2026:GAU-MZ:234 IN THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM & ARUNACHAL PRADESH) CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.16 OF 2025 Shri PC Ramnunmawia S/o PC Vanlalauva R/o Rahsi Veng, Lunglei, Mizoram …….Appellant -Versus- State of Mizoram r/b The Secretary, Home Department Govt. of Mizoram. …….Respondent – B E F O R E – HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE KAUSHIK GOSWAMI For the Appellant(s) :Mr. Jonathan Lalrintluanga, Advocate. For the Respondent(s) :Ms. Linda L. Fambawl, learned Public Prosecutor. Date of Hearing : 25.05.2026. Date of Judgment : 25.05.2026. JUDGMENT & ORDER (ORAL) Heard Mr. Jonathan Lalrintluanga, learned counsel appearing for the appellant. Also heard Ms. Linda L. Fanbawl, learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the State respondent. 2. The present criminal appeal has been preferred under Section 415 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita read with Section 36B of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as the “NDPS Act”), assailing the Judgment and Order dated 23.11.2023 and the consequential Sentence Order dated 24.11.2023 passed by the learned Special Judge, NDPS Act, Lunglei, Mizoram in Crl. Trial No. 548/2020, whereby the accused/appellant was convicted for the offence punishable under Section 21(c) of the NDPS Act and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 (ten) years along with fine of Rs.1,00,000/-, with default stipulation. 3. The prosecution case, shorn of unnecessary details, is that on the intervening night of 27.06.2020, at about 12:05 AM, information was conveyed to Lunglei Police Station by ASI C. Lalremruata of CID (SB), Lunglei, that one person had been detained on suspicion of carrying contraband substances at Rahsiveng, Lunglei. Acting upon the said information, the police party proceeded to the location, where the accused/appellant was found detained by CID personnel. Upon search of the dark brown rucksack allegedly being carried by the accused/appellant, 28 soap cases containing suspected heroin were recovered. The total weight of the seized substance was stated to be 351.5 grams. The contraband was seized, sealed, and thereafter the case was registered, investigated and culminated in submission of charge-sheet. 4. The accused/appellant denied the accusation and claimed trial. During the course of trial, the prosecution examined the material witnesses including the seizing officer, seizure witnesses, the officer who initially intercepted the accused/appellant, and the Investigating Officer. The accused/appellant, upon examination under Section 313 CrPC, admitted certain factual circumstances concerning interception and recovery, while denying conscious knowledge of the contents of the rucksack. One defence witness, namely the father of the accused/appellant, was also examined. 5. Upon appreciation of the evidence, the learned trial court recorded conviction, holding that the prosecution had established conscious possession of the contraband beyond reasonable doubt. Aggrieved thereby, the present appeal has been preferred. 6. Mr. Jonathan Lalrintluanga, learned counsel appearing for the accused/appellant, assails the impugned judgment on multiple grounds, contending that the conviction is unsustainable both on facts and in law. 7. Learned counsel submits, at the outset, that the prosecution case is riddled with material contradictions and procedural infirmities going to the root of the matter, thereby rendering the conviction unsafe. It is argued that the learned trial court failed to properly appreciate the inconsistencies emerging from the prosecution evidence and instead proceeded on conjectural assumptions. 8. The principal submission of learned counsel for the accused/appellant is that there has been non-compliance with the mandatory safeguards contained in Sections 41 and 42 of the NDPS Act. It is argued that the prosecution case itself reveals prior information having been received regarding a suspected person carrying contraband. Once such prior information existed, strict compliance with statutory safeguards became necessary. However, according to learned counsel, the prosecution evidence is inconsistent as to who actually received the information, who was competent to act upon it, and whether the statutory procedure was in fact followed. 9. Elaborating the submission, learned counsel points out that while the prosecution case suggests that ASI C. Lalremruata initially conveyed the information, PW-4 stated in cross-examination that the Officer-in-Charge was not present when the matter was reported and remained absent until they proceeded to the place of occurrence. Page 5 of 33 According to the accused/appellant, this undermines the prosecution version regarding authorization allegedly issued by the Officer-in-Charge. 10. It is further contended that PW-4 himself admitted being competent to conduct search and arrest. In such circumstances, the prosecution has failed to satisfactorily explain why he merely detained the appellant and instead triggered a different procedural course through another officer. According to learned counsel, this unexplained departure creates doubt about the genuineness of the prosecution version. 