1 2026:CGHC:18247-DB AFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR Reserved for Judgment On : 19.03.2026 Judgment Delivered On : 22/04/2026 Judgment Uploaded On : 22/04/2026 WA No. 34 of 2026 1 - Miss. Akanksha Bhardwaj D/o Shri Ashok Kumar Bhardwaj Aged About 35 Years R/o Jr. M I G- 05, Near Post Office, Rajkishore Nagar, Bilaspur (C.G.). --- Appellant versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through : Principal Secretary, Law and Legislative Affairs, Mahanadi Bhawan, Mantralaya, Naya Raipur (C.G.) 2 - High Court Of Chhattisgarh, Through : The Registrar General, High Court Building, Bodri, Bilaspur (C.G.) ---- Respondents (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Appellant : Ms. Akanksha Bhardwaj, appellant-in-person. For State No.1 : Mr. Gairy Mukhopadhyay, Additional A.G. For Respondent No.2 : Mr. Amrito Das, Advocate DIVISION BENCH : Hon'ble Shri Parth Prateem Sahu, Judge Hon'ble Shri Sanjay Kumar Jaiswal, Judge C A V Order Per Parth Prateem Sahu, Judge 1. Appellant by this appeal has questioned the legality and sustainability of the impugned order dated 03.12.2025, passed in WPS No. 2942 of BALRAM PRASAD DEWANGAN Digitally signed by BALRAM PRASAD DEWANGAN 2 2025, whereby learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition filed by appellant against the order of termination dated 14.01.2025. 2. Facts relevant for disposal of this appeal are that appellant was initially appointed on the post of Civil Judge (Entry Level) vide her letter of appointment dated 12.12.2013. Period of probation according to order of appointment was two years. Period of probation of appellant along with other judicial officers was extended on 18.03.2016. On 09.02.2017 appellant was terminated from service. Order of termination was challenged by appellant by way of filing writ petition bearing WPS No.2206 of 2017, which came to be allowed in part vide order dated 01.05.2024. Order passed by learned Single Judge in WPS No.2206 of 2017 was put to challenge in writ appeal by respondent No.2/High Court of C.G. bearing WA No.363 of 2024 and appellant herein also questioned the order passed in earlier writ petition bearing WPS No.2206 of 2017 in WA No.362 of 2024 claiming back wages. Both the writ appeals came to be dismissed vide order dated 20.09.2024 and Division Bench of this Court affirmed the order passed in WPS No.2206 of 2017. Appellant was reinstated in service vide order dated 28.11.2024 and she was posted as Fourth Civil Judge Class-II at Mahasamund to which she joined on 04.12.2024. Vide order dated 14.01.2025, petitioner was terminated and order of termination was communicated to her on 15.01.2025. Order of termination was put to challenge in WPS No.2942 of 2025, which came to be dismissed by impugned order. 3. Appellant-in-person submits that writ petition filed by her bearing WPS No.2206 of 2017 was allowed in part and learned Single Judge while 3 passing the order of reinstatement has further observed that reinstatement of appellant with continuity of service but without back- wages. As there is order of continuity of service and appellant was initially appointed on the post of Civil Judge vide appointment letter dated 12.12.2013 with a conditions mentioned therein that period of probation is of two years and even considering the extension of probation period of one year, appellant has been confirmed in service by virtue of Rule 11 of the Chhattisgarh Lower Judicial Service (Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 2006 (In short ‘the Rules, 2006’). It is contention of appellant that under Rule 11 of the Rules, 2006, maximum period of probation has been clearly stipulated of four years, therefore, language used in Rule 11 (3) of the Rules, 2006 after four years of maximum period of probation, appellant got automatically confirmed in service, therefore, appellant is having protection under Article 311 of the Constitution of India. She submits that her services could not have been terminated without holding due departmental enquiry against her. She contended that there is no mention of issuing of an order of confirmation under Rule 11 of the Rules, 2006. Amendment incorporated under Rule 11 (1) and Rule 11 (3) came into force w.e.f. 08.06.2021 and 19.12.2024 respectively. Appointment of appellant was prior to that, therefore, rules applicable to the services of appellant in facts of the case in particular the provision of Rule 11 of the Rules, 2006 governing the period of probation will apply as it exists prior to 08.06.2021. She further contended that period of probation under Rule 11(1), as provided under the pre-amended provision, is two years, therefore, without there being any further order after completion of two years, she got the 4 status of confirmed employee under the principles of ‘deemed confirmation’. In support of her contention, she placed reliance upon the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of State of Punjab Vs. Dharam Singh, reported in 1968 SCC OnLine SC 66, in case of High Court of Madhya Pradesh, through Registrar & Ors. Vs. Satya Narayan Jhavar, reported in (2001) 7 SCC 161, in case of Abhay Jain Vs. High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan & Another, reported in (2022) 13 SCC 1, in case of Anantdeep Singh Vs. High Court of Punjab And Haryana at Chandigarh & Another, reported in (2024) 18 SCC 616. 