2026:JHHC:10475-DB 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI W.P.(Cr)(D.B.) No.69 of 2026 ----- Ravi Tiwary @ Ravi Kumar Tiwary, son of aged about 26 years, son of Ramakant Tiwari, R/o village Pachpadwa, PO and PS: Garhwa, District- Garhwa, Jharkhand. … …Petitioner Versus 1.The State of Jharkhand through Chief Secretary, having office at - Project Building, PO: Dhurwa, PS: Jagarnathpur, District: Ranchi 2. Additional Secretary, Department of Home, Prison and Disaster Management, Government of Jharkhand, having office at Project Bhawan, PO: Dhurwa, PS: Jagarnathpur, District Ranchi. 3. The District Magistrate cum Deputy Commissioner, Garhwa, having office at Garhwa DC Office, Garhwa, PO and PS:Garhwa, District Garhwa. 4. The Superintendent of Police, having office at Garhwa SP Office, Garhwa, PO and PS: Garhwa, District Garhwa. 5. The Sub-Divisional Police Officer, Garhwa, having office at Garhwa SDPO, Garhwa, PO and PS: Garhwa, District Garhwa. ……. Respondents ----- CORAM:HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY PRASAD ------- For the Petitioners(s) : Mr. Sheo Kumar Singh, Advocate For the Respondent(s): Mr. Sachin Kumar, AAG-II Mr. Srikant Swaroop, AC to AAG-II ------ C.A.V.ON: 19.3.2026 PRONOUNCED ON:10/04/2026 1. The present writ petition has been filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking following reliefs: “a. In the nature of Certiorari for quashing order dated 07.11.2025 in case no. 03/2025 passed by the District Magistrate-cum- Deputy Commissioner, Garhwa, whereby the petitioner was put under preventive detention in terms of Section 12(1) and 12(2) of the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002. b. The petitioner has also challenged the memo no. 5/CCA/01/62/2025/460/CCA/Ranchi by order dated 22.12.2025 passed by the Additional Secretary, Department of Home, Prisons and Disaster Management, Government of Jharkhand, whereby and whereunder the order of preventive detention passed under section 12 of the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002, in order dated 2026:JHHC:10475-DB 2 07.11.2025 in case no. 03/2025 passed by the District Magistrate- cum- Deputy Commissioner, Garhwa has been confirmed. 2. During the pendency of the instant writ petition, memo no. 5/CCA/01/62/2025-13/CCA/Ranchi dated 30.01.2026 was passed by the Additional Secretary, Department of Home, Prisons and Disaster Management, Government of Jharkhand by which the detention has been extended from 07.02.2026 to 06.05.2026 which has also been challenged by filing interlocutory application being I.A. No.2271 of 2026 seeking amendment in the writ petition, in the pleading and prayer portion thereof. 3. The said interlocutory application was allowed vide order dated 17.02.2026.The amended writ petition has also been filed and kept on record.The counter affidavit to the amended writ petition has also been filed. Factual Matrix: 4. The brief facts of the case as per pleadings made in the present writ petition are as under: (i) On 26.09.2025 in-charge, Garhwa Police Station got information that harden criminal Ravi Tiwari @ Ravi Kumar Tiwari who is in judicial custody in Mandal Jail, Garhwa, in connection with Garhwa PS case no. 379/2025 is using his henchman for threatening in the town that after release from jail, he will create panic in the town. On this information, a sanha bearing No.67 of 2025 was registered. Thereafter, other 2026:JHHC:10475-DB 3 officers have also got information about henchmen in town for threatening that after release from jail he will be spread panic. (ii) By memo no. 2810 dated 24.10.2025, the Sub-Divisional Police Officer, Garhwa has recommended for taking action against the petitioner under Sections 12(1) and 12(2) of the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002(hereinafter referred to Act of 2002) as there is possibility of threatening to the witnesses of cases against the petitioner. (iii) By memo no. 1245 dated 25.10.2025 the Superintendent of Police, Garhwa has recommended for taking action against the petitioner under Section 12(1) and 12(2) of the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002 as there will be difficulty to maintain law and order and peace in public if the petitioner is released from jail. (iv) On the basis of recommendation of the respondent nos. 4 and 5, the respondent no. 3 has framed charge against the petitioner in case no. 03/2025, under Section 12(2) of the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002, wherein 11 criminal cases and 6 sanha have been mentioned, which were registered against the petitioner and there is possibility of violation of public peace and law and order if the petitioner will be released from jail. (v) Thereafter, detention order dated 07.11.2005 in case no. 03/2025, was passed by the respondent no.3 against the detenu/petitioner under section 12(2) of the Jharkhand Control 2026:JHHC:10475-DB 4 of Crimes Act, 2002, wherein petitioner was ordered to be detained for three months. (vi) Then, by memo no. 5/CCA/01/62/2025/460/CCA/Ranchi dated 22.12.2025 passed by the Additional Secretary, Department of Home, Prisons and Disaster Management, Government of Jharkhand, whereby and whereunder the orderdated 07.11.2025 passed by the District Magistrate-cum- Deputy Commissioner, Garhwa, under section 12 of the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002, has been confirmed and petitioner was ordered to be detained for three months i.e. 07.11.2025 to 06.02.2026. (vii)By memo no. 5/CCA/01/62/2025-13/CCA/Ranchi dated 30.01.2026 passed by the Additional Secretary, Department of Home, Prisons and Disaster Management, Government of Jharkhand, detention of the petitioner was further extended from 07.02.2026 to 06.05.2026. Submission on behalf of the writ petitioner: 5. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has taken the following grounds in assailing the impugned orders: (i) It has been contended that petitioner has been illegally detained as no case is made out to detain the petitioner under the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act. Petitioner is neither a habitual offender nor an anti-social element as defined under section 2(d) of the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act. 2026:JHHC:10475-DB 5 (ii) It is further contended that there is nothing to suggest that the petitioner is a threat to the society and is a threat to public order. (iii) It is further contended that the officials of the district have tried to convert law and order problem to that of public order and are thus unnecessarily harassing the petitioner. (iv) It has further been contended that out of the 11 criminal cases mentioned in the impugned detention order, detenue/petitioner has been acquitted in four cases and has been enlarged on bail in six cases by the court of law. Hence, only in i.e. Garhwa PS case no. 416/2025, the petitioner is in judicial custody. (v) It has been further submitted that authorities have tried to convert law and order problem to that of public order and hence, unnecessarily harassing the petitioner. (vi) The learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that there is difference between public order and law and order. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of AmeenaBegum vs. State of Telangana and Others reported in (2023)9 SCC 587, while referring to various earlier judgments has distinguished between law and order and public order. (vii) The learned counsel has further relied on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court delivered in case of Shaik Nazneen versus State of Telangana and Others reported in (2023)9 SCC 633, and submitted that in the present case state may seek 2026:JHHC:10475-DB 6 cancelation of bail instead of passing detention order against the petitioner under the preventive detention law. (viii) The learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that so far as the Station Diary Entries (Sanhas) are concerned, it is an admitted case that those have not been culminated in any criminal case. Merely entry in the Station Diary and alleging some acts, cannot be the ground to detain a person. (ix) The learned counsel has further submitted that if the acts mentioned in the Station Diary Entries are criminal acts and are cognizable in nature, then why the State has not filed any FIR. Law provides that if cognizable offence is committed and is brought to the knowledge of an authority, FIR should be lodged. 6. The learned counsel, based upon the aforesaid grounds, has submitted that the impugned orders therefore, need interference by this Court and be quashed. Submission on behalf of the Respondent-State: 7. Per contra, Mr. Sachin Kumar, the learned AAG-II appearing for the respondent-State to defend the impugned orders has raised the following grounds: (i) It has been contended that the impugned detention order is issued under the provision of section 12(2) of Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002, as the petitioner is involved in eleven criminal cases as well as six sanhas were registered against him in police stations of Garhwa District specially for 2026:JHHC:10475-DB 7 creating threat by his henchmen among witnesses and public at large and also to disturb the public order when he will be releasedfrom jail and, as such, the present writ petition is not maintainable in the law as well as on facts. (ii) It is further contended that police records refer to 11 criminal cases against the petitioner and acquittal in four cases do not absolve the petitioner of his pattern of criminal conduct. The sevenpending cases against the petitioner are as under: i. Garhwa P.S. Case No. 253 of 2022, bail granted on 20.03.2023. ii. Garhwa P.S. Case No. 293 of 2023, bail granted on 13.10.2025. iii. Garhwa P.S. Case No. 368 of 2025, bail granted on 09.10.2025 iv. Garhwa P.S. Case No. 391 of 2025, bail granted on 02.12.2025 v. Garhwa P.S. Case No. 403 of 2025, bail granted on 04.12.2025 vi. Garhwa P.S. Case No. 405 of 2025, bail granted on 28.11.2025 vii. Garhwa P.S. Case No. 416 of 2025, petitioner is in custody. (iii) it is further submitted that initial detention of the petitioner was from 07.11.2025 to 06.02.2026. The police reported that petitioner and his henchman still extended threat to disturb the public order when he will be released and for this Sanha No. 60/2026, dated 2026:JHHC:10475-DB 8 10.01.2020 and Sanha No. 54/2026, dated 11.01.2026 was registered requesting Respondent No. 3 to extend the period of detention, accordingly, respondent No. 3 being satisfied with the report and materials, recommended extension vide 05/CCA/01/62/2025-13/CCA/Ranchi dated 30.01.2026 from 07.02.2026 to 06.05.2026 under Sections 21(1) and 22 of the Act of 2002, after review.Hence,The extension is lawful and necessary to avert imminent public disorder. (iv) It is stated and submitted that petitioner's extensive criminal record, including multiple violent offences and use of henchmen for threats, clearly establishes him as a societal threat, warranting preventive detention to safeguard public tranquility. (v) It is submitted that final reports in some cases, or acquittals granted, do not negate the pattern of the criminal activity of the petitioner. The criminal antecedents and collected intelligence regarding threat to disturb public order demonstrates recidivism, justifying detention. (vi) The petitioner qualifies as a "habitual offender" and "anti-social element under Section 2(d) of the Act due to repeated charges under Chapters XVI/XVII IPC (now BNS equivalents) and Arms Act and organized intimidation. His activities habitually threaten public order beyond individual cases. 8. The learned State counsel, based upon the aforesaid grounds, has submitted that the impugned orders, thus, need no interference and the present writ petition is fit to be dismissed. 2026:JHHC:10475-DB 9 Analysis: 9. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and gone through the pleadings made in the writ petition along with the relevant documents annexed therewith. 