Judgment : Raja Vijayaraghavan, J. 1.Muniyandi Raj @ Raj, the appellant herein is the accused in S.C.No. 205 of 2019 on the file of the Additional Sessions Judge-III, Pathanamthitta. In the aforesaid case, he faced indictment for having committed offences punishable under Sections 392 and 302 of the IPC . By the judgment, which is impugned in this appeal, the learned Sessions Judge found the appellant guilty of the offences under Section 392 and 302 of the and sentenced him to undergo: i) Rigorous Imprisonment for 7 years and to pay a fine of Rs. 2000/- for the offence under Section 392 of the IPC ; and ii) Imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs. 5000/- for the offence under Section 302 of the IPC , both with default clauses. 2. The above finding of guilt, conviction and sentence are challenged in this appeal. 3. The incident that allegedly led to the death of one Karuthakannan is stated to have occurred on 19.01.1991. According to the prosecution, Karuthakannan earned his livelihood by collecting alms from pilgrims visiting Sabarimala and was a native of Uthampalayam Taluk in the State of Tamil Nadu. The prosecution case is that, on the aforesaid date, Karuthakannan was found seated beside the Nadappatha near Poonkavanam, consuming food from a steel vessel. A sack containing miscellaneous articles, coins, and other belongings, along with another bag, was lying beside him. It is alleged that the accused approached the deceased and attempted to snatch the sack containing the coins, which resulted in a physical altercation between them. According to the charge, the appellant assaulted the deceased, struck his head against a tree, and thereafter dragged him to a location approximately 19.60 metres away from the spot where he had been sitting. It is further alleged that the appellant inflicted fatal injuries by striking the deceased on the head with a heavy stone, thereby causing his death. The prosecution further alleges that the appellant thereafter robbed the bags containing currency that were in the possession of the deceased. 4. It must be noted at the outset that there are no eyewitnesses to the occurrence. The prosecution case, therefore, rests entirely on circumstantial evidence and the inferences sought to be drawn therefrom. 5. The prosecution further alleges that the appellant thereafter robbed the bags containing currency that were in the possession of the deceased. 4. It must be noted at the outset that there are no eyewitnesses to the occurrence. The prosecution case, therefore, rests entirely on circumstantial evidence and the inferences sought to be drawn therefrom. 5. As stated earlier, although the incident occurred in January 1991 and the final report was laid on 31.05.1995, the investigating agency was unable to apprehend the accused. Consequently, an absconding charge was filed before the jurisdictional court. The records reveal that the matter was thereafter classified as a Long Pending Case and numbered as L.P. No. 86 of 1996. It was only on 15.02.2019, nearly 28 years after the alleged occurrence, that the appellant was arrested and committed to the Court of Session. The evidence in the case came to be recorded in February 2020, and the appellant was defended by a legal aid counsel. These circumstances assume considerable significance in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case and cannot be lost sight of while appreciating the evidence on record. 6. It would be apposite to briefly refer to the sequence of events that culminated in the registration of the crime and the eventual submission of the final report. 7. The first informant is one Silvaster, who was then working as a Watcher in the Vallakkadavu Forest Range. He, along with other Watchers, namely, Rejimon (PW2), Thankakuttan (CW3) and Radhakrishnan (CW5), used to reside in a shed at Uppupara. On 19.01.1991, Silvester, along with Reji and Thankakuttan, proceeded to Sannidhanam at about 9.30 a.m. and returned at approximately 3.30 p.m. When they reached the shed at Poonkavanam, they noticed the deceased seated beside the pathway, consuming rice gruel from a plate. They also observed a large sack and a smaller sack placed near him. Silvester enquired whether the deceased intended to accompany them, to which the deceased replied that he would come later. According to the informant, they reached the Uppupara shed at about 4.00 p.m., where CW5 was already present. Shortly thereafter, Karuppuswamy (PW15) arrived at the shed accompanied by another person. PW15 informed him that, while proceeding towards the shed, he had witnessed the appellant holding and shaking the deceased and had subsequently heard a cry. According to the informant, they reached the Uppupara shed at about 4.00 p.m., where CW5 was already present. Shortly thereafter, Karuppuswamy (PW15) arrived at the shed accompanied by another person. PW15 informed him that, while proceeding towards the shed, he had witnessed the appellant holding and shaking the deceased and had subsequently heard a cry. He later came to know that the deceased was found lying dead inside the forest, near the place where he had earlier been seated at Poonkavanam. PW15 further stated that the appellant was the very same person whom they had seen standing near the deceased while returning from Sannidhanam. It appears that the informant was unable to convey information regarding the death of the deceased to the police on 19.01.1991 itself. According to