11. Learned counsel has also relied upon a discrepancy in the documentary record, particularly the forwarding document sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory, wherein it is mentioned that the contraband was recovered from the house of the accused/appellant. This, it is argued, fundamentally contradicts the prosecution’s oral case that recovery occurred from the accused/appellant’s rucksack in a public place. According to the accused/appellant, such contradiction is not minor but goes to the root of the prosecution story. 12. Learned counsel next submits that the independent witness requirement was not meaningfully complied with. It is argued that one seizure witness was himself a police personnel, while the circumstances under which the other witness was procured remain uncertain. According to the accused/appellant, the safeguards intended to lend transparency to seizure proceedings stand materially diluted. 13. A further submission concerns the chain of custody of the seized samples. Learned counsel points out that although the prosecution claims the samples were dispatched on 27.06.2020, the Forensic Science Laboratory received them only on 01.07.2020. No satisfactory evidence, according to the accused/appellant, has been led to establish whose custody the samples remained in during the intervening period or whether the sanctity of the samples remained intact. 14. Learned counsel also contends that the charge itself reflects inconsistency regarding the timing of occurrence, whereas the evidence suggests a materially different timeline. Such discrepancies, according to the accused/appellant, cumulatively demonstrate that the prosecution case is neither coherent nor free from doubt. 15. On the merits, learned counsel argues that even assuming recovery from the accused/appellant’s possession, the prosecution has failed to establish conscious possession. It is submitted that the accused/appellant’s consistent explanation has been that he was unaware of the contents of the rucksack and had merely been asked to carry it. In the absence of independent evidence establishing knowledge, the statutory presumptions, according to the accused/appellant, ought not to have been mechanically invoked. 16. It is accordingly submitted that the prosecution having failed to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused/appellant is entitled to acquittal. 17. Per contra, Ms. Linda L. Fanbawl, learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the State, supports the impugned judgment and submits that the prosecution has successfully established the guilt of the accused/appellant beyond reasonable doubt. 18. It is submitted that the prosecution evidence, particularly that of PW-1, PW-2, PW-3, PW-4 and PW-7, consistently establishes that the accused/appellant was apprehended while carrying the rucksack from which the contraband was recovered. It is further submitted that the accused/appellant himself, in his statement under Section 313 CrPC, admitted the essential facts relating to possession of the rucksack and recovery therefrom. 19. Learned Public Prosecutor submits that the defence has sought to magnify minor discrepancies while ignoring the substance of the evidence. It is contended that trivial inconsistencies or procedural irregularities which do not occasion prejudice cannot be elevated into grounds for acquittal where the core prosecution version remains intact and trustworthy. Page 8 of 33 20. It is submitted that the recovery in the present case was from the physical possession of the accused/appellant in a public place and not from any enclosed premises, and therefore the challenge founded on the premise of a house search is misconceived. 21. It is further submitted that the seized contraband was duly deposited in malkhana, samples were drawn under judicial supervision, the FSL report confirmed the substance to be heroin, and there is no material suggesting tampering or substitution. 22. It is therefore contended that the learned trial court correctly appreciated the evidence and recorded conviction, warranting no interference. 23. Having considered the rival submissions and perused the record, the following points arise for determination: (i) Whether the prosecution has successfully established beyond reasonable doubt that the contraband substance was recovered from the possession of the accused/appellant in the manner alleged? (ii) Whether such possession, if established, was conscious possession so as to attract the statutory presumptions under the NDPS Act? (iii) Whether the prosecution case stands vitiated by the alleged procedural infirmities or statutory non-compliance? Page 9 of 33 (iv) Whether the conviction and sentence recorded by the learned trial court call for interference? 24. Since the present matter is a criminal appeal against conviction, this Court is under an obligation to independently re-appreciate the evidence on record and arrive at its own conclusions. Equally, in prosecutions under the NDPS Act, having regard to the severity of punishment and the reverse burden framework, courts must insist upon the prosecution first establishing foundational facts through cogent and reliable evidence before statutory presumptions can be invoked. 25. It is equally well settled that while procedural safeguards under the NDPS Act are of considerable importance and must ordinarily receive strict compliance where mandatory, every irregularity does not ipso facto vitiate the prosecution. The decisive question remains whether the alleged defect strikes at the fairness, legality, or credibility of the prosecution case so as to create reasonable doubt. 