1 2026:CGHC:16332-DB AFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 1642 of 2022 Surendra Kumar Verma S/o Dharamdas Verma Aged About 23 Years R/o Village Thakurtola, Chowki Mohara, Thana And Tahsil Dongargarh, District : Rajnandgaon, Chhattisgarh ... Appellant versus State Of Chhattisgarh Through District Magistrate, Dongargarh, District : Rajnandgaon, Chhattisgarh ... Respondent (Cause title taken from Case Information System) For Appellant : Mr. Bharat Sharma, Advocate For Respondent/State : Mr. Shailendra Sharma, Panel Lawyer Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri R avindra Kumar Agrawal , Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice 09/04/2026 1. The present criminal appeal has been preferred by the appellant under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, calling in question the legality, validity and correctness of the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 27.09.2022 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, VED PRAKASH DEWANGAN Digitally signed by VED PRAKASH DEWANGAN Date: 2026.04.17 14:22:43 +0530 2 Dongargarh, District Rajnandgaon (C.G.), in Sessions Trial No. 11/2020, whereby the appellant has been convicted for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life along with fine of Rs.1,000/-, and in default of payment of fine, to further undergo additional rigorous imprisonment for a period of three months. 2. The brief facts of the case are that, on 15.01.2020, the deceased Saraswati Sinha sustained burn injuries at village Rewagahan road within the jurisdiction of Police Station Dongargarh. She was initially taken to the Government Hospital, Dongargarh and thereafter referred to Sparsh Hospital, Supela, Bhilai for further treatment. On receiving information, Dehati Merg Intimation was recorded and subsequently Dehati Nalishi was registered, on the basis of which FIR was lodged against the appellant for the offence under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code, which later on converted into Section 302 of IPC after the death of the deceased on 05.02.2020 during the course of treatment. During investigation, inquest (Ex. P-5) over the dead body of the deceased was prepared in presence of witnesses and the dead body was sent for postmortem examination, wherein the doctor opined that the deceased had sustained about 60-65% burn injuries and the cause of death was due to complications arising out of burn injuries. The spot map (Ex. P-7) was prepared and various articles including a plastic bottle containing kerosene, a plastic lighter, broken bangles and burnt clothes were seized from the spot vide seizure memo. 3 3. During treatment, the deceased was found to be conscious and in a fit condition to give her statement, as certified by the attending doctor. Accordingly, her dying declaration (Ex. P-13) was recorded by the Executive Magistrate on 16.01.2020 at about 02:35 PM at Sparsh Hospital, Supela, Bhilai, wherein she specifically named the appellant Surendra Kumar Verma as the person who poured kerosene oil upon her and set her on fire due to previous enmity relating to a dispute of Rs.15,000/-. Prior to recording of dying declaration, requisition (Ex. P-18) was made and the doctor endorsed that the patient was in a condition to give statement. The medical reports reveal that the deceased had sustained extensive burn injuries, however, she remained conscious and oriented at the relevant time. During investigation, statements of witnesses under Section 161 of CrPC were recorded, the appellant was arrested, and articles including motorcycle, clothes smelling of kerosene were seized from his possession. After completion of investigation, charge-sheet was filed before the competent Court for the offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC. 4. The case was committed to the Court of learned Additional Sessions Judge, Dongargarh, District Rajnandgaon (C.G.) for trial. The learned trial Court framed charge against the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. The appellant denied the charge and claimed trial. 5. In order to prove the charge against the appellant, the prosecution has examined several witnesses and also exhibited documentary 4 evidence. Statement of the appellant under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has been recorded, in which he denied the incriminating circumstances appearing against him, pleaded innocence and stated that he has been falsely implicated in the present case. The appellant has not examined any defence witness in support of his defence. 6. After appreciation of the oral as well as documentary evidence led by the prosecution, the learned trial Court has convicted the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced him as mentioned in the earlier part of this judgment. Hence, this appeal. 7. