9 sa 276 of 2026.doc IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION SECOND APPEAL NO.276 OF 2026 Monila Amar Kothari and Ors. ... Appellants versus Sardarmal Chunilal Chavan and Ors. … Respondents WITH INTERIM APPLICATION NO.4311 OF 2026 Mr. Aditya S. Desai, for Appellants. CORAM: N.J.JAMADAR, J. DATE : 2 SEPTEMBER 2026 ORAL ORDER : 1. Heard the learned Counsel for the Appellants. 2. The challenge in this appeal is to a judgment and order dated 28 November 2025 passed by the learned District Judge, Panvel, in Regular Civil Appeal No.486 of 2019, whereby the order passed by the Executing Court dated 10 April 2017 in Regular Darkhast No.30 of 2012 came to be set aside and the obstruction proceedings taken out by the Appellants came to be dismissed. By the said judgment and order dated 10 April 2017, the learned Civil Judge has set aside the consent decree dated 28 February 1995 as bad in law. 3. Mr. Desai, learned Counsel for the Appellants, submitted that, the Appellants were claiming title over the suit property on the basis of a pre- SSP 1/4 2026:BHC-AS:36453 9 sa 276 of 2026.doc existing right to purchase the suit property, pursuant to an agreement for sale executed on 28 March 1979. 4. On 18 December 1980, the holders of the suit property i.e. Defendant Nos.1 and 2, had executed an agreement for sale in favour of the Plaintiffs in Suit No.93 of 1989. On the basis of the said agreement for sale, the Plaintiffs had instituted a suit for specific performance of the contract. By a compromise decree dated 28 February 1995, the original holders agreed to execute the sale deed in favour of the Plaintiffs. Subsequently, on 31 August 1995, Judgment Debtor No.2 executed a registered deed in favour of the Appellants. Since the said sale deed was executed in pursuance of the agreement for sale dated 28 March 1979, the compromise decree did not bind the appellants. 5. Mr. Desai, further submitted that, the learned District Judge erred in holding that the said sale deed dated 31 August 1995 was affected by the principle of lis pendence. 6. I find it rather difficult to accede to the submission of the learned Counsel for the Appellants. A compromise decree was passed on 28 February 1995. Thereafter, on 31 August 1995, Judgment Debtor No.2 executed the sale deed in favour of Defendant No.3. The explanation appended to Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, makes it clear the duration for which the principle of lis pendence applies. It, inter alia, SSP 2/4 9 sa 276 of 2026.doc provides that the pendency of a suit or proceeding shall be deemed to commence from the date of the presentation of the plaint or the institution of the proceeding in a Court of competent jurisdiction, and to continue until the suit or proceeding has been disposed of by a final decree or order and complete satisfaction or discharge of such decree or order has been obtained, or has become unobtainable by reason of the expiration of any period of limitation prescribed for the execution thereof, by any law for the time being in force. 7. Evidently, in the case at hand, the execution proceedings was filed on 1 March 2006, before the expiration of period prescribed for the execution of the decree. The transfer in question in favour of Judgment Debtor No.2 was under a month and half of the passing of the compromise decree on 28 February 1995. In the face of the aforesaid time lag, the Trial Court erred in delving into the merits of the compromise decree and in the process, travelled beyond the compromise decree. 8. In any event, the compromise decree could not have been assailed by filing obstruction proceedings, as the proper course available to the Appellants was to approach the Court which had passed the compromise decree; the legality and validity of which was sought to be put in contest. A profitable reference in this context can be made to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Trilok Nath Singh V/s. Anirudh Singh (D) SSP 3/4 9 sa 276 of 2026.doc through legal heirs and Ors.1 9. The learned District Judge has correctly appreciated the legal position. No question of law, much less, a substantial question of law arises for consideration. 10. The Second Appeal, thus, stands dismissed. 11. Interim Application No.4311 of 2026 also stands disposed. ( N.J.JAMADAR, J. ) 1 AIR 2020 SC 2111 SSP 4/4 Signed by: S.S.Phadke Designation: PS To Honourable Judge Date: 07/09/2026 10:34:02