[2026:RJ-JP:12399-DB] HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 264/2002 State of Rajasthan ----Appellant Versus Hazari Lal S/o Ramdev, Aged 32 years, R/o Village Rahimpura @ Naya Gaon, P.S. Peeplu, District-Tonk. ----Respondent Connected With S.B. Criminal Appeal No. 41/2001 Hazari Lal S/o Ramdev, aged about 32 years, R/o Village Raheempura @ Nayagaon P.S. Peeplu District-Tonk. (Presently confined in district Jail, Tonk) ---Accused-Appellant Versus State of Rajasthan, through P. P. ----Respondent For Appellant(s) : Mr. Naresh Kumar Gupta, PP in D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 264/2002 Mr. Happy Sharma & Mr. Syed Adeel Naqvi in D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 41/2001 For Respondent(s) : Mr. Happy Sharma & Mr. Syed Adeel Naqvi in D.B. Criminal Appeal No.264/2002 Mr. Naresh Kumar Gupta, PP in D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 41/2001 HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MAHENDAR KUMAR GOYAL HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE BHUWAN GOYAL Judgment 24/03/2026 Per Hon’ble Mahendar Kumar Goyal, J. These criminal appeals are directed against the judgment dated 22.12.2000 passed by the learned Special Judge (Communal Riots Cases) Tonk (for brevity ‘the learned trial court’) [2026:RJ-JP:12399-DB] (2 of 13) [CRLA-264/2002] in Sessions Case No.39/2000, whereby, while acquitting the accused Hazari Lal of the charge under Section 302 IPC, he has been convicted and sentenced as under:- 1. Under Section 304 Part I IPC: Seven years’ rigorous imprisonment and fine of ₹1,000/-; in default whereof, one month’s additional imprisonment. 2. Under Section 326 IPC: Two years’ rigorous imprisonment and fine of ₹500/-; in default whereof, fifteen days’ additional imprisonment. 3. Under Section 325 IPC: One year’s rigorous imprisonment and fine of ₹250/-; in default whereof, seven days’ additional imprisonment. All the substantive sentences to run concurrently. The criminal appeal No.264/2002 has been preferred by the State being aggrieved to the extent the accused has been acquitted of the charge under Section 302 IPC; whereas, Criminal Appeal No.41/2001 has been preferred by the accused against his conviction and sentence, as supra. The relevant facts in brief are that on 07.09.1999, the complainant Lala Nath (PW-3) submitted a written report (Ex.P4) to the SHO Police Station Piplu, District Tonk wherein, it was stated that at about 06.30 PM on 06.09.1999, the accused came to their house with a heifer calf with an allegation that the same belonged to them and used to graze his crop whereupon, his brother-Prahlad denied the allegation. It was alleged that thereupon, the accused got annoyed and started a scuffle with the complainant party whereafter, the accused rushed to his home and brought an iron rod (measuring 1 foot 8 inches, used in [2026:RJ-JP:12399-DB] (3 of 13) [CRLA-264/2002] tractor by agriculturist and not a weapon of offence) and dealt with a blow on head of his brother-Prahlad which proved to be fatal. Based thereupon, an FIR No. 160 dated 07.09.1999 (Ex.P5) came to be registered under Sections 302 and 323 IPC. After investigation, the accused was charge-sheeted and charges under Sections 302, 326, 325 and 323 IPC were framed against him. After trial, he has been convicted and sentenced, as stated hereinabove. Assailing the impugned judgment, learned Public Prosecutor submitted that although, the defence has come out with a plea of right of private defence; but, from the evidence on record, it was established that after the first episode of scuffle having occurred in front of house of the deceased, the accused had rushed to his home, brought an iron rod and inflicted a blow on head of the deceased which proved to be fatal. He contended that in absence of any evidence that once the accused had reached his home, he had any apprehension of any harm to his body/property, the plea of right of private defence could not have been invoked to justify infliction of the injury which, as per medical opinion, was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. He, therefore, prayed that the appeal preferred by the State be allowed, the judgment impugned dated 22.12.2000 be quashed and set aside to the extent the accused has been acquitted of the charge under Section 302 IPC, he be convicted of the same and be sentenced accordingly. Per contra, learned counsel for the accused would argue that from the prosecution evidence, it was established that the incident occurred at spur of the moment, without any premeditation on his [2026:RJ-JP:12399-DB] (4 of 13) [CRLA-264/2002] part to cause either death or to inflict any bodily injury on the person of the deceased. He further submitted that as a matter of fact, the accused had gone to residence of the deceased with a request to keep their heifer calf under control as she used to graze his crop whereupon, he was assaulted by the deceased and a large number of his family members resulting into multiple injuries on his body and in the scuffle, a single blow came to be inflicted on the body of the deceased which, unfortunately, proved to be fatal. Learned counsel contended that the prosecution has miserably failed to explain the injuries received by him which creates a serious doubt as to veracity of its story. He, however, confined his submission to the extent that since the incident had occurred at the spur of the moment, without any premeditation on his part to cause any bodily injury to the deceased or his family members, the allegation against him is of inflicting a single blow which proved to be fatal, the case would fall under Section 300 Exception-4 IPC and his conviction is liable to be altered from Section 304 Part I to Section 304 Part II IPC. He, therefore, prayed that the judgment impugned be modified in terms that his conviction under Section 304 Part I be altered to Section 304 Part II IPC and the substantive sentence be reduced to the period already undergone. Heard. Considered. A perusal of the autopsy report (Ex.P17) reflects that the deceased Prahlad had received 7 injuries and the injury No.7-a penetrating wound on his head proved to be fatal. Out of remaining 6 injuries, 5 injuries were in the nature of bruises and one injury was incised wound; all on non-vital parts of the body [2026:RJ-JP:12399-DB] (5 of 13) [CRLA-264/2002] with no corresponding fracture. As per the opinion of the Medical Board which conducted the autopsy, cause of death was coma brought on account of head injury, corresponding fractures and injury to brain. Thus, it is an established case of homicidal death. Further, as per the Injury Report-Ex.P14 and the X-Ray Report-Ex.P15 which were proved by Dr. V.K.Nigam (PW-11), Smt. Supyar-wife of deceased-Prahlad, has received one grievous injury on her right shoulder and one simple injury on base of her index finger. Similarly, as per the Injury Report-Ex.P16 and the X-Ray Report-Ex.P12, Meera-daughter of Prahlad, has received one grievous and one simple injury on her body. The injuries to the deceased as also to the injured-Smt. Supyar and Smt. Meera were attributed to the accused. As per the prosecution case, genesis of the incident is a visit made by the accused to the residence of the deceased Prahlad alongwith a heifer calf with a request to keep the same under control as she was grazing his crop. The allegation of the calf belonging to him was denied by the deceased resulting into a scuffle. The prosecution story, to this extent, is not disputed by either of the parties. Therefore, there was no premeditation on the part of the accused to commit any offence. Further, as per the testimony of the complainant-Lala Nath (PW-3)-brother of the deceased, injured eye witnesses Smt. Supyar (PW-9) and Meera (PW-12)-wife and daughter of the deceased respectively and other eye-witnesses namely Norti (PW- 16)-sister of the deceased, Tulsa (PW-17) and Ladi (PW-18)- sisters-in-law of the deceased, the accused inflicted a lathi blow on the body of the deceased whereupon, they intervened and [2026:RJ-JP:12399-DB] (6 of 13) [CRLA-264/2002] snatched the lathi from the accused. They have further stated that thereupon, he got annoyed and brought an iron rod from his home and inflicted a single blow on the head of the deceased whereafter, the accused went back. From the aforesaid evidence, it is established that as per the prosecution case itself, the accused had gone to the residence of the deceased with a heifer calf and requested to keep her under control as she used to graze his crop and upon denial by the deceased, a scuffle took place and a large number of family members of the deceased gathered at the site. In the scuffle which ensued thereupon, the deceased, two of his family members as also accused received certain injuries. Thereafter, the accused went to his home situated in the vicinity and returned back with an iron rod and inflicted a single blow on the head of the deceased which proved to be fatal. Thus, there was neither any premeditation on the part of the accused to cause either murder or to inflict any bodily injury to the deceased or his family members nor, there was any previous enmity or motive to cause death/injuries; rather, in the scuffle, which occurred at the spur of the moment, the parties received injuries. From the injury report-Ex-D-3 which was proved by Doctor Gyanendra Bansal (DW-1), it was extablished that the accused has also received 5 injuries in the incident including a lacerated wound measuring 4X1cm and scalp deep on the occipital region of the head. Although, the injured eye witnesses as also other eye witnesses have denied that they caused any injury to the accused but, could offer no explanation as to how he received the same. In the aforesaid factual context, it can safely be inferred that the assault on the accused by the deceased and his family members caused a [2026:RJ-JP:12399-DB] (7 of 13) [CRLA-264/2002] grave and sudden provocation whereupon, he brought an iron rod from his home and inflicted a single blow on the head of the deceased which proved to be fatal. At the cost of repetition, we may observe here that the subject iron rod was an instrument used in tractor by the agriculturists and was not a weapon of offence. Moreover, there is complete absence of allegation of repetition of blow by the accused although, as per the evidence available on record, the deceased had fallen down after the subject blow and was rendered defenceless. A Division Bench of this Court has, in the case of Shaitan Singh Vs. The State of Rajasthan: MANU/RH/0766/1986, while dealing with an identical situation wherein, after the earlier altercation, the accused had left the place, had gone to attend his duty and once he had finished his work, came to room where the deceased was sitting, paused for some time and then gave a knife blow on chest of the victim, did not repeat the blow and ran away and where the trial Court has convicted him of the offence under Section 302 IPC, held as under:- “10. We have given our careful consideration to the rival contentions and in the circumstances of the case we are inclined to accept the contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant. It is true that after the earlier altercation the accused had left the place and thereafter he came to the room, where Anil Kumar was sitting, armed with a knife but this had happened in a quick succession. After the first incident, the accused had left to go to his duty and it was when he had finished his work he came to the room where Anil Kumar was sitting where he paused for some time and then gave a blow with the knife which unfortunately fell on the chest of the victim but thereafter he did not inflict any further injury and ran away. According to the doctor the other injury on his hand was simultaneously caused with the injury on the chest [2026:RJ-JP:12399-DB] (8 of 13) [CRLA-264/2002] and was result of one blow. The fact remains that the accused was annoyed with deceased as he suspected him to have opened his private letter and even then he was arguing with the accused as to why he was falsely involving him in the letter episode. Then an altercation had taken place between them and it was thereafter that the accused had come to the room where Anil Kumar was silting and gave one knife blow on his person. The blow also does not appear to have been inflicted in any cruel manner or with great intensity as would be clear from the nature of the injury referred to above. The heart was perforated and it was on account of the shock and haemorrhage that the victim died. The case appears to be very much nearer to the case before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kulwant Rai's case (Supra). In that case a short quarrel preceded the assault, and only one blow with a dagger was inflicted on the victim which landed in the epigastric area. The accused did not persist in giving any further blow and in these circumstances their Lordship observed 'the question is in the circumstances in which the offence came to be committed, could it ever be said that the accused intended to inflict that injury which proved to be fatal. To repeat, there was an altercation. There was no premeditation. It was something like hit and run. In such a case part 3 of S. 300 would not be attracted because it cannot be said that the accused intended to inflict that particular injury which was ultimately found to have been inflicted. In the circumstances herein discussed, it would appear that the accused inflicted an injury which he knew to be likely to cause death and the case would accordingly fall under S. 304 Part II Penal Code." So also appears to be the case in Jagtar Singh's case (Supra). Of course, the circumstances were a little different but it was also a case of a single injury to the heart. Their Lordships observed-the circumstances in which the incident occurred would clearly negative any suggestion of premeditation. It was a sudden quarrel to some extent provoked by the deceased, that the appellant gave one blow with a knife. Could it be said that para 3 of Section 300 is attracted. We have considerable doubt about the conclusion reached by the High Court. We cannot confidentially say that the appellant intended to cause that particular injury which is shown to have caused death. There was no premeditation. There was no malice. The meeting was a chance meeting The cause of quarrel though trivial, was just sudden and in this background the appellant, a [2026:RJ-JP:12399-DB] (9 of 13) [CRLA-264/2002] vary young man gave one blow. He could not be imputed with the intention to cause death or the intention to cause that particular injury which has proved fatal. Neither para 1 nor para 3 of Section 300 would be attracted. We are fortified in this view by the decision of this Court in Jagrup Singh V. State of Naryana. It was subsequently followed in Randhir Singh V. State of Punjab and Kulwant Rai V. State of Punjab Following the ratio of the aforementioned decisions, we are of the opinion that the appellant could not be convicted for having committed murder of the deceased Narinder Singh. His conviction for an offence under Section 302 IPC and sentence of imprisonment for life are liable to be set aside. 11. The next question is what offence the appellant is shown to have committed. In a trivial quarrel the appellant wielded a weapon like a knife. The incident occurred around 1.45 noon. The quarrel was of a trivial nature and even in such a trivial quarrel the appellant wielded a weapon like a knife and landed a blow in the chest. In these circumstances, it is a permissible inference that the appellant at least could be imputed with a knowledge that he was likely to cause an injury which was likely to cause death. Therefore, the appellant is shown to have committed an offence under Section 304 Part II of the I.P.C. and a sentence of imprisonment for five years will meet the ends of justice. It may be stated here that the present case cannot be said to be one in which there was any premeditation. As already stated above, the accused had come to the room where Anil Kumar was sitting. He had paused there for some time and he then struck a single blow with the knife he was already carrying on his person. 12. The authority relied upon by the learned public prosecutor is, in our opinion not applicable to the facts of the present case. In that case after some altercation the fatal blow had been inflicted but it was observed by their Lordships, "we are, however, unable to agree with this contention because there is nothing to show that the altercation was of such a serious nature which could cause sudden provocation. Secondly, the nature of injury, namely, the stab on the chest which resulted in the fracture of the 6th rib and injured the heart and the lung and which according to the doctor was given with great force showed that it was most cruel and therefore the case squarely falls under S. 302 I.P.C." As already stated above, the injury in this case is not of such a nature. [2026:RJ-JP:12399-DB] (10 of 13) [CRLA-264/2002] 13. For the reasons stated above, we are clearly of the opinion that the conviction of the appellant under section 302 I.P.C. cannot be maintained and it must be altered to one under section 304 Part II I.P.C. Now coming to the question of sentence, the accused has already suffered more than six years r.i. and in our opinion sentence already undergone will be sufficient. 14. We, accordingly, partly allow this appeal, set aside the conviction of the appellant under section 302 I.P.C. and instead convict him under section 304 Part II I.P.C. and sentence him to the imprisonment already undergone by him. He shall be released forthwith, if not required in any other case.” In the case of Kesar Dev vs. State of Rajasthan: 1992 CriLR 663, a Division Bench of this Court held as under:- “16. …………………..We have already said earlier that the occurrence took place at the spur of moment without any premeditation, the accused and the deceased, are neighbourers of the same enclosure; their houses are nearby situated. The accused caused only) one blow, no doubt, on the chest and Dr. J.P. Verma has said that the deceased must have tried to save himself and the force was used. Under these circumstances, in our opinion, it cannot be said that the accused appellant intended to cause an injury which was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death and in the facts and circumstances of this case the accused can only be held guilty of the offence under Section 304-II of the IPC as the accused did the act with the knowledge i.e. of likely to cause death.” Their Lordships have, in the case of Anbazhagan Vs. The State represented by the Inspector of Police: MANU/SC/0782/2023, held as under:- “60. (1)XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX (2) Even when the intention or knowledge of the Accused may fall within Clauses (1) to (4) of [2026:RJ-JP:12399-DB] (11 of 13) [CRLA-264/2002] Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code, the act of the Accused which would otherwise be murder, will be taken out of the purview of murder, if the Accused's case attracts any one of the five exceptions enumerated in that section. In the event of the case falling within any of those exceptions, the offence would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder, falling within Part 1 of Section 304 of the Indian Penal Code, if the case of the Accused is such as to fall within Clauses (1) to (3) of Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code. It would be offence under Part II of Section 304 if the case is such as to fall within Clause (4) of Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code. Again, the intention or knowledge of the Accused may be such that only 2nd or 3rd part of Section 299 of the Indian Penal Code, may be attracted but not any of the clauses of Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code. In that situation also, the offence would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder Under Section 304 of the Indian Penal Code. It would be an offence under Part I of that section, if the case fall within 2nd part of Section 299, while it would be an offence under Part II of Section 304 if the case fall within 3rd part of Section 299 of the Indian Penal Code. Thus, in the aforesaid authoritative pronouncements, it was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India as also by this Court that when the incident has happened at spur of the moment without any premeditation, there was no repetition of blow despite opportunity, the conviction has to be under Section 304 Part II IPC. The instant case also falls under the same category inasmuch as, as already discussed, the incident occurred at spur of the moment, in heat of passion without any premeditation and only a single blow was inflicted with blunt object which, as a matter of fact, was not the weapon of offence but, an agricultural instrument generally available with the agriculturists. Indisputably, the accused was an agriculturist as he had gone to the residence of the deceased with a request to keep the calf under control as [2026:RJ-JP:12399-DB] (12 of 13) [CRLA-264/2002] she was grazing his crop. Further, it was not the prosecution case that the accused had any previous enmity or motive to commit any offence against the deceased or his family members much less the murder. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we find no reason to interfere with the findings of the learned trial Court whereby, the accused has been acquitted of the charge under Section 302 IPC; rather, in the conspectus of the aforesaid analysis, we are of the considered opinion that conviction of the accused deserves to be altered from Section 304 Part I IPC to Section 304 Part II IPC as Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC is attracted. We are informed that the accused had served the sentence of 2 years, 5 months and 17 days before he was extended benefit of bail by this Court. The incident is almost 27 years old and as per his Arrest Memo (Ex.P1), at that time, the accused was aged about 32 years which renders his age about 60 years as on date. His no other criminal antecedent has been brought to our notice. His sentence was suspended by this Court vide order dated 08.02.2002 and he is on bail for last more than 24 years with no allegation of its misuse. In the aforesaid circumstances, we are of the considered view that ends of justice would be served if the substantive sentence awarded to him is reduced to the period already undergone. Resultantly, while, the appeal preferred by the State is dismissed, the appeal preferred by the accused is partly allowed in following terms:- [2026:RJ-JP:12399-DB] (13 of 13) [CRLA-264/2002] (1) The conviction recorded by the learned Special Judge (Communal Riots Cases) Tonk in Sessions Case No.39/2000 vide judgment dated 22.12.2000 is altered from the offence under Section 304 Part I IPC to Section 304 Part II IPC. Rest of the conviction is maintained. (2) The sentence of seven years awarded under Section 304 Part I IPC is altered to the sentence already served. (3) Two months’ time is granted to pay the fine part, if not already paid. (4) In case of default, the learned trial Court shall ensure that he serves the default sentence imposed vide impugned judgment dated 22.12.2000. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A CrPC (Section 481 Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023), the appellant namely Hazari Lal S/o Ramdev is directed to furnish a personal bond in the sum of Rs. 25,000/- and a surety in the like amount within four weeks before the Registrar (Judl.) of this Court, which shall be effective for a period of six months with the stipulation that in the event Special Leave Petition being filed against the judgment or on grant of leave, the appellant aforesaid, on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. (BHUWAN GOYAL),J (MAHENDAR KUMAR GOYAL),J Gourav/34-35