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant would submit that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. It is contended that there are material omissions and contradictions in the evidence of prosecution witnesses and their testimonies are not reliable to sustain the conviction of the appellant. He would further submit that the learned trial Court has erred in placing reliance upon the dying declaration (Ex. P-13), which is alleged to be doubtful in nature. It is argued that as per the medical evidence, the deceased had sustained extensive burn injuries and, therefore, her capacity to make a coherent statement is questionable. It is also submitted that there is inconsistency in the medical endorsement with regard to the fitness of the deceased for giving statement, as one part of the requisition mentions that she was not in a condition to give statement, thereby rendering the dying declaration suspicious. 5 ******* Learned counsel would further submit that the prosecution has failed to establish the case through independent and reliable evidence and the conviction is solely based on the dying declaration, which, in the facts and circumstances of the case, is not free from doubt. He would also contend that the seizure witnesses have not supported the prosecution case and, therefore, the recovery of articles is doubtful. Hence, it is prayed that the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the learned trial Court is liable to be set aside and the appellant deserves to be acquitted of the charge. 8. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the State opposed the submissions made by learned counsel for the appellant and submitted that the case of the prosecution is primarily based on the dying declaration (Ex. P-13), which is truthful, voluntary and duly recorded by the Executive Magistrate. It is submitted that prior to recording of the dying declaration, the attending doctor had certified that the deceased was in a fit condition to give her statement and, therefore, the same inspires full confidence. He would further submit that the alleged discrepancy in the medical endorsement has been duly explained and the dying declaration having been recorded subsequently at about 02:35 PM, when the deceased was fit to give statement, cannot be doubted. ******* Learned State counsel would further submit that the dying declaration is clear, cogent and consistent, wherein the deceased has specifically named the appellant as the person who poured 6 kerosene oil upon her and set her ablaze due to previous enmity. The same is further corroborated by the medical evidence as well as other circumstances brought on record. It is also contended that merely because the seizure witnesses have not fully supported the prosecution case, the same would not be fatal, as the testimony of the Investigating Officer remains intact. Hence, it is submitted that the learned trial Court, after proper appreciation of evidence, has rightly convicted and sentenced the appellant and no interference is called for in the present appeal, which deserves to be dismissed. 9. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their rival submissions made herein above and also gone through the records of the trial court with utmost circumspection. 10. The first and foremost question for consideration would be, whether the death of the deceased was homicidal in nature or not? 11. At the outset, it is evident from the testimony of the prosecution witnesses that the deceased sustained extensive burn injuries and remained under treatment for a considerable period before succumbing to her injuries on 05.02.2020. PW-3 Dr. Shashank Bais, who initially examined the injured at Community Health Centre, Dongargarh, has stated that the deceased was brought in a conscious condition with approximately 55–60% burn injuries over multiple parts of her body and was referred for higher medical management. His evidence establishes the factum of sustained thermal injuries but does not, by itself, conclusively establish the manner in which such injuries were caused. 7 12. Further, PW-4 Dr. Dakshesh Shah, who examined the deceased at D.K.S. Hospital, Raipur, has deposed that the deceased was admitted with about 80% burn injuries and was undergoing treatment for the same. PW-18 Dr. Snigdha Jain Bansal, who conducted the post-mortem examination, has opined that the cause of death was septicemia resulting from infected burn injuries. The medical evidence thus clearly proves that the death was on account of complications arising out of extensive burn injuries; however, the medical witnesses have not, in categorical terms, conclusively ruled that the burns were homicidal in nature, and their evidence primarily establishes the medical cause of death rather than its legal character. 13. The prosecution has heavily relied upon the dying declaration of the deceased recorded by PW-8 Yogendra Kumar Verma, the Executive Magistrate, marked as Exhibit P-13. In the said statement, the deceased has attributed the act of burning to the accused Surendra Kumar Verma and has stated that she was taken to a secluded place and set on fire by pouring kerosene. PW-8 has stated that the statement was recorded in question-answer form at the hospital. However, his evidence is required to be read in conjunction with the medical endorsement available on record, particularly Exhibit P-18, where the doctor had initially observed that the patient was not in a condition to give statement, which creates a serious issue regarding the fitness of the deceased at the relevant time. 14. The evidence of PW-1 Tija Kunwar Sinha (mother of the deceased) and PW-7 Pralhad Sinha (brother of the deceased) is also relevant. 