26. The Apex Court in the case of Bharat Aambale Vs. State of Chhattisgarh, reported in (2025) 8 SCC 452, has reiterated that procedural irregularities do not automatically result in acquittal unless such deficiencies render the prosecution case doubtful when assessed holistically. The evidence on record must therefore be appreciated cumulatively and not in isolated fragments. Page 10 of 33 Relevant paragraphs of the aforesaid judgment read as under : “56. We summarise our final conclusion as under: 56.1. Although Section 52-A is primarily for the disposal and destruction of seized contraband in a safe manner yet it extends beyond the immediate context of drug disposal. as it serves a broader purpose of also introducing procedural safeguards in the treatment of narcotics substance after seizure inasmuch as it provides for the preparation of inventories, taking of photographs of the seized substances and drawing samples therefrom in the presence and with the certification of a Magistrate. Mere drawing of samples in the presence of a gazetted officer would not constitute sufficient compliance of the mandate under Section 52-A sub- section (2) of the NDPS Act. 56.2. Although, there is no mandate that the drawing of samples from the seized substance must take place at the time of seizure as held in Mohanlal. yet we are of the opinion that the process of inventorying, photographing and drawing samples of the seized substance shall as far as possible, take place in the presence of the accused, though the same may not be done at the very spot of seizure 56.3. Any inventory, photographs or samples of seized substance prepared in substantial compliance of the procedure prescribed under Section 52-A of the NDPS Act and the Rules/Standing Order(s) thereunder would have to be mandatorily treated as primary evidence as per Section 52-A sub-section (4) of the NDPS Act. irrespective of whether the substance in original is actually produced before the court or not. 56.4. The procedure prescribed by the Standing Order(s)/Rules in terms of Section 52-A of the NDPS Act is only intended to guide the officers and to see that a fair procedure is adopted by the officer in charge of the investigation, and as such what is required is substantial compliance of the procedure laid therein. 56.5. Mere non-compliance of the procedure under Section 52-A or the Standing Order(s)/Rules thereunder will not be fatal to the trial unless there are discrepancies in the physical evidence rendering the prosecution's case doubtful, which may not have been there had such compliance been done. Courts should take a holistic and cumulative view of the discrepancies that may exist in the evidence adduced by the prosecution and appreciate the same more carefully keeping in mind the procedural lapses. 56.6. If the other material on record adduced by the prosecution, oral or documentary inspires confidence and satisfies the court as regards the recovery as well as conscious possession of the contraband from the accused persons, then even in such cases, the courts can without hesitation proceed to hold the accused guilty notwithstanding any procedural defect in terms of Section 52-A of the NDPS Act. 56.7. Non-compliance or delayed compliance of the said provision or rules thereunder may lead the court to drawing an adverse inference against the prosecution, however no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down as to when such inference may be drawn. and it would all depend on the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case. 56.8. Where there has been lapse on the part of the police in either following the procedure laid down in Section 52-A of the NDPS Act or the prosecution in proving the same, it will not be appropriate for the court to resort to the statutory presumption of commission of an offence from the possession of illicit material under Section 54 of the NDPS Act, unless the court is otherwise satisfied as regards the seizure or recovery of such material from the accused persons from the other material on record. 56.9. The initial burden will lie on the accused to first lay the foundational facts to show that there was non-compliance of Section 52-A, either by leading evidence of its own or by relying upon the evidence of the prosecution, and the standard required would only be preponderance of probabilities. 56.10. Once the foundational facts laid indicate non-compliance of Section 52-A of the NDPS Act, the onus would thereafter be on the prosecution to prove by cogent evidence that either: (i) there was substantial compliance with the mandate of Section 52-A of the NDPS Act, OR (ii) satisfy the court that such non-compliance does not affect its case against the accused, and the standard of proof required would be beyond a reasonable doubt.” 27. The foundational question requiring determination is whether the prosecution has successfully established that the contraband was in fact recovered from the possession of the accused/appellant in the manner alleged. 28. PW-1, Inspector C. Ramnunmawii, is the principal seizure witness and the officer who conducted the search. Her evidence is categorical that upon receiving information from PW-4, she proceeded to the place of occurrence, secured witnesses to the extent possible, informed the accused/appellant of the grounds of suspicion, prepared the grounds of belief, and thereafter conducted search of the dark brown rucksack being carried by the accused/appellant. 