Page No.# 1/18 GAHC040008402023 2026:GAU-AP:532 THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH) Case No. : Crl.A./21/2023 Tadap Tok @ Baskar Tok S/o Late Resum Tok, Resident of Palam Village, PO/PS Pakke Kesang, Pakke Kesang District, Arunachal Pradesh. VERSUS THE STATE OF AP through the Public Prosecutor, Arunachal Pradesh. BEFORE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ROBIN PHUKAN HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE BUDI HABUNG Advocate for the Appellant : Mr. D. Panging, ld. Sr. Adv. Advocate for the Respondent : Ms. L. Hage, ld. Addl. P.P, Date on which Judgment is reserved : 24.03.2026 Date of Hearing : 24.03.2026 Date of Judgment and Order : 27.05.2026 Whether the pronouncement is of the Operative part of the Judgment? :No Whether the full Judgment has been pronounced ? : Yes Page No.# 2/18 JUDGMENT & ORDER (CAV) [Budi Habung, J] Heard Mr. D. Panging, learned Senior Counsel for the accused/appellant. Also heard Ms. L. Hage, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State respondent. 2. The present appeal has been preferred under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (corresponding to Section 415 (2) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023), assailing the judgment of conviction, dated 29.05.2023, and the order of sentence dated 30.05.2023, passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Bomdila, in Sessions Case No. 26/2017, whereby the appellant was convicted under Sections 120(B)/302/457 of the Indian Penal Code. 3. By the impugned judgment and order of sentence, the appellant has been sentenced to undergo: i. Rigorous imprisonment for 5 (five) years with a fine of Rs. 5000/- (Rupees five thousand only) under Section 120(B) of the IPC; ii. Simple imprisonment for 2 (two) years with a fine of Rs. 2,000/- (Rupees two thousand only) under Section 457 of the IPC; and iii. Imprisonment for life with a fine of Rs. 20,000/- (Rupees twenty thousand only), with a default stipulation, for the offence under Section 302 of the IPC. 4. The prosecution case, in brief, is that on 07.12.2003, a written FIR was Page No.# 3/18 lodged before the Officer-in-Charge of Seppa Police Station, by the Headmaster of the Government Secondary School, Pakke Kesang(PW-2), alleging that one Pramod Kumar Phukan, a junior teacher of the school, had been murdered during the intervening night of 05.12.2023 and 06.12.2023. 5. Based on the said written FIR, Seppa P.S. Case No. 81/2003, under Section 302 of the IPC was registered, and investigation was taken up. 6. During the investigation, the Investigating Officer had visited the place of occurrence and seized certain wearing apparels of the deceased, allegedly containing multiple stab marks. The police also claimed to have recovered two motorcycles, one torchlight, and two daggers, one suspected to belong to Apo Tachang (A-1) and another from the house of accused Tadap Tok (A-2), allegedly used in the commission of the offence. 7. Upon completion of the investigation, a charge-sheet was submitted against the present appellant (A-2) and another accused (A-1) under Sections 457/120(B)/302/34 of the IPC. During investigation, both the accused persons were forwarded before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Seppa [in short ‘learned JMFC, Seppa’], for recording of their confessional statements under Section 164 of the Cr.PC. The confessional statements of both the accused persons were recorded by the learned JMFC, Seppa on 19.12.2003. 8. In his confessional statement, the appellant allegedly admitted that he had accompanied the deceased to Seppa for withdrawal of stipend money and thereafter stayed with the co-accused, A-1. It was further stated therein that both the accused persons had conspired to rob the stipend amount from the deceased and, during the night hours, entered the school office. However, upon Page No.# 4/18 not finding anything there, they subsequently entered the residence of the deceased. The appellant allegedly confessed that, while searching for money, the deceased woke up and recognized him. Thereupon, he gagged the deceased and stabbed him with a knife, after which the co-accused also joined him and assaulted the deceased with another knife. 