1 2026:CGHC:16874 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPS No. 6650 of 2021 1- Boharan Lal Gendre S/o Shri Hirak Ram Gendre Aged About 58 Years Training Superintendent, Government Industrial Training Institute Baster P.O. Baster District Baster, Chhattisgarh., District : Bastar(Jagdalpur), Chhattisgarh. 2 - Hari Singh Rana S/o Late D.S. Rana Aged About 58 Years Training Superintendent, Government Industrial Training Institute Bemetara, District Bemetara, Chhattisgarh., District : Bemetara, Chhattisgarh. 3 - B.C. Pandey S/o S.D. Pandey Aged About 59 Years Training Superintendent, Government Industrial Training Institute Baster, P.O. Baster, District Baster, Chhattisgarh., District : Bastar(Jagdalpur), Chhattisgarh. 4 - R.M. Shukla S/o Shri R.P. Shukla Aged About 57 Years Training Superintendent, Government Industrial Training Institute Bhopalpatnam, District Bijapur, Chhattisgarh., District : Bijapur, Chhattisgarh. ... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Secretary, Skill Development Technical Education And Employment Mantralaya Mahanadi Bhawan Atal Nagar, Nava Raipur, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh., District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh. 2 - Director Directorate Of Employment And Training, Indravati Bhawan Atal Nagar Nava Raipur, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh., District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh. ... Respondent(s) For Petitioner(s) : Ms. Pooja Sinha, Advocate For State : Mr. Anway Tiwari, Panel Lawyer Hon’ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey Order on Board 13/04/2026 1. The petitioners have filed the present petition seeking the following relief(s):- “10.1 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to call for the entire record pertaining to the case of the 2 petitioners' from the office of respondents by issuing a writ of certiorari and, 10.2 after parasol of record be pleased to direct the respondents for extending the benefit of promoting to the petitioners from 01/04/2003/on the ground of parity which is already being availed by the employees of department of skill development employment and training and they be given all notional benefit including promotion as directed by this Hon'ble Court in terms of order passed on 03/07/2020 in WPS No. 4568/2011. 10.3 Any appropriate writ, direction or order may also kindly be passed which this Hon'ble Court deems fit and appropriate in the circumstances of the case, in the interest of justice.” 2. Brief facts of the case are that under the Erstwhile State of Madhya Pradesh around 16 ITI's were run by the Tribal Welfare Department. The Erstwhile State of M.P. on 24.02:1999 issued an order for merger of the ITS's under the Tribal Welfare Department to the Man Power Planning Department of the State Government. Out of 16 ITI's with the Tribal Welfare Department 10 of the ITI's stood within the territory falling under the State of Chhattisgarh. The State of Chhattisgarh also on 10.02.2003 issued a similar notification for mergerX of the ITI's under the Tribal Welfare Department to the Man Power Planning Department of the State Government and it was acted upon. The petitioners in the writ petition are employees working with the ITI's earlier under the Tribal Welfare Department and subsequent to 10.02.2003 they became employees under the Man Power Planning Department of the State Government. 3. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners would submit that the petitioners have been working under the Directorate of Employment & Training. She would submit that a gradation list was issued, and eligible employees were promoted. However, the names of the petitioners were not considered for promotion. She would also submit that a direction 3 may be issued to the respondent authorities to consider the cases of the petitioners for promotion to the next higher post. 4. On the other hand, learned State counsel would oppose the submissions made by counsel for the petitioner and contend that the petitioners are claiming the benefit of promotion with effect from the year 2003. He would further submit that the petition is hit by the principle of delay and laches, as the petitioners have approached this Court after an inordinate delay. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents. 6. It is an admitted fact that the names of the petitioners were not considered for promotion. However, the present petition has been filed only on 25.11.2021. In paragraph 7 of the petition, it is stated that there is no delay in filing the petition; however, no satisfactory explanation has been given for such a prolonged delay. 7. The Supreme Court in the matter of Union of India and others v. Tarsem Singh reported in (2008) 8 SCC 652 summarized the settled principles in the following manner:- “7. To summarise, normally, a belated service related claim will be rejected on the ground of delay and laches (where remedy is sought by filing a writ petition) or limitation (where remedy is sought by an application to the Administrative Tribunal). One of the exceptions to the said rule is cases relating to a continuing wrong. Where a service related claim is based on a continuing wrong, relief can be granted even if there is a long delay in seeking remedy, with reference to the date on which the continuing wrong commenced, if such continuing wrong creates a continuing source of injury. But there is an exception to the exception. If the grievance is in respect of any order or administrative decision which related to or affected several others also, 4 and if the reopening of the issue would affect the settled rights of third parties, then the claim will not be entertained. For example, if the issue relates to payment or re fixation of pay or pension, relief may be granted in spite of delay as it does not affect the rights of third parties. But if the claim involved issues relating to seniority or promotion,etc.., affecting others, delay would render the claim stale and doctrine of laches/limitation will be applied. Insofar as the consequential relief of recovery of arrears for a past period is concerned, the principles relating to recurring/successive wrongs will apply. As a consequence, the High Courts will restrict the consequential relief relating to arrears normally to a period of three years prior to the date of filing of the writ petition.” 8. Recently, Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of H. Guruswamy & Ors. Versus A. Krishnaiah Since Deceased by Lrs.1 held courts cannot use a "liberal approach" to condone inordinate, unjustified delays caused by a party's own negligence. Relevant paras of the aforesaid judgment are reproduced herein below :- “13. We are at our wits end to understand why the High Court overlooked all the aforesaid aspects. What was the good reason for the High Court to ignore all this? Time and again, the Supreme Court has reminded the District judiciary as well the High courts that the concepts such as "liberal approach", "Justice oriented approach", "substantial justice" should not be employed to frustrate or jettison the substantial law of limitation. 16. The length of the delay is definitely a relevant matter which the court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not. From the tenor of the approach of the respondents herein, it appears that they want to fix their own period of limitation for the purpose of instituting the proceedings for which law has 1. [2025] 1 SCR 764 5 prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the case, he cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations. While considering the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay. 17. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. No court should keep the 'Sword of Damocles' hanging over the head of litigant for an indefinite period of time.” 9. At the time of filing of the petition in the year 2021, the petitioners were aged about 57, 58, and 59 years respectively, and by efflux of time, they have already attained the age of superannuation. Further, the petitioners have failed to properly explain the delay in approaching this Court. 10. Taking into consideration the above discussed facts and law, the petition is liable to be and is hereby dismissed. No order as to cost(s). Sd/- Rakesh Mohan Pandey JUDGE Nadim