Judgment : A.K. Jayasankaran Nambiar, J. The United India Insurance Company is the appellant before us, aggrieved by the judgment dated 04.12.2025 of a learned Single Judge that dismissed a writ petition filed by it, assailing an award passed by the Permanent Lok Adalat for Public Utility Services [PLA], Kozhikode. 2. The brief facts necessary for disposal of this Writ Appeal are as follows: The appellant had issued a motor cycle/scooter liability only policy to cover vehicle No.KL 49B 0752 owned by the 2 nd respondent. As per the said policy, compulsory personal accident coverage for the owner/driver was also granted subject to the conditions prescribed in the policy document. Those conditions stipulated that the owner - driver had to be the registered owner of the vehicle, that the owner - driver was the insured person and that the owner- driver had to hold an effective driving licence at the time of the accident. 3. In the instant case, the respondents lodged a claim under the policy pursuant to the accidental death of their son that occurred on 20.12.2023 while he was driving the insured vehicle. The said claim was rejected by the appellant herein on the contention that the son of the respondents was not the insured person named in the policy. The respondents therefore approached the PLA, which, after hearing the parties, found in favour of the respondents herein by rejecting the contention of the appellant Insurance Company. At paragraph 12 of its award, the PLA found as follows: “12. Above stated clauses/conditions are included in Ext.B1 policy schedule. Respondent Insurance company rejected first applicant's PA claim contending that the PA cover is purely a contractual liability and that cover is not available to any other person driving/riding the insured vehicle except the insured/registered owner. The learned advocate appearing for the respondent insurance company relied upon the decisions in United India Insurance Company Ltd v Vijayarajan and Others – 2009 (3) KHC 158 , New India Assurance Co. Ltd v Sujit Mohan and Another - 2022 KHC 4400, Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd v Rajni Devi and Others - 2008 KHC 4640 and Deepika Sharma and Others v Deepak – 2019 ICO 4168 to fortify the contention of the respondent insurance company. The dictum laid down in those cases is not applicable in this case because separate premium was collected from the second petitioner for PA cover. Ltd v Rajni Devi and Others - 2008 KHC 4640 and Deepika Sharma and Others v Deepak – 2019 ICO 4168 to fortify the contention of the respondent insurance company. The dictum laid down in those cases is not applicable in this case because separate premium was collected from the second petitioner for PA cover. In this case, the question to be considered is whether a borrowed rider/driver of a motor vehicle would step into the shoes of owner/insured or not for the purpose of PA cover benefit. The decisions cited by the respondent insurance company are not useful in this case. The applicants contended that a person driving a motor vehicle having PA cover for owner/driver with registered owner's permission steps into the shoes of the registered owner and eligible for getting PA cover benefits under the policy. Owner cum driver cannot be split up to narrow down the enforceability of the policy to driver only if he is also owner of the vehicle. (National Insurance Co. Ltd v Krishnan - 2014 KHC 5694 and Vasuki and Another v Shanthi and Another - 2021 KHC 6627) A borrowed driver is also eligible for obtaining PA cover ( Ramkhiladi and Another v. United India Insurance Company and Another - 2020 KHC 6008 and Kunjila v. Mary - 2024 KHC 219) . The respondent insurance company ought not to have declined first applicant's claim stating flimsy or technical grounds. (Gurmel Singh v Branch Manager, National Insurance Co. Ltd - 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 506 and the Oriental Insurance Company Ltd v K. Narasimhareddy - CA.No.7694/2013 (SC) . For the reasons and circumstances mentioned above, we are of the opinion that the respondent insurance company is not justified in not allowing the claim of first applicant. Second applicant, as he is not a legal heir of the deceased, is not eligible for getting benefits under PA cover of the policy. 4. For the reasons and circumstances mentioned above, we are of the opinion that the respondent insurance company is not justified in not allowing the claim of first applicant. Second applicant, as he is not a legal heir of the deceased, is not eligible for getting benefits under PA cover of the policy. 