ORDER : JOBIN SEBASTIAN, J. The challenge in this revision petition is directed against the conviction and sentence imposed on the revision petitioners for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (for short, “the N.I. Act”). 2. The revision petitioners are the accused in C.C. No. 826/2015 on the file of the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court (N.I. Act Cases), Ernakulam. 3. The case of the complainant, in brief, is as follows: The complainant is a proprietary concern. The first accused is also a proprietary concern represented by the second accused, who is its proprietor. According to the complainant, the accused had agreed to supply glass materials to the complainant for a total consideration of Rs.10,00,524/-. Pursuant to the said agreement, the complainant paid the entire amount in advance to the accused. However, the accused failed to supply the materials as agreed. Subsequently, the accused acknowledged their liability and agreed to refund the amount received from the complainant. Accordingly, the accused repaid a sum of Rs.5,00,524/-. Towards discharge of the balance liability of Rs.5,00,000/-, the accused issued Ext.P1 cheque in favour of the complainant. When the cheque was presented for encashment through the complainant's banker, it was dishonoured and returned unpaid with the endorsement “Funds Insufficient”. Thereafter, the complainant caused a statutory demand notice to be issued to the accused, informing them of the dishonour of the cheque and demanding payment of the cheque amount within the prescribed period. Despite receipt of the said notice, the accused failed to make payment of the amount covered by the cheque. It was in the above circumstances that the complaint came to be filed alleging commission of the offence punishable under Section 138 of the N.I. Act. 4. During the trial, on the side of the complainant, the proprietor representing the complainant's concern was examined as PW1. The documents produced by the complainant were marked as Exts.P1 to P6. On the side of the defence, DW1 and DW2 were examined, and Exts.D1 to D5 were marked in evidence. 5. Upon an appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence on record, the trial court found the accused guilty of the offence punishable under Section 138 of the N.I. Act and convicted them accordingly. The second accused was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of three months and to pay a fine of Rs.5,00,000/-. 5. Upon an appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence on record, the trial court found the accused guilty of the offence punishable under Section 138 of the N.I. Act and convicted them accordingly. The second accused was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of three months and to pay a fine of Rs.5,00,000/-. In default of payment of the fine, the second accused was directed to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one month. The fine amount, if realised, was ordered to be paid to the complainant as compensation under Section 357(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure . 6. Aggrieved by the said judgment, the accused preferred Crl. Appeal No.324/2017 before the Sessions Court. The learned Additional Sessions Judge-VI, Ernakulam, who heard the appeal, allowed the same in part. While confirming the finding of conviction, the appellate court modified the sentence and directed the second accused to undergo imprisonment till the rising of the court and to pay a fine of Rs.5,00,000/-. The fine amount, if realised, was ordered to be paid to the complainant as compensation under Section 357(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure . In default of payment of the fine, the accused was directed to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one month. 7. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioners and the learned counsel appearing for the first respondent. The records have also been perused. 8. The learned counsel for the revision petitioners contended that both the trial court and the appellate court failed to properly appreciate the evidence on record and arrived at a finding of guilt without due application of mind. It was further argued that the complainant had failed to establish the transaction alleged in the complaint, as well as the due execution and issuance of Ext.P1 cheque. According to the learned counsel, the present complaint was foisted against the accused by misusing Ext.P1 cheque, which had been issued only as a security and not towards discharge of any legally enforceable debt or liability. 9. Per contra, the learned counsel for the first respondent/complainant submitted that there is no illegality, impropriety, or perversity in the concurrent findings rendered by the courts below. It was argued that the complainant had adduced cogent and convincing oral and documentary evidence to prove the transaction alleged in the complaint and the execution and issuance of Ext.P1 cheque. 9. Per contra, the learned counsel for the first respondent/complainant submitted that there is no illegality, impropriety, or perversity in the concurrent findings rendered by the courts below. It was argued that the complainant had adduced cogent and convincing oral and documentary evidence to prove the transaction alleged in the complaint and the execution and issuance of Ext.P1 cheque. It was further contended that, once the execution of the cheque is admitted or proved, the statutory presumptions under Sections 118(a) and 139 of the N.I. Act operates in favour of the complainant, and that the accused had failed to rebut the said presumptions by adducing any credible evidence. 