10. In the backdrop of the aforesaid factual aspect the following issues require consideration herein: i. Whether the criminal activities of petitioner come under the purview of definition of ‘’Anti-social Elements’’ as defined under section 2(d) of the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002? ii. Whether acquittal and grant of bail to thedetenue/petitioner in some cases is ground for his release from the prevention detention passed under 12(2) of the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002? iii. Whether the petitioner’s criminal history and alleged activities threatened “public order” as stipulated in Act 2002 or simply affected “law and order.” Re: Issue No. (i) 11. But, before considering the first issues, the statutory provisions as contained under the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act,2002 needs to be referred herein. 12. The relevant provisions which require consideration herein are Section 2(d)and Section 12 of Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act,2002. 13. “Anti-social Element” has been defined in section 2(d) of the Act of 2002, which reads hereunder as: - “ 2(d) Anti-social element" means a person who- 2026:JHHC:10475-DB 10 (i) either by himself or as a member of or leader of a gang habitually commits or attempts to commit or abets the commission of offences punishable under Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code;or (ii) habitually commits or abets the commission of offences under the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956; or (iii) who by words or otherwise promotes or attempts to promote, on grounds of religion, race, language, caste or community or any other grounds whatsoever, feelings of enmity or hatred between different religions, racial or language groups or castes or communities; or (iv) has been found habitually passing indecent remarks to, or teasing women or girls; or (v)who has been convicted of an offence under sections 25,26, 27, 28 or 29 of the Arms Act of 1959.” 14. From perusal of Section 2(d) of the Jharkhand Crime Control Act of 2002, it is evident that "anti-social element" as a person who habitually commits or abets offenses listed in Chapters XVI or XVII of the Indian Penal Code, or certain other specific crimes. It needs to refer herein that this definition requires a pattern of behaviour, not isolated incidents, and aims to identify individuals whose acts cause alarm or terror among the public, warranting preventive detention to maintain public order. 15. It requires to refer herein that the Act of 2002 was meant to make special provisions for the control and suppression of anti-social elements with a view to maintenance of public order. It also needs to refer herein that the “Law and order” problems typically affect only individuals or small groups, whereas “public order” disruptions affect the community’s normal functioning on a broader scale often generating fear or anxiety among the general public. 2026:JHHC:10475-DB 11 16. It is pertinent to mention herein that the primary element with respect to Section 2(d)(i) seems to be the word "habitual". It would thus mean that a person who is frequently engaged in committing or attempting or abating commission of an offence in terms of Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code would be an anti-social element. In this context, we may refer to the case of Vijay Narayan Singh Vs. State of Bihar reported in (1984) 3 SCC 14 wherein the word "habitually" has been sought to be enumerated in the following manner: "31. It is seen from Section 12 of the Act that it makes provision for the detention of an anti-social element. If a person is not an antisocial element, he cannot be detained under the Act. The detaining authority should, therefore, be satisfied that the person against whom an order is made under Section 12 of the Act is an anti-social element as defined in Section 2(d) of the Act. Sub-clauses (ii), (iii) and (v) of Section 2(d) of the Act which are not quite relevant for the purposes of this case may be omitted from consideration for the present. The two other sub-clauses which need to be examined closely are sub clauses (i) and (iv) of Section 2(d). Under sub-clause (i) of Section 2(d) of the Act, a person who either by himself or as a member of or leader of a gang habitually commits or attempts to commit or abets the commission of offences punishable under Chapter XVI dealing with offences affecting the human body or Chapter XVII dealing with offences against property, of the Penal Code, 1860 is considered to be an anti-social element. Under subclause (iv) of Section 2(d) of the Act, a person who has been habitually passing indecent remarks to, or teasing women or girls, is an anti-social element. In both these sub clauses, the word "habitually" is used. The expression "habitually" means "repeatedly" or "persistently". It implies a thread of continuity stringing together similar repetitive acts. Repeated, persistent and similar, but not isolated, individual and dissimilar acts are necessary to justify an inference of habit. It connotes frequent commission of acts or omissions of the same kind referred to in each of the said sub clauses or an aggregate of similar acts or omissions. This appears to be clear from the use of the word "habitually" separately in subclause (i), sub-clause (ii) and sub- clause (iv) of Section 2(d) and not in sub clauses (iii) and (v) of Section 2(d). If the State Legislature had intended that a commission of two or more acts or omissions referred to in any of the sub- clauses (i) to 2026:JHHC:10475-DB 12 (v) of Section 2(d) was sufficient to make a person an "anti-social element", the definition would have run as "Anti-social element" means "a person who habitually is. ..". As Section 2(d) of the Act now stands, whereas under sub-clause (iii) or sub-clause (v) of Section 2(d) a single act or omission referred to in them may be enough to treat the person concerned as an 'antisocial element', in the case of sub-clause (i), sub- clause (ii) or sub-clause (iv), there should be a repetition of acts or omissions of the same kind referred to in sub-clause (i), subclause (ii) or in sub-clause (iv) by the person concerned to treat him as an "anti-social element". Commission