him, however, the appellant had been detained at the shed. During the night, a herd of elephants allegedly approached the shed and attempted to attack it. In the confusion and commotion that ensued, the appellant is stated to have escaped. Be that as it may, on the following day at about 11.00 a.m., the informant approached the Kumili Police Station and furnished a statement, on the basis of which Crime No. 07 of 1991 was registered on 20.01.1991 under Section 302 of the IPC . In the First Information Report, the name of the accused is stated as Muniyandi Raj. 8. Since the incident had occurred within the territorial limits of Moozhiyar Police Station, the records were transferred and a fresh crime was registered as Crime No. 33 of 1991 for offences punishable under Sections 392 and 302 of the IPC . The investigation was taken over by PW11, Sukumarakurup, the then Circle Inspector of Police. He conducted the inquest over the dead body and prepared Ext.P7 inquest report. Various articles, including Rudraksha beads, chains, coins, vessels, clothes and pooja materials found near the dead body, were seized and incorporated in Ext.P9 property list. The body was thereafter forwarded to the Medical College Hospital, Kottayam, for postmortem examination. On 22.01.1991, the sack allegedly left behind by the accused near the shed at Uppupara was seized under Ext.P10 mahazar, and the coins and other articles recovered therefrom were entered in Ext.P11 property list. Subsequently, Ext.P12 report was submitted before the court incorporating and 302 of the . On 22.01.1991, the sack allegedly left behind by the accused near the shed at Uppupara was seized under Ext.P10 mahazar, and the coins and other articles recovered therefrom were entered in Ext.P11 property list. Subsequently, Ext.P12 report was submitted before the court incorporating and 302 of the . During the course of investigation, the identity of the deceased was ascertained, and a report disclosing his name and address was forwarded to the court as Ext.P13. PW11 continued the investigation until May 1991, whereafter the investigation was entrusted to the Circle Inspector of Police, Chittar Police Station. 9. PW16, Sri. M.T. Skariah, the then Circle Inspector of Police, Chittar, took over the investigation on 08.08.1993. Despite making earnest efforts to trace and apprehend the accused, the investigating officer claims that he was unable to trace his whereabouts. In the said circumstances, after verifying the investigation already conducted, PW16 laid the final report before the jurisdictional Magistrate on 31.05.1995. 10. On receipt of the final report, the case was taken on file by the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Ranni, and committal proceedings were initiated by registering it as C.P. No. 10 of 1995. Since the accused remained absconding and could not be secured before the court, the proceedings could not be taken forward. Consequently, the matter was transferred to the register of Long Pending Cases and renumbered as L.P. No. 86 of 1996. It was only on 15.02.2019, nearly twenty-four years after the filing of the final report, that the accused was arrested and produced before the court. Thereupon, the case was restored to file and renumbered as C.P. No. 5 of 2019. The accused was remanded to judicial custody pending committal proceedings and, after complying with the statutory formalities contemplated under Section 209 of the Code of Criminal Procedure , the learned Magistrate committed the case to the Court of Session for trial. 11. When the accused appeared before the Court of Session, a legal aid counsel was appointed to defend him. The prosecution records were also handed over. After hearing the prosecution and the accused, charges for the offence under Sections 392 and 302 of the IPC were framed, and the same was read over and explained to the accused. He pleaded not guilty to the charge and claimed that he be tried in accordance with law. 12. The prosecution records were also handed over. After hearing the prosecution and the accused, charges for the offence under Sections 392 and 302 of the IPC were framed, and the same was read over and explained to the accused. He pleaded not guilty to the charge and claimed that he be tried in accordance with law. 12. On the side of the prosecution, 19 witnesses were examined as PWs 1 to 19, and through them Exts.P1 to P21 were exhibited and marked. The material objects produced in evidence were identified as MOs 1 to 10. After the conclusion of the prosecution evidence, the incriminating circumstances emerging therefrom were put to the accused under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure . The accused denied all incriminating evidence and asserted his innocence. No defence evidence was adduced. 13. The learned Sessions Judge, after an evaluation of the oral and documentary evidence on record, concluded that the prosecution had succeeded in establishing, through the testimonies of PWs 1 and 7, that the accused was present near the deceased while they were descending from Sannidhanam. The trial court further found that the accused had arrived at the Watchers’ shed shortly after Karuppuswamy and that, immediately prior to reaching the shed, he had abandoned a sack along the way. Proceeding on the premise that the said sack belonged to the deceased, the court held that the accused was under an obligation to furnish an explanation as to how he came into possession of the same. The learned Sessions Judge treated the aforesaid circumstances as forming a complete and incriminating chain of evidence against the accused and concluded that they were sufficient to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. On that basis, the accused was found guilty of the offences punishable under Sections 392 and 302 of the IPC and was convicted accordingly. 