1 2026:CGHC:17143 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR SA No. 393 of 2022 1 - Nutan S/o Meru Prasad Aged About 37 Years Village - Thangan, Tahsil Dabhara, District Janjgir Champa Chhattisgarh 2 - Surendra S/o Meru Prasad Aged About 47 Years Village - Thangan, Tahsil Dabhara, District Janjgir Champa Chhattisgarh. 3 - Indrakant S/o Meru Prasad Aged About 42 Years Village - Thangan, Tahsil Dabhara, District Janjgir Champa Chhattisgarh 4 - Sajila Bai (Delete) As Per Hon'ble Court Order Dated 02/03/2026 5 - Devshri (Deleted) As Per Hon'ble Court Order Dated 02/03/2026 6 - Shivkumar (Deleted) As Per Hon'ble Court Order Dated 02/03/2026 ..Appellant(s) Versus 1 - Premendra S/o Ghanchand Aged About 42 Years Village - Thangan, Tahsil Dabhara, District Janjgir Champa Chhattisgarh 2 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through - The Collector/district Magistrate, Janjgir, District Janjgir-Champa Chhattisgarh. 3 - Sajila Bai D/o Ramlal W/o Kartikram Aged About 58 Years Caste- Mauwar R/o Village - Thangan Tahsil- Dabhara At Present Address- Village- Khaira Tahsil- Sarangarh District- Raigarh (C.G.) 4 - Devshri D/o Ghanchand Aged About 25 Years Caste- Mauwar, R/o Village- Thangan, At Present Address- Village- Khaira Tahsil- Sarangarh District- Raigarh (C.G.) 5 - Shivkumar S/o Dilip Kumar Aged About 47 Years Caste- Mauwar R/o Village- Thangan Tahsil- Dabhara District- Janjgir-Champa (C.G.) Respondent(s) RAHUL JHA Digitally signed by RAHUL JHA Date: 2026.04.16 17:44:49 +0530 2 (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Appellant(s) : Mr. Ishwar Jaiswal, Advocate For Resp No.2. : Mr. Malay Jain, PL For Resp No. 3 to 5 : Mr. Vimlesh Bajpai, Advocate Judgment on Board 15/04/2026 1. The present Second Appeal has been preferred under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 by the defendants, who are the appellants herein, calling in question the judgment and decree dated 04/04/2022 passed in Civil Appeal No. 53-A/2018 (Premendra Kumar v. Nutan & Others) by the learned I Additional District Judge, Sakti (C.G.). By the said impugned judgment and decree, the learned First Appellate Court has allowed the appeal preferred by the plaintiff/respondent No.1 against the judgment and decree dated 27/04/2018 passed in Civil Suit No. 155- A/2007 (Premendra Kumar v. Nutan & Others) by the learned Civil Judge, Class II, Dabhara, District Janjgir-Champa (C.G.), whereby the civil suit instituted by the plaintiff/respondent No.1 was partly decreed.” 2. For the sake of convenience, the parties shall hereinafter be referred to as per their status before the Trial Court. 3. (a) The plaintiff instituted a civil suit seeking declaration of title and recovery of vacant possession in respect of the suit land bearing Khasra No. 1141/2 admeasuring 0.17 acre and Khasra No. 1141/4 admeasuring 0.05 acre, along with the house constructed thereon, situated at Village Ungan, Patwari Halka No. 8, Tahsil Dabhra, District Janjgir-Champa (C.G.) (hereinafter referred to as the “suit property”). 3 (b) It is the case of the plaintiff, in brief, that the suit property forms part of joint ancestral property recorded in the revenue records in the joint names and possession of the plaintiff and defendants No. 4 and 5, comprising total 16 khasra numbers admeasuring 10.85 acres. It was pleaded that the suit property originally belonged to their predecessor-in- interest, Ramlal, who had acquired the same in a family partition. (c) According to the plaintiff, the suit property consists of ancestral house and badi, and the same fell to the share of Ramlal in an earlier partition between Ramlal and the predecessor of defendants No. 1 to 3, namely, Meru Prasad. In the said partition, out of Khasra No. 1141/2 (0.33 acre), northern portion admeasuring 0.17 acre fell to the share of Ramlal, whereas southern portion admeasuring 0.16 acre (Khasra No. 1141/3) fell to the share of Meru Prasad. It is further pleaded that Meru Prasad subsequently sold his share to one Jagdish, thereby extinguishing any right of defendants No. 1 to 3 over the suit property. (d) It is further the case of the plaintiff that after the death of Ramlal, the plaintiff was a minor aged about 10 years. On the occasion of the last rites of Ramlal, defendants No. 1 to 3 requested the plaintiff to permit them to reside temporarily in a portion of the suit house. On the persuasion of villagers, the plaintiff allowed them to occupy a portion of the house (shown in red colour in the map) on the condition that they would vacate the same as and when required. (e) It was pleaded that despite repeated requests made by the plaintiff from time to time, defendants No. 1 to 3 failed to vacate the suit property and continued in unauthorized possession. It was further alleged that on 4 15.05.2006 and again on 26.05.2006, defendants No. 1 to 3 attempted to dismantle portions of the house and remove building materials, which led to intervention by the plaintiff and lodging of police reports. (f) The plaintiff pleaded that he along with defendants No. 4 