of an act or omission referred to in one of the sub- clauses (i), (ii) and (iv) and of another act or omission referred to in any other of the said sub-clauses would not be sufficient to treat a person as an "anti-social element". A single act or omission falling under subclause (i) and a single act or omission falling under sub-clause (iv) of Section 2(d) cannot, therefore, be characterized as a habitual act or omission referred to in either of them. Because the idea of "habit" involves an element of persistence and a tendency to repeat the acts or omissions of the same class or kind, if the acts or omissions in question are not of the same kind or even if they are of the same kind when they are committed with a long interval of time between them they cannot be treated as habitual ones." 17. Thus, from the aforesaid it is evident that if a person is not an antisocial element, he cannot be detained under the Act. The detaining authority should, therefore, be satisfied that the person against whom an order is made under Section 12 of the Act is an anti- social element as defined in Section 2(d) of the Act. Under sub-clause (i) of Section 2(d) of the Act, a person who either by himself or as a member of or leader of a gang habitually commits or attempts to commit or abets the commission of offences punishable under Chapter XVI dealing with offences affecting the human body or Chapter XVII dealing with offences against property, of the Penal Code, 1860 is considered to be an anti-social element. Further the expression "habitually" means "repeatedly" or "persistently". It implies a thread of continuity stringing together similar repetitive 2026:JHHC:10475-DB 13 acts. Repeated, persistent and similar, but not isolated, individual and dissimilar acts are necessary to justify an inference of habit. 18. It requires to refer herein that Section 12 of the Act of 2002 contains the word “anti-social” which qualifies the section 12 of Act of 2002 for passing the order of detention of any individual or others. Section 12 of the Act is the initiation of the process of detaining a person under the Act, for ready reference the same is being quoted herein, which reads as under- “12. Power to make order detaining certain persons. - The State Government may- (1) if satisfied with respect to any person that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and there is reason to fear that the activities of anti-social elements cannot be prevented otherwise than by the immediate arrest of such person, make an order directing that such anti-social element be detained. (2) If, having regard to the circumstances prevailing or likely to prevail in any area within the local limits of the jurisdiction of a District Magistrate, the State Government is satisfied that it is necessary so to do, it may by an order in writing direct, that during such period as may be specified in the order, such District Magistrate may also, if satisfied as provided in sub-section (1) exercise the powers conferred upon by the said sub-section: Provided that the period specified in an order made by the State Government under this sub-section shall not, in the first instance exceed three months, but the State Government may, if satisfied as aforesaid that it is necessary so to do, amend such order to extend such period from time to time by any period not exceeding three months at any one time. (3) When any order is made by District Magistrate, he shall forthwith report, the fact to the State Government together with the grounds on which the order has been made and such other particulars as, in his opinion, have a bearing on the matter, and no such order shall remain in force for more than 12 days after the 2026:JHHC:10475-DB 14 making thereof unless, in the meantime, it has been approved by the State Government: Provided that where under Section 17 the grounds of detention are communicated by the officer making the order after five days but not later than ten days from the date of detention, this sub-section shall apply subject to the modification that, for the words "twelve days", the words "fifteen days" shall be substituted.” 19. Thus, from the perusal of Section 12 of the Act of 2002, it is evident that power to make orders detaining certain persons are provided in section 12 of the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002. Section 12(1) provides that if State Government is satisfied with respect to any person that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and there is reason to fear that the activities of anti-social elements cannot be prevented otherwise than by the immediate arrest of such person, make an order directing that such anti-social element be detained. 20. Hence, section 12(1) empowers the State Government to detain anti- social element if there is reason to fear that the activities of anti-social elements cannot be prevented otherwise than by the immediate arrest of such person. The anti-social element has been defined in Section 2(d) of the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002 and section 2(d)(i) of the Act provides that "Anti-social Element" means a person who either by himself or as a member of or leader of gang habitually commits, or attempts to commit or abets the commission of offences punishable under Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code. 2026:JHHC:10475-DB 15 21. In the backdrop of the aforesaid settled position of law this Court is now, reverting to the first issue whether the criminal activities of petitioner come under the purview of definition of “Anti-social Elements’’ as defined under section 2(d) of the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002. 