1 2026:CGHC:16811-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 57 of 2024 Indrapal Singh S/o Dhan Singh Aged About 40 Years R/o Village Katkona Kodawari Para, Police Station - Khandganwa, District Koria (C.G.) ... Appellant versus State Of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station Khandganwa, District Koria (C.G.) ---- Respondent (Cause title taken from Case Information System) For Appellant : Ms. Smita Jha, Advocate For Respondent/State : Mr. Nitansh Jaiswal, Deputy Govt. Advocate Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri R avindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge Judgement on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, C.J. 13/04/2026 1. This is a criminal appeal under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure filed by the appellant against the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence dated 21.08.2023 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Chirimiri, District Koria in Sessions Case No. 63 of 2020, whereby the learned trial Court has convicted and sentenced the appellant in the following manner:- VED PRAKASH DEWANGAN Digitally signed by VED PRAKASH DEWANGAN Date: 2026.04.17 14:27:00 +0530 2 Conviction Sentence U/s. 302 of IPC Life imprisonment and fine of Rs.1000/-, in default of payment of fine additional R.I. for one month. 2. The brief facts of the case are that on 18.09.2020 at about 4:00 PM, when the deceased Manish Singh (aged 4 years) was walking with his father Anand Singh (PW-2) near the house of Ajay Singh at Village Katkona, at that time, the appellant Indrapal Singh came out of his house armed with an iron crowbar (sabbal) and attempted to assault Anand Singh due to previous enmity. When the complainant, Anand Singh, fled to save his life, the appellant struck the minor child Manish on his head with the iron crowbar (sabbal). The injured child was immediately taken to the Community Health Centre, Khadgawa, where he was declared dead. The death intimation was sent by the doctor to the police on the same day, where merg intimation (Exhibit P-01) was recorded. The said merg intimation was sent to Police Station Khadgawa, where a numbered FIR (Exhibit P-02) was subsequently registered against the accused for the offence under Section 302 of IPC. 3. The inquest (Exhibit P-03) was prepared by the police in the presence of witnesses, and the dead body was sent for postmortem examination to the Community Health Centre, Khadgawa, where PW-10 Dr. Manish Pratap Singh conducted the postmortem and gave his report (Exhibit P-11). During the postmortem, the doctor noticed one major lacerated 3 wound on the frontal region of the head along with multiple contusions. On opening the scalp, hematoma was found on the frontal and parietal regions, and a fracture was present on the frontal bone of the skull. Extradural hematoma was also present. The doctor opined that the cause of death was shock due to fracture of skull bone and excessive hemorrhage. The death was homicidal in nature. 4. Spot map (Exhibit P-04) was prepared. The appellant was arrested on 21.09.2020, and his memorandum statement (Exhibit P-05) was recorded, pursuant to which one iron crowbar (sabbal) was seized vide seizure memo (Exhibit P-06). The seized weapon was sent for FSL examination, and as per the report (Exhibit P-18), human blood was found on it. Statements of witnesses under Section 161 Cr.P.C. were recorded. After completion of the investigation, charge-sheet was filed before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, who committed the case to the Court of Sessions, from where it was transferred to the learned trial Court for its trial. 5. The learned trial Court framed charge against the appellant for the offence under Section 302 IPC. The appellant denied the charge and claimed trial. 6. In order to prove the charge, the prosecution examined as many as 12 witnesses. Statement of the appellant under Section 313 Cr.P.C. was recorded, wherein he denied all incriminating circumstances, pleaded innocence and stated that he has been falsely implicated due to previous enmity with Anand Singh. He further stated that he was not present at the place of occurrence. However, the appellant did not 4 examine any defence witness to substantiate his plea of alibi or false implication. 7. After appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence, the learned trial Court convicted and sentenced the appellant as mentioned hereinabove, hence this appeal. 8. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. There are material omissions and contradictions in the evidence of prosecution witnesses, and such evidence cannot be considered sufficient to hold the appellant guilty. It is further submitted that the incident occurred on the spur of the moment due to a sudden quarrel relating to a dispute between children. The alleged eyewitnesses are closely related to the deceased and are interested witnesses. The appellant and the complainant belong to the same family. It is also contended that there was no premeditation or intention to commit murder, as the quarrel was with the father and not with the child. Therefore, at the most, the case would fall under Section 304 Part-I IPC, and a sentence of 7 years would meet the ends of justice. 9. Per contra, learned State counsel opposes the submissions and submits that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. The incident is duly supported by reliable eyewitnesses. Except for minor omissions and contradictions, there is nothing to discredit their testimony. Merely being related to the deceased is no ground to discard their evidence. The nature of injuries, particularly on the vital part of the body of a 4-year-old child, caused by a heavy iron crowbar, 5 clearly establishes the intention and knowledge of the appellant. Hence, the conviction under Section 302 IPC is justified, and the appeal deserves to be dismissed. 10. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered the rival submissions advanced, and perused the record of the trial Court with due circumspection. 11. The homicidal death of the deceased stands proved from the evidence of PW-10 Dr. Manish Pratap Singh, who conducted the postmortem. He found a major lacerated wound and contusions on the frontal region of the head, along with fracture of the frontal bone and hematoma. He opined that the cause of death was shock due to skull fracture and excessive hemorrhage, and that the injuries were sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. Nothing substantial could be elicited in his cross-examination to discredit his testimony. His evidence is further corroborated by PW-1 Rama Bai and PW-2 Anand Singh, who witnessed the condition of the deceased immediately after the incident. Therefore, the finding of the learned trial Court that the death was homicidal in nature is well-founded and calls for no interference. 12. So far as the involvement of the appellant in the offence is concerned, the case of the prosecution rests upon the testimony of eyewitnesses. 13. PW-2 Anand Singh, the father of the deceased and the complainant, is the star eyewitness of the prosecution. He has categorically deposed that at the time of the incident, the appellant came armed with an iron 6 crowbar (sabbal) and attempted to assault him, due to which he fled to save his life. He has further stated that while he was running, the appellant struck his minor son Manish on the head with the crowbar. His presence at the spot is natural and cannot be doubted, as he was accompanying his minor son. His testimony inspires confidence and remains consistent on material particulars. Despite detailed cross- examination, nothing substantial has been elicited to discredit his version. Minor omissions or contradictions, if any, do not affect the core of the prosecution case. Therefore, his evidence is found to be reliable and trustworthy. 14. PW-1 Rama Bai, another eyewitness, has supported the prosecution case by stating that she witnessed the appellant assaulting the minor child with a crowbar. However, on careful scrutiny, it appears that her testimony suffers from certain inconsistencies and lacks clarity on some material aspects, particularly regarding the sequence of events and the precise manner of assault. Her version does not fully align with that of PW-2 on certain particulars. Further, her testimony does not receive strong independent corroboration. In such circumstances, though her presence at or near the place of occurrence cannot be entirely ruled out, her evidence requires cautious appreciation and cannot be treated as wholly reliable in isolation. 15. PW-6 Rajkumar and PW-7 Uday Singh have also been cited as eyewitnesses by the prosecution. Both these witnesses have supported the prosecution’s version and have identified the appellant as the assailant. Their presence near the place of occurrence appears 7 to be natural. However, their testimonies are largely corroborative in nature and do not materially improve the case beyond what has already been stated by PW-2. Their cross-examinations do not reveal any major contradiction so as to discard their evidence in toto. At the same time, being witnesses from the same locality, their testimonies are required to be assessed with due caution. Nonetheless, their evidence lends assurance to the version of PW-2 regarding the involvement of the appellant. 16. Thus, upon a cumulative evaluation of the eyewitness account, this Court finds that the testimony of PW-2 Anand Singh stands on a firm footing and is duly corroborated, to an extent, by PW-6 and PW-7. Although PW-1’s testimony is not wholly free from doubt, the same does not materially affect the prosecution case, in view of the cogent and reliable evidence of PW-2. It is a settled principle of law that conviction can be based on the testimony of a single reliable eyewitness, and in the present case, PW-2 inspires such confidence. 17. So far as the seizure of the weapon of offence and the medical evidence are concerned, the prosecution has duly established the same by cogent and reliable evidence. The memorandum statement of the appellant (Exhibit P-05), recorded under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, led to the recovery of the iron crowbar (sabbal) and blood-stained banyan at his instance, which were seized vide Exhibit P-06. The said articles were sent for forensic examination, and as per the FSL report (Exhibit P-18), human blood was detected on the seized weapon as well as on the clothes of the appellant. Though the 8 recovery evidence is essentially corroborative in nature, it lends substantial assurance to the prosecution version regarding the use of the said weapon in the commission of the offence. 18. Further, the medical evidence adduced by PW-10 Dr. Manish Pratap Singh clearly establishes that the deceased sustained a grievous head injury caused by a hard and blunt object, resulting in fracture of the skull and consequent hemorrhage leading to death. The nature, seat and severity of the injury, as noted in the postmortem report (Exhibit P- 11), are fully consistent with the manner of assault as deposed by the eyewitnesses, particularly PW-2 Anand Singh. Thus, the medical evidence not only proves the homicidal nature of death but also corroborates the ocular testimony of the prosecution witnesses in material particulars. 19. The next question for consideration is, whether the case of the appellant is covered within Exception-4 to Section 300 IPC vis-a-vis culpable homicide not amounting to murder and his conviction can be converted to Section 304 Part-I or Part-II of the IPC, as submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant? 20. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Sukhbir Singh v. State of Haryana, 2002 (3) SCC 327 observed as under:- “21. Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that in the absence of the existence of common object Sukhbir Singh is proved to have committed the offence of culpable homicide without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of 9 passion upon a sudden quarrel and did not act in a cruel or unusual manner and his case is covered by Exception 4 of Section 300 IPC which is punishable under Section 304 (Part I) IPC. The finding of the courts below holding the aforesaid appellant guilty of offence of murder punishable under Section 302 IPC is set aside and he is held guilty for the commission of offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder punishable under Section 304 (Part I) IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and to pay a fine of Rs.5000. In default of payment of fine, he shall undergo further rigorous imprisonment for one year.” 21. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Gurmukh Singh v. State of Haryana, 2009 (15) SCC 635, laid down certain factors which are to be taken into consideration before awarding appropriate sentence to the accused with reference to Section 302 or Section 304 Part II of the IPC, which state as under :- “23. These are some factors which are required to be taken into consideration before awarding appropriate sentence to the accused. These factors are only illustrative in character and not exhaustive. Each case has to be seen for its special perspective. The relevant factors are as under : (a) Motive or previous enmity; (b) Whether the incident had taken place on the spur of the moment; 10 (c) The intention/knowledge of the accused while inflicting the blow or injury; (d) Whether the death ensued instantaneously or the victim died after several days; (e) The gravity, dimension and nature of injury; (f) The age and general health condition of the accused; (g) Whether the injury was caused without premeditation in a sudden fight; (h) The nature and size of weapon used for inflicting the injury and the force with which the blow was inflicted; (i) The criminal background and adverse history of the accused; (j) Whether the injury inflicted was not sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death but the death was because of shock; (k) Number of other criminal cases pending against the accused; (l) Incident occurred within the family members or close relations; (m) The conduct and behaviour of the accused after the incident. Whether the accused had taken the injured/the deceased to the hospital immediately to ensure 11 that he/she gets proper medical treatment ? These are some of the factors which can be taken into consideration while granting an appropriate sentence to the accused. 24. The list of circumstances enumerated above is only illustrative and not exhaustive. In our considered view, proper and appropriate sentence to the accused is the bounded obligation and duty of the court. The endeavour of the court must be to ensure that the accused receives appropriate sentence, in other words, sentence should be according to the gravity of the offence. These are some of the relevant factors which are required to be kept in view while convicting and sentencing the accused.” 22. Likewise, in the matter of State Vs. Sanjeev Nanda, 2012 (8) SCC 450, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that once knowledge that it is likely to cause death is established but without any intention to cause death, then jail sentence may be for a term which may extend to 10 years or with fine or with both. It has further been held that to make out an offence punishable under Section 304 Part II of the IPC, the prosecution has to prove the death of the person in question and such death was caused by the act of the accused and that he knew that such act of his is likely to cause death. 23. Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Arjun Vs. State of Chhattisgarh, 2017 (3) SCC 247, has elaborately dealt with the issue and observed in paragraphs 20 and 21, which reads as under :- “20. To invoke this Exception 4, the 12 requirements that are to be fulfilled have been laid down by this Court in Surinder Kumar v. UT, Chandigarh [(1989) 2 SCC 217 : 1989 SCC (Cri) 348], it has been explained as under :(SCC p. 220, para 7) “7. To invoke this exception four requirements must be satisfied, namely, (I) it was a sudden fight; (ii) there was no premeditation; (iii) the act was done in a heat of passion; and (iv) the assailant had not taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner. The cause of the quarrel is not relevant nor its I relevant who offered the provocation or started the assault. The number of wounds caused during the occurrence is not a decisive factor but what is important is that the occurrence must have been sudden and unpremeditated and the offender must have acted in a fit of anger. Of course, the offender must not have taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner. Where, on a sudden quarrel, a person in the heat of the moment picks up a weapon which is handy and causes injuries, one of which proves fatal, he would be entitled to the benefit of this exception provided he has not acted cruelly.” 21. Further in Arumugam v. State [(2008) 15 SCC 590 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1130], in support of the proposition of law that under what circumstances Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC can be invoked if death is caused, it has been 13 explained as under : “9. .... '18. The help of exception 4 can be invoked if death is caused (a) without premeditation; (b) in a sudden fight; (c) without the offender's having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner; and (d) the fight must have been with the person killed. To bring a case within Exception 4 all the ingredients mentioned in it must be found. It is to be noted that the “fight” occurring in Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC is not defined in the Penal Code, 1860. It takes two to make a fight. Heat of passion requires that there must be no time for the passions to cool down and in this case, the parties had worked themselves into a fury on account of the verbal altercation in the beginning. A fight is a combat between two or more persons whether with or without weapons. It is not possible to enunciate any general rule as to what shall be deemed to be a sudden quarrel. It is a question of fact and whether a quarrel is sudden or not must necessarily depend upon the proved facts of each case. For the application of Exception 4, it is not sufficient to show that there was a sudden quarrel and there was no premeditation. It must further be shown that the offender has not taken undue advantage or acted in cruel or unusual manner. The expression “undue advantage” as used in the provisions means “unfair advantage”. 