1 2026:HHC:6177 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AT SHIMLA FAO No.4080 of 2013 and FAO No.12 of 2014 Reserved on: 28.02.2026 Decided on: 06.03.2026 ________________________________________________________ (1) FAO No.4080 of 2013 Matten Pillai Gudja (German National) …..Appellant Versus Dot Ram and others ……Respondents ________________________________________________________ (2) FAO No.12 of 2014 The New India Assurance Company Limited …..Appellant Versus Matten Pillai Gudja (German National) and others ……Respondents ________________________________________________________ Coram Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sushil Kukreja, Judge 1 Whether approved for reporting? ________________________________________________________ For the appellant(s): Mr. Naveen K. Bhardwaj, Advocate, for the appellant in FAO No.4080 of 2013 and for respondent No.1 in FAO No.12 of 2014. Mr. Praneet Gupta, Advocate, for the appellant in FAO No.12 of 2014 and for respondent No.1 in FAO No.4080 of 2013. For the respondent(s): Mr. Ajay Chandel, Advocate, for respondents No.1 & 2 in FAO No.4080 of 2013 and for respondents No.2 & 3 in FAO No.12 of 2014. ________________________________________________________ 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? 2 2026:HHC:6177 Sushil Kukreja , Judge Since both these appeals are the offshoot of impugned award dated 30.04.2013, passed by learned Motor Accidents Claim Tribunal-II (Additional District Judge), Kullu, HP. in Claim Petition No.19 of 2009 (RBT No.4 of 2013), they are being taken up together for disposal. 2. The appeal, being FAO No.4080 of 2013, is maintained by the appellant-petitioner (hereinafter referred to as the petitioner) under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short, ‘MV Act’) for enhancement of the awarded amount of compensation with the prayer that the impugned award dated 30.04.2013 may be quashed modified and the petitioner may be awarded compensation to the tune of Rs.50,00,000/-, as claimed in the claim petition. 3. Similarly, the appeal, being FAO No.12 of 2014, is maintained by the appellant-Insurance Company under Section 173 of MV Act with the prayer to exonerate the Insurance Company from the liability to bear the amount of compensation, interest etc. by quashing and setting aside the impugned award. 4. Briefly stated the facts, giving rise to these appeal, are that on 21.04.2008, the petitioner boarded a Maruti Van bearing registration No.HP-01-K-1116 from Bhunter to Manikaran and when the said vehicle reached near village Jaan, the vehicle (Mahindra Jeep) 3 2026:HHC:6177 bearing registration No.HP-34-4559 came from Manikaran side in a rash and negligent manner and struck against the said Maruti Van, due to which, the Maruti Van fell down below the road. In the said accident, the driver as well as the petitioner suffered multiple grievous injuries. Thereafter, the petitioner was taken to District Hospital, Kullu for treatment, from where, she was referred to PGI Chandigarh for further treatment, where she remained admitted for one month. As per the petitioner, she spent more than Rs.2 lacs on her treatment including medicines, taxi charges etc. The petitioner further alleged that before the accident, she was hale and hearty and she rented a guest house at Manikaran and had engaged two attendants to look after her and paid Rs.3,000/- per month to each attendant. Due to the accident, she had become disabled both mentally and physically, hence, she prayed for grant of compensation to the tune of Rs.50,00,000/-. 5. Respondents No.1 and 2 contested the petition and filed joint reply, wherein preliminary objections regarding no negligence on the part of respondent No.2, non-joinder of necessary parties and suppression of material facts were taken. On merits, it was averred that the vehicle in question never met with the alleged accident and there was no negligence on the part of respondent No.2. It was further averred that as per the FIR, it was vehicle NO.HP-34-A-4559 which was involved in the alleged accident not the vehicle No.HP34-4559. 4 2026:HHC:6177 6. In the reply filed on behalf of respondent No.3/ Insurance Company, preliminary objections were taken qua maintainability, driver of the vehicle was not holding a valid and effective driving licence, the owner of the vehicle was also not possessing valid route permit, token tax, fitness certificate etc. On merits, it was averred that the compensation, as claimed, was highly excessive. 7. On the pleadings of the parties, the learned Tribunal below framed the following issues on 11.12.2009:- “1. Whether respondent No.2 was driving the vehicle bearing registration No.HP-34-4559 on 21.04.2008 in a rash and negligent manner? OPP 2. Whether the petitioner had suffered injuries as a result of rashness or negligence on the part of respondent No.2? OPP 3. Whether petitioner is entitled for the compensation to the extent of Rs.50 lakh? ...OPP 4. Whether the claim petition is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties. If so, its effect? ...OPR 5. Whether the petitioner has not come to the court with clean hands and had suppressed material facts from the Court. If so, its effect? ...OPR 6. Whether petition is not maintainable against respondent No.3? ….OPR-3 7. Whether the vehicle was being driven in contravention of the terms of insurance policy. If so, its effect? ...OPR 8. Relief.” 