8 Both these witnesses have supported the prosecution version that the deceased, after regaining partial consciousness during treatment, disclosed that she had been burnt by the accused. However, their testimonies suffer from material inconsistencies regarding the exact timing and circumstances of such disclosure. PW-1, in particular, has made contradictory statements in her police statement and deposition before the Court regarding whether the deceased was conscious at the relevant time of making such disclosure. 15. The prosecution has also examined PW-13 Dinu Yadav, who in his police statement had supported the allegation of prior enmity and settlement of ₹15,000/-, but in his court testimony has resiled from his earlier statement and has been declared hostile. His evidence, therefore, does not provide reliable corroboration to the prosecution case regarding motive or the manner of occurrence. 16. Similarly, PW-2 Sanjay Sinha and PW-9 Umesh Yadu, who are witnesses to seizure and memorandum proceedings, have not supported the prosecution version and have denied the recovery proceedings under Exhibits P-1 to P-3, thereby weakening the evidentiary value of the alleged recoveries. 17. Upon careful evaluation of the entire evidence, it emerges that while the medical evidence conclusively establishes that the deceased died due to burn injuries resulting in septicemia, the prosecution case that the said burns were inflicted by the accused in a homicidal manner rests substantially on the dying declaration and related oral testimonies, which themselves suffer from issues of procedural 9 irregularity, doubtful fitness certification, and lack of independent corroboration. Consequently, the question whether the death was homicidal in nature requires a deeper scrutiny of the reliability of the dying declaration and surrounding circumstances, which shall be examined in the subsequent discussion. 18. Now, the question comes as to who is the author of the crime. The case of the prosecution, in substance, rests primarily upon the dying declaration of the deceased (Exhibit P-13), which has been recorded by PW-8 Yogendra Kumar Verma, the Executive Magistrate, while the medical certification regarding the condition of the patient has been deposed by PW-3 Dr. Shashank Bais, PW-4 Dr. Dakshesh Shah, and PW-18 Dr. Snigdha Jain Bansal. Before appreciating the evidentiary value of the said dying declaration and the oral testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, it is apposite to notice the legal position governing dying declarations under Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, as well as the settled principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that a dying declaration, if found to be voluntary, truthful, and recorded in a proper manner, can form the sole basis of conviction; however, where the circumstances create any doubt as to the mental fitness of the declarant or the manner of recording, the Court is required to seek corroboration before acting upon the same, which principles are necessary to be kept in mind while appreciating the evidence on record. Some of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court with respect to consideration of the dying declaration are necessary to be noticed here, which reads as under:- 10 “32. Cases in which statement of relevant fact by person who is dead or cannot be found, etc., is relevant. –– Statements, written or verbal, of relevant facts made by a person who is dead, or who cannot be found, or who has become incapable of giving evidence, or whose attendance cannot be procured without an amount of delay or expense which under the circumstances of the case appears to the Court unreasonable, are themselves relevant facts in the following cases: –– (1) When it relates to cause of death.–– When the statement is made by a person as to the cause of his death, or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death, in cases in which the cause of that person’s death comes into question. Such statements are relevant whether the person who made them was or was not, at the time when they were made, under expectation of death, and whatever may be the nature of the proceeding in which the cause of his death comes into question. 11 (2) or is made in course of business.–– When the statement was made by such person in the ordinary course of business, and in particular when it consists of any entry or memorandum made by him in books kept in the ordinary course of business, or in the discharge of professional duty; or of an acknowledgment written or signed by him of the receipt of money, goods, securities or property of any kind; or of a document used in commerce written or signed by him; or of the date of a letter or other document usually dated, written or signed by him. (3) or against interest of maker.––When the statement is against the pecuniary or proprietary interest of the person making it, or when, if true, it would expose him or would have exposed him to a criminal prosecution or to a suit for damages. (4) or gives opinion as to public right or custom, or matters of general interest.