29. Her testimony is specific that the accused/appellant was carrying the rucksack on his back when found detained by CID personnel; that upon search of the said rucksack, 28 soap cases wrapped in black cello tape were found; that each contained powder suspected to be heroin; that the substance was weighed at the spot; and that the seized material was sealed and taken into custody. 30. In cross-examination, while certain peripheral aspects were elicited, such as absence of specimen seal impression on the seizure form, non-testing of weighing machine accuracy, and absence of a gazetted officer, nothing material was brought out to discredit the central assertion that the contraband was recovered from the rucksack physically carried by the accused/appellant. 31. Her testimony on the core aspect of recovery remains intact. The matters elicited in cross-examination pertain to peripheral aspects and do not, in themselves, undermine the substantive prosecution narrative. 32. PW-2, R. Lalsangmawia, an independent civilian witness, materially corroborates PW-1. He deposed that police personnel came to his residence during late night hours, informed him that one person had been detained on suspicion, and requested him to witness the search. 33. His evidence is clear that upon reaching the place, he saw the accused/appellant detained with the brown rucksack; that the accused/appellant was asked to place the bag down; that the search was conducted in his presence; and that 28 soap cases containing suspected heroin were recovered therefrom. 34. In cross-examination, PW-2 stated that he did not know the specific identity of the police personnel who first called him. In the considered view of this Court, this circumstance carries little evidentiary significance. A witness called from sleep in the late hours of the night cannot be expected to retain exact recollection of the identity of each officer present. 35. Importantly, his testimony regarding the actual recovery remained unshaken. He consistently maintained that he personally witnessed the seizure from the accused/appellant’s rucksack. 36. PW-3, Vanlalruata, also substantially corroborates the prosecution version. He deposed that police personnel approached him late at night, requested him to witness the search, and also asked him to bring another witness, whereupon he brought PW-2. 37. He too stated that the accused/appellant was found near the construction site carrying the brown rucksack; that the police conducted search thereof in the presence of witnesses; and that the contraband was recovered therefrom. 38. The defence has argued that PW-3 cannot be treated as a truly independent witness since he was a police personnel. That contention may affect the degree of independent corroborative weight attached to his testimony, but does not automatically render his evidence unreliable. The evidence of police personnel is not to be discarded merely by reason of official status; what is required is careful scrutiny. 39. Upon such scrutiny, this Court finds no inherent improbability or material contradiction in his account on the central fact of recovery. 40. Learned counsel for the accused/appellant has argued that the prosecution failed to secure proper independent witnesses, thereby undermining the credibility of the seizure. This contention does not persuade the Court. 41. The occurrence took place during late-night hours amid pandemic restrictions. PW-1 explained the practical difficulty in securing witnesses at that hour and the circumstances under which available local persons were requested to witness the proceedings. 42. More importantly, the prosecution did secure one independent civilian witness, namely PW-2, whose testimony remains materially intact. 43. The Apex Court has consistently held that conviction cannot be discarded merely because police witnesses were examined, provided their evidence is otherwise reliable and inspires confidence. It is apposite in this regard to refer to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Anil Alias Andya Sadashiv Nandoskar Vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in (1996) 2 SCC 589, wherein the Apex Court has held as under: “5. Indeed all the 5 prosecution witnesses who have been examined in support of search and seizure were members of the raiding party. They are all police officials. There is, however, no rule of law that the evidence of police officials has to be discarded or that it suffers from some inherent infirmity. Prudence, however, requires that the evidence of the police officials, who are interested in the outcome of the result of the case, needs to be carefully scrutinised and independently appreciated. The police officials do not suffer from any disability to give evidence and the mere fact that they are police officials does not by itself give rise to any doubt about their creditworthiness. We have carefully and critically analysed the evidence of all the 5 police officials. There is nothing on the record to show that any one of them was hostile to the appellant and despite lengthy cross- examination their evidence has remained unshaken throughout. These witnesses have deposed in clear terms the details of the trap that was laid to apprehend the appellant and the manner in which he was apprehended. Their evidence regarding search and seizure of the weapons from the appellant is straightforward, consistent and specific. It inspires confidence and learned counsel for the appellant has not been able to point out any serious, let alone fatal, infirmity in their evidence. In our opinion, the factum of search and seizure of the country-made revolver from the conscious