8. The parties led their evidence and after hearing learned counsel for the parties, the claim petition was partly allowed and the petitioner was held entitled to compensation of Rs.2,00,000/- alongwith interest @ 6% per annum from the date of filing of the petition till the date of deposit of amount, which shall be deposited by respondent 5 2026:HHC:6177 No.3 within a period of two months from today, failing which respondents would be liable to pay interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of award. 9. Feeling aggrieved/dissatisfied, the petitioner filed appeal, i.e. FAO No.4080 of 2013, for enhancement of the amount of compensation and the insurance company also filed appeal (FAO No.12 of 2014), seeking quashing and setting-aside of the impugned award. 10. Learned counsel for the appellant/petitioner in FAO No.4080 of 2023, contended that the learned Tribunal below has failed to award adequate compensation to the petitioner, which is liable to enhanced. He further contended that the petitioner is also entitled to compensation under the heads medical expenses, loss of income, disability and attendant charges. 11. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner as well as learned counsel for the Insurance Company and learned counsel for the owner and driver of the offending vehicle and also carefully examined the entire record. 12. From perusal of the record, it has become clear that on on 21.04.2008, while the petitioner was traveling in the Maruti Van bearing registration No.HP-01-K-1116 from Bhunter to Manikaran and when the said vehicle reached near village Jaan, Mahindra Jeep bearing 6 2026:HHC:6177 registration No.HP-34-4559 came from Manikaran side in a rash and negligent manner, which struck against the Maruti Van and due to the said accident, the Maruti Van fell down below the road, as a result of which, the petitioner suffered multiple injuries on her various part of the body. Though, the petitioner has claimed that she had spent more than Rs.2 lacs upon her treatment, including medicines, taxi charges etc. However, no material has been placed on record to suggest that she had spent more than Rs.2 lacs on her treatment, including medicines, taxi charges etc. Therefore, in the absence of any evidence on record, the learned Tribunal had rightly held that the petitioner was not entitled to compensation under this head. The petitioner has also claimed that she was working as free lance translator and was earning about Rs.3,60,000/- per year. However, no evidence has been adduced on record to this effect. Neither any bank statement, nor any income certificate has been placed on record by the petitioner to show that she was earning Rs.3,60,000/- per year by working as free lance translator. 13. Although, the petitioner had pleaded that she had suffered permanent disability, however, the disability certificate has not been proved in accordance with law as none of the doctors, who has signed the same, has been examined. It is settled law that mere marking of a document as an exhibit does not dispense with its proof. In Sait Tarajee Khimchand and others Vs. Yelamarti Satyam and others, 7 2026:HHC:6177 AIR 1971 Supreme Court 1865, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in para- 15 of the judgment held as under:- “15.The plaintiffs wanted to rely on Exhibits A-12 and A- 13, the day book and the ledger respectively. The plaintiffs did not prove these books. There is no reference to these books in the judgments. The mere marking of an exhibit does not dispense with the proof of documents. It is common place to say that the negative cannot be proved. The proof of the plaintiffs' books of account became important because the plaintiffs' accounts were impeached and falsified by the defendants' case of larger payments than those admitted by the plaintiffs. The irresistible inference arises that the plaintiffs' books would not have supported the plaintiffs.” 14. Similarly, in Neeraj Dutta Vs. State (Government of NCT of Delhi) (2023) 4 SCC 731, it has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that mere production and marking of a document as an exhibit by the Court cannot be held to be due proof of its contents and its execution has to be proved by admissible evidence. Relevant portion of the judgment reads as under:- “60.Section 61 deals with proof of contents of documents which is by either primary or by secondary evidence. When a document is produced as primary evidence, it will have to be proved in the manner laid down in Sections 67 to 73 of the Evidence Act. Mere production and marking of a document as an exhibit by the court cannot be held to be due proof of its contents. Its execution has to be proved by admissible evidence…..” 