4. Aggrieved by the award of the PLA, and notwithstanding the scheme of finality envisaged under the Legal Services Authorities Act for such award, the appellant approached the writ court through the writ petition aforementioned which was dismissed by the learned Single Judge accepting the reasoning of the PLA and finding that the decision of the Supreme Court in Ramkhiladi and Another v. United India Insurance Company and Another - [2020 KHC 6008] , a case pertaining to the appellant company itself, held that a person who stepped into the shoes of the owner would also be entitled to get the coverage of personal accidents and injuries. The findings of the learned Single Judge are at paragraphs 6 to 11 of the impugned judgment which read as follows: “6. I have examined the contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioner. As far as the issue raised by the petitioner is concerned, the said question is already considered by this Court in Kunjila v. Mary [2024 KHC Online 219] , in which, after taking note of the observations made by the Honourable Supreme Court in Ramkhiladi and Another v. United India Insurance Company and Another [ (2020) 2 SCC 550 ] it was observed that, if the policy contains personal accident coverage for the owner-driver, benefit of the same can be extended to the claimants in a petition under Section 163A , where the claimants are the legal heirs of the deceased driver who was driving the vehicle with the permission of the owner. Of course, the learned counsel for the petitioner made an attempt to distinguish the said judgment, pointing out that, as far as the said decision is concerned, the same was passed in an application under Section 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act , whereas, in this case, it was passed under the provisions of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 . It was also pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner that, in Kunjila (supra), a decision contrary to the contention raised by the insurance company was taken in view of the fact that, in the said case, the insurance company raised a contention against the maintainability of the application under Section 163A of the , filed at the instance of the legal heirs of the driver, who died in an accident, on the ground that, the said driver while driving the vehicle with the permission of the registered owner of the vehicle, had stepped into the shoes of the registered owner. Therefore, it was pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner that, in view of the said contention, the claim of the party respondents were accepted in the said case, by observing that, after taking such a stand with regard to the question of maintainability of Section 163A , insurance company cannot take a different stand, when it comes to the question of the personal accident coverage. However, according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the position in this case is completely different, as the matter was decided by the Permanant Lok Adalat for Public Utility Services and not in a proceeding under Section 163A of the . 7. However, on going through the observations made in Kunjila (supra), even though the said decision was taken in a proceeding under Section 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act , in view of the categorical observations made by the Honourable Supreme Court in Ramkhiladi (supra), a different view cannot be taken in the matter of applying the said principles in this case. It was observed in Ramkhiladi’s case (supra) at paragraph No.5.8 as follows: “However, at the same time, even as per the contract of insurance, in case of personal accident the owner-driver is entitled to a sum of Rs.1 lakh. Therefore, the deceased, as observed hereinabove, who would be in the shoes of the owner shall be entitled to a sum of Rs.1 lakh, even as per the contract of insurance…...” 8. Thus, it was noticed by this court in Kunjila’s case (supra) that, the Honourable Supreme Court, after interpreting the clauses in the policy held that, the person who stepped into the shoes of the owner would also be entitled to get the coverage of personal accident. 9. Thus, it was noticed by this court in Kunjila’s case (supra) that, the Honourable Supreme Court, after interpreting the clauses in the policy held that, the person who stepped into the shoes of the owner would also be entitled to get the coverage of personal accident. 9. As far as the decision of Punjab and Haryana High Court, rendered in Harjit Kaur (supra) relied on by the petitioner is concerned, even though a different view is taken by the said Court, I am of the view that since this Court has already taken a decision in Kunjila (supra), which is contrary to the decision of High Court of Punjab and Haryana, this Court is bound to follow the decision in Kunjila (supra). It is also a relevant aspect to notice in this case that, the person who was driving the vehicle was none other than the son of the registered owner. 10. It is also to be noted that, in view of the observations made by the Honourable Supreme Court in Ningamma and Another v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd [2009 KHC 5046] and Ramkhiladi (supra) the respondents herein would not be in a position to seek any compensation under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act . Therefore, the only compensation that can be claimed by the respondents here, is under the personal accident coverage in the said policy. The Honourable Supreme Court in Ramkhiladi (supra) specifically took note of the said aspect and held that, going by the provisions in the insurance policy, the compulsory personal accident coverage could be extended to the driver/person, who was driving the vehicle with the knowledge and consent of the registered owner, as he stepped into the shoes of the owner. 