possession of the appellant has been established by the prosecution beyond any reasonable doubt. The explanation given by the prosecution, for the non-examination of the two panch witnesses, which is supported by the report Ext. 24 filed by PW 4 PI Gaikwad is satisfactory. The evidence on the record shows that the raiding party made sincere efforts to join with them two independent panchas at the time of search and seizure and they were so joined. They were also cited as prosecution witnesses and summoned to give evidence. However, despite diligent efforts made by the prosecuting agency to serve them, they could not be located or traced and therefore they could not be examined at the trial. In the face of the facts stated in report Ext. 24. the correctness of which has remained virtually unchallenged during the cross-examination of PW 4, the non- examination of the two panchas cannot be said to be on account of any oblique reason. Their non- production at the trial thus has not created any dent in the prosecution case. The prosecution cannot be accused of withholding these witnesses since it made every effort to trace and produce them at the trial but failed on account of the fact that they had left the addresses furnished by them at the time of search and their whereabouts could not be traced despite diligent efforts made in that behalf. We, therefore, do not find any reason to doubt the correctness of the prosecution version relating to the apprehension of the appellant, the search and seizure by the raiding party and the recovery from the appellant of the country-made revolver and cartridges for which he could produce no licence or authority because of the non- examination of the panch witnesses. We find that the evidence of PW 1 to PW 5 is reliable, cogent and trustworthy.” 44. On that touchstone, the evidence of PW-1, PW-2 and PW-3 remains acceptable. 45. PW-4, ASI C. Lalremruata, assumes particular significance because much of the accused/appellant’s challenge is built around his testimony. He deposed that while on patrol duty during lockdown hours, he and his team noticed the accused/appellant carrying a rucksack at late night near an ongoing RCC construction site, behaving suspiciously and appearing intoxicated. Upon questioning him regarding movement during restricted hours, suspicion arose and he was detained. 46. Significantly, during cross-examination, PW-4 clarified that the accused/appellant was intercepted in a public place while carrying the rucksack. This aspect assumes importance in view of the defence attempt to suggest a house search. 47. PW-4 specifically stated that he did not conduct the search himself, but instead proceeded to the police station to report the matter, leaving the accused/appellant detained under watch with instructions that no search be conducted until proper procedure was followed. Page 18 of 33 48. Far from weakening the prosecution, this conduct lends procedural credibility to the sequence, indicating restraint rather than arbitrariness. 49. Learned counsel has argued that since PW-4 admitted competence to conduct search, his failure to do so creates suspicion. This submission is without merit. 50. Mere competence to exercise statutory power does not create a legal obligation to personally conduct the search. A decision to proceed through a more formal seizure process cannot be treated as suspicious merely because an alternative course was theoretically available. 51. Learned counsel also relied upon PW-4’s statement that the Officer-in-Charge was not present when information was first conveyed. This aspect does not materially affect the prosecution case. 52. The essential fact is that information was communicated, the seizure officer proceeded to the spot, and recovery was effected in the presence of witnesses. 53. Even if some uncertainty exists regarding the precise internal administrative routing of information within the police station, that does not undermine the independent evidence establishing actual recovery. 54. Read cumulatively, the evidence of PW-1, PW-2, PW-3 and PW-4 forms a coherent and mutually corroborative chain establishing: (i) that the accused/appellant was intercepted while carrying the rucksack in a public place; (ii) that the rucksack remained in his custody until formal search; (iii) that the contraband was recovered from the same; (iv) that the recovery was witnessed; and (v) that seizure formalities were undertaken thereafter. 55. The contradictions pointed out by the accused/appellant pertain primarily to peripheral or collateral details rather than the central occurrence itself. 56. In criminal adjudication, particularly in cases involving multiple witnesses describing late-night operational events, some variation in incidental details is neither unusual nor necessarily indicative of falsehood. 57. This Court therefore finds that the prosecution has successfully established the factum of recovery from the physical possession of the accused/appellant. 58. PW-7, the Investigating Officer, deposed that upon registration of the case, he undertook the investigation, formally arrested the accused/appellant, caused medical examination, prepared inventory, arranged judicial sampling, sent the samples for forensic examination, and ultimately submitted charge-sheet upon receipt of the Forensic Science Laboratory report confirming the seized substance to be heroin. Page 20 of 33 59. His evidence assumes significance not because he witnessed the original recovery, but because it establishes continuity of investigation, custody, sampling, and forensic linkage between the seized substance and the material ultimately examined. 