22. On going through the impugned detention order dated 07.11.2025 (Annexure-5), this court finds that detention order is passed by the respondent no.3 District Magistrate-cum- Deputy Commissioner, Garhwa, wherein involvement of the petitioner in 11 criminal cases are mentioned out of which petitioner has been acquitted in four cases i.e. Garhwa P.S. Case No. 665 of 2020 dated 30.09.2020,under section 307 IPC and 27 Arms Act; Garhwa P.S. Case No. 675 of 2020 dated 01.10.2020,under section 307/34 IPC and 27 Arms Act;Garhwa P.S. Case No. 292 of 2023 dated 28.06.2023,under section 394 IPC and Garhwa P.S. Case No. 342 of 2024 dated 25.06.2024,under section 302/34 IPC and 27 Arms Act. 23. Further, from the impugned detention order dated 07.11.2025 (Annexure-5), this court finds that following 7 FIRs have been registered against the petitioner in Garhwa police station: i. Garhwa P.S. Case No. 253 of 2022, dated 20.05.2022, under section 379 IPC ii. Garhwa P.S. Case No. 293 of 2023, dated28.06.2023, under section 25(1-B)/26/27/35 Arms Act iii. Garhwa P.S. Case No. 368 of 2025, dated 20.08.2025 under section 308(4)/3(5) of BNS 2026:JHHC:10475-DB 16 iv. Garhwa P.S. Case No. 379 of 2025, dated 27.08.2025 under section 308(4)/351(2)/352/3(5) BNS v. Garhwa P.S. Case No. 403 of 2025, dated 06.09.2025 under section 109(1)/308(4)/351(2)/352/3(5) BNS and 27 Arms Act vi. Garhwa P.S. Case No. 405 of 2025, dated 08.09.2025 under section 25(1-B)a/26/27/35 Arms Act vii. Garhwa P.S. Case No. 416 of 2025, dated 13.09.2025under section 25(1-B) a/26/27/35 Arms Act 24. From record it appears that petitioner has been granted bail in Garhwa P.S. Case No. 253 of 2022 on 20.03.2023; in Garhwa P.S. Case No. 293 of 2023 on 13.10.2025; in Garhwa P.S. Case No. 368 of 2025 on 09.10.2025; in Garhwa P.S. Case No. 379 of 2025 on 02.12.2025; in Garhwa P.S. Case No. 403 of 2025 on 04.12.2025 and inGarhwa P.S. Case No. 405 of 2025 on 28.11.2025. The writ petitioner is in custody in connection with Garhwa P.S. Case No. 416 of 2025. 25. Hence, from the 7 FIRs mentioned in the impugned detention order dated 07.11.2025 (Annexure-5), this court finds that crime committed by the petitioner ranges from attempt to murder, criminal intimidation, extortion etc. and the several cases under Arms Act has also been registered against the petitioner. Hence, this court is of view that the petitioner is habitual offender. 26. Thus, petitioner habitually commits offences punishable under section Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code(now BNS equivalents) as defined in section 2(d)(i) of the Act of 2002. 27. Further, the detaining authority respondent no.3 while passing the impugned detention order dated 07.11.2025 (Annexure-5), under 2026:JHHC:10475-DB 17 section 12(2) of the Act was satisfied that the dentition of the petitioner was necessary as continuous criminal activities of the petitioner was causing threat to maintenance of public order. 28. This Court, on consideration of the aforesaid factual aspect, is of the view that the authority concerned has rightly considered that the act of the petitioner comes under the purview of the ‘’Anti-social Elements’’ as stipulated under Section 2(d) of the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002.This Court, therefore, is of the view that the orders of detention dated 07.11.2025 (Annexure-5), on this score needs no interference. 29. Accordingly issue no. (i) is hereby answered. Re: Issue No. (ii) 30. Regarding this issue i.e. whether acquittal and grant of bail to the detenue/petitioner in some cases is ground for his release from the prevention detention passed under 12(2) of the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002? 31. In this regard learned counsel for the detenue/petitioner has contended the said cases were relied by the detaining authority while passing the impugned order of detention dated 07.11.2025 (Annexure-5) and hence, detention order cannot be sustained. 32. This court finds that in the impugned detention order dated 07.11.2025 (Annexure-5), there is reference of 11 criminal cases against the detenue/petitioner out of which detenue/petitioner has been acquitted in four cases Garhwa P.S. Case No. 665 of 2020 dated 30.09.2020, Garhwa P.S. Case No. 675 of 2020 dated 2026:JHHC:10475-DB 18 01.10.2020,Garhwa P.S. Case No. 292 of 2023 dated 28.06.2023 and Garhwa P.S. Case No. 342 of 2024 dated 25.06.2024. 33. Further, in 7 FIRs mentioned in the impugned detention order,detenue/petitioner has been enlarged on bail in six cases - GarhwaP.S. Case No. 253 of 2022 dated 20.05.2022, Garhwa P.S. Case No. 293 of 2023, dated 28.06.2023, Garhwa P.S. Case No. 368 of 2025 dated 20.08.2025, Garhwa P.S. Case No. 379 of 2025 dated 27.08.2025, Garhwa P.S. Case No. 403 of 2025 dated 06.09.2025, Garhwa P.S. Case No. 405 of 2025 dated 08.09.2025. In connection with Garhwa P.S. Case No. 416 of 2025, dated 13.09.2025, detenue/petitioner is in judicial custody. 34. Hence, so far as acquittal of the detenue/petitioner in some of the cases and his release on bail,in aforesaid pending cases is concerned, this Court finds that it is the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority that in spite of his continuous activities causing threat to maintenance of public order and in such circumstances, based on the relevant materials and satisfying itself, that it would not be possible to control his habituality in continuing the criminal activities by resorting the normal procedures, the Detaining Authority had passed an order detaining him under the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002. 35. Further, acquittal and enlargement on bail, of the detenue/petitioner, in some of the cases cannot be said to affect the decision taken by the competent authority of detention, rather the accusation so made in the First Information Report is to be seen for 2026:JHHC:10475-DB 19 the purpose to have the subjective satisfaction of the nature of accusation made in the said FIR. Since the detention order is to be passed by the competent authority anticipating the criminality of the concerned and it would be evident from the accusation made in the impugned detention order dated 07.11.2025 (Annexure- 5),passed by the District Magistrate, wherein seven pending criminal cases registered against the detenue is mentioned. 