Page No.# 1/12 GAHC030002692026 THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH) Case No. : Bail Appln./33/2026 Sh. Hosen Ali S/o Abdul Rahim R/o Rakhiyasina Village Mornoi Police Station, Goalpara District, Assam. VERSUS The State of Mizoram Aizawl Advocate for the Petitioner : Mr. Azad Ahmed Advocate for the Respondent : P.P./Addl.PP, Mizoram BEFORE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE KAUSHIK GOSWAMI ORDER 26.05.2026 Heard Mr. Sakiat Ali, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner through video conferencing mode. Also heard Mrs. Linda L. Fambawl, learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the State respondent. 2. By way of the present petition under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (hereinafter referred to as the “BNSS”), the petitioner, namely, Hosen Ali, seeks enlargement on regular bail in Page No.# 2/12 connection with Saitual P.S. Case No. 20/2026, registered under Sections 22(C)/25/29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as the “NDPS Act”). The petitioner was arrested on 01.03.2026. 3. The prosecution case, in brief, is that an FIR came to be lodged alleging that on 28.02.2026, one ASI H. Lalpekhlun, along with a police team, had proceeded from the police station for random checking at Kulmawi, Keifang. During such checking, a vehicle bearing registration No. AS-01-NC-8361, allegedly proceeding from Manipur towards Aizawl and driven by the present petitioner, was intercepted at about 6:20 A.M. on 01.03.2026 at Keifang-Kulmawi Road, approximately 2 kilometres south of Saitual Police Station. Upon inspection, suspicious packages allegedly concealed inside the vehicle were detected, leading to a detailed search in the presence of civilian witnesses. During such search, 15 bundles containing substances suspected to be methamphetamine tablets were allegedly recovered from a concealed compartment within the vehicle. The seized quantity is stated to be of commercial quantity. Consequently, the contraband articles, along with the vehicle, were seized and the petitioner was arrested. 4. Mr. Sakiat Ali, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, assails the legality of the petitioner’s continued detention not, at this stage, on a detailed examination of the merits of the prosecution allegations, but on the foundational ground that the arrest itself stands vitiated by non- compliance with mandatory constitutional and statutory safeguards governing deprivation of personal liberty. 5. It is contended that the constitutional mandate embodied in Page No.# 3/12 Articles 21 and 22(1) of the Constitution of India, read with Sections 47 and 48 of the BNSS, has been flagrantly breached. Learned counsel submits that the so-called notice communicating grounds of arrest does not establish that the grounds were communicated to the petitioner in a language known to or understood by him. According to the petitioner, he is conversant only with Assamese and Hindi and is not familiar with English. It is argued that mere preparation of an arrest-related document in English cannot satisfy the constitutional requirement of effective communication of the grounds of arrest. 6. Learned counsel further submits that the statutory obligation requiring intimation of arrest to a relative, friend, or person nominated by the arrested individual has also not been meaningfully complied with. Drawing attention to the purported arrest intimation under Section 48 of the BNSS, it is submitted that the said document does not bear acknowledgment of any family member or nominated person, but instead contains only acknowledgment attributable to the petitioner himself. It is contended that an intimation ostensibly addressed to a relative, but neither actually served upon nor acknowledged by such person, cannot amount to compliance with the safeguard intended to secure prompt legal assistance and prevent isolation of the arrested individual. 7. Learned counsel further submits that the petitioner has been falsely implicated. According to him, the petitioner was merely engaged as the driver of the vehicle and had no ownership, dominion, or knowledge in respect of the alleged contraband articles. It is argued that mere physical presence in the vehicle, absent material indicating Page No.# 4/12 conscious possession or involvement in the alleged offence, cannot automatically attract criminal culpability under the NDPS Act. 8. It is further contended that the prosecution has failed to demonstrate compliance with the mandatory requirements of Section 42 of the NDPS Act. According to learned counsel, there is no satisfactory material to show that any prior information was duly reduced into writing and communicated to the competent superior officer in the manner required by law. It is additionally urged that procedural safeguards governing lawful search and seizure have not been adhered to. 9. Learned counsel also submits that the petitioner was not produced before the competent Magistrate within the constitutionally permissible period, thereby rendering the detention unlawful. It is contended that the petitioner was arrested in the early hours of 01.03.2026 and was produced only thereafter beyond the permissible constitutional limit, in violation of the safeguards against unlawful detention. 10. In support of the aforesaid submissions, reliance has been placed upon the decisions of the Apex Court in Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India, reported in (2024) 7 SCC 576; Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana & Anr., reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 269; and Mihir Rajesh Shah v. State of Maharashtra & Anr, reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2356, as well as decisions of coordinate Benches relied upon by the petitioner. 11. Per contra, Mrs. Linda L. Fambawl, learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the State respondent, submits that the petitioner was duly Page No.