60. PW-7 stated that the seized contraband was deposited in the police malkhana immediately after seizure. He further deposed that inventory proceedings and sample drawing were conducted before the competent Magistrate in the presence of the accused/appellant. 61. Significantly, the accused/appellant himself, in his examination under Section 313 CrPC, substantially admitted these procedural events. 62. Thus, the prosecution case does not rest merely upon oral assertion regarding seizure; it is supported by subsequent procedural steps connecting the seized material with forensic confirmation. 63. Learned counsel for the accused/appellant has argued that although the forwarding documents indicate dispatch on 27.06.2020, the Forensic Science Laboratory received the samples only on 01.07.2020, and that the intervening delay creates doubt regarding the sanctity of the samples. The submission has been considered. 64. There can be no dispute that in prosecutions under the NDPS Act, maintenance of the chain of custody assumes considerable importance. Given the stringent penal consequences under the statute, courts must carefully scrutinize whether the seized material remained protected from tampering and whether the sample analyzed is traceable to the actual seizure. 65. However, the law does not insist upon mathematical perfection, but credible continuity. The evidence on record demonstrates: (i) seizure and sealing at the spot; (ii) deposit in the police malkhana; (iii) judicial inventory and sampling proceedings; (iv) forwarding for forensic examination; and (v) forensic confirmation identifying the substance as heroin. 66. No evidence has been brought on record by the defence suggesting actual tampering, substitution, broken seals, mismatch in sample identity, or any other circumstance creating a tangible possibility of compromise. 67. Mere lapse of a few days between seizure and laboratory receipt, absent evidence of prejudice or compromise, cannot by itself demolish an otherwise credible prosecution case. 68. The accused/appellant seeks to convert temporal delay into evidentiary doubt without demonstrating any concrete infirmity in the chain of custody. That contention cannot be accepted. 69. Learned counsel for the accused/appellant has placed considerable emphasis upon a recital in one forwarding document indicating that the contraband was recovered from the house of the accused/appellant, contending that this completely demolishes the prosecution case. This submission cannot be accepted upon a proper appreciation of the evidence as a whole. 70. The substantive evidence on record is uniform and unequivocal that the accused/appellant was intercepted in a public place while carrying the rucksack in question and that the contraband was recovered therefrom. 71. PW-4 specifically deposed that while on patrol duty, the accused/appellant was noticed moving at late night carrying the rucksack, whereupon he was detained on suspicion. PW-1 categorically stated that when she reached the place of occurrence, the accused/appellant was found detained with the rucksack on his person and the recovery was effected therefrom. This version stands materially corroborated by PW-2 and PW-3, both of whom witnessed the search and recovery. 72. Most significantly, the accused/appellant himself, in his examination under Section 313 CrPC, admitted that: (i) the rucksack was being carried by him; (ii) the police asked him to place it down; and (iii) the contraband was recovered from that very bag. 73. In the face of such direct substantive evidence, a stray inconsistent recital in one forwarding document cannot override the consistent oral testimony of multiple witnesses and the accused/appellant’s own admissions. 74. Significantly, the fact that the accused/appellant was intercepted in a public place was not meaningfully shaken in the cross-examination of PW-4. Further, the Investigating Officer was not confronted in cross- examination with any specific suggestion that the recovery had in fact been made from a house. 75. Documentary recitals prepared in the course of administrative processing cannot be read in isolation so as to displace clear substantive evidence proving the actual occurrence. 76. The defence has produced no material whatsoever suggesting that the accused/appellant was apprehended from his residence or that the seizure was in fact conducted from a house. 77. This Court is therefore satisfied that the prosecution has clearly established that the recovery was effected from the accused/appellant’s immediate physical possession in a public place. 78. Once it stands established on evidence that the accused/appellant was intercepted in a public place while physically carrying the contraband, the challenge founded on the factual premise of a house search necessarily fails. 79. Learned counsel for the accused/appellant has argued that prior information existed and that statutory safeguards were therefore not properly complied with. 80. Even assuming prior information existed, the present prosecution ultimately rests upon recovery from the accused/appellant’s immediate physical possession in a public place, clearly established through substantive evidence. 81. The accused/appellant’s challenge is substantially premised on the assumption that the recovery occurred from enclosed premises pursuant to a house search. That factual premise stands disproved. 