4. Referring to Rule 11 (3), 11 (4) and 11 (5) of the Rules, 2006 she argued that sub-rule-5 of Rule 11 of the Rules, 2006, no where provides for separate order to be issued for confirmation of service of Judicial Officers (entry level), therefore, order of termination passed without affording proper opportunity to appellant is per-se illegal and arbitrary in light of the protection granted under 311 (2) of the Constitution of India. She next contended that Standing Committee is having no jurisdiction under the rules applicable to services of appellant to recommend for termination of her service. It is contention of appellant that High Court means High Court of Chhattisgarh as envisaged under Rule 2 (g) of the Rules, 2006 and Rule 2 (f) of the High Court of Chhattisgarh Rules, 2007 (In short ‘the Rules, 2007’). Appellant further contended that under Rule 4-O of the Rules, 2007, it is envisaged that all the recommendations for dismissal from office of the Judicial Officer shall be taken by the Judges at a meeting of Full Court and in her case, recommendation is made by the Standing 5 Committee. The recommendation of the Standing Committee for termination of her services is in contravention of the provisions under the Rules, 2007. It is also argued that learned Single Judge has not discussed as to the “recommendation for dismissal” as envisaged under Rule 4-O (i) (b) is different from “recommendation for termination”. 5. She next contended that she was not served with ACR for the year 2015-16 and 2016-17, whereas, ACRs of both the years have been considered by the Committee in the proceedings. The very ground raised by appellant in the writ petition was not considered and appreciated by the learned Single Judge in appropriate manner. Learned Single Judge relied upon the finding recorded in the order dated 01.05.2024 passed in WPS No.2206 of 2017, which is subject matter of challenge before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Special Leave Petition and is pending consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Learned Single Judge erroneously considered and took note that SLP filed by appellant before Hon’ble Supreme Court has been withdrawn. She also contended that in view of the extract from the ACR for period from 01.04.2015 to 31.03.2016, it is apparent that it was stigmatic, therefore, in support of her above contention, she placed reliance upon the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Dev Dutt Vs. Union of India, reported in (2008) 8 SCC 725, in case of Sukhdev Singh Vs. Union of India & Ors., reported in (2013) 9 SCC 566, Sarita Choudhary Vs. High Court of Madhya Pradesh & Anr, reported in 2005 INSC 289. 6 6. Appellant next contended that she being the confirmed employee is entitled for protection under 311 (2) of the Constitution of India. She also contended that if recommendation of termination of appellant is based on extracts made in ACR of the appellant mentioning that “she would not be able to discharge any other job” confirming basis for issuance of order of termination, then passing of an order of termination without conducting enquiry against appellant is against well settled principles of law. She also contended that the manner in which the order of termination of appellant was served upon her after office hours in the night at about 11 PM is inhuman. Serving upon the order of termination and asking her to handover the charge of Judicial Officer at 11 PM is unbecoming of constitutionally protected service like ‘Judicial Function’, appellant is entitled for back wages in the facts of the case and placed reliance upon the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Deepali Gundu Surwase Vs. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.) & Ors., reported in (2013) 10 SCC 324 and in case of Pradeep Vs. Manganese & Ors. (India) Limited & Others, reported in (2022) 3 SCC 683. 7. Learned counsel for respondent No.2 vehemently opposes the submission of learned counsel for appellant and would submit that there is no concept of deemed confirmation under the Rules, 2006. He contended that even though under Rule 11 (3) of the Rules, 2006 there is mention of maximum period of probation of four years now and earlier 3 years then also under Rule 11 (5), it is provided that probationer shall be confirmed on successful completion of probation, which means that authority will issue the order of confirmation only 7 after assessment of working and performance of Judicial Officer, therefore, it cannot be said that confirmation of Judicial Officer to be automatic after completion of period as provided under Rule 11 of the Rules, 2006. He also referred to the sub-rule 6 of Rule 11 of Rules, 2006, which envisages that Judicial Officer shall continue as probationer until he or she is terminated or confirmed under sub-rule 4 or sub-rule-5 of Rule 11 of the Rules, 2006, therefore, from the reading of the provision under Rule 11 of the Rules, 2006, it is apparent that before the Judicial Officer is said to be confirmed in service, it requires an order of the authority that particular Judicial Officer has been confirmed in service. Sub-rule 3 of Rule 11 of the Rules, 2006 has to be read along with sub-rule -5 and sub-rule 6 in conjunction and not in isolation. He further contended that for conformation of Judicial officer there has to be a conscious decision on assessment by authority, which has not been done in case of appellant. Consideration of confirmation of Judicial Officer and that of other government servant is different. 