14 24. In the matter of Arjun (supra), the Supreme Court has held that if there is intent and knowledge, the same would be case of Section 304 Part-I of the IPC and if it is only a case of knowledge and not the intention to cause murder and bodily injury, then same would be a case of Section 304 Part-II of the IPC. 25. Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Rambir Vs. State (NCT of Delhi), 2019 (6) SCC 122, has laid down four ingredients to bring a case within the purview of Exception 4 to Section 300 of IPC, which reads as under: “16. A plain reading of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC shows that the following four ingredients are required: (i) There must be a sudden fight; (ii) There was no premeditation; (iii) he act was committed in a heat of passion; and (iv) The offender had not taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner.” 26. Reverting to the facts of the present case in the light of the aforesaid legal principles, it is evident that the incident had taken place on the spur of the moment. From the testimony of PW-2 Anand Singh, it is clear that the appellant came out of his house and attempted to assault him due to previous enmity, and in that course of events, when PW-2 fled from the spot, the appellant inflicted a blow on the minor child who happened to be accompanying him. The entire incident 15 occurred suddenly and without any prior deliberation. It is also not in dispute that there was no previous enmity between the appellant and the deceased minor child. The evidence on record clearly indicates that the intended target of the appellant was PW-2 Anand Singh and not the deceased child. The unfortunate death of the child appears to have occurred in the course of a sudden quarrel and in the heat of passion. Thus, the element of premeditation, which is a sine qua non for an offence under Section 302 IPC, is conspicuously absent in the present case. However, at the same time, it cannot be overlooked that the appellant used a heavy iron crowbar (sabbal) and inflicted a forceful blow on the head, which is a vital part of the body, of a 4-year- old child. The nature of the weapon used, the part of the body targeted, and the force applied clearly indicate that the appellant intended to cause such bodily injury as was likely to cause death. Therefore, the requisite intention, though not amounting to intention to commit murder, can safely be attributed to the appellant. 27. From the overall circumstances, it is apparent that the act of the appellant was committed without premeditation, in a sudden quarrel, and in the heat of passion. There is no material to indicate that the appellant had taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner so as to take the case out of the purview of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC. Thus, all the necessary ingredients for invoking Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC stand satisfied. 28. In view of the aforesaid analysis, this Court is of the considered opinion that though the appellant had the intention of causing such 16 bodily injury as was likely to cause death, the case would fall within Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC. Consequently, the conviction of the appellant under Section 302 IPC is liable to be altered to one under Section 304 Part-I IPC. 29. Accordingly, the conviction of the appellant under Section 302 IPC is set aside and instead, he is convicted for the offence punishable under Section 304 Part-I IPC. 30. So far as the sentence is concerned, considering the facts and circumstances of the case, particularly the absence of premeditation, the sudden nature of the incident, and the fact that the act was not directed towards the deceased child, under the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case, this Court is of the view that rigorous imprisonment for 7 years would meet the ends of justice. 31. Accordingly, the appeal is partly allowed. The conviction of the appellant under Section 302 IPC is set aside and instead, he is convicted under Section 304 Part-I IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 7 years. The fine imposed by the trial Court and default stipulation shall remain intact. 32. The appellant is reported to be in custody. He shall undergo the remaining part of the sentence. The appellant is entitled to set off his undergone period during the trial as well as during the appeal. 33. Registry is directed to send a copy of this judgment to the concerned Superintendent of Jail, where the appellant is undergoing his jail sentence to serve the same on the appellant informing him that he is 17 at liberty to assail the present judgment passed by this Court by preferring an appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court with the assistance of High Court Legal Services Committee or the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee. 34. Let a copy of this judgment and the original records be transmitted to the trial Court concerned forthwith for necessary information and compliance. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice ved