36. The consideration of coming from judicial custody by virtue of order passed by the court to release on bail has been taken into consideration by the Hon'ble Apex Court in D.M Nagaraja Versus Government of Karnataka and others reported in (2011) 10 SCC 215 wherein detenue had challenged his detention order. The Hon'ble Apex Court in this case had noted in paragraph-17 that the even after release on bail detenue again started indulging in the same type of offences, particularly, threatening the public life, damaging public property, etc. and hence, detenue appeal was dismissed. Further in paragraph-20 of the aforesaid judgment the Hon'ble Apex Court had noted the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority in passing the detention order against the detenue, for the ready reference Paragraph-17 and 20 of D.M. Nagaraja(supra) case is quoted herein below - "17. All the abovementioned details which have been correctly stated in the detention order clearly show that the appellant is not amenable to ordinary course of law. It also shows that even after his release on bail from the prison on various occasions, he again started indulging in the same type of offences, particularly, threatening the public life, damaging public property, etc. All these aspects have been meticulously considered by the detaining authority 2026:JHHC:10475-DB 20 and after finding that in order to maintain public order, since his activities are prejudicial to the public, causing harm and danger, the detaining authority detained him as "goonda" under Karnataka Act 12 of 1985 for a period of 12 months and the same was rightly approved by the Advisory Board and the State Government. Inasmuch as the detaining authority has taken note of all the relevant materials and strictly followed all the safeguards as provided in the Act ensuring the liberty of the detenue, we are in entire agreement with the decision of the detaining authority as well as the impugned order of the High Court affirming the same." Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 20. In the case on hand, we have already extracted criminality, criminal activities starting from the age of 30 and details relating to eleven cases mentioned in the grounds of detention. It is not in dispute that in one case he has been convicted and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a term of nine years. He had been acquitted in two cases and four cases are pending against him wherein he was granted bail by the courts. It is the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority that in spite of his continuous activities causing threat to maintenance of public order, he was getting bail one after another and indulging in the same activities. In such circumstances, based on the relevant materials and satisfying itself, namely, that it would not be possible to control his habituality in continuing the criminal activities by resorting to normal procedure, the detaining authority passed an order detaining him under Act 12 of 1985." 37. In the present case, from the impugned detention order dated 07.11.2025 (Annexure-5), it is apparent thatin seven pending cases registered against the detenue ranges from attempt to murder, criminal intimidation, extortion etc. and the several cases under Arms Act has also been registered against the petitioner. 38. From, the impugned detention order dated 07.11.2025, it also appears that out of the pending cases against the detenue/petitioner, the oldest FIR is of the year 2022 and thereafter, petitioner did not repent and 2026:JHHC:10475-DB 21 again in years 2024 and 2025, six more FIRs had been registered against the detenue/petitioner. 39. The authority concerned while passing the impugned detention order which was passed on 07.11.2025 has taken into consideration the entire history of accusation against the petitioner and only thereafter has passed the order of detention. Hence, satisfaction has been arrived by the detaining authority bearing in mind existence of live and proximate link between the past conduct of the petitioner and material which is not stale. 40. Thus, from the impugned detention order dated 07.11.2025, it is evident that the detenue/petitioner is habitually involved in offences which ranges from attempt to murder, involvement in organized crime, extortion etc. and the several cases under Arms Act and further on the basis of subjective satisfaction the detaining authority has arrived to conclusion that the well-organized manner in which such pre-judicial activities have been carried on and nexus between dates of incidents and passing of the detention order and the said observation is according to the ratio led down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of D.M Nagaraja Versus Government of Karnataka and others(supra) therefore, the said observation of the detaining authority cannot be said to be suffer from an error. 41. Accordingly,Issue No.(ii) is hereby answered Re: Issue No. (iii) 42. Regarding this issue i.e.whether the petitioner’s criminal history and alleged activities threatened “public order” as stipulated in Act 2002 or simply affected “law and order.” 2026:JHHC:10475-DB 22 43.The petitioner has challenged the detention order by also taking the ground that his alleged activities did not rise to the level of “public order” disturbance and that no strong factual foundation existed to justify his continued detention. 44. With regard to the aforesaid contention of the learned Counsel, it would be instructive to refer to the relevant case law on the distinction between “law and order” and “public order” which has been enunciated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in catena of Judgments. 