# 5/12 informed of the grounds of arrest and that intimation regarding his arrest was conveyed telephonically to his brother. However, upon a specific query from the Court, learned Public Prosecutor fairly submits that no contemporaneous documentary material has been placed on record to substantiate such compliance. It is nevertheless contended that the available record substantially reflects compliance with the statutory requirements. 12. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and upon perusal of the materials available on record, the principal issue requiring determination is not, at this stage, whether the prosecution possesses prima facie incriminating material sufficient to sustain the accusation on merits, but whether the petitioner’s arrest and consequent continued detention satisfy the minimum constitutional and statutory safeguards that must necessarily precede lawful deprivation of personal liberty. 13. Upon consideration of the materials placed on record, this Court finds that the challenge raised by the petitioner warrants examination at the threshold level of constitutional compliance governing arrest and detention. 14. Personal liberty occupies a central position within the constitutional framework, and any curtailment thereof must strictly conform not only to statutory prescription but also to the constitutional safeguards embodied in Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution of India. The power of arrest, though recognised in law, is not unbridled; its exercise must demonstrably satisfy the procedural guarantees intended to protect the individual against arbitrary deprivation of liberty. Page No.# 6/12 15. Article 22(1) guarantees that no person who is arrested shall be detained in custody without being informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds of such arrest. The corresponding statutory obligation under Section 47 of the BNSS is not a mere procedural formality, but a substantive safeguard intended to ensure that the arrested individual is made aware, with sufficient clarity, of the legal and factual basis on which liberty is being curtailed, so as to enable him to seek timely legal recourse. 16. Upon examination of the material placed on record, this Court finds that the purported document relied upon by the prosecution as compliance with Section 47 of the BNSS does not satisfactorily establish effective communication of the grounds of arrest in a language understood by the petitioner. The document appears to contain the grounds in English, whereas the petitioner’s specific case is that he is conversant only with Assamese and Hindi and does not understand English. Significantly, there is no contemporaneous endorsement or material indicating that the contents were translated, explained, or otherwise communicated to him in a language known to him. 17. Effective communication of grounds of arrest cannot be equated with mere preparation of a written document in a language unfamiliar to the arrested person. Constitutional compliance demands communication in substance, not mere formal documentation. Unless the arrested person is placed in a position to meaningfully understand why his liberty is being curtailed, the constitutional safeguard would stand reduced to a ritualistic formality. 18. Equally significant is the circumstance that the document appears Page No.# 7/12 to record a statement attributable to the petitioner himself in Assamese to the effect that he was apprehended while carrying contraband. Such a recital, even assuming its existence, cannot substitute the mandatory obligation cast upon the arresting authority to communicate the grounds of arrest. A statement attributed to the arrested individual is conceptually distinct from compliance by the arresting authority with the constitutional mandate under Article 22(1) and the statutory requirement under Section 47 of the BNSS. 19. The requirement of informing a relative, friend, or nominated person regarding the arrest, as contemplated under Section 48 of the BNSS, stands on an equally important footing. The object of this safeguard is not symbolic. It is intended to ensure that the arrested individual is not left isolated, that access to legal assistance becomes realistically available, and that the possibility of arbitrary detention is meaningfully checked through external awareness of the arrest. 20. In the present case, the prosecution has asserted that telephonic intimation was conveyed to the petitioner’s brother. However, beyond such assertion, no contemporaneous material has been placed on record to substantiate such compliance. The purported arrest intimation does not bear acknowledgment from the relative concerned, nor is there any objective material reflecting the time, mode, recipient, or proof of communication. 21. In matters involving deprivation of liberty, constitutional compliance cannot rest upon subsequent explanations from the bar unsupported by contemporaneous official record. Where a specific allegation of breach of arrest safeguards is raised, the burden Page No.# 8/12 necessarily lies upon the arresting authority to demonstrate scrupulous compliance through objective and verifiable material. 22. A purported oral communication, unsupported by any contemporaneous record, would render judicial scrutiny illusory and substantially dilute the protection intended by Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution. Procedural safeguards meant to protect liberty derive their efficacy from demonstrable observance, not from post facto assertion. 23. The decisions relied upon by the petitioner proceed on the settled principle that constitutional safeguards relating to arrest are not dispensable formalities and must be meaningfully complied with. While each case necessarily turns on its own facts, the broader constitutional principle admits of little ambiguity. 