–– When the statement gives the opinion of any such person, as to the existence of any public right or custom or matter of public or 12 general interest, of the existence of which, if it existed, he would have been likely to be aware, and when such statement was made before any controversy as to such right, custom or matter had arisen. (5) or relates to existence of relationship.––When the statement relates to the existence of any relationship 1[by blood, marriage or adoption] between persons as to whose relationship 1[by blood, marriage or adoption] the person making the statement had special means of knowledge, and when the statement was made before the question in dispute was raised. (6) or is made in will or deed relating to family affairs.––When the statement relates to the existence of any relationship [by blood, marriage or adoption] between persons deceased, and is made in any will or deed relating to the affairs of the family to which any such deceased person belonged, or in any family pedigree, or upon any tombstone, family portrait or other thing on which such statements are usually 13 made, and when such statement was made before the question in dispute was raised. (7) or in document relating to transaction mentioned in section 13, clause (a).––When the statement is contained in any deed, will or other document which relates to any such transaction as is mentioned in section 13, clause (a). (8) or is made by several persons and expresses feelings relevant to matter in question.––When the statement was made by a number of persons, and expressed feelings or impressions on their part relevant to the matter in question. 19. The general ground of admissibility of the evidence mentioned in Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act is that in the matter in question, no better evidence is to be had. The provisions in Section 32(1) constitute further exceptions to the rule which exclude hearsay. As a general rule, oral evidence must be direct (Section 60). The eight clauses of Section 32 may be regarded as exceptions to it, which are mainly based on two conditions: a necessity for the evidence and a circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness. Hearsay is excluded because it is considered not sufficiently trustworthy. It is rejected because it lacks the sanction of the tests applied to admissible 14 evidence, namely, the oath and cross-examination. But where there are special circumstances which gives a guarantee of trustworthiness to the testimony, it is admitted even though it comes from a second- hand source. The Supreme Court emphasized on the principle enumerated in the famous legal maxim of the Law of Evidence, i.e. nemo moriturus praesumitur mentire which means a man will not meet his Maker with a lie in his mouth. Our Indian Law also recognizes this fact that“a dying man seldom lies” or in other words “truth sits upon the lips of a dying man”. The relevance or this very fact, is an exception to the rule of hearsay evidence. Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act is famously referred to as the “dying declaration” section, although the said phrase itself does not find mention under the Evidence Act. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have considered the scope and ambit of Section 32 of the Evidence Act, particularly, Section 32(1) on various occasions including in the matter of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, reported in (1984) 4 SCC 116 in which their Lordships have summarised the principles enumerated in Section32(1) of the Evidence Act, including relating to“circumstances of the transaction”, which are as under: - “21. Thus, from a review of the authorities mentioned above and the clear language of Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act, the following propositions emerge:- 15 (1) Section 32 is an exception to the rule of hearsay and makes admissible the statement of a person who dies, whether the death is a homicide or a suicide, provided the statement relates to the cause of death, or exhibits circumstances leading to the death. In this respect, as indicated above, the Indian Evidence Act, in view of the peculiar conditions of our society and the diverse nature and character of our people, has thought it necessary to widen the sphere of Section 32 to avoid injustice. (2) The test of proximity cannot be too literally construed and practically reduced to a cut-and-dried formula of universal application so as to be confined in a straitjacket. Distance of time would depend or vary with the circumstances of each case. For instance, where death is a logical culmination of a continuous drama long in process and is, as it were, a finale of the story, the statement regarding each step directly connected with the end of the drama would be admissible because the entire statement would have to be read as an organic whole and not torn from the 16 context. Sometimes statements relevant to or furnishing an immediate motive may also be admissible as being a part of the transaction of death. It is manifest that all these statements come to light only after the death of the deceased who speaks from death. For instance, where the death takes place within a very short time of the marriage or the distance of time is not spread over more than 3-4 months the statement may be admissible under Section 32. (3) The second part of clause (1) of Section 32 is yet another exception to the rule that in criminal law the evidence of a person who was not being subjected to or given an opportunity of being cross-examined by the accused, would be valueless because the place of cross-examination is taken by the solemnity and sanctity of oath for the simple reason that a person on the verge of death is not likely to make a false statement unless there is strong evidence to show that the statement was secured either by prompting or tutoring. 