( 2026:JHHC:11000 ) 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI M.A. No. 86 of 2022 Vikash Jain, aged about 41 years, Son of Late Nemi Chand Jain, Resident of Golden Gas Agency, Panch Mandir Chowk, P.O. Hazaribagh, P.S. Sadar & District Hazaribagh. ... ... Appellant Versus 1. The Branch Manager, National Insurance Company Limited, having its office at Ranchi Patna Road, Near Prince Hotel, P.O. Hazaribagh, P.S. Sadar & District -Hazaribagh. 2. Omi, S/o Ashutosh Kumar Sinha, R/o Malviya Marg, P.O. Hazaribagh, P.S. Sadar & District - Hazaribagh. 3. Saaleeha Khatoon, W/o Late Jamal @ Md. Jamal 4. Wasim Ansari, S/o Late Jamal @ Md. Jamal 5. Arif Ansari, S/o Late Jamal @ Md. Jamal 6. Rokhsar, D/o Late Jamal @ Md. Jamal 7. Tannuna, D/o Late Jamal @ Md. Jamal (Sl. No. 4 to 7 are minors represented through their mother and natural guardian Saaleeha Khatoon Sl. No. 3) Sl. No. 3 to 7 are R/o Village Bhelwara, P.O. Hazaribagh, P.S. Mufasil & District - Hazaribagh. …. … Respondents ------ CORAM : HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE ------ For the Appellant : Mr Rupesh Singh, Advocate Mr Chanchal Jai, Advocate Mr Abhishek Kumar, Advocate Mr Abhijeet Indra Guru, Advocate For the Ins. Company : Mr Manish Kumar, Advocate For the Claimants : Mr Awnish Shankar, Advocate Mr Kundan Kumar, Advocate Mr Atul Kumar Tiwari, Advocate ----- 08 /Dated: 17.04.2026 1. Heard the learned counsel for the parties. 2. This appeal by the owner of the insured vehicle challenges the impugned judgment and award dated 06.02.2019 made by the Presiding Officer, Motor Vehicles Accident Claims Tribunal at Hazaribagh (Tribunal). 3. Mr Rupesh Singh, learned counsel for the appellant submits that the challenges made in this appeal is restricted to ‘pay and recovery’ order made by the Tribunal, on the alleged ground that the appellant i.e. the owner of the insured vehicle, willfully allowed a driver, who did not possess a driving license to ride the insured vehicle i.e. motorcycle. ( 2026:JHHC:11000 ) 2 4. Mr Rupesh Singh submits that, firstly, there was no pleading in the insurance company's written statement that the driver had no driving license. Secondly, he pointed out that the insurance company had in fact pleaded that this driver was not at fault, but rather the deceased, who was going on the wrong side, was at fault. 5. Mr Rupesh Singh submitted that, even otherwise, it was well settled that the burden of pleading and proving a breach of any of the terms of the insurance policy lay on the insurance company. He submitted that there were, in fact, findings in the impugned award to the effect that the insurance company had fault to discharge such burden. In such circumstances, Mr Rupesh Sngh submitted that ‘pay and recovery’ order does not warrant. He relied on the decision of National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Swaran Singh & Others, (2004) 3 SCC 297 and Ram Chandra Singh Vs. Rajaram & Others, (2018) 8 SCC 799 to support his contentions. 6. Mr. Manish Kumar learned counsel for the Insurance Company argued that neither before the Tribunal nor before this Court, the appellant bothered to produce the driving license of the driver, if at all there existed any such license. He submitted that unless such basic evidence was produced by the owner or the driver, the onus would not shift upon the insurance company. He relied on Pappu & Others Vs. Vinod Kumar Lamba and Another, (2018) 3 SCC 208 to support this argument. 7. Learned counsel for the claimants had no arguments to offer, because none of the parties was questioning the entitlement of the claimants in this matter. 8. The rival contentions now fall for determination. 9. In this case, the records were called for, and the written statement of the appellant insurance company was perused. In the entire written statement, there is ( 2026:JHHC:11000 ) 3 no allegation that the driver of the insured motorcycle lacked a valid driver’s license. Instead, in paragraph 9 of the written statement, the insurance company has pleaded that the accident occurred on NH-33, a four-lane highway, and that the driver of the insured vehicle was driving in his left lane without any rashness or negligence. Instead, it is pleaded that the deceased was driving on the wrong side and, therefore, the driver of the insured vehicle was not at fault, warranting the rejection of the claim. 10. In paragraph 10 of the written statement, there is a bald statement that “the opposite party seeks and is entitled to protection under Section 149 of the MV Act”. 