8. Referring to the dates and events it is submission of learned counsel for respondent No.2 that order of appointment of appellant is dated 12.12.2013. Her joining is of 27.12.2013. The order of extension of period of probation is on 18.03.2016 and the order of termination is on 09.02.2017. He contended that decision relied upon by appellant in case of Dharam Singh (supra) is on different set of facts and not applicable to the present case. In that case, probationer was allowed to continue in post after completion of maximum period of probation and further respondent therein was allowed to draw annual increments 8 of salary including the increments which fell due on October, 1962. He contended that even after reinstatement, appellant worked only for one month and five days beyond three years. He placed reliance upon the decision of Division Bench of this Court in case of Ganesh Ram Burman Vs. High Court of Chhattisgarh, in W.A. No.727 of 2024, decided on 07.11.2024. He also contended that aforementioned decision in case of Ganesh Ram Burman (supra) is under challenge before the Hon’ble Supureme Court in SLP (C) No. 809 of 2025 and is pending consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. He next contended that consequence of order of reinstatement passed in first writ petition filed by appellant herein bearing WPS No.2206 of 2017 is that appellant has been reinstated on her formal post i.e. Civil Judge Class-II as probationer. 9. It is next contended by learned counsel for respondent No.2 that submission of appellant herein that the Standing Committee is not having jurisdiction to recommend the appellant- Judicial Officer for termination under the Rules, 2007 is not correct. Rule 4-O (i) (b) of the Rules, 2007 provides for dismissal whereas appellant is recommended for termination. It is submitted that termination is not penalty under Rule 10 of the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1966 (In short ‘the Rules, 1966’) and in support of his contention he referred to the explanation appended to Rule 10 of the Rules, 1966. Decision which was taken by the Standing Committee in its meeting dated 06.01.2025 is with regard to confirm the appellant in service or not. Learned Single Judge has extracted the decision of Standing Committee in para-38. Referring to Rule 11 (6) of the Rules, 9 2006, it is argued that termination of judicial officer on his/her non- confirmation will not come within the purview of Rule 4-O of the Rules, 2007, but will fall under Rule 4-C (xvii). In the aforementioned facts of the case provision under Rule 11 of the Rules, 2006 and the provision under the Rules, 2007, the Standing Committee is having jurisdiction to recommend for termination of a non-confirmed Judicial Officer on the ground of his/her non-confirmation. 10. He next contended that grievance of appellant that she was served with order of termination in the night at about 11 PM, which was not proper is only because the Principle District Judge received an envelop in the name of appellant mentioning over envelop the word ‘Confidential’, therefore, Principle District Judge might have thought appropriate to serve the envelop upon appellant immediately after its receipt. Service of order of termination after office hours is for not other purpose. He next contended that argument raised by appellant with regard to non-serving of her ACR within time prescribed, to be not sustainable because, ACR is not sole consideration for non- confirmation of appellant but the Standing Committee in its resolution has considered over all performance entire services record ACRs and assessment chart of appellant and thereafter concluded that she is not fit for confirmation in service and recommended for termination of her services. The procedure adopted for recommendation is in accordance with provisions/rules applicable to the facts of the case. Decision relied upon by appellant in case of Dev Dutt (supra), in case of Sukhdev Singh (supra), in case of Sarita Choudhary (supra) and in Abhay 10 Jain (supra) are on different facts and are not applicable to the case at hand. 11. Learned counsel for State would support the contention of learned counsel for respondent No.2. It is submitted that based on the recommendation made by respondent No.2, order of termination has been issued by the respondent No.1, which is in accordance with provisions under the Rules, 2006. 