and 5 are the exclusive title holders and in possession of the suit property, whereas defendants No. 1 to 3 have no right, title or interest therein and their possession is illegal. Hence, the Civil suit was filed seeking declaration of title and recovery of possession. In support of his case, the plaintiff examined himself and other witnesses and exhibited documents including revenue records, khasra entries, map of the suit land, and copies of police reports. (g) Defendants No. 1 and 3 filed their written statement denying the plaint allegations. It was contended that the suit property is ancestral property and that they have been residing in the house since the time of their forefathers. It was further pleaded that they have acquired rights in the suit property through partition and long possession. The defendants further contended that a Panchayat decision (Panch Faisla) had already taken place between the parties, wherein the house was recognized to be in possession of the defendants. It was also contended that without challenging the said Panch Faisla, the Civil suit is not maintainable. Objection has also been raised regarding non-joinder of necessary parties and pendency of proceedings before the revenue court. In support of their defence, they examined witnesses and exhibited documents including an agreement/receipt and the Panch Faisla. (h) Defendants No. 4, 5 and 6 supported the case of the plaintiff in 5 their written statement. 4. On the basis of the pleadings and material available on record, the learned Trial Court framed the necessary issues. While deciding the issues relating to title and possession, the learned Trial Court relied upon the revenue records produced by the plaintiff, wherein the names of the plaintiff and defendants No. 4 and 5 were recorded over Khasra No. 1141/2 and 1141/4. In absence of any rebuttal evidence from defendants No. 1 to 3, presumption of correctness under Section 117 of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code was drawn, and the title and possession over the suit land was held in favour of the plaintiff and defendants No. 4 and 5. However, with regard to the existence of the house over the suit land, the learned Trial Court found that the khasra entries did not conclusively establish the same. The plaintiff failed to produce cogent evidence or get the land demarcated to show that the suit house was situated on the suit land. Accordingly, it was held that the plaintiff failed to prove his title over the suit house and also failed to establish unauthorized possession of defendants No. 1 to 3. Issue No. 1 was held to be partly proved and Issue No. 2 not proved. The learned Trial Court further held that the valuation of the suit was proper and rejected the counter-claim of the defendants for want of proof. 5. In view of the aforesaid findings, the learned Trial Court partly decreed the suit, holding that while the plaintiff established his title over the suit land, he failed to prove his entitlement to declaration and recovery of possession of the suit house. 6. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Court, 6 the plaintiff preferred a first appeal before the Appellate Court. The learned First Appellate Court, upon re-appreciation of the entire evidence available on record, held that the findings of the learned Trial Court insofar as denial of relief of possession were not sustainable in law. It was observed that the revenue records clearly established the title and possession of the plaintiff along with defendants No. 4 and 5 over the suit land and the same had not been effectively rebutted by defendants No. 1 to 3. The learned First Appellate Court further took note of the admissions made by the defendants’ witnesses in their cross- examination, wherein it was acknowledged that the house was situated over Khasra No. 1141/2 and that the defendants had no recorded title over the said land. It was also admitted that the dispute arose when the structure over the suit property was sought to be altered or dismantled by the defendants. In view of such admissions, the Appellate Court held that the existence of the house over the suit land stood sufficiently established. The learned First Appellate Court thus concluded that once the title of the plaintiff over the suit land stood proved, denial of the consequential relief of recovery of possession was unjustified. Accordingly, it was held that defendants No. 1 to 3 were in unauthorized possession of the suit house and the plaintiff was entitled to recovery of vacant possession. 7. In view of the aforesaid findings, the learned First Appellate Court allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Court to the extent of denial of possession, and decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff by granting declaration of title as well as 7 recovery of vacant possession of the suit property. 