45. In the case of Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia v. State Bihar1965 SCC OnLine SC 9 a Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, explained the difference between maintenance of law and order and maintenance of public order and its disturbance. The Court has further explained the whole concept of public order and law and order, by observing that one has to imagine three concentric circles, that law and order represents the largest circle, within which is the next circle representing public order and the smallest circle represents security of State. For ready reference the relevant paragraphs of the aforesaid judgment are being quoted as under: “54. … Does the expression “public order” take in every kind of disorder or only some of them? The answer to this serves to distinguish “public order” from “law and order” because the latter undoubtedly takes in all of them. Public order if disturbed, must lead to public disorder. Every breach of the peace does not lead to public disorder. When two drunkards quarrel and fight there is disorder but not public disorder. They can be dealt with under the powers to maintain law and order but cannot be detained on the ground that they were disturbing public order. Suppose that the two fighters were of rival communities and one of them tried to raise communal passions. The problem is still one of law and order but it raises the apprehension of public disorder. Other examples 2026:JHHC:10475-DB 23 can be imagined. The contravention of law always affects order but before it can be said to affect public order, it must affect the community or the public at large. A mere disturbance of law and order leading to disorder is thus not necessarily sufficient for action under the Defence of India Act but disturbances which subvert the public order are. A District Magistrate is entitled to take action under Rule 30(1)(b) to prevent subversion of public order but not in aid of maintenance of law and order under ordinary circumstances. 55. It will thus appear that just as “public order” in the rulings of this Court (earlier cited) was said to comprehend disorders of less gravity than those affecting “security of State”, “law and order” also comprehends disorders of less gravity than those affecting “public order”. One has to imagine three concentric circles. Law and order represents the largest circle within which is the next circle representing public order and the smallest circle represents security of State. It is then easy to see that an act may affect law and order but not public order just as an act may affect public order but not security of the State.” 46. In the case Arun Ghosh v. State of W.B., (1970) 1 SCC 98the Hon’ble Apex Court has deal with the question of “public order” and “law and order” by citing the various illustration, the relevant portionof the aforesaid judgment reads as under: “3. … Public order was said to embrace more of the community than law and order. Public order is the even tempo of the life of the community taking the country as a whole or even a specified locality. Disturbance of public order is to be distinguished from acts directed against individuals which do not disturb the society to the extent of causing a general disturbance of public tranquillity. It is the degree of disturbance and its effect upon the life of the community in a locality which determines whether the disturbance amounts only to a breach of law and order. Take for instance, a man stabs another. People may be shocked and even disturbed, but the life of the community keeps moving at an even tempo, however much one may dislike the act. Take another case of a town where there is 2026:JHHC:10475-DB 24 communal tension. A man stabs a member of the other community. This is an act of a very different sort. Its implications are deeper and it affects the even tempo of life and public order is jeopardised because the repercussions of the act embrace large sections of the community and incite them to make further breaches of the law and order and to subvert the public order. An act by itself is not determinant of its own gravity. In its quality it may not differ from another but in its potentiality it may be very different. Take the case of assault on girls. A guest at a hotel may kiss or make advances to half a dozen chamber maids. He may annoy them and also the management but he does not cause disturbance of public order. He may even have a fracas with the friends of one of the girls but even then it would be a case of breach of law and order only. Take another case of a man who molests women in lonely places. As a result of his activities girls going to colleges and schools are in constant danger and fear. Women going for their ordinary business are afraid of being waylaid and assaulted. The activity of this man in its essential quality is not different from the act of the other man but in its potentiality and in its effect upon the public tranquillity there is a vast difference. The act of the man who molests the girls in lonely places causes a disturbance in the even tempo of living which is the first requirement of public order. He disturbs the society and the community. His act makes all the women apprehensive of their honour and he can be said to be causing disturbance of public order and not merely committing individual actions which may be taken note of by the criminal prosecution agencies. It means therefore that the question whether a man has only committed a breach of law and order or has acted in a manner likely to cause a disturbance of the public order is a question of degree and the extent of the reach of the act upon the society.” 2026:JHHC:10475-DB 25 47. In Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia's case examples were given by the Hon’ble Apex Court by observing that like acts in different contexts affect differently law and order on the one hand and public order on the other. It is always a question of degree of the damage and its affect upon the community. The question to ask is : Does it lead to trouble of the current of life of the community so as to amount a disturbance of the public order or does it affect merely an individual leaving the tranquility of the society undisturbed? This question has to be faced in every case on facts. There is no formula by which one case can be distinguished from another. 48. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the in the case of Babul Mitra v. State of W.B. (1973) 1 SCC 393 had deal with the question of “public order” and “law and order”. The Hon’ble Apex Court observed that the true distinction between the areas of “law and order” and “public order” is one of degree and extent of the reach of the act in question upon society. The Court pointed out that the act by itself is not determinant of its own gravity. In its quality it may not differ but in its potentiality, it may be very different. 