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2026 DAILYLAW 6677 (CHH)

DAGA BENEFICIAL TRUST v. M/S MOHANLAL AND COMPANY

REVP/106/2026 · 2026-04-16

Shri Bibhu Datta Guru

Review Petitionbody2026

Judgment text

Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.

1 2026:CGHC:17545 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR REVP No. 106 of 2026 1 - Daga Beneficial Trust Private Trust, Through Its Managing Trustee, Shri Omprakash Daga, Aged About 88 Years, S/o Late Banshidhar Daga Resident Of Gudiyari, Raipur, (Chhattisgarh) 2 - Omprakash Daga S/o Late Banshidhar Daga Aged About 88 Years Managing Trustee Of Daga Beneficial Trust, Resident Of Gudiyari, Raipur (Chhattisgarh) ... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - M/s Mohanlal And Company A Duly Registered Firm Under The Indian Partnership Act Dealers In Wholesale Vanaspati Oil, Merchand And Commission Agent, Arhat Bazar, Dehradun (Uttarakhand) 2 - M/s Mahalaxmi Trading Company Through Its Proprietor, Shri Jawaharlal Daga, S/o Banshidhar Daga, Dealers In Oil At Gudiyari, Raipur (Chhattisgarh) 3 - Shri Purushottam Daga S/o Late Banshidhar Daga Aged About SHOAIB ANWAR Digitally signed by SHOAIB ANWAR Date: 2026.04.17 16:11:29 +0530 2 76 Years Trustee Of Daga Beneficial Trust Resident Of Gudhiyari, Raipur, (Chhattisgarh) ... Respondent(s) (Cause title taken from CIS) For Petitioner(s) : Shri Harshmander Rastogi, Advocate Hon’ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru, Judge Order on Board 17.04.2026 1. Heard on I.A. No. 2 of 2026, application for condonation of delay of 3469 days in filing this review petition under Order 47 Rule 1 read with Section 151 of the CPC 1908 & Rule 90 (1) of the High Court of Chhattisgarh Rules, 2007. 2. It would be appropriate to quote the contents of the application for condonation of delay in filing the Petition, which state as under :- "APPLICATION FOR CONDONATION OF DELAY IN FILING PETITION” 1. The Petitioners have filed the captioned review petition before this Hon'ble Court to recall or modify/review Judgment and decree dated 21.07.2016 (Annexure P/1) passed by Hon'ble Single Judge in F.A. No. 233/1995. 3 2. That the Petitioners are old aged person and has been suffering from serious cardiac ailments for a considerable period, due to which they were under continuous medical treatment and was not in a position to effectively pursue litigation or undertake travel. Copy of the medical reports of the petitioner is herein marked and annexed as AnnexureP/4. 3. It is further submitted that the judgment dated 21.07.2016, though pronounced, could not be effectively traced and its legal implications were not fully appreciated at the relevant time. The applicant gained clear and effective knowledge of the patent legal errors apparent on the face of the record only upon subsequent judicial proceedings culminating in the order dated 25.09.2025 passed in proceedings (Annexure A/3), wherein the Trial Court decree dated 08.03.1995, receipt of money by the respondent, and principles of 4 restitution under Section 144 CPC were expressly noticed. 4. That, for the aforesaid reasons there is delay of 3469 days in filing of the review petition and if the delay is not condoned and the review petition is not heard on its merit then it will cause irreparable loss to the Petitioners. 5. That, the reason mentioned is bonafide and the delay deserves to be condoned. 3. (a) Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the present review petition has been filed against the judgment dated 21.07.2016 passed by this Court in F.A. No. 233/1995, whereby the judgment and decree passed by the learned Fourth Additional District Judge, Raipur dated 08.03.1995 in civil suit No.35-B/1990 was set aside and the suit of the plaintiffs was dismissed. (b) It is submitted that delay of 3469 days in filing the review petition is attributable to the petitioner’s advanced age of octogenarian and prolonged cardiac ailments, due to which 5 he remained under continuous medical treatment and was unable to effectively pursue litigation or undertake necessary steps. The said elderly review petitioner bore no fault on his part. It is further submitted that although the judgment dated 21.07.2016 was passed, it could not be properly traced and its legal implications were not appreciated at the relevant time. The petitioner acquired clear knowledge of the apparent errors on the face of the record only upon subsequent proceedings culminating in the order dated 25.09.2025, and hence, the delay is bona fide and deserves to be condoned. 4. Having heard learned counsel for the review petitioner and upon perusal of the documents, this Court finds that the present application seeks condonation of an inordinate delay of 3469 days in filing the review petition against the judgment dated 21.07.2016. 5. The grounds urged by the petitioners for condonation of delay are that the review petitioner is aged person suffering from cardiac ailments and that he could not effectively pursue the matter. However, from the medical documents placed on record, it appears that the alleged medical condition pertains to the period subsequent to the year 2018, whereas the 6 judgment sought to be reviewed was passed on 21.07.2016. Thus, there remains a substantial period of delay for which no satisfactory explanation has been furnished. Further, the plea that the judgment could not be traced or that its legal implications were not appreciated does not constitute a sufficient cause for condonation of such an inordinate delay. The explanation offered by the petitioners is vague and lacks cogency, and does not satisfactorily explain the entire period of delay. Accordingly, the inordinate and unexplained delay of 3469 days in filing the appeal does not deserve to be condoned. 6. True it is that sufficient cause enumerated under Section 5 of the Limitation Act has to be construed liberally, but some cause much less sufficient cause has to be shown for condoning the delay particularly, when the delay is of more than two years. No such sufficient cause has been shown in the application for condonation of delay of 3469 days in filing the review petition. 7. In the absence of any sufficient cause, the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be entertained as a 7 matter of routine, particularly, when the delay in filing of the instant appeal is for a period of 3469 days. 8. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Basawaraj and anothers. Vs. The Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, reported in 2013 (14) SCC 81, has, in very categorical terms, after considering a series of judgments of Supreme Court on Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the Supreme Court held that where a case has been presented in the Court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the Court as to what was the "sufficient cause which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the Court within limitation. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the Court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature. It further held that ‘sufficient cause’ means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has "not acted diligently" or "remained inactive". The applicant must satisfy 8 the Court that he was prevented by any "sufficient cause" from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow the application of condonation of delay. Para’s 12 & 15 of the said decision read as under :- 12. It is a settled legal position that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be show period of limitation on equitable grounds. "A result prescribes. The Court has no power to extend the Court has no power to ignore the provision to relieve flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A what is considers a distress resulting from it operation." The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the Court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim "dura lex sed lex" which means "the law is hard but it is the law", stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, "inconvenience is not" a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute. 9 15. …..In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be justified ground to condone the delay….." 9. The Supreme Court in the matter of Pathpati Subba Reddy (Died) by LRs. And Ors Vs. Special Deputy Collector {2024 SCC OnLine SC 513} had held as under:- 26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that: (i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself; (ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time; (iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be 10 construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally; (iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act; (v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence; (vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal; 11 (vi) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and (viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision. 10. Accordingly, I.A. No. 2, for condonation of delay in filing the review petition is rejected. Consequently, the review petition is also dismissed on the ground of inordinate delay and laches. Sd/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) JUDGE Shoaib/Gowri