11. Mr Manish Kumar submitted that Section 149 provides for the defences that can be raised by and on behalf of an insurer. He points out that one of the permissible defences is that the driver of the insured vehicle possesses no valid license. Therefore, the pleading in paragraph-10 should be construed as a pleading to the effect that the driver of the insured vehicle had no license. 12. The pleading in paragraph 10 of the written statement is too general for any Court or Tribunal to infer that the same constitutes a specific defence that, in this case, the driver of the insured motorcycle possessed no license. In the absence of such pleading, the claimant or the policyholder was not expected to meet the case now advanced. 13. Considering the law laid down in Swaran Singh (supra) and Ramchandra Singh (supra) to the effect that the burden of proof regarding breach of any of the fundamental terms of the insurance policy would be upon the insurance company, it is difficult to hold that, at least in this case, the insurance company had pleaded or succeeded in establishing the breach. ( 2026:JHHC:11000 ) 4 14. In Swaran Singh (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in its summary of findings has held that the insurance companies, however, with a view to avoid their liability, must not only establish the available defence(s) raised in the said proceedings but must also establish “breach” on the part of the owner of the vehicle, the burden of proof wherefore would be on them. To the same effect are the observations in Ram Chandra Singh (supra). 15. The above means that the insurance companies must plead and prove the circumstances from which breach of any terms of the insurance policy could be established or inferred. It is well settled that no amount of proof, if not backed by any pleadings, is liable to be considered. In this case, there are neither any pleadings worth the name nor any evidence to establish that the driver of the insured motorcycle had no driving license and furthermore that the owner of the insured motorcycle consciously allowed the driver to ride the insured motorcycle with full knowledge that the driver had no valid driving license. Therefore, in this case, the Tribunal should not have made any ‘pay and recovery’ order. 16. In Pappu (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the insurance company is entitled to take a defence that the offending vehicle was driven by an unauthorised person or that the person driving the vehicle did not have a valid driving license. The onus would shift to the insurance company only after the owner of the offending vehicle pleads and proves the basic facts within his knowledge: that the driver of the offending vehicle was authorised by him to drive the vehicle and had a valid driving license at the relevant time. The Court noted that in the said matter, the owner of the offending vehicle merely raised a vague plea in the written statement that the offending vehicle was being driven by a person having a valid driving license without disclosing the name of the driver and other details. ( 2026:JHHC:11000 ) 5 17. The decision in Pappu (supra) is distinguishable, mainly on the ground that, in the said matter, the insurance company, in its pleadings, specifically raised the defence that the driver of the insured vehicle did not have a driving licence to drive this vehicle. Once a defence was raised, the owner of the insured vehicle had to plead and prove the basic facts within his knowledge: that the driver of the offending vehicle was authorised by him to drive the vehicle and had a valid driving licence at the relevant time. 18. In the absence of the insurance company raising any such defence in its pleadings, there was no obligation on the owner of the insured vehicle to plead on the same issue, which did not even legitimately arise in the matter. Secondly, this was not a case where the owner raised a vague plea in the written statement without even disclosing the driver’s name or other details. In this case, therefore, the general proposition laid down in Swaran Singh (supra), which was in fact followed in Pappu (supra) that the burden of proof would be upon the party raising the defence would apply. 19. For all the above reasons, this appeal is liable to be allowed, and the direction in the impugned award for pay and recovery quashed and set aside. Such direction for ‘pay and recovery’ is, therefore, now quashed and set aside, and this appeal is allowed. No costs. 20. The Bank guarantee furnished by the appellant is now ordered to be discharged. The appellant is now permitted to withdraw the statutory amount deposited at the time of the institution of this appeal, together with any interest that may have accrued thereon. The Registry is to do the needful in the matter. (M.S. Sonak, C.J.) April 17, 2026 Ranjeet / R.Kr. AFR/ Uploaded on 20.04.2026