82. The consistent prosecution case is one of interception in a public place followed by search of the article carried by the accused/appellant. The accused/appellant himself admits this factual position. 83. In such circumstances, the accused/appellant cannot derive advantage from an isolated documentary inconsistency contrary to the substantive evidentiary record. 84. Learned counsel has argued that uncertainty regarding who first received the information and whether the Officer-in-Charge was physically present creates doubt regarding the prosecution case. This submission is overstated. 85. Internal administrative routing of information within a police station is not, in itself, the determinative issue unless it materially affects the legality of seizure or the credibility of recovery. 86. The decisive question remains whether the accused/appellant was found in possession of the contraband. That fact stands independently established. 87. Criminal adjudication must focus on substantive evidentiary reliability rather than technical over-reading of administrative sequencing, unless genuine prejudice or reasonable doubt is demonstrated. 88. The objections raised by the accused/appellant regarding witness procurement, documentary discrepancy, sample transmission, internal procedural inconsistencies, and alleged statutory non-compliance; when individually or cumulatively examined, do not create reasonable doubt sufficient to dislodge the prosecution case. 89. The prosecution has successfully preserved the evidentiary continuity necessary for sustaining the present prosecution. 90. The statement of the accused/appellant recorded under Section 313 CrPC assumes considerable significance in the present case. While such statement is not substantive evidence for the prosecution in the strict sense, admissions made therein may legitimately be taken into account insofar as they support established facts or illuminate the defence taken. 91. In the present case, the accused/appellant admitted several material circumstances, namely: (i) that he was detained by CID personnel on the relevant night; (ii) that the police thereafter arrived; (iii) that the rucksack in question was being carried by him; (iv) that the police searched the said rucksack; (v) that 28 soap cases containing the contraband substance were recovered therefrom; (vi) that weighing was conducted; and (vii) that inventory and sample procedures were subsequently undertaken. 92. Thus, the accused/appellant does not dispute either the factum of possession of the bag or the recovery therefrom. His defence is limited to asserting absence of knowledge regarding its contents. This distinction is crucial. 93. Before invoking statutory presumptions under the NDPS Act, the prosecution must first establish foundational facts demonstrating possession. The Apex Court has consistently held that the reverse burden under Sections 35 and 54 does not dispense with the prosecution’s initial obligation to establish possession through reliable evidence. 94. That threshold stands fully satisfied in the present case through: (i) the consistent testimony of PW-1; (ii) corroboration by PW-2 and PW-3; (iii) the supporting evidence of PW-4 regarding interception; (iv) continuity established through PW-7; and (v) the accused/appellant’s own admissions under Section 313 CrPC. 95. Once possession is established, the legal burden shifts in terms of Sections 35 and 54 of the NDPS Act, subject to rebuttal by the accused/appellant through a credible and probable explanation. 96. Learned counsel for the accused/appellant contends that although the accused/appellant carried the rucksack, he had no knowledge that it contained heroin. This explanation requires close scrutiny. 97. Conscious possession under the NDPS Act does not require proof of ownership in the proprietary sense. 98. Where contraband is recovered from an article in the immediate and exclusive physical possession of the accused, a strong presumption ordinarily arises unless satisfactorily explained. 99. The Apex Court in the case of Mohan Lal v. State of Rajasthan, reported in (2015) 6 SCC 222, has explained that possession in the context of the NDPS Act includes conscious physical control coupled with the mental element contemplated under Section 35. 100. In the present case, the contraband was not recovered from a remote, jointly accessible, or uncertain location. It was recovered from a bag physically carried by the accused/appellant at the time of interception. This constitutes direct and immediate possession. 101. The accused/appellant’s explanation is that he was merely carrying the bag for another person and was unaware of its contents. 102. This explanation does not inspire confidence. First, no credible particulars were furnished enabling verification of the alleged person. A vague assertion unsupported by specific identifying details cannot, by itself, rebut a statutory presumption arising from immediate physical possession. 103. Second, PW-7 specifically deposed that acting upon the accused/appellant’s version, efforts were made to trace the alleged person by taking the accused/appellant to different localities. No such person could be found. Thus, the explanation was not merely unsupported; it was investigated and remained wholly unsubstantiated. 104. Third, the quantity involved is significant. The contraband consisted of 28 separately packed soap cases concealed within the bag. The nature, volume, and manner of concealment are relevant circumstances in assessing the plausibility of the defence explanation. 