14. Mrs. Gisa Susan Thomas, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant, vehemently contended that there was not even a semblance of legally admissible evidence connecting the accused with the commission of the offences alleged. According to the learned counsel, the present case rests entirely on circumstantial evidence. 14. Mrs. Gisa Susan Thomas, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant, vehemently contended that there was not even a semblance of legally admissible evidence connecting the accused with the commission of the offences alleged. According to the learned counsel, the present case rests entirely on circumstantial evidence. It was submitted that, while convicting the appellant for the offences punishable under Sections 392 and 302 of the IPC , the learned Sessions Judge failed to apply the well-settled principles governing cases based solely on circumstantial evidence, as repeatedly enunciated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court as well as by this Court. The learned counsel argued that the prosecution had succeeded only in establishing two facts, namely, that the deceased had met with a homicidal death and that the accused remained untraced from the date of registration of the crime on 20.01.1991 until his arrest on 15.02.2019. Beyond these circumstances, no evidence whatsoever had been adduced to connect the accused with the crime. It was pointed out that not a single witness had claimed to have witnessed any part of the occurrence or any act attributable to the accused which could implicate him in the commission of the offences. The learned counsel further submitted that the trial court had permitted the Public Prosecutor to put leading questions to prosecution witnesses during chief-examination and, in that process, to introduce portions of statements allegedly made to the police, notwithstanding the clear embargo contained in Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure . According to the learned counsel, the reliance placed on such evidence has resulted in serious prejudice to the accused and has materially affected the fairness of the trial. It was further argued that the evidence on record is replete with material inconsistencies and discrepancies which strike at the very root of the prosecution case. However, instead of subjecting the evidence to careful scrutiny, the learned Sessions Judge either ignored such infirmities or brushed them aside without adequate consideration. The learned counsel submitted that the court below failed to bear in mind the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that suspicion, however strong or grave, can never take the place of legal proof. However, instead of subjecting the evidence to careful scrutiny, the learned Sessions Judge either ignored such infirmities or brushed them aside without adequate consideration. The learned counsel submitted that the court below failed to bear in mind the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that suspicion, however strong or grave, can never take the place of legal proof. According to the learned counsel, the court below failed to note that one of the cardinal principles in criminal cases particularly in cases wherein the guilt of the accused is sought to be established by circumstantial evidence is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. She would profusely rely on the law laid down in Hanumant v. State Of Madhya Pradesh , [ AIR 1952 SC 343 ] , Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra , [ (1984) 4 SCC 116 ] , State through Central Bureau of Investigation v. Mahender Singh Dahiya , [ (2011) 3 SCC 109 ] Ramesh Harijan v. State Of Uttar Pradesh , [ (2012) 5 SCC 777 ) and Kali Ram v. State Of Himachal Pradesh , [ 1973 SCC 2 808 ] 15. The learned Public Prosecutor has opposed the submissions, and it was argued that the prosecution has fully met the standard of proof required to convict a person in a case of circumstantial evidence. According to the learned Public Prosecutor, the circumstances relied upon by the Sessions Court have fully established the involvement of the appellant, and the chain of evidence furnished by the circumstances is also complete. 16. We have carefully considered the submissions advanced and have perused the records. 17. The first and foremost issue is whether the prosecution has established that the death of Karuthakannan was homicidal. No serious dispute is raised by the learned counsel appearing for the defence. In the case on hand, the autopsy was conducted by PW14, the Assistant Professor (Forensic Medicine), Kottayam Medical College and he issued Ext.P15 Certificate, noting as many as six injuries. The opinion of the Doctor is that the deceased had died of blunt injuries sustained to the head, being injury Nos. 1 to 3. In the case on hand, the autopsy was conducted by PW14, the Assistant Professor (Forensic Medicine), Kottayam Medical College and he issued Ext.P15 Certificate, noting as many as six injuries. The opinion of the Doctor is that the deceased had died of blunt injuries sustained to the head, being injury Nos. 1 to 3. In view of the evidence of PW14, it can be concluded without any semblance of doubt that the death was homicidal. 