9. The co-accused, Apo Tachang (A-1), also allegedly made a confessional statement substantially similar in nature, implicating himself as well as the present appellant (A-2) in the commission of the alleged offence. However, during the pendency of the trial, the co-accused, Apo Tachang, expired, and the case against him stood abated. Evidence Adduced During Trial 10. To bring home the charges against the accused persons, the prosecution side had examined altogether 11 witnesses. The accused was, thereafter examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C. wherein he denied the evidence adduced by the prosecution witness. He also denied the confessional statement made before the Magistrate. Now, let us examine the evidence of the prosecution witnesses: 11. PW-2, the informant and Headmaster of the School, deposed that on the morning of 06.12.2003, he received information regarding the murder of the deceased, P.K. Phukan, and thereafter, he went to the place of occurrence. There, he found the dead body of the deceased lying inside the room with multiple stab injuries, and household articles lying scattered. According to him, the deceased had withdrawn stipend money, amounting to approximately Rs. 1,07,000/-, and the appellant was aware of such withdrawal since he had accompanied the deceased to Seppa for collection of the said amount. Page No.# 5/18 12. PW-10 is another teacher of the school and a colleague of the deceased. He stated that on the evening prior to the incident, the deceased had come to his residence and kept with him a packet of money amounting to Rs. 1 lakh for safe custody. He further deposed that, after hearing about the murder of the deceased in the morning, he went to the place of occurrence and found the deceased lying dead on the bed. However, during cross-examination, the witness clearly admitted that he had not witnessed the occurrence and did not know who had committed the murder. 13. PW-11 is the doctor who conducted the post-mortem examination on the dead body of the deceased. During examination he found the following wounds: i. Incised penetrating wound over the anterior aspect of right side of chest. In the 5th rib bone, measuring about 2.56 cm x 5 mm depth 15 cm, penetrating deep into the chest, the sound was horizontally placed, and wound margin was slightly everted. ii. Incised penetrative wound over right inter scapular area measuring about 2.5 cm x 5 mm x 5cm, cutting through the pleurae an into the posterior aspect of right upper lobe of right lung horizontally placed and margins everted. iii. Obliquely placed incised wound over right scapula 2.5 cm x 4 cm x 2cm (Superomedial aspect). iv. Incised wound over 10th dorsal vertebra cutting though the ligament 2cm x 3mm x .5cm obliquely placed, margins everted. v. Incised wound over inferomedial aspect of left scapula 2 cm x 4 mm Page No.# 6/18 bone deep. vi. Incised perforating wound over posteromedial aspect to posterolateral aspect of (lt.) leg about 4 cm from modal malleolus measuring 2.6 x .5 cm medially & 2.4 x 5 cm laterally. Horizontally placed margins everted. Partially cutting through the lowerends of Gastrocnemius & solaces muscles the posterior tibial vessels. 14. He perused the post-mortem report. The doctor opined that death was caused as a result of the multiple injuries sustained by the deceased, leading to cardiorespiratory failure. The medical evidence conclusively established that the death was homicidal in nature. 15. PW-9 is the learned JMFC, Seppa who recorded the confessional statements of both the accused persons. He proved the confessional statements of both the accused, recorded under Section 164 of the Cr.PC. He deposed that both the accused persons were produced before him by the police and that their confessional statements were recorded by him. However, during cross- examination, PW-9 stated that he did not remember the exact period granted to the accused persons for reflection before recording the confessional statements and merely stated that usually half an hour’s time is granted. 16. PW-8 is the Investigating Officer of the case. He deposed regarding the investigation carried out by him. He stated that he had seized the wearing apparels of the deceased, two daggers/knives, two motorcycles, and one torchlight. According to him, one knife was recovered based on the disclosure statement made by the co-accused, A-1. He also stated that the torchlight was recovered from the house of the present accused-appellant (A-2). Page No.# 7/18 However, during cross-examination, the Investigating Officer admitted several deficiencies in the prosecution case. He admitted that: i. There was no eyewitness to the occurrence; ii. The alleged weapons of offence were not produced before the Court; iii. No bloodstains were found on the alleged seized knife; iv. The knife was not sent for forensic examination; v. He had not mentioned in the seizure memo or charge-sheet that the recovery was made pursuant to the disclosure statement made by the accused persons; and vi. The material exhibits were not produced before the Court during the trial. 17. It further appears from the evidence on record that the alleged weapon of offence was never formally exhibited during the trial, and the seizure witnesses relating to the recovery of the alleged weapon turned hostile. The other seizure witnesses, although they had put their signatures on the seizure memo, were also not examined. Grounds of Appeal 18. Assailing the impugned judgment, the learned counsel for the appellant submits that the conviction recorded by the learned Trial Court is wholly unsustainable in law as well as on facts. It is contended that, except for the confessional statements recorded under Section 164 of the Cr.PC, there is no Page No.