105. Fourth, the explanation remains a bare denial unsupported by any objective material. The statutory burden upon the accused/appellant is not to prove innocence beyond reasonable doubt, but at the very least to place before the Court a credible explanation capable of creating reasonable doubt. That burden has not been discharged. 106. The defence examined DW-1, the accused/appellant’s father. His testimony does not materially assist the defence. 107. DW-1 admittedly had no personal knowledge regarding the occurrence, the recovery, or the surrounding circumstances. His evidence is therefore incapable of either discrediting the prosecution case or probabilising the defence explanation. 108. Learned counsel also relied upon discrepancy in the timing reflected in the charge vis-à-vis the oral evidence. This submission carries little substance. Page 30 of 33 109. Unless prejudice affecting the conduct of defence is demonstrated, minor variance in the description of time does not vitiate a criminal trial where the identity of the occurrence, the accused, and the transaction remain unmistakably established. No such prejudice has been demonstrated. 110. Upon an independent re-appreciation of the evidence, this Court is satisfied that: (i) the accused/appellant was in exclusive physical possession of the rucksack; (ii) the contraband was recovered therefrom; (iii) foundational facts necessary for invoking the statutory presumptions stand firmly established; and (iv) the accused/appellant has failed to rebut those presumptions through any credible explanation. 111. The prosecution has therefore successfully established conscious possession of the contraband beyond reasonable doubt. 112. Having independently re-appreciated the entire evidence on record, this Court finds that the prosecution has successfully established the foundational facts necessary to sustain the conviction of the accused/appellant. 113. The evidence of PW-1, the seizing officer, finds material corroboration from PW-2 and PW-3, who witnessed the recovery, as well as from PW-4, who initially intercepted the accused/appellant under suspicious circumstances. The subsequent investigative chain through PW-7, coupled with the forensic confirmation, completes the evidentiary continuum. 114. The defence has attempted to impeach the prosecution case primarily through procedural objections and isolated inconsistencies. However, as already discussed, the discrepancies relied upon do not strike at the core of the prosecution case. Criminal adjudication requires courts to distinguish between material contradictions affecting the substratum of the prosecution and minor irregularities that do not generate reasonable doubt. The objections raised in the present appeal fall in the latter category. 115. The prosecution has successfully established beyond reasonable doubt that the contraband substance was recovered from the immediate physical possession of the accused/appellant. 116. The recovery having been proved through reliable and corroborative evidence, the statutory presumptions under Sections 35 and 54 of the NDPS Act validly arise. 117. The explanation furnished by the accused/appellant that he was innocently carrying the bag for another person without knowledge of its contents is wholly unsubstantiated, inherently improbable in the circumstances, and insufficient to rebut the statutory presumptions. 118. The challenge founded upon alleged procedural irregularities, including the documentary discrepancy regarding place of recovery, the argument relating to independent witnesses, the contention regarding delay in transmission of samples, and the objections concerning internal procedural routing of information, do not create reasonable doubt regarding the prosecution case. 119. The accused/appellant’s guilt therefore stands established beyond reasonable doubt. 120. The points framed for determination are answered as follows: (i) The prosecution has successfully established beyond reasonable doubt that the contraband substance was recovered from the possession of the accused/appellant in the manner alleged. (ii) Such possession was conscious possession within the meaning of the NDPS Act. (iii) The prosecution case is not vitiated by the alleged procedural infirmities or statutory non-compliance. (iv) The conviction recorded by the learned trial court does not call for interference. Page 33 of 33 121. As regards sentence, the learned trial court imposed rigorous imprisonment for ten years along with fine. 122. The quantity involved being commercial quantity, the sentence imposed is the statutory minimum prescribed under the NDPS Act. In the absence of any legal infirmity in the conviction, no scope for interference with the sentence arises. 123. No mitigating circumstance of such compelling nature has been brought on record warranting appellate interference. 124. Consequently, the present criminal appeal stands dismissed. 125. The Judgment and Order dated 23.11.2023 and the consequential Sentence Order dated 24.11.2023 passed by the learned Special Judge, NDPS Act, Lunglei, Mizoram in Crl. Trial No. 548/2020 are hereby affirmed. 126. The period of detention already undergone by the accused/appellant shall be set off in accordance with law. 127. Registry shall transmit the records of the learned trial court forthwith along with a copy of this judgment. JUDGE Comparing Assistant