1 APHC010250112026 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI TUESDAY, THE 28th DAY OF JULY 2026 PRESENT THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE D RAMESH THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE ALAPATI GIRIDHAR WRIT APPEAL NO: 612 OF 2026 Writ Appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent to set-aside the Order dated 22/01/2026 passed by the learned Single Judge in WP No.7698 of 2019 and consequently dismiss the Writ Petition and allow the Writ Appeal Between: 1. Andhra Paper Limited, (Formerly known as M/s. International Paper APPM Limited) Rajamahendravaram- 533 105 East Godavari District, AP rep. by its General Manager - IR Mr. S. Sakayaraju ...Petitioner AND 1. Mr Nukala Srinivasu, S/o Sri N. Venkata Ramana Aged 54 years R/o D.No.35-11-29, Akulavari Street Mangalavarapu Peta Ramamahendravaram East Godavari District, AP 2. The Industrial TribunalcumLabour Court, Visakhapatnam rep. by its Presiding Officer ...Respondents Counsel for the Petitioner: G.V.S. GANESH Counsel for the Respondents: GP FOR SERVICES II Counsel for the Respondents: M. SRI ATCHYUT 2 The Court made the following JUDGMENT: 1. This Writ Appeal is filed against the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge dated 22.01.2026 in W.P. No.7698 of 2019, whereby the learned Single Judge set aside the award passed by the Industrial Tribunal for returning the case on the ground that he was not workman, the learned Single Judge remanded the matter to the Tribunal for fresh adjudication on the ground that the Tribunal had not assigned reasons for arriving at conclusion that the Claimant/1st Respondent suppressed material though he was a Manager but not a "workman" within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 2. The learned counsel for the Appellant/Management contended that the learned Single Judge failed to appreciate the categorical findings recorded by the Industrial Tribunal that the Respondent did not fall within the definition of "workman" under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. That the burden lies upon the employee to establish that he is a workman within the meaning of the Act. The Tribunal, upon appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence, rightly concluded that the Respondent had suppressed his managerial status as well as his salary and, therefore, could not be treated as a workman. It is further contended that the learned Single Judge exceeded the limited scope of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by interfering with a well-reasoned factual finding 3 recorded by the Industrial Tribunal, finally prayed to set aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 22.01.2026. 3. Per contra, the learned counsel for the Respondent No.1 submitted that although the Respondent was designated as a Graduate Engineer Trainee and was subsequently promoted as Officer and Senior Officer, the actual nature of duties discharged by him was clerical in nature. Therefore, notwithstanding his designation, he falls within the definition of "workman" under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act. It is further contended that the learned Single Judge rightly remanded the matter, holding that the Industrial Tribunal had failed to record adequate reasons for holding that he suppressed material facts and finally prayed to dismiss the appeal. I. BRIEF FACTS: 4. The Claimant/Respondent raised an industrial dispute before the Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Visakhapatnam, pleading that he joined the Appellant Company on 13.10.2005 as a Graduate Engineer Trainee (Mechanical), he was posted in the Commercial Department, he was subsequently promoted as Officer and thereafter as Senior Officer in the year 2011, and he was terminated from service on 23.06.2014 without assigning any valid reason. That though his designation was that of Senior Officer, it was pleaded that the duties actually discharged by him were clerical in nature and, therefore, he was entitled to the status of a workman and finally prayed to direct the Employer to reinstate him into the service with continuity of service 4 with full back wages and all attending benefits by setting aside the termination order. 5. The Appellant Company pleaded that the Respondent was functioning as a Senior Officer, discharging managerial and supervisory duties, and therefore he did not fall within the definition of "workman" under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act. It was further pleaded that he was drawing a salary of Rs.30,011/- per month and, consequently, the industrial dispute itself was not maintainable. The Management also pleaded that the Respondent's services came to an end by termination as per Rules. The Management further pleaded that the Respondent declined to receive the gratuity amount and, therefore, on the advice of the Assistant Commissioner of Labour, letter dated 02.07.2015, the gratuity amount was deposited Rs.90,800/- into his bank account towards full and final settlement. Finally, prayed to dismiss the claim as he is not workman. II. ANALYSIS: 6. This Court perused the material on record, The Claimant/Respondent was examined as WW-1 and got exhibited W-1 to W-14. The Management got examined its employee as MW-1 and exhibited M-1 to M-23. 7. The Tribunal, particularly in paragraphs 10 and 11 of its award, discussed the evidence and recorded the Claimant’s cross-examination, wherein he admitted that he possessed a B.Tech. (Mechanical) qualification, he was appointed as a Graduate Engineer Trainee, and on the date of 5 termination he was working as a Senior Officer in the Commercial Department and he discharged duties till his termination as a Senior Officer. He also admitted his appointment Letter/Ex.M1, his Placing Orders/Ex.M2 & M3, his Promotion/Ex.M4, his salary revision letters/Ex.M5 & M6, Emails, Commercial recommendations and quotations/Ex.M7 to M13. 