18. Now, we shall deal with the evidence let in by the prosecution to establish the guilt. 19. PW1 is the Watcher who furnished the First Information Statement. His evidence was recorded nearly three decades after the date of the incident. According to his testimony, on 19.01.1991, while returning along with the other Watchers, he had seen the deceased sitting by the side of the pathway and eating food from a steel plate. When specifically asked by the learned Public Prosecutor during chief-examination as to whether the accused was present at the scene, the witness answered in the affirmative. However, in cross-examination, it was unequivocally brought out that PW1 had no prior acquaintance whatsoever with the accused. He candidly admitted that after the incident on 19.01.1991, the first occasion on which he saw the accused was in the courtroom during trial. A careful reading of the entire deposition leaves little room for doubt that the witness was unable to independently recollect the material events that had allegedly occurred thirty years earlier. His memory had evidently faded with the passage of time, and he was unable to narrate the relevant facts from his own recollection. Faced with this situation, the learned Public Prosecutor adopted a course of examination which, in our considered view, was wholly impermissible. Regrettably, no objection was raised by the defence counsel, who had been appointed through the legal aid system. More importantly, the learned Sessions Judge ought to have intervened and prevented the examination from proceeding in such a manner. Instead of eliciting the witness’s independent recollection of the occurrence, the learned Public Prosecutor repeatedly read out portions of the First Information Statement and asked the witness whether he had made such statements before the police. The witness merely answered those questions in the affirmative. Instead of eliciting the witness’s independent recollection of the occurrence, the learned Public Prosecutor repeatedly read out portions of the First Information Statement and asked the witness whether he had made such statements before the police. The witness merely answered those questions in the affirmative. By adopting this method, what was effectively placed on record was not the witness’s present testimony based on personal memory, but a reproduction of the contents of the First Information Statement through the mouth of the witness. One such instance reads as follows: This was repeated and using this mode the entire statement of the witness given to the police at the stage of recording the FIS was brought in as evidence. We have no doubt in our mind that, in the examination-in-chief, the prosecutor could not have read out the FIS or the Section 164 statement and got the same recorded in the deposition. In chief examination, the Prosecutor is required to elicit the witness’s own memory of events. The examination-in-chief should elicit the witness’s own recollection of the facts and not recitals of the FIR or the Section 164 statement. The Apex Court in Tahsildar Singh And Another vs The State Of Uttar Pradesh , [ 1959 AIR SC 1012 ] , has held that a statement made by a witness before a police officer during investigation can be used only for the limited purpose of contradiction and for no other purpose; statements not reduced to writing cannot be used for contradiction; and even omissions can be used only to the limited extent recognised by law. The decision underscores the fundamental principle that previous statements recorded during investigation are not substantive evidence and cannot be introduced through chief-examination as a substitute for the witness’s testimony in court. 20. Viewed in the above legal and factual backdrop, the evidence of PW1 loses much of the significance attributed to it by the trial court. Stripped of the inadmissible manner in which portions of the First Information Statement were introduced, the testimony of PW1 establishes only one fact—that on the afternoon of 19.01.1991, he had seen the deceased sitting by the side of the pathway and consuming food. Beyond that limited circumstance, the witness was unable to furnish any reliable or independent evidence connecting the accused with either the deceased or the occurrence in question. Beyond that limited circumstance, the witness was unable to furnish any reliable or independent evidence connecting the accused with either the deceased or the occurrence in question. Consequently, his testimony does not advance the prosecution case in any meaningful manner insofar as the involvement of the accused is concerned. 21. PW2 is one Soman Pillai. According to the prosecution, he was accompanying PW1 and the other Watchers on 19.01.1991 and was therefore expected to corroborate the prosecution version regarding the events that allegedly transpired on that day. However, when examined before the court nearly three decades later, PW2 did not support the prosecution case in any material particular. Consequently, the testimony of PW2 is of no assistance whatsoever in establishing either the occurrence alleged by the prosecution or the involvement of the accused therein. 