JUDGMENT : Soumen Sen, C.J. The first appellant claims that he is neither a borrower nor a guarantor, but that his property has been illegally taken possession of by the Bank. The second appellant, though claims to be a guarantor, has raised a dispute with regard to the identity of the mortgaged property. 2. The Bank, in exercise of its power under Section 13(4) read with Section 14 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act 2002 (SARFAESI Act), has taken possession of the properties which, according to the Bank, has been mortgaged by the principal borrower during his lifetime. In the proceeding before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, the Bank filed the affidavit contemplated under (1) of the SARFAESI Act, and the procedure prescribed therein was duly followed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate. 3. It appears that a Surveyor was appointed to identify the property in question. The grievance of the appellants with regard to the report prepared by the Taluk Surveyor, forming part of Ext.P20, is that although the Chief Judicial Magistrate had come to a finding that the properties were not identifiable and directed the authorised officer to take steps, no such steps were taken. However, the Advocate Commissioner appointed in M.C.No.235 of 2024 on the file of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kottayam, without the third respondent taking any such steps, issued Ext.P21 notice illegally, arbitrarily and perversely, and took possession of the same unidentified property, including 1.43 Ares of land belonging to the first appellant, who was not a party to Ext.P16. 4. The learned counsel of the appellants submitted that in view of the law laid down in paragraph 29 of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Harshad Govardhan Sondagar & Ors. v. International Assets Reconstruction Company Limited & Ors. , (2014) 6 SCC 1 a writ petition challenging proceedings under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act is maintainable. Paragraph 29 thus relied on by the appellants reads as follows: “Sub-section (3) of S.14 of the SARFAESI Act provides that no act of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or the District Magistrate or any officer authorised by the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or District Magistrate done in pursuance of S.14 shall be called in question in any Court or before any authority. The SARFAESI Act, therefore, attaches finality to the decision of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or the District Magistrate and this decision cannot be challenged before any Court or any authority. But this Court has repeatedly held that statutory provisions attaching finality to the decision of an authority excluding the power of any other authority or Court to examine such a decision will not be a bar for the High Court or this Court to exercise jurisdiction vested by the Constitution because a statutory provision cannot take away a power vested by the Constitution. To quote, the observations of this Court in Columbia Sportswear Company v. Director of Income Tax, Bangalore , 2012 (11) SCC 224 : “17. Considering the settled position of law that the powers of this Court under Art.136 of the Constitution and the powers of the High Court under Art.226 and Art.227 of the Constitution could not be affected by the provisions made in a Statute by the Legislature making the decision of the Tribunal final or conclusive, we hold that sub-section (1) of S.245S of the Act, insofar as, it makes the advance ruling of the Authority binding on the applicant, in respect of the transaction and on the Commissioner and income - tax authorities subordinate to him, does not bar the jurisdiction of this Court under Art.136 of the Constitution or the jurisdiction of the High Court under Art.226 and Art.227 of the Constitutionto entertain a challenge to the advance ruling of the Authority.” “In our view, therefore, the decision of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or the District Magistrate can be challenged before the High Court under Art.226 and Art.227 of the Constitution by any aggrieved party and if such a challenge is made, the High Court can examine the decision of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or the District Magistrate, as the case may be, in accordance with the settled principles of law.” 5. It is submitted that although there are conflicting judgments on the point, the aforesaid decision, being a later decision rendered after considering Section 14 (3) of the SARFAESI Act, should govern the field. 6. Whether the writ court should entertain a challenge to a proceeding under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act was considered in Grids Engineers and Contractors v. Union Bank of India, 2026 SCC OnLine Ker 3650 the relevant portion of which reads as follows: 61. 6. Whether the writ court should entertain a challenge to a proceeding under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act was considered in Grids Engineers and Contractors v. Union Bank of India, 2026 SCC OnLine Ker 3650 the relevant portion of which reads as follows: 61. The exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution would depend on the facts of the case. If the Magistrate has not complied with the provisions of Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 and passed an order without any affidavit filed by the Authorised Officer and it appears from record that such coercive measure was taken notwithstanding repayment of the loan amount, a writ petition can be entertained. 62. When such an order is challenged in exercise of the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution, the remedies available are limited but significant. Notwithstanding the availability of a remedy under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 may be invoked in the following exceptional circumstances: (i) Lack of Jurisdiction: An order passed under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act would be amenable to interference under Article 226 of the Constitution where the same suffers from a jurisdictional error. If the District Magistrate or Chief Metropolitan Magistrate entertains the application of the secured creditor without the affidavit mandated under the amended (1), or proceeds to pass orders without satisfying himself regarding the compliance of the statutory pre-conditions contemplated under Section 13(2) and 13(4) of the Act, the action would be without jurisdiction. Likewise, if the Magistrate travels beyond the limited ministerial role assigned under and adjudicates disputed questions or grants relief not contemplated by the statute, such exercise would be ultra vires the Act. In such circumstances, the writ of certiorari would lie to quash the impugned order, as the defect goes to the root of jurisdiction and renders the proceedings non est in the eye of law. