1 2026:CGHC:17546 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CR No. 161 of 2025 Cholamandalam M. S. General Insurance Company Limited Through Branch Manager, Permanent Office At - Ward No. 25 (Guru Govind Singh Ward), Second Flor, Simran Towers, Pandri Road, In Front Of Lic Office Raipur, District- Raipur (C.G.) ... Applicant versus 1 - Champa Bai Shriwas W/o Late Ramshankar Shriwas Aged About 30 Years R/o Village And Post Hirri, Tehsil And Police Station- Masturi, District- Bilaspur (C.G.)..........(Claimants) 2 - Yashwant Kumar Shriwas S/o Late Ramshankar Shriwas Aged About 8 Years (Minor, Represented By Monther Respondent No. 1) R/o Village And Post Hirri, Tehsil And Police Station- Masturi, District- Bilaspur (C.G.).................(Claimant) 3 - Acche Ram Shriwas S/o Late Ramprasad Shriwas Aged About 70 Years R/o Village And Post Hirri, Tehsil And Police Station- Masturi, District- Bilaspur (C.G.)............(Claimant) 4 - Chameli Bai Shriwas W/o Acche Ram Shriwas Aged About 68 Years R/o Village And Post Hirri, Tehsil And Police Station- Masturi, District- Bilaspur (C.G.)........(Claimant) 5 - Indal Kumar Yadav S/o Shiv Kumar Yadav Aged About 32 Years R/o Village And Post Pakaria (Jhulan), Police Station-Mulmula, District- Janjgir-Champa (C.G.)..............(Driver) 6 - Balmukund Verma S/o Late Anek Ram Verma Aged About 45 Years R/o Village- Parsada (Raymond), 80/1 Nadiyapara Parsada, Police Station-Mulmula, District- Janjgir-Champa (C.G.)........(Owner) ... Non-Applicants YOGESH TIWARI Digitally signed by YOGESH TIWARI Date: 2026.04.17 18:02:45 +0530 2 (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Applicant : Ms. Aditi Diwan, Advocate Hon'ble Shri Amitendra Kishore Prasad, Judge Order on Board 17.04.2026 1. Ms. Aditi Diwan, learned counsel for the applicant submits that the issue involved in the present civil revision has already been considered and decided by this Court in CR No.193/2025 and analogous cases decided on 08.04.2026. 2. This Court while dismissing CR No.193/2025 and analogous cases vide order dated 08.04.2026, observed as follows : “1. Since a common question of law and fact arises for consideration in the present batch of civil revisions, all the matters were heard analogously and are being disposed of by this common order. 2. In all these revisions, the applicants, comprising Insurance Companies as well as vehicle owners, have called in question the legality, propriety and correctness of the proceedings initiated and orders passed by the respective Motor Accident Claims Tribunals in relation to claim petitions preferred under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short, ‘M.V. Act’). 3. The core issue involved in all the cases pertains to the maintainability of claim petitions filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation and the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to condone such delay. 3 4. The facts, in brief, as obtaining in all the cases, are broadly similar and are therefore being noticed in a consolidated manner. In each of these cases, the claimants instituted applications under Section 166 of the M.V. Act seeking compensation on account of injuries sustained in motor accidents. However, the said claim petitions were filed beyond the statutory period prescribed under Section 166(3) of the M.V. Act. Upon such filing, the present applicants/revisionists, i.e., the Insurance Companies and the vehicle owners, raised objections before the concerned Tribunals and preferred applications seeking rejection of the claim petitions on the ground that the same were barred by limitation and thus not maintainable. 5. The respective Tribunals, however, declined to accept the objections raised by the revisionists and proceeded to entertain the claim petitions by condoning the delay in filing the same. While doing so, the Tribunals, in substance, invoked principles analogous to Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (for short, ‘Limitation Act’), and held that sufficient cause had been shown for condonation of delay. 6. Consequently, the applications preferred by the present revisionists under Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC seeking rejection of the claim petitions came to be dismissed, giving rise to the present batch of civil revisions. 7. The applicants have assailed the impugned orders primarily on the ground that the learned Tribunals have acted with material irregularity and illegality in assuming jurisdiction not vested in them 4 by law. It is contended that the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, being a statutory forum constituted under the M.V. Act, is bound by the provisions of the said Act and cannot travel beyond the same. According to the applicants, there is no provision under the Act, particularly after the amendments brought into force, which empowers the Tribunal to condone delay in filing claim petitions under Section 166 of the M.V. Act, and therefore, the invocation of principles akin to Section 5 of the Limitation Act is wholly misconceived and impermissible. 8. It is further contended that the claim petitions, having been instituted beyond the statutorily prescribed period, could not have been entertained at all, and the failure on the part of the learned Tribunals to reject such petitions at the threshold amounts to a jurisdictional error. It has also been urged that, in several instances, the delay has been condoned without affording adequate and effective opportunity of hearing to the present revisionists, i.e., the Insurance Companies as well as the vehicle owners, thereby resulting in violation of the principles of natural justice. According to the applicants, the impugned orders thus suffer from non-application of mind, patent illegality and jurisdictional infirmity, warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. 9. It is further submitted that the issue relating to the scope, applicability and condonability of delay under Section 166(3) of the M.V. Act has been engaging consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a batch of proceedings, wherein interim protection 5 has also been granted. In the said proceedings, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has, inter alia, directed that claim petitions ought not to be dismissed at this stage solely on the ground of limitation, thereby indicating that the issue is yet to attain finality and is under active consideration before the Apex Court. 