12. Appellant in reply to the arguments raised by learned counsel for respondents would submit that unless and until ACRs are served upon her within time, she was not having an opportunity to improve her work. She also contended that the decision in case of Ganesh Ram Burman (supra) is on different facts. She submits that in the facts of the case, after reinstatement after completion of maximum period of probation, the status of appellant would be of confirmed employee and in support of her contention, she placed reliance upon the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Anantdeep Singh (supra). She also pointed out that during appellant was in service prior to her first order of termination, she was conferred summary powers and powers of Judicial Magistrate First Class. Appellant has earlier filed writ petition before Hon’ble Supreme Court against the order of termination, however, the said writ petition was withdrawn to challenge the second order of termination before the High Court. 13. We have heard learned counsel for parties and perused the documents placed on record. 11 14. Appellant has pressed upon the grounds that she was confirmed on her post i.e. Civil Judge (Entry Level) automatically after completion of period of probation as provided under the Rules, 2006 i.e. of three years by application of principles of ‘deemed confirmation’. Appellant as well as respondent No.2 have pressed upon their arguments relying upon Rule 11 of the Rules, 2006, therefore, before proceeding further, to appreciate the submission of learned counsel for respective parties, we find it appropriate to extract Rule-11 of the Rules, 2006 for ready reference, which is as under :- “11. Probation. – (1) A person appointed to category (a) of sub- rule (1) of Rule 3 shall be posted on probation for a period of three years. (2) A person appointed to a post in category (a) of sub-rule (1) of Rule 3 shall undergo a judicial training for a period of one year in accordance with the scheme prepared by the High Court and shall also include training in the Chhattisgarh State Judicial Academy. (3) The High Court may, at any time, before the completion of probation period extend the period of probation, but the total period of probation shall not exceed four years. (4) The High Court, may at any time, before the completion of period of probation, recommend termination of the services of Civil Judge (Junior Division) (Entry Level) appointed to the category (a) of sub-rule (1) of Rule 3. (5) On successfully completion of probation, a probationer shall be confirmed in the Service or 12 post, to which, he has been appointed and if no permanent post is available, a certificate shall be issued in his favour by the High Court to the effect that the probationer would have been confirmed, but for the non- availability of the permanent post and as soon as a permanent post becomes available, he shall be confirmed. (6) A person appointed on probation shall continue as such until terminated or confirmed under sub-rule (4) or sub-rule (5) as the case may be. (7) When a probationer is confirmed, he shall be allowed to draw annual increment for the whole of the period of probation.” 15. The above extracted Rule 11 (1) is amended vide notification dated 08.06.2021 and Rule 11 (3) came to be amended vide notification dated 19.12.2024. Prior to it, Rule -11 (1) provides for probation of 2 years and Rule 11 (3) provides for probation shall not exceed 3 years. Perusal of aforementioned extracted provision under Rule 11 would show that a person is to be appointed on probation for a period of two years with further provision that period of probation can be extended but shall not exceed 3 years. Under the rules for considering the status of employee to be a probationer or confirmed employee, it is not only Rule 11 (1) or Rule 11 (3) only is to be read, but it also have sub rule-5 under Rule 11 of the Rules, 2006 which provides that on successful completion of probation, a probationer shall be confirmed in service or post which means that there has to be assessment of an officer by the competent authority before an officer shall be confirmed in service. There has to be application of mind, therefore, there has to be 13 conscious decision of authority on the issue of confirmation of an employee/officer as envisaged under Rule 11 (5). Further sub-rule (6) of Rule 11 of the Rules, 2006 also envisages that a person appointed on probation shall continue as such until terminated or confirmed under sub-rule 4 or sub-rule -5 meaning thereby the status of a probationer under Rule -11 has to be treated to be a probationer till further orders is passed, either under sub-rule 4 or sub-rule 5 of Rule 11 of the Rules, 2006. Reading of the provision under Rule 11 of the Rules, 2006 in its entirety the only conclusion would be that authority has to take conscious decision either to confirm an employee/officer or to terminate, therefore, until such a decision is taken, persons appointed under the Rules, 2006 shall continue to hold the status of probationers only. Upon reading of the entire provision under Rule 11 of the Rules, 2006 we are unable to accept the contention of appellant that she attained the status of confirmed employee by applying the principles of deemed confirmation. The said submission/grounds raised by appellant in view of the specific provision under Rule 11 of the Rules, 2006 is not sustainable and accordingly, it