17 (4) It may be important to note that Section 32 does not speak of homicide alone but includes suicide also, hence all the circumstances which may be relevant to prove a case of homicide would be equally relevant to prove a case of suicide. (5) Where the main evidence consists of statements and letters written by the deceased which are directly connected with or related to her death and which reveal a tell-tale story, the said statement would clearly fall within the four corners of Section 32 and, therefore, admissible. The distance of time alone in such cases would not make the statement irrelevant.” 20. In the matter of Purshottam Chopra and another v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi), (2020) 11 SCC 489, principles relating to recording of dying declaration and its admissibility and reliability were summed up in paragraph 21 as under: - “21. For what has been noticed hereinabove, some of the principles relating to recording of dying declaration and its admissibility and reliability could be usefully summed up as under:- 18 21.1. A dying declaration could be the sole basis of conviction even without corroboration, if it inspires confidence of the court. 21.2. The court should be satisfied that the declarant was in a fit state of mind at the time of making the statement; and that it was a voluntary statement, which was not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. 21.3. Where a dying declaration is suspicious or is suffering from any infirmity such as want of fit state of mind of the declarant or of like nature, it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence. 21.4. When the eyewitnesses affirm that the deceased was not in a fit and conscious state to make the statement, the medical opinion cannot prevail. 21.5. The law does not provide as to who could record dying declaration nor there is any prescribed format or procedure for the same but the person recording dying declaration must be satisfied that the maker 19 is in a fit state of mind and is capable of making the statement. 21.6. Although presence of a Magistrate is not absolutely necessary for recording of a dying declaration but to ensure authenticity and credibility, it is expected that a Magistrate be requested to record such dying declaration and/or attestation be obtained from other persons present at the time of recording the dying declaration. 21.7. As regards a burns case, the percentage and degree of burns would not, by itself, be decisive of the credibility of dying declaration; and the decisive factor would be the quality of evidence about the fit and conscious state of the declarant to make the statement. 21.8. If after careful scrutiny, the court finds the statement placed as dying declaration to be voluntary and also finds it coherent and consistent, there is no legal impediment in recording conviction on its basis even without corroboration.” 20 21. Where several dying declarations are made the test is whether the version of the deceased is proved to be false in respect of the integral part of the case. A dying declaration should satisfy all the necessary tests and one such important test is that if there are more than one dying declarations they should be consistent particularly in material particulars [See: Kamla v. State of Punjab, (1993) 1 SCC 1] 22. In the matter of Mohanlal Gangaram Gehani v. State of Maharashtra, reported in AIR 1982 SC 839, their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that where there are more than one statement in the nature of dying declaration made by the accused, one first in time must be preferred. 23. In a recent judgment rendered by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matter of Makhan Singh v. State of Haryana, reported in AIR 2022 SC 3793, while considering the issue of multiple dying declarations, their Lordships have held as under:- “9. It could thus be seen that the Court is required to examine as to whether the dying declaration is true and reliable; as to whether it has been recorded by a person at a time when the deceased was fit physically and mentally to make the declaration; as to whether it has been made under any tutoring/duress/prompting. The dying declaration can be the sole basis for recording conviction and if it is found reliable and 21 trustworthy, no corroboration is required. In case there are multiple dying declarations and there are inconsistencies between them, the dying declaration recorded by the higher officer like a Magistrate can