22. PW3, Raju, is a jeep driver. His evidence was confined to the assertion that about 30 years earlier he had seen the accused sitting inside the Watchers’ shed. He has not stated that he had occasion to witness any altercation involving the deceased. He also did not attribute any incriminating conduct to the accused. As his testimony did not support the prosecution version, permission was sought and obtained by the prosecution to put questions in the nature of cross-examination. Even thereafter, nothing was brought on record which could lend support to the prosecution case. The evidence of PW3 only establishes the presence of the accused in the vicinity of the shed, a circumstance which, by itself, is wholly insufficient to infer participation in the alleged crime. 23. PW4 entered the witness box and merely stated that the accused used to reside in the LMS Estate where his wife was living. Beyond this limited assertion regarding the place of residence of the accused, the witness had nothing relevant to state concerning the occurrence. He neither witnessed any part of the incident nor spoke of any circumstance tending to implicate the accused. No incriminating material whatsoever emerged from his testimony. 24. PW5 stated that he knew the accused and that the latter was working as a coolie labourer. PW6 deposed that he had married the sister of the accused. Their evidence is confined to establishing the identity and family background of the accused and does not contain any circumstance connecting him with the commission of the offences. 25. 24. PW5 stated that he knew the accused and that the latter was working as a coolie labourer. PW6 deposed that he had married the sister of the accused. Their evidence is confined to establishing the identity and family background of the accused and does not contain any circumstance connecting him with the commission of the offences. 25. PW7, Rejimon, who was working as a Watcher at the relevant time, deposed that on 19.01.1991, while returning from Sannidhanam, he had seen the deceased sitting by the side of the pathway and the accused standing at a distance of about ten feet from him. According to the witness, he was later informed by certain persons that a quarrel had taken place between the deceased and the accused. He further stated that one of the persons accompanying him went back to enquire about the matter and, thereafter, informed him that the person who had been sitting by the wayside was found lying dead. PW7 further deposed that those persons expressed a suspicion against the accused and advised that he should not be allowed to leave the shed. According to him, during the night, elephants entered the vicinity of the shed and, in the confusion that followed, the accused escaped. A close scrutiny of the testimony of PW7 reveals that substantial portions of his evidence are not based on his personal knowledge but on information allegedly received from unnamed third parties. He admittedly did not witness any altercation between the deceased and the accused. More importantly, in cross-examination, he stated that he was unaware of when exactly his statement had been recorded by the police. He further admitted that he had not furnished any identifying particulars of the accused to the investigating officer. He conceded that he had not even seen the dead body of the deceased. Numerous omissions and contradictions were brought out during cross-examination. When confronted with those omissions, the witness was unable to offer any satisfactory explanation. The tenor of the cross-examination unmistakably suggested that the witness was making improvements and deposing under the influence of what had subsequently been suggested to him by the investigating agency. Viewed in its entirety, the testimony of PW7 is far from reliable and cannot be treated as substantive evidence establishing the involvement of the accused in the crime. 26. PW8 is merely an attesting witness to Ext.P7 inquest report. Viewed in its entirety, the testimony of PW7 is far from reliable and cannot be treated as substantive evidence establishing the involvement of the accused in the crime. 26. PW8 is merely an attesting witness to Ext.P7 inquest report. His evidence is purely formal in nature and does not touch upon the occurrence or the identity of the assailant. 27. PW9, a Police Constable attached to the Kumily Police Station, was examined solely for the purpose of proving that no relatives of the deceased had come forward to claim the body and that, consequently, the mortal remains were cremated in a public crematorium. His testimony is likewise formal and has no bearing on the culpability of the accused. 28. PW10 was employed as a jeep cleaner. He stated that on 19.01.1991 he had seen the accused sitting in a shed. He further deposed that the brother of the accused had studied with him and that the accused used to reside in the LMS Estate. However, in cross-examination, he admitted that he was not acquainted with any of the Watchers who were allegedly present at the relevant time. It was also elicited that he was seeing the accused for the first time in court. Though this aspect was sought to be clarified in re-examination by stating that he had last seen the accused on 19.01.1991, the fact remains that his identification of the accused after an interval of nearly thirty years, without any intervening acquaintance, becomes inherently unreliable and unsafe to rely upon. In any event, his testimony merely establishes the presence of the accused in a shed and does not incriminate the accused in any manner. 