8. The employee was required to establish, by producing relevant material on the nature of the duties discharged by him. However, he failed to discharge the initial burden of proving that he was performing clerical duties. The Industrial Tribunal rightly recorded that the employee had suppressed material facts including position and salary, and accordingly returned his claim. The relevant paragraph of the Industrial Tribunal's is extracted below: “18…………...Now adverting to the case on hand and on analysis of the cross-examination of MW1 it is established that the learned counsel for the workman tried his level best elicit the lack of powers on the part of the workman as senior officer. In the case of Prem Sagar and also in the case of Dinesh Sharma, the Hon'ble Apex Court culled out some of the functions for consideration. The learned counsel for the workman tried his level best to take it as an advantage to get the benefit of Sec.2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act Ignoring the appointment order under Ex.W1 which is very clear in terms of the service of the workman in the respondent company and subsequent confirmation of the post of the workman strengthens the appointment order of the management under Ex.M1. The nature of duties attended by the workman by way of his correspondence on behalf of the company as a Senior Officer is also established on record and the workman failed to establish his basic duties in the respondent company and the entire evidence of the workman shows the suppression of facts only to establish evidence to get the jurisdiction of this court Ignoring his salary particulars and it is more than Rs.10,000/- and it oust the Jurisdiction of this court and the criteria of salary also being the manager of the company. The petitioner also failed to answer on what basis he served as Member in the Senior Officers Association and a plausible explanation is required to come to a clear condusion by this court to decide whether the petitioner comes under the Jurisdiction of this court or not and the petitioner appears that he has either suppressed the facts of his natural or primary duties in the respondent company or deverly tried to come under the purview of Sec.2(s) of the LD. Act to invoke the Jurisdiction of this court on the ground that the respondent Is a company with composite functions and 6 undisputedly the hierarchy system shows there is a purchase department and the petitioner attended the transactions of purchase but failed to explain whether it is his primary duty or secondary duty and the workman also failed to explain his primary duty. In the absence of the evidence the document under ECM1 establishes the appointment of the petitioner with stipulations and the document under Ex.M3 also strengthens the appointment as officer after completion of the training by the respondent management and the managerial functions of the petitioner are established on record and the rulings relied on by the petitioner also shows the same legal position and in view of the available evidence on record it is established that the workman attended managerial functions in the respondent company and when once it is established this court lacks Jurisdiction to entertain the case of the petitioner since the petitioner does not come under the purview of Sec.2(s) of the I.D.Act and the petitioner remedy is elsewhere but not before this court and in the absence of jurisdictional aspect this court cannot entertain the case of the petitioner and there is no force in the argument of the learned counsel for the workman to that extent and this court even does not touch the merits of the case and all the observations made supra are only for the purpose of deciding the jurisdiction point. 9. Thus, the order of the Industrial Tribunal reveals that there is discussion on evidence on record, further categorically held that the Respondent had suppressed material facts regarding his designation, salary, and nature of duties in an attempt to invoke the jurisdiction of the Labour Court. The Tribunal also found that the appointment orders, subsequent promotions, correspondence by the Respondent on behalf of the Management, and his role as a member of the Senior Officers' Association, held that is it demonstrated that he was discharging managerial functions. Consequently, the Tribunal held that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the industrial dispute since the Respondent was not a "workman" within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act. This Court finds no perversity or illegality in the findings recorded by the Tribunal. 