is repelled. The decision relied upon by appellant in case of Dharam Singh (supra), there was a consideration of Rule 6 of the Punjab Educational Service (Provincialised Cadre) Class-III Rules, 1961, which mentions only on the completion of period of probation, whereas under the Rules, 2006, the language used under sub-rule – 5 of Rule 11 is on successful completion of probation. Under the Punjab Educational Service (Provincialised Cadre) Class-III Rules, 1961, which was considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Dharam Singh (supra), there is no provision like sub-rule 6 of Rule 11 of the Rules, 2006, therefore, 14 the decision relied upon by appellant in case of Dharam Singh (supra) is distinguishable on facts. The conclusion of aforementioned discussion is that appellant has not got the status of confirmed employee at any point of time from the date of her appointment till the date of passing of order of termination dated 14.01.2025 but she worked only as a probationer as envisaged under sub-rule -6 of Rule 11 of the Rules, 2006. Learned Single Judge has discussed the issue raised by appellant in this regard from para-22 to 26. 16. The decision relied upon by the appellant in case of Satya Narayan Jhavar (supra), particularly the portion of paragraph 11 thereof, if read in its entirety, would not support the appellant’s contention. In concluding para-11, Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed the cases where even if the rules provided for maximum period of probation but the same require a specific act on the part of the employer by issuing an order of confirmation and of passing a test for the purposes of confirmation and it is held that even if the maximum period of probation has expired and neither any order of confirmation has been passed nor the person concerned has passed the requisite test, he cannot be deemed to have been confirmed merely because the said period has expired. The case of appellant falls in the aforementioned category as observed by Hon’ble Supreme Court. For the aforementioned discussions, the submission made by appellant that status of appellant is of confirmed employee by applying the principles of deemed confirmation is having no legs to stand, accordingly it is repelled. 15 17. So far as the second ground raised by appellant with regard to jurisdiction of Standing Committee to make recommendation to the State Government for terminating the Judicial Officer like appellant herein is concerned, provision under Rule 2 (s) of Rules, 2007 defines Standing Committee, which is extracted below for ready reference. “2(s) ‘Standing Committee’ means the Committee constituted under these rules;” 18. Power of Standing Committee is envisaged under Rule 4-C of the Rules, 2007, which is extracted below for ready reference :- “4-C. The Standing Committee shall have power, without reference to the Judges generally- (i) to dispose of all correspondence within its own Department urgent in its nature and not of general importance; (ii) to make recommendations for promotion of Subordinate Judges to the rank of Additional District & Sessions Judges and of the Additional District & Sessions Judges to the rank of District & Sessions Judges, and their initial posting on promotion or appointment; (iii) to exercise the power exercisable by the Court under 1[the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023]; (iv) to make recommendations to the Government for the vesting of special powers under any special Act; (v) to pass orders of transfer of District & Sessions Judges and Additional District & Sessions Judges; 16 (vi) to pass orders of the transfer and posting of subordinate Judges with or without the powers of an Additional Sessions Judges and Civil Judges; (vii) to make recommendations for the deputation of Lower Judicial Service or Higher Judicial Service to posts under the Government of India, Government of Chhattisgarh or other State Government or to Foreign Service; (viii) to issue orders regarding the promotion of Civil Judges; (ix) to pass orders of suspension, initiation of departmental proceedings against members of the Higher Judicial Service and Subordinate Judicial Service, and consequential orders in the said proceedings other than that of dismissal from service; (x) to issue Circular Orders and General letters to the Subordinate Courts; (xi) to dispose of any matter which might have been dealt with by the Judge in charge of the Administrative Department, but which he has referred to the Committee for their opinion; (xii) to make recommendation to the State Government for compulsory retirement of any Judicial Officer of any rank: Provided that notice of the decision of the Standing Committee shall be circulated to the Full Court within ten days from the date of the decision and if any member of Full Court desires, within three weeks of the decision, the matter to be discussed at a meeting of the Full Court then no action will be taken till the decision at such a meeting; and 17 (xiii) to dispose of any matter referred to it by the Full Court which might have been dealt with by the Full Court; 1[(xiv) to consider the representations of Judicial Officers with