11. Thus, I do not find any justifiable reason, not to follow the said decision and to take a different view, merely because of the reason that the proceeding, which is the subject matter of this case, has arisen under the provisions of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 and not in the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act . More over, such a distinction cannot be possibly be drawn, as what is relevant, is the application of the principle of stepping into the shoes of the owner, as held in Kunjila (supra) and Ramkhiladi (supra). More over, such a distinction cannot be possibly be drawn, as what is relevant, is the application of the principle of stepping into the shoes of the owner, as held in Kunjila (supra) and Ramkhiladi (supra). In such circumstances, I do not find any justifiable reason to entertain this writ petition and to interfere with the Ext P5 award passed by the Permanent Lok Adalat for Public Utility Services, Kozhikode. Accordingly, I find no merit in this writ petition and the same is dismissed.” 5. Although before us, the learned counsel for the appellant would reiterate the submissions made before the learned Single Judge and rely on earlier precedents of the Delhi High Court in Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. v. Rashmi & Ors. - [MAC. App. 691 of 2012] and the Punjab and Haryana High Court in United India Insurance Company v. Harjit Kaur and Another – 2018 (2) I.L.R. Punjab and Haryana 908], we are of the view that nothing in the said precedents dislodges the clear principle laid down by the Supreme Court in Ramkhiladi [supra] . We therefore do not see any reason to interfere with the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge and dismiss the Writ Appeal as devoid of merit. 6. Before parting with this case, however, we feel constrained to observe that we are a bit miffed by the conduct of the appellant company, that is in the insurance business and is expected to come to the aid of those who have paid the necessary premium amounts and insured themselves against named risks. Insurance contracts are entered into uberimmae fidei namely, in good faith and with the hope that the insurer will promptly honour its obligations under the contract in the event of the insured risk materialising. It is trite that, as mandated by the contra preferentum rule, even in cases of real doubt, the policy document ought to be construed most strongly against the insurers, since they are the ones who framed the policy and inserted the exceptions. Further, the words of “exception” or “exemption” in any contract must be read in the context of the contract as a whole and with due regard to its purpose. Further, the words of “exception” or “exemption” in any contract must be read in the context of the contract as a whole and with due regard to its purpose. As a matter of general principle, it is well established that if one party, otherwise liable, wishes to exclude or limit his liability to the other party, he must do so in clear words; and the contract should be given the meaning it would convey to a reasonable person having all the background knowledge which is reasonably available to the person or class of persons to whom the document is addressed. The said principle applies not only where the words of exception remove a remedy for breach, but where they seek to prevent a liability from arising by removing, through a subsidiary provision, part of the benefit which it appears to have been the purpose of the contract to provide [ New India Assurance Company Limited v. Rajeshwar Sharma and Others – [ (2019) 2 SCC 671 ] and Texco Marketing Private Limited v. Tata AIG General Insurance Company Limited and Others – [ (2023) 1 SCC 428 ] In the instant case, the factual situation was not a novel one, and did not give rise to any occasion for the appellant Insurance Company to have entertained any doubts regarding its obligation to honour the insurance claim. This was more so because the precedent relied upon by the PLA at first instance, and by the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment, namely, Ramkhiladi [supra] was one in which the appellant itself was a party. In our view, it was not open to the appellant herein to prolong the agony of the respondents herein by unnecessarily pursuing a litigation in respect of an issue that was already settled by the judgment of the Supreme Court in Ramkhiladi [supra] and an award passed by the PLA relying thereon. At any rate, the appellant ought not to have pursued the present writ appeal in a case where the order impugned in the writ petition itself was an award by the PLA, a statutory finality of which is envisaged through the provisions of the Legal Services Authorities Act. The object of the Legal Services Authorities Act is to ensure an expeditious disposal of disputes between an individual and a provider of public utility services. The object of the Legal Services Authorities Act is to ensure an expeditious disposal of disputes between an individual and a provider of public utility services. The appellant in the instant case, being a company in the insurance sector, ought to have acted more responsibly towards the hapless respondents. Therefore, while dismissing the writ appeal as devoid of merit, we also deem it appropriate to impose nominal costs of Rs.10,000/- [Rupees Ten thousand only], which, the appellant company shall pay to the respondents within a period of one month from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment.