Page No.# 1/7 GAHC010077062026 THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH) Case No. : WP(C)/2560/2026 SHRI VINAY KUMAR S/O LATE VISHNU DEO, RETIRED PRINCIPAL COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, R/O FLAT NO. 9A, BLOCK- III, SILVER SPRING, 5 JBS, HALDEN AVENUE, KOLKATA- 700105, WEST BENGAL VERSUS THE UNION OF INDIA AND 4 ORS REPRESENTED BY THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, MINISTRY OF FINANCE, DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, NORTH BLOCK, NEW DELHI, PIN- 110001 2:THE CENTRAL BOARD OF DIRECT TAXES REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE NORTH BLOCK NEW DELHI PIN- 110001 3:UNION PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY DHOLPUR HOUSE SHAHJAHAN ROAD NEW DELHI- 110001 4:THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX (VIG) OFFICE OF THE PRINCIPAL COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX NER GUWAHATI 1ST FLOOR AYAKAR BHAWAN CHRISTIAN BASTI Page No.# 2/7 G.S. ROAD GUWAHATI- 78100 Advocate for the Petitioner : MS D CHAUDHURY, MR A K PAUL Advocate for the Respondent : DY.S.G.I., BEFORE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE MICHAEL ZOTHANKHUMA HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SANJEEV KUMAR SHARMA ORDER 18.05.2026 (M. Zothankhuma, J) 1. Heard Ms. D. Chaudhury, learned counsel for the petitioner, who has put to challenge the impugned order 18.03.2018 passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Guwahati, in O.A No. 040/375/2018, rejecting the petitioner’s prayer to set aside the departmental proceeding initiated against him, one day prior to his retirement. 2. The writ petitioner is aggrieved by the Memorandum of Charge that has been issued to him on 29.06.2018, which pertained to the retrieval of several documents from the hard disk of the computer belonging to M/s S.K. Tulsiyan & Company which had been raided by the CBI. The charge against the petitioner is that the documents pertain to fully drafted appeal orders allegedly meant to be passed by the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) in different cases, where M/s S.K. Tulsiyan & Company represented the appellants. The orders of the petitioner was strikingly similar to the retrieved documents from the computer of M/s S.K. Tulsiyan & Company with dates made prior to the order of the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals). Moreover, in one of the cases, the Page No.# 3/7 details of loans and advances appeared in the retrieved documents, which were not available in the documents available in the appeal folder. The retrieved documents thus existed prior to the creation of the appellate order and major portions of the appellate order were copied from it. This indicated a nexus between the firms and the petitioner, which amounted to exhibiting conduct unbecoming of a Government servant. The petitioner was also asked to submit within 10 days of receipt of the Memorandum of Charge, a written statement of his defence and also state whether he desired to be heard in person. 3. The petitioner had thereafter submitted his written statement of defence. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that though the written statement of defence is not annexed in the petition, the petitioner has also taken up the issues raised in this petition in the written statement of defence submitted. 4. Being aggrieved with the Memorandum of Charge the petitioner has challenged the same on two grounds. Firstly, on the ground that there has been a delay of 11 years in issuing the Memorandum of Charge and secondly, on the ground that the charge-sheet has not been approved by the President of India, despite the petitioner being a Group-A officer. 5. The learned Tribunal thereafter passed the impugned order dated 18.03.2026 in O.A No. 040/375/2018, by holding that as the closure report by the CBI in respect to the above case had been made only in the year 2014, which made them aware of the alleged unbecoming conduct of the petitioner, a Page No.# 4/7 decision had been taken to initiate departmental proceedings. The other ground for dismissing the petitioner’s O.A No. 040/375/2018, was that in view of Rule 13(2) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, the authority which had the power to impose penalties specified in Clauses (i) to (iv) of Rule 11 may institute disciplinary proceedings against any Government servant in Clauses (v) to (ix) of Rule 11, notwithstanding that such disciplinary authority was not competent under the Rules to impose any of the latter penalties. 6. The learned Tribunal thus held that when there was clear provision in terms of Rule 13(2) of CCS (CCA) Rules and as the Finance Minister who had the power to impose a penalty, delegated the same to the Minister of State Finance Ministry, Department of Revenue and Department of Financial Services, vide Office Order No.A-22012/1/2012-Admn.I(i) dated 03.04.2018 issued by Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Department of Expenditure, the initiation of disciplinary proceedings had been approved by the competent authority. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that as there is no proof that the Finance Minister of State had initiated the disciplinary proceeding or given approval to the charge-sheet, the initiation of the disciplinary proceedings was illegal and has to be set aside. 8. On the other hand, Mr. B. Chakraborty, learned CGC submits that as no writ lies against a charge-sheet or show-cause notice, the writ petition should be dismissed, as the same does not give any cause of action to the petitioner, Page No.# 5/7 affecting the rights of the party. 9. We have heard the learned counsels for the parties. 10. In the present case, a raid had been conducted by the CBI on M/s S.K. Tulsiyan & Company in the year 2007 and the CBI had made a closure of the same in the year 2014. The initiation of the departmental proceeding against the petitioner had been done on 29.06.2018, in view of the closure of the case by the CBI. Though there is a delay in the initiation of the departmental proceeding against the petitioner, it has to be kept in mind that the CBI had been seized of the matter for 7 years. It was only on account of the CBI case that the respondents became aware of the alleged misconduct of the petitioner that a departmental proceeding had been initiated by the respondents. The above being said, the Supreme Court in Government of Andhra Pradesh & Others vs. Appala Swamy in Civil Appeal No.393/2007, has held that mere delay does not automatically invalidate disciplinary proceedings. It also held that the principles upon which a proceeding can be directed to be quashed on the ground of delay are (i) Where by reason of the delay, the employer condoned the lapse on the part of the employee and (ii) Where the delay caused prejudice to the employee. Such a case of prejudice, however, is to be made out by the employee before the Inquiry Officer. In the present case the employer has not condoned the lapse and even if we are to assume that some real prejudice has been caused to the appellant, the Supreme Court has held that the case of real prejudice is to be made out before the Inquiry Officer. Thus a challenge to the Departmental Proceedings before us and the learned Tribunal on the ground of delay is premature. Further, there is nothing to show that the Page No.# 6/7 principles of natural justice has not been followed. 11. With regard to the question whether the Finance Minister had given approval to the initiation of the departmental proceeding and the charges framed against the petitioner, it is quite apparent that the appellant wants to see the signature of the concerned Minister of State on the file approving the Departmental Proceeding/Memorandum of Charge/Charge-sheet. We are of view that the said issue can also be decided by the Inquiry Officer, inasmuch as, the concerned file or note sheet/document can be shown to the petitioner during Departmental Proceedings. Further, we are of the view that issuance of a Memorandum of Charge/charge-sheet does not give rise to any cause of action to the petitioner to file a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, as no rights of the parties have been decided by the Memorandum of Charge. 12. In the case of Union of India & Another vs. Kunisetty Satyanarayana, reported in (2006) 12 SCC 28, the Supreme Court had held at paragraph-13 & 14 as follows : “13. It is well settled by a series of decisions of this Court that ordinarily no writ lies against a charge sheet or show-cause notice vide Executive Engineer, Bihar State Housing Board vs. Ramdesh Kumar Singh and others JT 1995 (8) SC 331, Special Director and another vs. Mohd. Ghulam Ghouse and another AIR 2004 SC 1467, Ulagappa and others vs. Divisional Commissioner, Mysore and others 2001(10) SCC 639, State of U.P. vs. Brahm Datt Sharma and another AIR 1987 SC 943 etc. 14. The reason why ordinarily a writ petition should not be entertained Page No.# 7/7 against a mere show-cause notice or charge-sheet is that at that stage the writ petition may be held to be premature. A mere charge-sheet or show-cause notice does not give rise to any cause of action, because it does not amount to an adverse order which affects the rights of any party unless the same has been issued by a person having no jurisdiction to do so. It is quite possible that after considering the reply to the show-cause notice or after holding an enquiry the authority concerned may drop the proceedings and/or hold that the charges are not established. It is well settled that a writ lies when some right of any party is infringed. A mere show-cause notice or charge-sheet does not infringe the right of any one. It is only when a final order imposing some punishment or otherwise adversely affecting a party is passed, that the said party can be said to have any grievance.” 13. On considering the above laws laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, we do not find any ground to interfere with the impugned order of the learned Tribunal. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed. JUDGE JUDGE Comparing Assistant