10. The Appellant has rightly contended that the Respondent does not fall within the definition of "workman". In support of the said contention, 7 reliance has been placed on Lenin Kumar Ray v. M/s. Express Publications (Madurai) Ltd.,1 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows: “15. The law is well settled that the determinative factor for „Workman‟ covered under Section 2(s) of the I.D. Act, is the principal duties and functions performed by an employee in the establishment and not merely the designation of his post. Further, the onus of proving the nature of employment rests on the person claiming to be a „workman‟ within the definition of section 2(s) of the I.D.Act. 16. In the present case, there is no specific document adduced relating to the actual work and functions performed by the employee. In the absence of any concrete material to demonstrate the nature of duties discharged by the employee, the employment orders issued by the management will have to be taken into consideration and as per the same, the employee was appointed as Junior Engineer and was promoted as Assistant Engineer, on the administrative side. It is the evidence of M.W.1 that the employee was supervising the work of two junior engineers, who were working under him, which was also admitted by the employee in his cross examination, as W.W.1. Even according to the employee, the nature of duties and functions discharged by him was of supervisory. As such, applying the pre-amended provision of Section 2(s), since the employee was terminated from service on 08.10.2003 and was drawing salary of more than Rs.1,600/-, he does not come within the definition of „Workman‟. Therefore, we hold that the employee is not a „workman‟ as defined under Section 2(s) and is not covered by the provisions of the I.D.Act . In view of the same, the order of the High Court upholding the finding of the Labour Court that the employee was a „workman‟ within the definition of post-amended section 2(s), is liable to be set aside.” 11. The Hon’ble Apex Court held that the determinative factor is the nature of duties actually discharged by the employee and not merely the designation of the post. It was further held that the burden of proving that an 1 MANU/SC/1131/2024 8 employee is a workman rests upon the employee himself. The aforesaid principle squarely applies to the facts of the present case. 12. The Respondent failed to discharge the initial burden of proving that the principal duties discharged by him were clerical in nature. As rightly contended by the Appellant, the Claimant in his pleadings before the Tribunal made a bald assertion in the pleadings is that he was discharging duties clerical in nature only but no detailed pleading or evidence was produced to establish the actual nature of the work performed by him to determine as clerical duties. On the contrary, the documentary evidence produced by the Management and material elicited in the cross examination of the Claimant clearly established that he occupied a managerial/supervisory position and was drawing a salary beyond the statutory limit. 13. The learned Single Judge interfered with the Award solely on the ground that the Tribunal had not assigned adequate reasons and remanded the matter for fresh consideration. But this Court finds that the Tribunal had elaborately discussed both the oral and documentary evidence and had assigned cogent reasons for arriving at its conclusion as stated herein above. Once the Tribunal had recorded a reasoned finding on the jurisdictional issue duly appreciating the evidence including the admissions of the Claimant in his cross examination, there was no justification for remanding the matter on the ground that no adequate reasons are assigned. 9 14. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Nadakerappa (D) v. Pillamma (D)2 held that remand cannot be as a matter of course and to be disposed on merits, the same is extracted hereunder; ‘It is settled law that the order of remand cannot be passed as a matter of course. An order of remand cannot also be passed for the mere purpose of remanding a proceeding to the lower court or the Tribunal. An endeavour has to be made by the Appellate Court to dispose of the case on merits. Where both the sides have led oral and documentary evidence, the Appellate Court has to decide the appeal on merits instead of remanding the case to the lower court or the Tribunal.‟ 15. The aforesaid principle squarely applies to the facts of the present case as there is evidence including admission of the Claimant on record as stated supra, thus remand of the matter is not warranted. 16. The material on record reveals the Industrial Tribunal rightly held that he had suppressed material facts relating to his managerial position and salary only to invoke the jurisdiction of the Labour Court. Thus, the judgment of the learned Single Judge remanding the matter to the Industrial Tribunal on the ground that no reasons are recorded is liable to be set aside, and the award passed by the Industrial Tribunal deserves to be restored. 17. The material on record reveals that a frivolous litigation initiated by the Respondent, which consumed considerable judicial time before the Industrial Tribunal, the learned Single Judge, and this Court to pursue the litigation for all these years without jurisdiction and merits by suppressing material facts including his managerial position and salary as stated supra, thus, this Court deems it appropriate to impose costs of Rs.20,000/- payable 2 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 332 10 to the Appellant. It is needless to mention the Claimant may proceed with his claim and his entitlement if any in the jurisdictional fora subject to law of limitation. 18. Accordingly, the Writ Appeal is allowed and consequently the judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 22.01.2026 in W.P. No.7698 of 2019 is set aside and the award passed by the Industrial Tribunal is restored. The Respondent shall pay costs of Rs.20,000/- to the Appellant. Consequently, Miscellaneous Petitions, if any, pending in the Writ Appeal shall stand closed. ___________________ JUSTICE D. RAMESH __________________________ JUSTICE ALAPATI GIRIDHAR Date : 28.07.2026 CHD 11 THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE D. RAMESH AND THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE ALAPATI GIRIDHAR WRIT APPEAL No.612 of 2026 Date: 28th July, 2026 CHD