# 8/18 legally admissible evidence connecting the appellant with the commission of the offence. 19. It is further submitted that the alleged weapon of offence was neither proved nor exhibited during the trial, and the seizure witnesses having turned hostile, with some not having appeared at all, the alleged recovery itself remains unproved. According to the appellant, the entire prosecution case rests upon weak circumstantial evidence and an incomplete chain of circumstances. In support of his submissions, the learned counsel for the appellant relied upon the decision in Mohd. Aman & Anr. v. State of Rajasthan, reported in (1997) 10 SCC 44, the relevant paragraph of which is reproduced below: “Paragraph 8- After careful perusal of the evidence adduced in proof of the above circumstance we notice a glaring missing link, in that, the prosecution has failed to establish that the seized articles were not - or could not be - tampered with before it reached the Bureau for examination. Though evidence was led to prove that after seizure the articles were packaged and. then sealed, no evidence was led to indicate what was the mark given in the seals and whether the Bureau received the packages with the marked seals intact. Indeed, even the contemporaneous letters exchanged between them (Ext. P.59 and P.60) do not throw any light on this aspect of the matter. Rather, other circumstances appearing on record make the prosecution case doubtful in this regard : first, the articles were kept in the police station for five days without any justifiable reason, secondly the Investigating Officer (P.W. 20) admitted that the seal, mark of which was put on the articles, was with him since the time of seizure and lastly his letter (Ext. P.39) forwarding the seized articles to the Bureau contains admittedly, an overwriting as regards the date of its writing/dispatch and no satisfactory explanation is forthcoming for the same. Apart from the above missing link and the suspicious circumstances surrounding the same, there is another circumstance which also cast a serious mistrust as to genuineness of the evidence. Even though the specimen fingerprints of Mohd. Aman had to be taken on a number of occasions at the Page No.# 9/18 behest of the Bureau, they were never taken before or under the order of a Magistrate in accordance with Section 5 of the Identification of Prisoners Act. It is true that under Section 4 thereof police is competent to take finger prints of the accused but to dispel any suspicion as to its bonafides or to eliminate the possibility of fabrication of evidence it was eminently desirable that they were taken before or under the order of a Magistrate. The other related infirmity from which the prosecution case suffers is that the brass jug, production of which would have been the best evidence in proof of the claim of its seizure and subsequent examination by the Bureau, was not produced and exhibited during trial - for reasons best known to the prosecution and unknown to the Court. For the foregoing discussion we are unable to sustain the convictions of Mohd. Aman.” 20. The learned counsel for the appellant further contends that a confessional statement recorded under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C is not substantive evidence by itself and, in the absence of independent corroboration; conviction solely on the basis of such uncorroborated circumstantial evidence is unsafe. In support of his submissions, the learned counsel for the appellant relied on the decision in Utpal Das & Anr. v. State of West Bengal, reported in (2010) 6 SCC 493, the relevant paragraph of which is reproduced below: “Paragraph-14- The Prosecutrix more or less reiterated the same facts in her evidence. In the cross examination she stated that one of the miscreants "jumped" on the rickshaw and threatened her at the point of knife that she would be killed if she raises any hue and cry. She identified appellant No.2 in the court as the one who threatened her with the knife. Relying on this part of the statement in the cross examination, learned counsel submitted that this part of the story of appellant no.2 `jumping on the rickshaw and threatening her at the point of knife etc. was not stated by her in the first information report given to the police. This one circumstance according to the learned counsel for the appellants belies the evidence of the Prosecutrix as she went on making improvements. We find no merit in this submission Page No.# 10/18 for the simple reason that the contents of the first information report were never put to the victim. 