29. PW15, Karuppuswamy, is a vital prosecution witness. According to the prosecution, it was this witness who had allegedly come to the Watchers’ shed and informed PW1 and others that he had witnessed a physical altercation between the accused and the deceased shortly before the latter was found dead. The very genesis of the prosecution narrative rests upon what PW15 is alleged to have conveyed to PW1 on 19.01.1991. However, when PW15 entered the witness box, he did not support the prosecution version in any manner. He did not state that he had witnessed any quarrel between the accused and the deceased. He did not identify the accused as the person who had assaulted or manhandled the deceased. However, when PW15 entered the witness box, he did not support the prosecution version in any manner. He did not state that he had witnessed any quarrel between the accused and the deceased. He did not identify the accused as the person who had assaulted or manhandled the deceased. As his testimony ran contrary to the prosecution case, he was declared hostile and was subjected to cross-examination by the prosecution. Despite such cross-examination, nothing favourable to the prosecution could be elicited from him. It is of considerable significance that the entire prosecution case ultimately hinges upon what PW15 is alleged to have seen and communicated to PW1. Once PW15 himself disowns that version and fails to implicate the accused, the evidentiary foundation of the prosecution case stands seriously undermined. The statements allegedly made by PW15 to PW1 and others, even if assumed to have been made, are at best hearsay and cannot constitute substantive evidence of the facts asserted therein. The evidence of the remaining witnesses, insofar as it relates to the alleged altercation, is also hearsay in nature, being based entirely on what they claim to have been told by others. The rest of the witnesses examined by the prosecution are formal witnesses whose testimony is confined to procedural aspects of the investigation and does not contribute to establishing the guilt of the accused. 30. As noticed above, there is absolutely no direct evidence linking the appellant to the homicidal death of the deceased. No witness has claimed to have seen the occurrence or any part thereof. The prosecution case, therefore, rests entirely on circumstantial evidence and the inferences sought to be drawn therefrom. In such cases, it is trite that every circumstance relied upon by the prosecution must be firmly established and all the proved circumstances must form a complete and unbroken chain pointing unerringly to the guilt of the accused and ruling out every reasonable hypothesis consistent with his innocence. 31. The principal witness relied upon by the prosecution is PW1, whose evidence came to be recorded almost thirty years after the occurrence. While analysing his testimony, we have already adverted to the wholly unsatisfactory manner in which his chief-examination was conducted. The learned Public Prosecutor repeatedly read out portions of the First Information Statement and obtained affirmative answers from the witness instead of eliciting his independent recollection of events. While analysing his testimony, we have already adverted to the wholly unsatisfactory manner in which his chief-examination was conducted. The learned Public Prosecutor repeatedly read out portions of the First Information Statement and obtained affirmative answers from the witness instead of eliciting his independent recollection of events. A careful scrutiny of his evidence further reveals numerous omissions, inconsistencies and material departures from his previous version. The assertion that he had seen the accused standing near the deceased while returning from Sannidhanam is itself an improvement over his earlier statement. Apart from this circumstance, PW1 had no personal knowledge of any fact implicating the accused. The entirety of the remaining narrative was allegedly conveyed to him by PW15, Karuppuswamy. However, the prosecution case suffered a fatal blow when PW15 entered the witness box. The very witness on whose alleged disclosure the prosecution story was built refused to support the prosecution. He did not state that he had witnessed any altercation between the deceased and the accused; nor did he identify the accused as the person responsible for any assault on the deceased. Once PW15 disowned the prosecution version, the evidentiary value of what PW1 claimed to have been told by him is reduced to mere hearsay and cannot be treated as substantive evidence. Another circumstance that considerably weakens the prosecution case is the extraordinary delay in securing the accused. The incident is alleged to have occurred in January 1991. Though the final report was laid in May 1995, the investigating agency had not arrested the accused at any point during the intervening period. It was only in February 2019, almost twenty-eight years after the occurrence and nearly twenty-four years after the filing of the final report, that the appellant was apprehended and presented as the accused in the case. What is more significant is that every witness who purported to identify the accused in court was doing so after an interval of nearly three decades. None of them had any sustained or continuing acquaintance with him during the intervening years. Human memory is not infallible; it fades with time and becomes susceptible to suggestion and error. In such circumstances, it would be wholly unsafe to place implicit reliance on dock identification made after the lapse of thirty years, particularly in the absence of any prior test identification parade or other corroborative evidence. 