JUDGMENT : P.M. Manoj, J. The captioned appeals are preferred against the common award dated 13.03.2023 passed in O.P.(MV) No. 2740 of 2017 and O.P.(MV) No. 2730 of 2017. O.P.(MV) No. 2740 of 2017 was preferred by the mother and sisters of the deceased, Vipin Das, who died in a motor vehicle accident that occurred on 11.08.2017. O.P.(MV) No. 2730 of 2017 was preferred by the pillion rider of the motorcycle bearing registration No. TN 74 P 1303, which was driven by the deceased, Vipin Das, and who sustained injuries in the said accident. 2. The grievance voiced in both these appeals is against the dismissal of the respective claim petitions by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Thiruvananthapuram, vide the common award dated 13.03.2023. The short facts of the case are as follows: 3. On 11.08.2017, at approximately 12:00 noon, while the deceased in M.A.C.A. No. 2639 of 2023 and the appellant in M.A.C.A. No. 2819 of 2023 were travelling on a motorcycle bearing registration No. TN-74-P-1303 from Karakkonam to Parassala, a KSRTC bus hit the motorcycle near Kodavilakom, Karumannoor desom, causing serious injuries to both riders. The accident occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of the KSRTC bus, bearing registration No. KL- 15-7939 (RAC 772), by the 2 nd respondent. In connection with the incident, the Parassala Police registered a criminal case as F.I.R. No. 1442/2017. The 1st respondent was the owner of the KSRTC bus, and the 3rd respondent was its insurer. 4. The deceased in M.A.C.A. No. 2639 of 2023, who was riding the motorcycle at the time of the accident, succumbed to his injuries. He was 23 years old, worked as a mason, and was earning Rs.20,000/- per month. It was contended before the Tribunal that he was the sole breadwinner of the family, and the appellants, who are his legal heirs, lost his love and affection, thereby claiming a total compensation of Rs. 25 lakhs. 5. On the other hand, the appellant in M.A.C.A. No. 2819 of 2023 was the pillion rider of the motorcycle. He sustained a traumatic brain injury, including subdural haemorrhage (SDH), inter-hemispheric bleed, and haemorrhagic contusion in the right basifrontal region. He underwent treatment initially at the Taluk Hospital, Parassala, and subsequently at the Government Medical College Hospital, Thiruvananthapuram. At the time of the accident, he was 18 years old and a bright student. He sustained a traumatic brain injury, including subdural haemorrhage (SDH), inter-hemispheric bleed, and haemorrhagic contusion in the right basifrontal region. He underwent treatment initially at the Taluk Hospital, Parassala, and subsequently at the Government Medical College Hospital, Thiruvananthapuram. At the time of the accident, he was 18 years old and a bright student. The injuries severely disrupted his studies and caused him immense mental and physical agony, for which he seeks a compensation of Rs. 3 lakhs. 6. The first respondent resisted the claims by filing a written statement, contending that there was no rashness or negligence on the part of the KSRTC driver in causing the accident. The age, occupation, and income of both the deceased and the injured appellant were disputed, and the compensation claimed was asserted to be exorbitant. However, it was admitted that the KSRTC bus had valid insurance coverage with the third respondent. 7. In the written statement filed by the third respondent insurer, the manner of the accident as alleged by the claimants was denied. It was instead contended that the deceased, Vipin Das, was riding the motorcycle (bearing registration No. TN-74-T-1303) at high speed and in a rash and negligent manner. According to the insurer, the deceased moved to the wrong side of the road while attempting to overtake the bus and collided with the KSRTC bus, which was stationary at the time, having been parked on the side of the road for passengers to alight. The third respondent maintained that there was no negligence on the part of the bus driver and that the accident occurred solely due to the high speed and rash riding of the deceased. The third respondent also disputed the validity of the driving licence of the deceased and contended that his legal heirs were not entitled to any compensation. 8. Furthermore, the third respondent disputed the quantum of compensation claimed by the injured appellant. While admitting that the KSRTC bus had valid insurance coverage at the time of the accident, the insurer contended that the motorcycle was uninsured and that its rider lacked a valid driving licence. It was further submitted that since the insured (the first respondent) had failed to intimate the occurrence of the accident to the insurer, the third respondent was not liable to indemnify the first respondent or compensate the claimants. 9. It was further submitted that since the insured (the first respondent) had failed to intimate the occurrence of the accident to the insurer, the third respondent was not liable to indemnify the first respondent or compensate the claimants. 9. On the basis of the pleadings and contentions raised by both sides, the Tribunal framed the following issues for consideration: (i) Whether the accident occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of the KSRTC bus by the second respondent; (ii) Whether the petitioners/claimants are entitled to compensation; and (iii) If so, what is the quantum of compensation and whether the third respondent is liable to indemnify the owner of the vehicle. 10. Upon evaluating the contentions and examining the documentary evidence marked as Exts.A1 to A12 and B1 to B5, as well as the oral testimony of the witness for the petitioner—who is the claimant in O.P.(M.V.) No. 2730 of 2017—the Tribunal dismissed the claim petitions. The dismissal was primarily on the ground that, although PW1 stated in his examination-in-chief that he had given a statement to the police regarding the negligence of the second respondent, he alleged that the police, without conducting a proper investigation and being influenced by the respondents, filed a final report treating the incident as a case of mere coincidence (unavoidable accident). 