49. In Haradhan Saha v. The State of West Bengal (1975) 3 SCC 198 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has prescribed tests to determine whether the alleged acts affect ‘law and order’ or ‘public order’. The Hon’ble Court held that it is the potentiality of the act to disturb the even tempo of life which makes it prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and that it is the degree and extent of the each of the objectionable activity on the society which is vital for consideration. Considering the question whether a person has committed only 2026:JHHC:10475-DB 26 breach of law and order or has acted in any manner likely to cause disturbance to public order, it was held that an order of detention under the Act would be valid if the activities of the detenu affect public order, but could not be so where the same affects only the maintenance of law and order and that the facts of each case have therefore to be carefully scrutinized to test the validity of the detention. 50. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Pesala Nookaraju v. State of A.P., (2023) 14 SCC 641 has categorically observed that there is a very thin line between the question of law-and-order situation and a public order situation, and some times, the acts of a person relating to law-and-order situation can turn into a question of public order situation. What is decisive for determining the connection of ground of detention with the maintenance of public order, the object of detention, is not an intrinsic quality of the act but rather its latent potentiality. Therefore, for determining whether the ground of detention is relevant for the purposes of public order or not, merely an objective test based on the intrinsic quality of an act would not be a safe guide. The potentiality of the act has to be examined in the light of the surrounding circumstances, posterior and anterior for the offences under the Prohibition Act. 51. This Court is conscious with the fact that Preventive detention of a person is an extreme measure resorted to by the State when ordinary criminal law is found not adequate to control his activities which cause disturbance to public order. The preventive detention laws have been conceived in order to control the activities of a person which 2026:JHHC:10475-DB 27 tend to disturb public order as opposed to law and order and the procedural safeguards prescribed by the ordinary criminal laws are not available to the detenu under preventive detention laws. 52. The order of preventive detention and the decision must depend on the facts of the particular case; preventive detention being necessary to prevent the detenue from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State or to the maintenance of public order etc. but the detaining authority must show its awareness to the fact of subsisting custody of the detenu and take that factor into account while making the order; but, even so, if the detaining authority is reasonably satisfied on cogent material that there is likelihood of his release and in view of his antecedent activities which are proximate in point of time he must be detained in order to prevent him from indulging in such prejudicial activities, the detention order can be validly made even in anticipation to operate on his release. 53. Keeping in view the legal position discussed above, we need to consider the allegations against the detenue/writ petitioner. 54. It has come on record that the petitioner is involved in various criminal cases as well as six sanhas were also registered against him in police stations of Garhwa District specially for creating threat by his henchmen among witnesses and public at large and also to disturb the public order. Further the authority concerned based upon its subjective satisfaction has noted that when petitioner will be released from jail, he will create panic in the town. 2026:JHHC:10475-DB 28 55. It has further come on record that initial detention of the petitioner was from 07.11.2025 to 06.02.2026. The police reported that petitioner and his henchman still extended threat to disturb the public order and for this Sanha No. 60/2026, dated 10.01.2020 and Sanha No. 54/2026, dated 11.01.2026 was registered requesting Respondent No. 3 to extend the period of detention, accordingly, respondent No. 3 being satisfied with the report and materials, recommended extension of detention from 07.02.2026 to 06.05.2026 under Sections 21(1) and 22 of the Act of 2002. 56. In the present case, the detaining authority has arrived at a subjective satisfaction that the activities of the detenu–appellant are detrimental to the maintenance of public order. The authority has further concluded that it is necessary to prevent the detenu from engaging in such activities in the future. This satisfaction is based on credible material available on record, therefore, the contention of the writ petitioner that his alleged activities did not rise to the level of “public order” disturbance and that no strong factual foundation existed to justify his continued detention, is not fit to be accepted. 57. Accordingly, issue no.(iii) answered herein. 58. On the basis of the discussion made hereinabove this Court is of the considered view that the orders of detention need no interference. 59. Accordingly, the detention order dated 07.11.2025, (Annexure- 5)passed by the Respondent No.3and order dated 22.12.2025(Annexure-6) passed by the Respondent No.2, confirming the detention order dated 07.11.2025and subsequent extension order 2026:JHHC:10475-DB 29 dated 30.01.2026(Annexure-8),extending the period of preventive detention are sustained and upheld. 60. Consequent thereto, the instant writ petition stands dismissed. 61. Pending I.As, if any, stands disposed of. I Agree (Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.) (Sanjay Prasad, J.) (Sanjay Prasad, J.) Jharkhand High Court Dated:10.04.2026 KNR/AFR Uploaded on: 13.04.2026