15. It is needless to restate that the First Information Report does not constitute substantive evidence. It can, however, only be used as a previous statement for the purposes of either corroborating its maker or for contradicting him and in such a case the previous statement cannot be used unless the attention of witness has first been drawn to those parts by which it is proposed to contradict the witness. In this case the attention of the witness (PW-14) has not been drawn to those parts of the FIR which according to appellants are not in conformity with her evidence. 16. Likewise, statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. can never be used as substantive evidence of truth of the facts but may be used for contradictions and corroboration of a witness who made it. The statement made under Section 164 Cr.P.C. can be used to cross-examine the maker of it and the result may be to show that the evidence of the witness is false. It can be used to impeach the credibility of the prosecution witness. In the present case it was for the defence to invite the victim's attention as to what she stated in the first information report and statement made under Section 164 Cr.P.C. for the purposes of bringing out the contradictions, if any, in her evidence. In the absence of the same the court cannot read 164 statement and compare the same with her evidence.” 21. Ms. Hage, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, however, supported the impugned judgment and order of conviction. She submits that the prosecution has proved the case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt for the commission of the alleged offences under Sections 120B/457/302 of the IPC. She further submits that the convict, having accompanied the deceased, fully aware that the stipend money was with the deceased, and he made a plan with the co-accused with a view to robbing the money. In pursuant of their common intention they first went to the office and, having not found him there, they went to the residence of the deceased where he was sleeping. They entered Page No.# 11/18 inside and, upon being identified by the deceased, committed his murder. Later on, the weapon of offence was recovered based on the disclosure statement given by the accused/convict. 22. She further submits that all these facts could not have been known unless the accused himself reveals the sequel of the incident in his confessional statement. In his confessional statement the convict disclosed all facts leading to the killing of the deceased by stabbing him multiple times. The said facts stand corroborated by the post-mortem report. The fact of the convict having gone along with the deceased has been corroborated by the Headmaster (P.W- 2). Thus, she submits that all the circumstantial evidence unerringly pointed towards the guilt of the accused/convict, along with the co-accused and that they had committed the alleged offences and none else. She thus submits that there is no infirmity in the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court and prays for dismissal of the appeal. Points for Determination 23. In light of the above rival submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and the materials available on record, the following points emerge for determination: i. Whether the confessional statements recorded under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C were voluntary, reliable, and sufficient to sustain the conviction of the appellant; ii. Whether the prosecution has been able to prove the alleged recovery and seizure of the weapon of offence in accordance with law; iii. Whether the circumstantial evidence brought on record forms a Page No.# 12/18 complete chain pointing unerringly towards the guilt of the appellant; and iv. Whether the conviction recorded by the learned Trial Court can be sustained in law. Analysis and findings: 24. Since the prosecution case substantially rests upon the confessional statements of the accused persons, it becomes necessary to first examine the evidentiary value of such confessions. 25. It is no doubt true that a voluntary and truthful confession can form the basis of conviction. However, the settled principle of criminal jurisprudence is that, before acting upon a confession, the Court must be satisfied that the confession was voluntary in nature and free from any inducement, threat, or coercion. 26. In the present case, the confessional statements were recorded on 19.12.2003, after the accused persons had remained in police custody for several days. The evidence of P.W-9, the Magistrate, who had recorded the confessional statements of both the accused persons, does not clearly indicate the actual time granted to the accused persons for reflection, before recording the confessions. P.W-9, during his cross-examination, merely stated that he usually used to grant half an hour’s time for reflection. Such vague evidence does not satisfactorily establish compliance with the safeguards required while recording confessions under Section 164 of the Cr.PC. 27. It is also significant to note that the confessions of both the accused persons are substantially similar in nature, and there is no independent evidence Page No.