15. Therefore, in view of the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, no reliance can be placed upon the disability certificate Ext. PX, as the same has not been proved in accordance with law. 16. The petitioner (PW-1) deposed that she had engaged two ladies, namely Bimla Devi and Kumari Pushpa, as attendants and she 8 2026:HHC:6177 was paying Rs.3,000/- per month to each attendant. However, no documentary evidence has been led by petitioner to show that she was paying Rs.3,000/-per month to each attendant. Rather, the daughter of the petitioner (PW-2 Veena Pillai), stated that the petitioner was paying Rs.1,500/- per month to each lady. Hence, it cannot be inferred that the petitioner was paying Rs.3,000/- per month to each attendant, as claimed by her. 17. The case of the petitioner is that she remained admitted in the hospital from 21.04.2008 to 22.05.2008 and in support of her case, she had examined PW-7 Dr. Sunil Singh Gautam from PGI Chandigarh, who categorically stated that, as per record, the petitioner was admitted in the hospital on 26.4.2008 asnd she was discharged on 22.5.2008 and the discharge slip to that effect was Ex.PW-7/A. He further deposed that certificate Ex.PW-7/B was issued by Dr. Ashis Pathak. Perusal of discharge slip Ex.PW-7/A reveals that the petitioner remained admitted in PGI Chandigarh for treatment from 26.4.2008 to 22.5.2008 and perusal of the statement of PW-7 Dr. Sunil Singh Gautam also reveals that he himself had not given any treatment to the petitioner and he relied upon the certificate Ex.PW-7/B issued by Dr. Ashis Pathak. He opined that due to head injury the petitioner was not in a position to lead normal life. The said opinion of this witness is based upon speculation, especially when he himself had not examined 9 2026:HHC:6177 the petitioner and the petitioner had not gone to PGI Chandigarh for further treatment after having been discharged from there. After going through the entire evidence on record, the learned Tribunal below has rightly awarded a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- on account of pain and sufferings and Rs.1,00,000/- for loss of amenities to life, future discomfort and inconvenience. 18. Learned counsel for the appellant/Insurance Company contended that respondent No.3 was not having a valid and effective driving licence as at the relevant point of time he was having driving licence valid only for driving Scooter/LMV and not for driving transport vehicle. However, this contention of the learned counsel for the appellant/Insurance Company cannot be accepted in view of the recent decision by the Constitution Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bajaj Alliance General Insurance Company Limited Vs. Rambha Devi and others, (2025) 3 SCC 95, wherein it has been held that a person holding a licence for light motor vehicle under Section 10(2)(d) of MV Act for vehicles with a gross weight under 7500 KG, he is entitled and permitted to operate a transport vehicle without needing any additional authorization under Section 10(2)(e) of MV Act, specifically for the transport vehicle having unladen weight of 7500 KG. Relevant portions of the judgment read as under:- “181.1. A driver holding a licence for light motor vehicle (LMV) class. under Section 10(2)(d) for vehicles with a gross 10 2026:HHC:6177 vehicle weight under 7500 kg. is permitted to operate a "transport vehicle" without needing additional authorisation under Section 10(2)(e) of the MV Act specifically for the "transport vehicle" class. For licensing purposes, LMVs and transport vehicles are not entirely separate classes. An overlap exists between the two. The special eligibility requirements will however continue to apply for, inter alia, e-carts, e-rickshaws, and vehicles carrying hazardous goods. 181.2. The second part of Section 3(1), which emphasises the necessity of a specific requirement to drive a "transport vehicle", does not supersede the definition of LMV provided in Section 2(21) of the MV Act. 181.3. The additional eligibility criteria specified in the MV Act and the MV Rules generally for driving "transport vehicles" would apply only to those intending to operate vehicles with gross vehicle weight exceeding 7500 kg i.e. "medium goods vehicle", "medium passenger vehicle", "heavy goods vehicle" and "heavy passenger vehicle". 181.4. The decision in Mukund Dewangan (2017) is upheld but for reasons as explained by us in this judgment. In the absence of any obtrusive omission, the decision is not per incuriam, even if certain provisions of the MV Act and the MV Rules were not considered in the said judgment.” 19. In the present case also, perusal of the registration certificate (RC) of the vehicle in question, i.e. Mahindra Jeep No.HP34-4559 (Ext. RW1/C) reveals that the gross vehicle weight of the vehicle was 2750 KG, which is less than 7500 KG. Similarly, perusal of driving licence (DL) Ext.RW1/A reveals that the said driving licence was issued on 23.05.2007 and was valid upto 11.03.2025 for driving light motor vehicle. Hence, in view of the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rambha Devi’s case (supra), it cannot be said that respondent No.3 was not having a valid and effective driving licence at the time of the accident as contended by learned counsel for the appellant/Insurance Company. 11 2026:HHC:6177 20. Therefore, in view of the above discussion, this Court finds no illegality or irregularity in the impugned award dated 30.04.2013, passed by the learned Tribunal below, which has been passed on proper appreciation of the evidence on record and the same requires no interference by this Court 21. Consequently, in view of detailed discussion made hereinabove, both these appeals, preferred by the claimant as well as the Insurance Company, are dismissed and the impugned award dated 30.04.2013 passed by learned Tribunal below is upheld. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of. ( Sushil Kukreja ) Judge March 06, 2026 (V.Himalvi)