regard to expunging the adverse remarks/up-gradation of grades in Annual Confidential Reports or to refer to a Committee for the said purpose;) 2[(xv) Matters relating to the service conditions, facilities and amenities of the Judges of the Courts; (xvi) Rules which when published will have the force of law; (xvii) To dispose of any other matter(s) which are not covered under Rule 4-C excluding matters covered under Rule 4-O.” 19. Rule 4-C of the Rules, 2007 came to be amended vide notification dated 28.11.2023. In Rule 4 (c) following has been added by virtue of amendment dated 28.11.2023 :- “[(xv) Matters relating to the service conditions, facilities and amenities of the Judges of the Courts; (xvi) Rules which when published will have the force of law; (xvii) To dispose of any other matter(s) which are not covered under Rule 4-C excluding matters covered under Rule 4-O.”.” 20. Perusal of Rule 4.C. (xvii) provides that Standing Committee to dispose of any other matter (s) which are not covered under Rule 4-C excluding matters covered under Rule 4-O. 18 21. Prior to amendment Rule 4-O reads as under :- “4-O (i) On the following matter decision shall be taken by the Judges at a meeting of the Full Court:- (a) All appointments which by law are to be made by the High Court and which are not otherwise expressly provided for by these rules in this Chapter. (b) All recommendations for the dismissal from office of Judicial Officer. (c) Proposals for designating Advocates as Senior Advocates under section 16(2) of the Advocates Act, 1961. (d) Matters relating to the service conditions, facilities and amenities of the Judges of the Courts. (e) Constitution of Rule Committee under section 123 of the new Civil Procedure Code nominating Judges for the Rule Committee. (f) Consideration of matters relating to the Chief Justices’ Conference. (g) High Court Calendar. (ii) The following matters on which Judges have to be consulted, may be disposed of by circulation of files, except in a case where a meeting is called in accordance with Rule 4-N:- (a) Proposed changes in the law where the proposition emanates from the Government or, in other cases, where a committee or 19 any Judge of the Court considers that action is called for. (b) The Administration Report yearly submitted to Government when passed by the Judges of the Standing Committee. (c) Rules which when published will have the force of law. (d) Subjects connected with the relation between the Supreme Court and the High Court.” 22. By virtue of amendment dated 28.11.2023 Rule 4-O (i) (d) has been deleted. Rule 4-O (i) (b) provides for recommendation for the dismissal from office of Judicial Officer. It is this rule which is pressed upon by appellant to submit that recommendation for termination is made by the Standing Committee is also covered under Rule 4-O (i) (b), therefore, decision has to be taken by the Judges of the meeting of Full Court. The said submission of appellant in the opinion of this Court under amended provision of the Rule 4-C and 4-O of the Rules, 2007 is not sustainable. While bringing amendment under the Rules, 2007 with conscious decision Rule 4-O (i) (d) has been deleted and it has been brought in under Rule 4-C (xv) of the Rules, 2007. 23. To appreciate the submission of appellant herein that dismissal and termination are one and same for which it is only the Full Court to recommend for termination, We find it appropriate to extract the relevant provision under Rule 10 of the Rules, 1966, because the Rules, 1966 is applicable to the services of appellant. Rule 10 of the Rules, 1966 talks of penalties. Rule 10 (viii) talks of removal from 20 service and 10 (ix) talks of dismissal from service. Both of which has been treated to be major penalties. Under explanation Clause (viii) talks of termination of services not amount to penalty. Provision under (viii) (a) under explanation appended to the Rule 10 of the Rules, 1966 mentions that termination of the services of a government servant appointed on probation, during or at the end of period of probation, in accordance with the terms of his appointment or the rules and orders governing such probation shall not amount to penalty. If both the provision one under Rule 10 of the Rules, 1966 and another under the Rules, 2007 if read together it will be clear that under Rule 4-O (i) (b) only talks of dismissal and not termination. Dismissal and termination, therefore, is to be understood to be distinct connotation and cannot be replaced one for another. In view of the provision under the Rules, 2007 read with Rule 10 of the Rules, 1966 the Standing Committee has not exercised the jurisdiction as envisaged under Rule 4-O (i) (b) but has exercised jurisdiction under the Rule 4-C (xvii) of the Rules, 2007. Recommendation of the probationer for termination of his/her service on account of his/her non-confirmation is not part of provision under Rule 4-O (i) (b) of the Rules, 2007, therefore, submission of appellant that Standing Committee is having no jurisdiction for making recommendation for termination of service of appellant is misplaced and cannot be accepted in view of the specific provision under the Rules, 1966 and the Rules, 2007 as discussed above. Accordingly, the said grounds raised and submission made by appellant is not sustainable and according it is also repelled. 