24. On the materials presently available, this Court is prima facie of the view that the prosecution has failed to satisfactorily establish compliance with the mandatory safeguards governing communication of grounds of arrest and intimation of arrest in the manner contemplated by law. 25. Learned Public Prosecutor has rightly emphasised that the present case concerns alleged recovery of commercial quantity of contraband, thereby attracting the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act. Ordinarily, where such statutory restrictions are attracted, the jurisdiction of the Court to enlarge an accused on bail is significantly constrained, and the Court is required to exercise substantial restraint. 26. There can be no quarrel with the settled proposition that offences under the NDPS Act involving commercial quantity are viewed with Page No.# 9/12 seriousness, and the legislative intent underlying Section 37 is to impose stringent conditions before liberty is restored in such cases. 27. However, the present matter stands on a juridically distinct footing. The controversy here is not merely whether the petitioner has satisfied the conventional parameters governing grant of bail on merits. The anterior and more fundamental issue is whether continued detention founded upon an arrest that prima facie suffers from constitutional infirmity can be sustained at all. 28. A statutory restriction governing the exercise of bail jurisdiction presupposes lawful custody. Section 37 regulates the grant of bail in respect of a person validly detained in accordance with law; it cannot be construed as a statutory device to legitimise detention that is itself vulnerable on account of non-compliance with foundational constitutional safeguards. 29. The distinction is not merely semantic, but constitutional. A court considering ordinary bail examines whether liberty should be restored despite the accusation. A court confronted with prima facie unlawful curtailment of liberty examines whether such detention can be judicially permitted to continue at all. The latter inquiry necessarily precedes the former. 30. The constitutional guarantees under Articles 21 and 22 are not rendered inoperative merely because the accusation concerns a grave offence under a special statute. The State unquestionably possesses the authority to investigate serious offences and prosecute offenders in accordance with law; however, the exercise of such power must remain Page No.# 10/12 within constitutional bounds. The seriousness of the allegation cannot, by itself, cure a foundational defect in the process by which liberty has been curtailed. 31. This Court is conscious that no final opinion is being expressed on the merits of the prosecution case, the question of conscious possession, or the evidentiary worth of the material collected during investigation. Those are matters to be independently assessed at the appropriate stage by the competent court. The present determination is confined strictly to the legality of the petitioner’s arrest and the sustainability of continued detention in light of the constitutional objections raised. 32. Once prima facie constitutional non-compliance affecting the legality of arrest is demonstrated, continued incarceration cannot be justified solely by invoking statutory rigours that operate in the realm of ordinary bail discretion. Constitutional compliance is not a dispensable precondition to detention. 33. In that view of the matter, this Court is of the considered opinion that the petitioner has made out a case for release. 34. In view of the discussion recorded hereinabove, this Court is of the considered opinion that the petitioner’s continued detention cannot, at this stage, be judicially sustained, the materials presently available prima facie disclosing non-compliance with the mandatory constitutional and statutory safeguards governing arrest. 35. It is clarified that this determination does not rest upon an adjudication of the merits of the prosecution allegations, nor upon any Page No.# 11/12 conclusive finding regarding the petitioner’s culpability. The observations made herein are confined solely to the legality of the arrest and the constitutional sustainability of continued detention in the facts presently disclosed. 36. Consequently, the petitioner, namely, Hosen Ali, shall be enlarged on bail in connection with Saitual P.S. Case No. 20/2026, subject to the following conditions: (i) The petitioner shall be released upon furnishing a bail bond of Rs. 50,000/- (Rupees Fifty Thousand only) with two local sureties of the like amount, to the satisfaction of the learned Special Judge, NDPS, Aizawl. (ii) The petitioner shall appear before the Investigating Officer as and when required and shall extend full cooperation with the investigation. (iii) The petitioner shall not, directly or indirectly, make any inducement, threat, promise, or attempt to influence any person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade such person from disclosing relevant facts before the Court or the Investigating Agency. (iv) The petitioner shall not leave the jurisdiction of the learned Trial Court without prior leave of the Court concerned and shall furnish details of his place of stay and contact particulars to the Investigating Officer in advance in the event of travel. (v) The petitioner shall not involve himself in any offence of a similar nature during the period of release, failing which it shall be open to the prosecution to seek cancellation of bail in accordance with law. 37. Any violation of the aforesaid conditions shall entitle the prosecution to move for cancellation of bail in accordance with law. Page No.# 12/12 38. It is further clarified that the observations made in this order are confined to adjudication of the present bail application and shall not be construed as any expression on the merits of the prosecution case, which shall be independently examined by the competent court at the appropriate stage. 39. The bail application accordingly stands allowed and disposed of. JUDGE Comparing Assistant