11. The investigation records were marked through PW1. However, during cross-examination, PW1 admitted that the police had not recorded his statement, that he was unaware of the outcome of the police investigation, and that he had made no further inquiries in that regard. The Tribunal observed that the version deposed by the injured witness in cross-examination was completely contradictory to his testimony in examination-in-chief, and that both versions could not stand together. 12. Relying on the decision in Khadeeja and Others v. Rushdi and Another ( 2016 (3) KLT 400 ), the Tribunal opined that to fix liability on the respondents (the owner, driver, and insurer of the offending vehicle) in a claim petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, it is imperative for the claimant to prove that the accident was caused by the negligence of the driver or owner of the vehicle, which remains the primary point of consideration. The Tribunal then relied upon the police report marked as Exts. A6 and B5, wherein the police, after questioning several witnesses and recording their statements, had arrived at its conclusion. The Tribunal then relied upon the police report marked as Exts. A6 and B5, wherein the police, after questioning several witnesses and recording their statements, had arrived at its conclusion. 13. The Tribunal also took into consideration the contention that the deceased did not possess a valid driving licence at the time of riding the motorcycle. Another crucial factor considered was the spot of the accident. As per the scene mahazar marked as Ext. B2, the spot of the accident was located 2.5 metres east of the western tar end, on a road having a total width of 5.67 metres. While the injured claimed that the bus came to the wrong side and struck their motorcycle, the evidence indicated that the motorcycle was proceeding south from Karakkonam to Parassala, while the bus was approaching from the opposite direction. Based on the measurements in the scene mahazar, the Tribunal found that the motorcycle was on the wrong side of the road, thereby revealing serious contradictions in the evidence rendered by PW1. 14. No independent witness was cited or examined to prove the manner of the accident or to corroborate the version of PW1. The Tribunal further observed that it is a well-settled principle of the law of evidence that consistency is the test of reliability. A witness who offers contradictory versions during oral evidence cannot be believed, even though the standard of proof required from a petitioner in a claim under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act is lesser in degree. Finding that the solitary and uncorroborated testimony of PW1 was unreliable to prove the negligence of the driver and could not supersede the police report (Exts. A6/B5), the Tribunal held that the petitioners had failed to prove that the accident occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of the KSRTC bus by the second respondent. Consequently, the claims for compensation were declined. 15. On the other hand, it is contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that the Tribunal completely erred in applying the standard of proof applicable to motor accident claim cases. It is argued that the oral testimony of PW1, who was the pillion rider of the motorcycle, ought to have superseded the final report of the investigating officer, especially in the absence of any rebuttal evidence. It is argued that the oral testimony of PW1, who was the pillion rider of the motorcycle, ought to have superseded the final report of the investigating officer, especially in the absence of any rebuttal evidence. The appellants contend that evidence adduced before the Tribunal must be given greater weight than the final report, as held by the Apex Court in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Chamundeswari and Others (2021 KHC 6563). 16. It is further submitted that the standard of proof required to establish rashness and negligence under the Motor Vehicles Act is that of preponderance of probabilities, rather than proof beyond a shadow of doubt as required in criminal trials. Strict proof of negligence is not a prerequisite for awarding compensation, a principle established in State of Karnataka v. Muraleedhar (2009 KHC 413), Parmeshwari v. Amir Chand and Others (2011 KHC 2393), and Sherin J. Thankom v. Thankom and Others ( 2014 KHC 364 ). 17. The learned counsel for the appellants also pointed out a significant delay in the investigation, noting that the police recorded the First Information Statement only two days after the accident, and that too after the vehicles involved had been removed from the spot. While the police final report alleged that the motorcycle collided with the KSRTC bus while attempting to overtake it while it was stationary at a bus stop, the Tribunal failed to consider whether a designated bus stop even existed at the alleged site. 18. Finally, it is contended that although the Tribunal sweepingly observed that there were contradictions in the evidence of PW1, it failed to discuss or analyse even a single such contradiction in the impugned award. The appellants, therefore, submit that the findings entered by the Tribunal are perverse, unsupported by the evidence on record, and liable to be set aside. 19. It is further contended that the monthly income of the deceased ought to have been fixed on the basis of minimum wages, as held by the Apex Court in Himmat Kaur and Others v. National Insurance Company Ltd. and Others [ 2023 ACJ 601 ]. 20. I have heard Sri. R.T. Pradeep, learned counsel appearing for the appellants in both appeals; Sri. Alex Antony, learned Standing Counsel for the first respondent; Sri. Premchand, learned counsel for the third respondent in M.A.C.A. No. 2819 of 2023; and Sri. 20. I have heard Sri. R.T. Pradeep, learned counsel appearing for the appellants in both appeals; Sri. Alex Antony, learned Standing Counsel for the first respondent; Sri. Premchand, learned counsel for the third respondent in M.A.C.A. No. 2819 of 2023; and Sri. Lal K. Joseph, learned counsel for the third respondent in M.A.C.A. No. 2639 of 2023. 