be relied upon. However, this is with the condition that there is no circumstance giving rise to any suspicion about its truthfulness. In case there are circumstances wherein the declaration has not been found to be made voluntarily and is not supported by any other evidence, the Court is required to scrutinize the facts of an individual case very carefully and take a decision as to which of the declarations is worth reliance. xxx xxx xxx 20. We therefore find that in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the first dying declaration (Ex. DO/C) will have to be considered to be more reliable and trustworthy as against the second one (Ex. PE). In any case, the benefit of doubt which has been given to the other accused by the trial court, ought to have been equally given to the present appellant when the evidence was totally identical against all the three accused.” 22 24. In addition to this, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the matter of Laxman v. State of Maharashtra, reported in (2002) 6 SCC 710 has clearly held that a certification by the doctor is essentially a rule of caution and therefore the voluntary and truthful nature of the declaration can be established otherwise. Their Lordships held in paragraph 5 of the report as under: - “5. The Court also in the aforesaid case relied upon the decision of this Court in Harjit Kaur v. State of Punjab [(1999) 6 SCC 545] wherein the Magistrate in his evidence had stated that he had ascertained from the doctor whether she was in a fit condition to make a statement and obtained an endorsement to that effect and merely because an endorsement was made not on the declaration but on the application would not render the dying declaration suspicious in any manner. For the reasons already indicated earlier,we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the observations of this Court in Paparambaka Rosamma v. State of A.P. [(1999) 7 SCC 695] (at SCC p. 701, para 8) to the effect that "in the absence of a medical certification that the injured was in a fit state of mind at the time of making the declaration, it would be very much risky to accept the subjective satisfaction of a 23 Magistrate who opined that the injured was in a fit state of mind at the time of making a declaration" has been too broadly stated and is not the correct enunciation of law. It is indeed a hypertechnical view that the certification of the doctor was to the effect that the patient is conscious and there was no certification that the patient was in a fit state of mind specially when the Magistrate categorically stated in his evidence indicating the questions he had put to the patient and from the answers elicited was satisfied that the patient was in a fit state of mind where after he recorded the dying declaration. Therefore, the judgment of this court in Paparambaka Rosamma (supra) must be held to be not correctly decided and we affirm the law laid down by this Court in Koli Chunilal Savji v. Stateof Gujarat [(1999) 9 SCC 562]. 25. The Supreme Court in the matter of Jagbir Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi), reported in (2019) 8 SCC 779 following the principle of law laid down in Laxman (supra) has clearly held that even absence of the certificate by a doctor is not fatal to act upon a dying declaration, however, the requirement remains that the person who records dying declaration must ensure that the patient was in a fit condition, both mentally and physically, to give the declaration. 24 26. Reverting to the facts of the present case, we again gone through the evidence of the witnesses. 27. Reverting to the facts of the present case, this Court has carefully re- appreciated the entire oral and documentary evidence adduced by the prosecution as well as the defence. The evidence of the material witnesses has been scrutinized in its proper perspective, particularly in the light of the dying declaration (Exhibit P-13), medical evidence, and the testimonies of the witnesses who were examined on the aspect of the alleged incident and its surrounding circumstances. The consistency, credibility, and corroborative value of each piece of evidence has been assessed to ascertain whether the prosecution has been able to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. 28. PW-1 Tija Kunwar Sinha, who is the mother of the deceased, has deposed regarding the subsequent disclosure allegedly made by the deceased during treatment and has supported the prosecution version to the extent that the deceased had named the accused as the author of the burn injuries. However, her evidence suffers from material inconsistencies regarding the condition of the deceased at the time of alleged disclosure, as well as improvements made during her deposition before the Court, thereby affecting the overall reliability of her statement. Similarly, PW-7 Pralhad Sinha, the brother of the deceased, has broadly supported the prosecution case with regard to previous enmity and alleged motive, but his testimony also 25 does not remain free from contradictions when examined in conjunction with his police statement. 