the mutation application submitted before the Tahsildar, and the related mutation order. 6. Defendant No.6 also filed a written statement substantially supporting the stand of defendant No.3. It was reiterated that the suit land had been lawfully purchased by defendant No.3 through the registered sale deed dated 25.08.1998 with the 8 consent of the recorded co-sharers, and that his name had been duly mutated in the revenue records. It was further stated that the plaintiff was not present at the time of registration, had never purchased the property from Sukalu (defendant No. 2), and had instituted the suit in collusion with defendant No.2 only after defendant No.3 purchased the adjoining land and got his name recorded. It was therefore pleaded that the suit was devoid of cause of action, barred by limitation, insufficiently stamped, and liable to be dismissed with costs. 7. After framing the issues, the Trial Court upon appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence, held that the plaintiff failed to prove that defendant No.2 Sukalu had validly entered into an agreement dated 31.03.1994 to sell the suit land in his favour for a consideration of Rs.6,750/-. It was observed that the alleged document (Ex.P/5) was unregistered, vague in description of the property, did not contain essential particulars such as khasra number and boundaries, and was insufficient to establish a concluded contract of sale or delivery of possession. The Court further found that the plaintiff failed to prove his continuous readiness and willingness to perform his part of the alleged contract. The Court also considered the evidence of the attesting witnesses to the registered sale deed dated 25.08.1998. 9 Defendant witnesses, including the executants and attesting witness Kalu Ram, supported the execution of the sale deed in favour of defendant No.3 Ramsukh and deposed that Sukalu had voluntarily appeared before the Sub-Registrar and executed the document after receiving consideration. Their testimony remained substantially unshaken in cross- examination and corroborated the registered sale deed. On the contrary, the allegation of fraud and deceit set up by the plaintiff was held unproved, as no reliable evidence was adduced to discredit the registered instrument or the testimony of its witnesses. The Court therefore accepted the case of defendant No.3 that he had lawfully purchased the suit property through the registered sale deed, pursuant to which his name was duly mutated in the revenue records. Though the suit was held to be within limitation, the Court concluded that the plaintiff failed to establish any enforceable right, title, or entitlement to seek declaration, cancellation of the registered sale deed, or specific performance. Accordingly, the suit was dismissed. 8. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree dated 14.02.2006, the plaintiff preferred a First Appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure before the learned First Appellate Court. The learned First Appellate Court, on re-appreciation of the entire evidence on record, affirmed the 10 findings recorded by the Trial Court and dismissed the appeal by the impugned judgment. Hence, the present appeal. 9. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that both the Courts have committed grave error in dismissing the suit by recording findings contrary to the evidence available on record. It is contended that the agreement to sell in favour of the appellant was duly proved, yet the Trial Court wrongly held that the same was not legally executed and further erred in holding that the appellant was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. It is further submitted that the Courts failed to frame and consider the material issue regarding possession of the appellant over the suit land, though the demarcation report and oral evidence clearly established his possession since 1994. Learned counsel also submits that the admissions made by the respondents regarding title of Sukalu and the testimony of witness Suraj were not properly appreciated. Therefore, the impugned judgments suffer from perversity and raise substantial questions of law for consideration in the present second appeal. 10. I have heard learned counsel for the appellants on the question of admission, and the impugned judgments and decrees passed by the learned trial Court as also the learned First Appellate Court have been carefully examined. 11 11. This Court is not inclined to accept the aforesaid submission as from the findings recorded by the Trial Court, the submissions advanced on behalf of the appellant do not stand. The Trial Court, upon proper appreciation of the evidence, held that the appellant failed to prove existence of any valid and enforceable agreement to sell in respect of the suit land. The alleged document relied upon by the appellant was found vague, unregistered, and lacking essential particulars of the property, and therefore incapable of creating any right in his favour. Hence, no interference is warranted with the concurrent findings recorded by the Courts below. 12. The First Appellate Court affirmed the judgment and decree of the Trial Court and dismissed the appeal holding that no infirmity was made out in the findings recorded by the Trial Court. It further held that the plaintiff failed to prove the alleged agreement/document Ex.P/4 in accordance with law. Though the plaintiff examined certain witnesses in support of the alleged transaction, none of them satisfactorily proved the execution of Ex.P/4 as a valid and concluded sale agreement relating specifically to the suit land. The witnesses gave only general statements regarding an alleged sale for consideration, but they could not establish the identity of the property, as the document itself did not mention the khasra 12 number or boundaries. No reliable attesting witness proved that the executant Sukalu consciously executed the document after understanding its contents. In contrast, the registered sale deed Ex.D/2 in favour of defendant No.3 stood duly proved through the evidence of its attesting witness Kalaram and other witnesses, who specifically deposed about execution before the Sub-Registrar and signatures/thumb impressions of the executants. Therefore, the Court held that the plaintiff’s unregistered document remained unproved, whereas the defendant’s registered sale deed was duly established by cogent evidence. Further, the plea of fraud or impersonation set up by the plaintiff was found unsupported by cogent evidence. Though the plaintiff was found in possession during demarcation, such possession was held not to be lawful or based on a valid title. Accordingly, the Appellate Court concluded that the findings of the Trial Court were based on proper appreciation of evidence and required no interference, and therefore confirmed the dismissal of the suit. 13. Even otherwise, the scope of interference in a Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure is extremely limited. Interference is permissible only when the appeal involves a substantial question of law. Concurrent findings of fact recorded by both the Courts cannot be interfered with 13 unless such findings are shown to be perverse, based on no evidence, or contrary to settled principles of law. 14. In the present case, both the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court have concurrently recorded findings, on the basis of evidence available on record, that the appellants/ plaintiffs failed to establish their case by placing cogent and sufficient material. The appellants have failed to demonstrate any perversity, illegality, or misapplication of law in the findings so recorded. 15. The questions sought to be raised in the present Second Appeal essentially relate to re-appreciation of evidence and challenge to concurrent findings of fact. Such questions do not give rise to any substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 16. It is well established that when there is a concurrent finding of fact, unless it is found to be perverse, the Court should not ordinarily interfere with the said finding. 17. In the matter of State of Rajasthan and others Vs. Shiv Dayal and another, reported in (2019) 8 SCC 637, reiterating the settled proposition, it has been held that when any concurrent finding of fact is assailed in second appeal, the appellant is entitled to point out that it is bad in law because it was recorded de hors the pleadings or based on misreading 14 of material documentary evidence or it was recorded against any provision of law and lastly, the decision is one which no Judge acting judicially could reasonably have reached. 18. Be that as it may, the argument advanced by learned counsel for the appellants and the proposed question of law cannot be regarded as satisfying the test of being ‘substantial question of law’ within the meaning of Section 100 of CPC. These questions, in my view, are essentially question of facts. The appellants failed to raise any substantial question of law which is required under Section 100 of the CPC. In any event, the Second Appeal did not involve any substantial question of law as contemplated under Section 100 of the CPC, no case is made out by the appellants herein. The judgments impugned passed by the learned trial Court as as well as by the learned First Appellate Court are just and proper and there is no illegality and infirmity at all. 19. On perusal of the record of the case and in view of the above settled legal proposition, I find absolutely no merit in this appeal, as it does not involve any question of law, much less any substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the CPC. In my view, the judgment and decree passed by both the Courts appear to be just, proper and legal. The findings recorded are based on proper appreciation of evidence available on record and there is no illegality or 15 perversity in the same and they does not call for any interference. 20. Consequently, the Second Appeal fails and is hereby dismissed resulting in upholding the judgment and decree passed by the learned Appellate Court. SD/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) Judge Jyoti