10. Before delving into a detailed discussion regarding the scope of interference in the impugned judgment, it is worthwhile to note that the scope of interference in a revision petition is too limited. By a series of judicial pronouncements, it is well settled that a court exercising revisional jurisdiction will interfere with the findings of the courts below only when such findings suffer from illegality, impropriety, or perversity. Unless it is shown that the judgment of the Trial Court or the Appellate Court is perverse, unreasonable, or suffers from non-consideration of relevant material or misreading of evidence, interference in revision is not warranted. The revisional court cannot reappreciate the evidence as an Appellate Court and substitute its own view merely because another view is possible. 11. In State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri [ AIR 1999 SC 981 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court held thus: “In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of Supervisory Jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an Appellate Court nor can it be treated even as a second Appellate Jurisdiction. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of Supervisory Jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an Appellate Court nor can it be treated even as a second Appellate Jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to gross miscarriage of justice.” 12. Keeping in view the above principles and reverting to the facts of the present case, it is evident that, in order to establish the case of the complainant, the proprietor of the complainant's concern was examined as PW1. In the affidavit filed in lieu of the chief examination, PW1 reiterated the averments contained in the complaint. According to his evidence, Ext.P1 cheque was executed and issued by the accused towards the discharge of a liability arising out of a business transaction between the parties. 13. The impugned judgment itself reveals that the complainant had produced sufficient materials to establish the transaction alleged in the complaint. Furthermore, the judgments of both the trial court and the appellate court indicate that there is an admission on the part of the accused regarding the underlying transaction. The testimony of PW1 with respect to the execution and issuance of Ext.P1 cheque is cogent, convincing, and trustworthy. Once the execution of the cheque stands proved, the statutory presumption under Section 139 of the N.I. Act comes into operation in favour of the complainant, and the burden shifts to the accused to rebut the said presumption. 14. However, in the present case, the accused has failed to place any convincing material on record to rebut the statutory presumption available in favour of the complainant. Though the accused contended that Ext.P1 was a blank signed cheque issued merely as security, no reliable or acceptable evidence has been adduced to substantiate the said contention. A mere suggestion or bald assertion that the cheque was issued as security is insufficient to rebut the presumption under Section 139 of the N.I. Act. The defence set up by the accused, therefore, does not inspire confidence and cannot be accepted. A mere suggestion or bald assertion that the cheque was issued as security is insufficient to rebut the presumption under Section 139 of the N.I. Act. The defence set up by the accused, therefore, does not inspire confidence and cannot be accepted. Consequently, it has to be held that the accused has failed to discharge the burden cast upon him to rebut the statutory presumption operating in favour of the complainant. 15. Similarly, no material has been placed before this Court to demonstrate that the appreciation of evidence by the courts below or the concurrent findings of conviction recorded by them suffer from any illegality, impropriety, perversity, or jurisdictional error warranting interference in the exercise of the revisional jurisdiction of this Court. Upon an independent scrutiny of the records, this Court finds no reason to interfere with the judgments under challenge. 16. As regards the sentence, it is pertinent to note that the appellate court had already shown considerable leniency by modifying the substantive sentence and directing the second accused to undergo imprisonment till the rising of the court and to pay a fine of Rs.5,00,000/-, with a default sentence of simple imprisonment for one month in the event of non-payment of the fine. Having regard to the nature of the offence, the amount involved, and the circumstances of the case, this Court is of the considered view that the sentence imposed by the appellate court is just, reasonable, and proportionate, and does not warrant any further interference. In the result, the revision petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. However, considering the submission made by the learned counsel for the revision petitioner and having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, the revision petitioner is granted five months' time from the date of this order to remit the fine amount before the trial court. It is made clear that if any amount has already been deposited by the revision petitioner before the trial court pursuant to any direction issued by the appellate court or by this Court, the said amount shall be given due credit and adjusted towards the fine amount payable under this order.