8. Learned counsel for the appellants/defendants submits that the impugned judgment and decree passed by the learned First Appellate Court is perverse, contrary to the material available on record and suffers from misreading of evidence. It is contended that the learned First Appellate Court has erred in reversing the well-reasoned findings of the learned Trial Court without properly appreciating the evidence on record. It is further submitted that the learned First Appellate Court has granted the relief of recovery of possession without there being cogent and reliable evidence to establish the existence and location of the disputed house over the suit land. Learned counsel would contend that the Trial Court had rightly held that the khasra entries did not conclusively establish existence of the house and, therefore, denial of relief of possession was justified. It is also argued that the findings recorded by the learned First Appellate Court regarding title and possession are vitiated on account of non-consideration of material evidence, including the plea of non-joinder of necessary parties. It is further contended that the defendants are in settled possession of the disputed house and such possession could not have been termed as unauthorized. 9. I have heard learned counsel for the appellant on the question of admission and have carefully perused the impugned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts as well as the material available on record. 10. At the outset, it is to be noted that the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure is confined to the 8 examination of substantial questions of law. Interference with concurrent findings of fact recorded by the learned Trial Court and affirmed by the learned First Appellate Court is permissible only where such findings are shown to be perverse, based on no evidence or suffering from an error of law. 11. Upon due consideration of the material available on record, it is evident that the learned Trial Court, while accepting the title of the plaintiff over the suit land on the basis of revenue records, declined the relief of possession primarily on the ground that the existence of the house over the suit land was not conclusively established. However, the learned First Appellate Court, being the final Court of fact, has re-appreciated the entire oral as well as documentary evidence and has recorded a categorical finding that the plaintiff, along with defendants No. 4 and 5, has established title and possession over the suit land on the strength of revenue records, which remained unrebutted by defendants No. 1 to 3. The said finding is based on proper appreciation of evidence and does not suffer from any perversity. 12. Insofar as the existence and location of the house over the suit land is concerned, the learned First Appellate Court has taken into consideration not only the documentary evidence but also the admissions made by the defendants’ witnesses in their cross-examination. The defendants’ witnesses have clearly admitted that the house is situated over Khasra No. 1141/2 and that their names are not recorded in respect of the said land. The learned First Appellate Court has rightly held that such admissions constitute substantive evidence and sufficiently establish that 9 the house is situated on the suit land. The view taken by the learned Trial Court in doubting the existence of the house, in absence of demarcation, has thus been rightly interfered with. 13. Once the title of the plaintiff over the suit land stands established and the presence of the house thereon is also proved on the basis of evidence on record, the learned First Appellate Court was justified in holding that the defendants’ possession over the suit house is unauthorized. The consequential relief of recovery of possession, which was denied by the learned Trial Court, has therefore been rightly granted by the learned First Appellate Court upon proper re-appreciation of evidence. 14. Upon consideration of the entire record, this Court finds no perversity, patent illegality, or misapplication of law in the findings recorded by the First Appellate Court warranting interference under Section 100 CPC. The findings recorded by the First Appellate Court are essentially findings of fact based on appreciation of evidence. No perversity, misreading of evidence, or substantial error of law has been demonstrated by the appellant so as to give rise to any substantial question of law. 15. The questions sought to be urged by the appellants do not constitute substantial questions of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as they primarily relate to appreciation of evidence and findings of fact. 16. In the considered opinion of this Court, the findings recorded by the learned First Appellate Court do not suffer from perversity or illegality warranting interference. 10 17. Consequently, no substantial question of law arises for consideration in this Second Appeal. The appeal, being devoid of merit, is liable to be dismissed at the admission stage. 18. Accordingly, the Second Appeal is dismissed at the admission stage itself. No order as to costs. Sd/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) Judge Rahul/Gowri