21. On evaluating the contentions raised across the Bar, the primary question that arises for consideration is the standard of proof to be adopted by a Tribunal while dealing with claim petitions under a beneficent legislation like the Motor Vehicles Act. In a catena of decisions, including Kusum Lata and Others v. Satbir and Others [2011 KHC 4204], the Apex Court has held that in motor accident claim cases, the claimants are not required to prove their case with the absolute clinical precision required in criminal trials. The courts must consistently keep this principle in mind. Similarly, in Parmeshwari supra, the Apex Court, following its earlier decision in Bimla Devi and Others v. Himachal Road Transport Corporation and Others [2009 KHC 5016] reiterated that strict proof of an accident having been caused by a particular vehicle in a specific manner may not always be possible for the claimants. The claimants are merely required to establish their case on the touchstone of preponderance of probabilities, and the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt cannot be applied. 22. In the case at hand, although the Tribunal detailed the topography of the accident site, it chose to disbelieve the sole eyewitness, PW1, who was also an injured victim. Notably, the police did not cite or examine any independent witness before the Tribunal from among those whose statements they claimed to have recorded during the investigation. Despite this omission, the Tribunal placed undue reliance on the final report filed by the police and dismissed the claim for want of strict proof from PW1. This approach directly contradicts the settled principles laid down by the Apex Court as well as this Court. 23. Furthermore, the Tribunal relied heavily on the police narrative in the First Information Report (Ext.A1), which stated that the motorcycle rammed into the front of the KSRTC bus while it was stationary at a bus stop. PW1 had adduced oral evidence precisely to rebut this police report. 23. Furthermore, the Tribunal relied heavily on the police narrative in the First Information Report (Ext.A1), which stated that the motorcycle rammed into the front of the KSRTC bus while it was stationary at a bus stop. PW1 had adduced oral evidence precisely to rebut this police report. Although the Tribunal observed that PW1 gave a contradictory version during cross-examination compared to his affidavit-in-lieu of chief-examination, it failed to discuss or specify what these contradictions actually were before declaring PW1 an incredible witness. 24. The Tribunal also completely ignored the appellants' contention that the First Information Statement (F.I.S.), having been given by a person who was not an eyewitness, could not override the ocular testimony of PW1, who was an injured victim of the accident. The Tribunal brushed this aside on the ground that the informant, one Bineesh, was a relative of the deceased who had no adverse interest against the claimants. Yet, the Tribunal made no effort to summon the said informant to depose before it to rebut the testimony of PW1. Lastly, the Tribunal failed to consider the significant delay in the registration of the case. It was specifically contended by the appellants that the police recorded the F.I.S. only two days after the accident, and that too after the vehicles involved had already been removed from the site of occurrence. 25. In the absence of any rebuttal evidence adduced by the respondents—such as by examining independent eyewitnesses—the Tribunal erred in declaring PW1 to be an unreliable witness. PW1 was the pillion rider travelling with the deceased on the motorcycle bearing registration No. TN-74-P-1303 and was himself a victim who sustained serious injuries in the accident. Although the Tribunal highlighted that PW1 stated in cross-examination that the police did not record his statement, that he was unaware of the outcome of the investigation, and that he did not follow up on the same, these statements must be weighed against his explicit assertion in chief- examination that he had indeed given a statement blaming the second respondent. 26. The finding of the Tribunal that these statements completely discredit PW1 ignores normal human conduct in the aftermath of a traumatic event. 26. The finding of the Tribunal that these statements completely discredit PW1 ignores normal human conduct in the aftermath of a traumatic event. It cannot be reasonably expected that a person who has just survived a serious motor vehicle accident and is undergoing medical treatment would immediately ensure that the police recorded his statement, or subsequently track the progress of the police investigation. Since PW1 is a claimant in a connected petition arising from the very same accident, the Tribunal ought to have evaluated the case on the touchstone of preponderance of probabilities to determine whether rashness and negligence could be attributed to the second respondent, rather than insisting on strict and absolute proof. This legal position stands firmly clarified by the Apex Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Chamundeswari (supra). Under such circumstances, as the Tribunal has failed to adhere to the settled legal positions enunciated by the Apex Court as well as this Court, I deem it appropriate to set aside the common award passed in O.P.(M.V.) Nos. 2730 of 2017 and 2740 of 2017 on the file of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Thiruvananthapuram, and remand the matters for fresh consideration. Accordingly, the common award dated 13.03.2023 in the aforementioned O.P.(M.V.)s is set aside, and the matters are remanded to the M.A.C.T., Thiruvananthapuram, for fresh consideration in accordance with law.