# 13/18 corroborating the material particulars stated therein. 28. Though the confessional statements narrate the manner in which the offence was allegedly committed, the law is well settled that, as a rule of prudence, the Court should seek material corroboration before placing implicit reliance upon such confessions, particularly in a case involving serious charges punishable with life imprisonment. In the instant case, except for the confessional statements, there is no substantive evidence directly connecting the appellant with the crime. 29. Coming to the recovery of the weapon of offence, it is observed that the prosecution has also attempted to rely upon the alleged recovery of the weapon of offence. However, the evidence relating to such recovery suffers from serious infirmities. 30. Admittedly, the alleged knife said to have been used in the commission of the offence, was never exhibited before the learned Trial Court. The seizure witnesses either turned hostile or were not examined at all to prove the seizure. The Investigating Officer himself admitted that no bloodstains were found on the alleged knife and that the same was not sent for forensic examination. Thus, there exists absolutely no scientific evidence linking the alleged weapon with the commission of the offence. 31. The investigating officer further admitted that he had not mentioned in the seizure memo or the charge-sheet that the alleged recovery was made pursuant to the disclosure statements of the accused persons. Consequently, even the evidentiary value of the alleged discovery under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act becomes doubtful. In the absence of proper proof of seizure and Page No.# 14/18 exhibition of the alleged weapon before the Court, the recovery evidence loses much of its probative value. 32. In support of his submissions regarding the non-production of the weapon of offence before the Court, the learned counsel for the appellant relied upon the decision in Kipa Sero v. State of Arunachal Pradesh, reported in 2005 (4) GLT 86 and particularly paragraphs 38, 39, 40, and 41 thereof, which read as under: “38. In the case of Mohd. Aman & Anr. Vs. the State of Rajasthan, 1997 Crl.L.R. (SC) 452, the Apex Court noticing that the seized articles which could be the best evidence in the proof of the claim of seizure having not been produced and exhibited during the trial was fatal to the prosecution case. In the instant case also apart from non-production of the most important article, i.e., the dao or knife, allegedly used by the accused-appellant coupled with the defence version that the injuries were sustained by the victims from the sharp bamboo sticks makes the prosecution weak. 39. In the case of Kallikatt Kunhu vs. State of Kerala, AIR 2000 SC 1235, the eyewitnesses stated that the dagger was used to inflict injuries upon the deceased. However, the Apex Court found that if that be so, the dagger could not have been enclosed in a sheath. It should have been found unsheathed and ought to have some blood stains. Under those circumstances, the Apex Court held that the same strongly probabilised the version put forward by the appellant that the incident did not take place in the manner narrated by the prosecution witnesses. It was observed by the Apex court if the dagger was not used to inflict injuries there was no weapon of offence produced before the learned trial court. 40. In the instant case also apart from the fact that the seized articles were not produced, most importantly, the weapon allegedly used by the accused- Page No.# 15/18 appellant, it is also not the case of the prosecution that there were blood stains. All these factors have rendered the prosecution case highly improbable. As observed above, no amount of suspicion, howsoever, strong it may be can lead to any conviction. In the instant case also there might be suspicion about the conduct of the accused-appellant, but at the same time having regard to the fact that there is inherent contradictions, in the prosecution case coupled with the fatal discrepancy of non-production of the seized articles, more importantly, the dao or knife allegedly used by the accused-appellant has made the prosecution case weak. In such circumstances, it cannot be said that the offence allegedly committed by the accused-appellant has been proved beyond reasonable doubt. 