21 24. So far as the another ground raised by appellant that she was not served the excerpts of annual confidential report for the period from 01st April, 2015 to 31st March, 2016 and for the year 2016-17 even then the said ACRs have been considered by the Committee in the proceedings . As discussed in the preceding paragraph and according to the rules governing the services of appellant, in particular Rule 11 of the Rules, 2006, appellant from the date of her joining the service till the date of passing of an order of termination, she was a probationer, she was not confirmed in service by an order passed by the competent authority, she had not successfully completed the period of probation and there was no order of confirmation. The status of probationer in service like appellant stands on different footing than that of a confirmed employee in service. A probationer does not have a right to hold the post during period of probation, therefore, probationer cannot be equated with that of an employee who has been substantively appointed on the post and has a right to hold that post. 25. Appellant could not able to make out a case that her services had been terminated by way of punishment but challenge of order of termination on the ground as discussed above, on the authority of the Standing Committee to recommend for termination of her services and that appellant has been confirmed in service on the principles of deemed confirmation, which was negated by this Court in preceding paragraph. 26. Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of High Court of Judicature at Patna Vs. Pandey Madan Mohan Prasad Sinha & Others, reported in (1997) 10 SCC 409 has considered the issue raised by respondent 22 therein that they were not communicated ACRs with adverse entries and held thus :- “6…………The question is whether the non- communication of the said adverse remarks vitiates the action that has been taken against Respondent 1, viz., termination of his services on the ground that he was not fit for confirmation on the post of Munsif. As regards a probationer, the law is well settled that he does not have a right to hold the post during the period of probation. The position of a probationer cannot be equated with that of an employee who has been substantively appointed on a post and has a right to hold that post. An order terminating the services of a probationer can be questioned only if it is shown that it has been passed arbitrarily or has been passed by way of punishment without complying with the requirements of Article 311(2) of the Constitution. Since a probationer has no right to hold the post on which he has been appointed on probation, he cannot claim a right to be heard before an order terminating his services is passed. The obligation to communicate the adverse material to a person before taking action against him on the basis of the said material is a facet of the principles of natural justice. But principles of natural justice have no application in the case of termination of the services of a probationer during the period of probation since he has no right to hold the post. It is, therefore, not possible to hold that there is an obligation to communicate the adverse material to a probationer before a decision is taken on the basis of the said material that he is not fit for being retained in service. Such material can be relied upon to show that such a decision does not suffer from the vice of arbitrariness and is not capricious. ………….. * * * 23 8. We are, therefore, unable to hold that the failure to communicate some of the adverse remarks to Respondent 1 prior to 19-6-1985 vitiates the decision taken by the High Court on 19-6-1985 that Respondent 1 was not fit for confirmation on the post of Munsif and that his services should be terminated.” 27. In the aforementioned facts of the case, decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court as referred above we are of the considered view that the ground raised by appellant that non-supply of ACR to her for the period from 01st April, 2015 to 31st March, 2016 and for the year 2016-17 vitiates the entire proceedings, is not sustainable, accordingly it is repelled. 28. So far as the arguments raised by appellant about service of order of termination upon her at about 11.00 PM is concerned, submission is made by the counsel representing respondent No.2 that envelop which is sent to Principal District Judge mentions “Confidential”. The concerned Judicial Officer has though it to be some urgent post, has informed appellant and to collect the same. We are not making any observation on the said ground raised by appellant as it will not have any bearing on the merits of the appeal i.e. the order of termination of appellant (probationer). 29. For the foregoing discussions, we do not find any good ground to interfere with the decision of learned Single Judge. The appeal, being devoid of merit, is liable to be and it is hereby dismissed. Sd/- Sd/- (Sanjay Kumar Jaiswal) (Parth Prateem Sahu) Judge Judge Balram