10. In this context, reference is made to the order passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in ICICI Lombard General Insurance Company Limited v. Ayiti Navaneetha and others (Special Leave to Appeal (C) Nos. 8412–8413/2023 and connected matters), wherein, vide order dated 04.11.2025, it has been specifically observed that the Tribunals and the High Courts shall not dismiss claim petitions on the ground that such petitions are barred by limitation under Section 166(3) of the M.V. Act. Taking note of the aforesaid interim directions, this Court had earlier directed the concerned Motor Accident Claims Tribunals to proceed with the claim cases, however, no final award shall be passed. 11. Further, in continuation thereof and in view of the subsequent order passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bhagirathi Dash v. Union of India and another (Writ Petition (Civil) No. 166/2024) vide order dated 19.03.2026, whereby the matter has been directed to be listed for further hearing, this Court is of the considered opinion that a balanced approach is required to be adopted. Accordingly, while the concerned Tribunals shall be at liberty to proceed with the adjudication of the claim petitions in accordance with law, it is directed that no final order shall be passed until the issue is finally settled 6 by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 12. It is further clarified that in the event any order is passed which operates in favour of the Insurance Companies or the vehicle owners, it shall be open to them to bring such development to the notice of the concerned Tribunal, and upon such intimation, the Tribunal shall be at liberty to pass appropriate orders, strictly in accordance with law and subject to the final outcome of the proceedings pending before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 13. In view of the factual matrix as delineated hereinabove, particularly the interim directions issued by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in relation to the issue of limitation under Section 166(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, this Court finds that the principal grievance raised by the applicants i.e. Insurance Companies as well as vehicle owners, seeking outright rejection of the claim petitions on the ground of delay, cannot be countenanced at this stage. The directions of the Apex Court clearly mandate that such claim petitions ought not to be dismissed solely on the ground of limitation pending final adjudication of the issue. 14. Having bestowed anxious consideration to the rival submissions and upon perusal of the material available on record, this Court is of the considered opinion that the challenge laid by the applicants does not warrant interference in exercise of revisional jurisdiction at this stage. The orders passed by the learned Tribunals, in so far as they proceed to entertain the claim petitions instead of rejecting them at the threshold, cannot be said to 7 suffer from such jurisdictional error or material irregularity as would call for interference, particularly in light of the binding interim directions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 15. At the same time, considering the contention of the applicants with regard to lack of jurisdiction and the alleged improper exercise of discretion in condoning delay, it is deemed appropriate to balance the competing interests of the parties. While the claimants cannot be non-suited at the threshold on technical grounds of limitation, the rights and objections of the Insurance Companies and vehicle owners also deserve to be adequately safeguarded. 16. Accordingly, it is directed that the concerned Motor Accident Claims Tribunals shall proceed with the adjudication of the claim petitions in accordance with law. However, no final award shall be passed by the Tribunals until the issue relating to the applicability and condonation of delay under Section 166(3) of the M.V. Act is conclusively decided by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. It is further observed that all contentions of the parties, including those relating to limitation, jurisdiction, and the applicability of the provisions of the Limitation Act, are kept open to be urged at the appropriate stage, and the Tribunals shall consider the same independently, uninfluenced by any prima facie observations made in the present proceedings. 17. Needless to say, in the event there is any subsequent development or authoritative pronouncement by the Hon’ble Supreme Court governing the field, it shall be open to either party to 8 bring the same to the notice of the concerned Tribunal, which shall thereafter proceed to pass appropriate orders strictly in accordance with law and in consonance with such pronouncement. 18. In view of the aforesaid, all the civil revisions stand disposed of. Any interim orders operating in these matters shall stand vacated forthwith, subject, however, to the directions issued hereinabove. 19. Pending interlocutory applications, if any, also stand disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs.” She further submitted that since the facts and issue involved in the present case are identical to that of CR No.193/2025 and analogous cases, the present civil revision may also be disposed off in the same terms. 3. Having considered the rival submissions made by learned counsel for the applicant and having gone through the materials on record, it is evident that the facts and issue involved in the present case are identical to CR No.193/2025 and analogous cases, this Court deems it appropriate not to take a view other than what has been taken in CR No.193/2025 and analogous cases. 4. Accordingly, the present civil revision is disposed of in terms of the order dated 08.04.2026 passed in CR No.193/2025 and analogous cases. Sd/-/- (Amitendra Kishore Prasad) Judge Yogesh