32. Human memory is not infallible; it fades with time and becomes susceptible to suggestion and error. In such circumstances, it would be wholly unsafe to place implicit reliance on dock identification made after the lapse of thirty years, particularly in the absence of any prior test identification parade or other corroborative evidence. 32. The improbability of such identification becomes even more pronounced when one considers that the appellant who stood in the dock in the year 2020 was no longer the same person whom the witnesses allegedly saw in 1991. The inevitable effects of age, passage of time and change in physical appearance render such identification inherently fragile and unreliable. The evidence of PW3 and PW10, who are respectively the driver and cleaner of a jeep, illustrates this weakness. At the highest, they merely stated that they had seen the accused sitting in a shed on the relevant day. Neither of them witnessed any quarrel, assault, robbery or any other incriminating conduct. Their testimony does nothing more than establish the presence of a person in the vicinity and falls far short of connecting the accused with the commission of the offences alleged. 33. Notwithstanding these glaring deficiencies in the prosecution evidence, the learned Sessions Judge proceeded to record a finding of guilt without undertaking the essential exercise of identifying, analysing and evaluating the incriminating circumstances relied upon by the prosecution. The judgment does not contain a systematic marshalling of circumstances, nor does it examine whether those circumstances were proved beyond reasonable doubt or whether they collectively formed a complete chain pointing unerringly towards the guilt of the accused. 34. The principles that are to be borne in mind while appreciating the evidence in a case built up on circumstantial evidence has been laid down by the Apex Court. 35. In Kishore Chand v. State of Himachal Pradesh , AIR 1990 SC 2140 , the Apex Court has laid down the principles that are to be borne in mind while dealing with a case resting exclusively on circumstantial evidence. It was observed in paragraphs 4 to 6 of the judgment as under: “4………………In a case of circumstantial evidence, all the circumstances from which the conclusion of the guilt is to be drawn should be fully and cogently established. All the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. It was observed in paragraphs 4 to 6 of the judgment as under: “4………………In a case of circumstantial evidence, all the circumstances from which the conclusion of the guilt is to be drawn should be fully and cogently established. All the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. The proved circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and definite tendency, unerringly pointing towards the guilt of the accused. They should be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved. The circumstances must be satisfactorily established and the proved circumstances must bring home the offences to the accused beyond all reasonable doubt. It is not necessary that each circumstance by itself be conclusive but cumulatively must form unbroken chain of events leading to the proof of the guilt of the accused. If those circumstances or some of them can be explained by any of the reasonable hypothesis then the accused must have the benefit of that hypothesis. 5. In assessing the evidence imaginary possibilities have no role to play. What is to be considered are ordinary human probabilities. In other words when there is no direct witness to the commission of murder and the case rests entirely on circumstantial evidence, the circumstances relied on must be fully established. The chain of events furnished by the circumstances should be so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused. If any of the circumstances proved in a case are consistent with the innocence of the accused or the chain of the continuity of the circumstances is broken, the accused is entitled to the benefit of the doubt. 6. In assessing the evidence to find these principles, it is necessary to distinguish between facts which may be called primary or basic facts on one hand and inference of facts to be drawn from them on the other. In regard to the proof of basic or primary facts, the court has to judge the evidence in the ordinary way and in appreciation of the evidence in proof of those basic facts or primary facts, there is no scope for the application of the doctrine of benefit of doubt. The court has to consider the evidence and decide whether the evidence proves a particular fact or not. The court has to consider the evidence and decide whether the evidence proves a particular fact or not. Whether that fact leads to the inference of the guilt of the accused or not is another aspect and in dealing with this aspect of the problem, the doctrine of benefit of doubt would apply and an inference of guilt can be drawn only if the proved facts are inconsistent with the innocence of the accused and are consistent only with his guilt. There is a long distance between ‘may be true’ and ‘must be true’. There must be a chain of evidence so far consistent and complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that in all probability the act must have been done by the accused and the accused alone. 