41. The learned trial court simply believed the prosecution case unmindful of the inherent contradictions in the depositions made by the PWs. At the same time it did not take into account the inherent discrepancy in the prosecution case by not producing seized articles, most importantly, the dao or the knife. It also simply brushed aside the defence version and the depositions made by DWs. The statement made by the accused-appellant under Section 364 of Cr.P.C., as quoted above, clearly corroborated the evidence of the DWs.” 33. The prosecution case is admittedly based on circumstantial evidence. 34. The law regarding the appreciation of circumstantial evidence is well settled. The circumstances relied upon by the prosecution must be fully established; the chain of circumstances must be complete; and such circumstances must point only towards the guilt of the accused and rule out every possible hypothesis consistent with the innocence of the accused. In this regard, the learned counsel for the appellant relied upon the decision reported in Mohd. Aman & Anr. (supra), particularly paragraph 8 thereof. 35. In the present case, the circumstances relied upon by the prosecution are: Page No.# 16/18 i. The alleged motive relating to the stipend money; ii. The alleged confessional statements of both the accused persons; iii. The alleged recovery of the weapon and other articles from the house of the accused persons; and iv. The presence of the appellant with the deceased prior to the occurrence. 36. So far as the motive is concerned, P.W-10 clearly stated that on the previous evening itself, the deceased had kept the amount of Rs. 1 lakh at his residence for safe custody. Thus, the very foundation of the alleged motive relating to the money becomes doubtful. The prosecution has also failed to establish the “last seen together” circumstance by cogent evidence. None of the witnesses has stated that they had seen the appellant entering or leaving the house of the deceased during the night of the alleged incident. There is absolutely no evidence in this regard. 37. The alleged recovery of the weapon, as discussed above, remains unproved, as it was never produced or exhibited before the Trial Court. 38. No forensic evidence whatsoever has been brought on record connecting the appellant with the crime scene. Neither fingerprints, bloodstains, nor any other scientific material were collected or proved during the trial. The I.O of the case clearly stated that none of the above had been done by him during the investigation. 39. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion that the chain of circumstances remains incomplete and does not conclusively point towards the Page No.# 17/18 guilt of the appellant. 40. The medical evidence unquestionably establishes that the deceased died a homicidal death due to multiple stab injuries. However, medical evidence by itself cannot establish the identity of the assailant and in the absence of reliable connecting evidence, the medical evidence alone cannot sustain a conviction. 41. Upon consideration and overall appreciation of the evidence on record, this Court finds that the prosecution has failed to establish the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. The conviction recorded by the learned Trial Court appears to have been based substantially on the confessional statements of the accused persons without adequate independent corroboration. 42. The alleged recovery of the weapon remains unproved; the material exhibits were not properly exhibited and, in fact, were never exhibited at all. The seizure witnesses were either not examined or turned hostile, and there is a complete absence of forensic evidence. 43. It is a settled principle of criminal law that suspicion, however grave, cannot take the place of proof. The benefit of every reasonable doubt must necessarily go in favour of the accused. 44. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is unable to sustain the conviction and sentence imposed upon the appellant. Accordingly, the appeal stands allowed. 45. The judgment of conviction, dated 29.05.2023, and the order of sentence, dated 30.05.2023, passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Bomdila, in Sessions Case No. 26/2017 are hereby set aside. The appellant is acquitted of all the Page No.# 18/18 charges levelled against him by giving him the benefit of doubt. 46. The appellant shall be released forthwith, if his detention is not required in connection with any other case. 47. Before parting with the record, this Court deems it appropriate to observe that there have been serious lapses in the investigation. In particular, the failure to properly prove the recovery, the non-production of material exhibits, and the absence of scientific examination, have materially weakened the prosecution case and ultimately resulted in the failure of the prosecution to establish the charges beyond reasonable doubt. 48. In view of above, the appeal stands disposed of. 49. Let the Trial Court records be sent back forthwith. JUDGE JUDGE Comparing Assistant