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Harshad Govardhan Sondagar v. International Assets Reconstruction Co. Ltd. clarified the scope of inquiry under and emphasized that the Magistrate must ensure compliance with statutory pre-conditions before granting assistance for possession. Similarly, in NKGSB Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. Subir Chakravarty, it was reiterated that the satisfaction under must be based on the particulars required by law. Ltd. clarified the scope of inquiry under and emphasized that the Magistrate must ensure compliance with statutory pre-conditions before granting assistance for possession. Similarly, in NKGSB Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. Subir Chakravarty, it was reiterated that the satisfaction under must be based on the particulars required by law. (ii) Fraud or Mala Fide Action: Interference under Article 226 of the Constitution would also be warranted where the action of the secured creditor is vitiated by fraud, mis- representation or mala fides. If an order under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act is obtained by suppressing material facts, making false statements in the statutory affidavit, or by misleading the Magistrate regarding compliance with the mandatory requirements of the Act, the very foundation of the order would stand vitiated. It is trite law that fraud vitiates all solemn acts. In A.V. Papayya Sastry v. Government of A.P, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that any order obtained by playing fraud on the court is a nullity in the eye of law. (iii) Violation of Natural Justice: Though proceedings under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act are essentially ex parte in character and the Magistrate performs a limited ministerial function, the exercise of such power must nevertheless conform to the mandatory statutory safeguards engrafted in the provision. If the Magistrate grants assistance for taking possession without ensuring compliance with the conditions precedent under Sections 13(2) and 13(4), or without satisfying himself on the affidavit mandated by the proviso to (1), the order may stand vitiated for non-observance of statutory safeguards, which are themselves facets of natural justice. Further, where it is demonstrated that the secured creditor has suppressed material facts or misled the authority, resulting in denial of a fair and lawful consideration, the High Court may exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 to prevent manifest injustice. However, it is equally well settled, as held in Satyawati Tondon (supra) and reiterated in Phoenix ARC Pvt. Ltd. (supra), at paragraph 18, that if proceedings are initiated under the SARFAESI Act and/or any proposed action is to be taken and the borrower is aggrieved by any of the actions of the private bank/bank/ARC, borrower has to avail the remedy under the SARFAESI Act and no writ petition would lie and/or is maintainable and/or entertainable." 7. In the instant case, the exceptions as pointed out in Grids Engineers and Contractors (supra) are not attracted. In the instant case, the exceptions as pointed out in Grids Engineers and Contractors (supra) are not attracted. Moreover, efficacious alternative remedies are available to both appellants under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, as both may fall within the expression “any person aggrieved”. The points urged before us can be very effectively considered and decided by the Debt Recovery Tribunal. These are pure questions of fact and has to be ascertained on the basis of the evidence that may come on record. It will always be open to the Tribunal to appoint an Advocate Commissioner for a better view. 8. Neither can the Bank claim possession of any property not covered by the mortgage deed, nor can it be deprived of possession of any area that is covered by the mortgage deed. It is trite law that in case of conflict between the area and the boundaries in a property description, the boundaries prevail (See Gossain Das Kundu v. Mrittunjoy Agnan Sardar , (1913) 18 C.L.J. 541 and Palestine Kupat Am Bank Co-operative Society Ltd. v. Government of Palestine , AIR 1948 PC 207 ). It has been further held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Subhaga and Others v. Shobha and Others, (2006) 5 Supreme Court Cases 466 that a property can be identified either by its boundaries or by any other specific description and that once a property has been identified by boundaries, even if there is any discrepancy, normally, the boundaries should prevail. It is not necessary to survey all adjacent lands to find out whether an encroachment was made in the property concerned. It has been reiterated in Palestine Kupat Am Bank Co-operative Society Ltd. (supra) that where in the case of a grant of land there is a conflict between the description by boundaries and the area mentioned in the grant, the principle of preferring the description by fixed boundaries to the conflicting description by area should be applied in the construction of the grant, and the statement as to area should be rejected as falsa demonstratio. 9. 9. It is needless to mention that in the event any appeal is preferred by the appellant, the Tribunal shall be guided by the aforesaid principles while considering the report filed by the Advocate Commissioner before acceptance and while deciding whether the property over which the secured interest is claimed by the Bank is covered by the mortgage deed. 10. In view of the pendency of the writ petition and the writ appeal, we permit the appellants to prefer an appeal before the Debt Recovery Tribunal within a period of four weeks from today, failing which, the secured creditor may proceed in accordance with law. The secured creditor is restrained from disposing the secured assets for a period of four weeks from today. 11. In the event any such application is filed before the Debts Recovery Tribunal within the aforesaid time period, it shall be open to the Debts Recovery Tribunal to decide whether any interim order should be passed, uninfluenced by the limited interim order passed in this proceeding. 12. The writ appeal is disposed of accordingly.