36. In a case based on circumstantial evidence, the court has to be on its guard to avoid the danger of allowing suspicion to take the place of legal proof and has to be watchful to avoid the danger of being swayed by emotional considerations, however strong they may be, to take the place of proof (See: Balwinder Singh v. State of Punjab , [ 1996 AIR SC 607 ] ). 37. In State of U.P. v. Ashok Kumar Srivastava , [ (1992) 2 SCC 86 ] , it was observed that the circumstances relied upon must be established and the cumulative effect of the established facts must lead to a singular hypothesis that the accused is guilty. In Ram Singh v. Sonia & Ors , , [ AIR 2007 SC 1218 ] it was held that the court must satisfy itself that various circumstances in the chain of events have been established clearly and such complete chain of events must be such as to rule out a reasonable likelihood of the innocence of the accused. It has also been indicated that when the important link goes, the chain of circumstances gets snapped and the other circumstances cannot in any manner, establish the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubts. 38. In the light of the principles above, we shall analyse the evidence let in and the circumstances based on which the finding of guilt was arrived at. 39. 38. In the light of the principles above, we shall analyse the evidence let in and the circumstances based on which the finding of guilt was arrived at. 39. The circumstances referred to by the learned Sessions Judge are essentially the following: PW3 and PW10 had seen the accused in the shed where PW1 and PW7 were staying; that PW10 was acquainted with the accused because his younger brother had studied with him; that, according to PW1 the accused had abandoned a sack while approaching the Watchers’ shed; that some coins were recovered from the shed; that the accused remained unavailable for nearly twenty-nine years; and that PW15 had heard the cries of a person. Even if all these circumstances are assumed to have been proved, they do not, either individually or collectively, establish the guilt of the accused. 40. The circumstance that the accused was seen in or near the shed is wholly innocuous and does not implicate him in the commission of murder or robbery. The fact that PW10 knew the accused only explains the basis of his identification and is not an incriminating circumstance. The alleged abandonment of a sack by the accused remains shrouded in doubt, particularly when the witness who spoke about it was unable to recollect events independently and when the ownership of the sack itself has not been conclusively established. The recovery of certain coins from the shed is equally inconsequential in the absence of reliable evidence proving that they belonged to the deceased or that they were recovered from the exclusive possession of the accused. Likewise, the mere fact that the accused was not apprehended for several years cannot, by itself, constitute proof of guilt. Abscondence, even if established, is at best a weak circumstance and can never take the place of substantive evidence. Finally, the alleged cries heard by PW15 lose all significance when PW15 himself declined to support the prosecution and did not implicate the accused in any manner. 41. In our considered view, none of the aforesaid circumstances is of a conclusive nature. They neither establish the presence of the accused at the scene of the crime at the relevant time nor prove his participation in the assault on the deceased. More importantly, they do not form a complete and unbroken chain of circumstances excluding every reasonable hypothesis other than the guilt of the accused. They neither establish the presence of the accused at the scene of the crime at the relevant time nor prove his participation in the assault on the deceased. More importantly, they do not form a complete and unbroken chain of circumstances excluding every reasonable hypothesis other than the guilt of the accused. The prosecution evidence thus falls far short of the standard required in a case resting entirely on circumstantial evidence, and the findings recorded by the learned Sessions Judge cannot, therefore, be sustained. 42. After evaluating the entire facts in the light of the evidence adduced, we hold that neither have the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is sought to be drawn been fully established, nor are they consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the appellant. In our considered opinion, the circumstances are neither conclusive in nature nor do they exclude every possible hypothesis except that of the guilt of the appellant. The chain of circumstances in this case is not complete so as to exclude every reasonable ground consistent with the innocence of the appellant. 43. In view of the foregoing discussion, this appeal is allowed. The finding of guilt, conviction, and sentence passed against the appellant under Sections 302 and 392 of the Indian Penal Code in S.C. No. 205 of 2019 on the file of the Additional District & Sessions Judge-III, Pathanamthitta, are set aside, and he is acquitted of all charges. The appellant shall be released at forthwith, if his continued incarceration is not required in any other case. The Registry shall communicate this judgment forthwith to the concerned Jail Superintendent.