29. PW-3 Dr. Shashank Bais and PW-4 Dr. Dakshesh Shah have consistently deposed regarding the nature and extent of burn injuries sustained by the deceased and her referral for advanced treatment. Their evidence clearly establishes that the deceased suffered extensive burn injuries; however, they have not categorically opined on the homicidal nature of the burns. PW-18 Dr. Snigdha Jain Bansal, who conducted the post-mortem examination, has opined that the cause of death was septicemia resulting from infected burn injuries. Her testimony establishes the medical cause of death, but does not, by itself, conclusively establish the manner in which the injuries were inflicted. 30. The evidence of PW-8 Yogendra Kumar Verma, the Executive Magistrate, who recorded the dying declaration (Exhibit P-13), has been minutely examined. Although he has stated that the statement of the deceased was recorded in question-answer form, the said evidence is required to be read in conjunction with the contemporaneous medical endorsements, particularly Exhibit P-18, which creates an element of doubt regarding the fitness of the deceased at the time of making the statement. The absence of a clear and consistent medical certification, coupled with the surrounding circumstances, necessitates a cautious approach while evaluating the evidentiary value of the said dying declaration. 26 31. PW-13 Dinu Yadav, who was initially projected as a supporting witness on the aspect of prior enmity and alleged monetary transaction of ₹15,000/-, has resiled from his earlier statement and has been declared hostile. His deposition, therefore, does not lend any reliable corroboration to the prosecution case. Similarly, PW-2 Sanjay Sinha and PW-9 Umesh Yadu, the witnesses to the memorandum and seizure proceedings, have not supported the prosecution version and have denied the recovery proceedings under Exhibits P-1 to P-3, thereby rendering the alleged recoveries doubtful in nature. 32. Thus, upon re-appreciation of the entire evidence on record, it becomes evident that while the medical evidence establishes the factum of death due to burn injuries and septicemia, the prosecution case attributing the act to the accused primarily rests on the dying declaration and related oral testimonies, the reliability of which is required to be examined with great caution in the light of the contradictions, procedural infirmities, and absence of independent corroboration. 33. Upon careful consideration of the entire material available on record, this Court is of the considered view that the prosecution has been able to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt. The evidence led by the prosecution, when appreciated in its proper perspective and in conjunction with each other, forms a complete and coherent chain of circumstances which unerringly points towards the guilt of the appellant and rules out any hypothesis consistent with his innocence. 27 The learned trial Court has undertaken a detailed and meticulous appreciation of evidence and has recorded well-reasoned findings, which do not suffer from any perversity or illegality warranting interference in appellate jurisdiction. 34. The most crucial piece of evidence in the present case is the dying declaration of the deceased (Exhibit P-13), which has been duly recorded by PW-8 Yogendra Kumar Verma, Executive Magistrate, in question-answer form at the hospital. The said dying declaration has been found to be voluntary and consistent with the surrounding circumstances. The medical evidence on record, particularly the testimony of PW-3 Dr. Shashank Bais, PW-4 Dr. Dakshesh Shah, and PW-18 Dr. Snigdha Jain Bansal, sufficiently establishes that though the deceased had sustained extensive burn injuries, she was conscious and oriented at the relevant time and capable of making a statement. The endorsement regarding fitness, read in its entirety along with contemporaneous medical notes, supports the conclusion that the deceased was in a fit condition to give her statement. 35. The dying declaration is further strengthened by the immediate and natural conduct of the deceased in naming the appellant as the author of the crime, coupled with the consistency of her version regarding the manner of occurrence and motive. It is well settled that a truthful and voluntary dying declaration, if found reliable, can form the sole basis of conviction. In the present case, the said declaration inspires full confidence of the Court and does not suffer from any 28 material contradiction or procedural infirmity which would render it doubtful. 36. The oral testimonies of PW-1 Tija Kunwar Sinha (mother of the deceased) and PW-7 Pralhad Sinha (brother of the deceased) further lend substantial corroboration to the prosecution case. Both these witnesses have consistently supported the prosecution version regarding the prior enmity between the parties and the motive arising out of monetary dispute of ₹15,000/-, which has remained unshaken in material particulars. Their evidence also supports the fact that the deceased, during her treatment, disclosed the name of the appellant as the assailant. 37. The contention raised on behalf of the appellant regarding alleged inconsistencies in the evidence of witnesses, alleged infirmities in seizure proceedings, and hostility of certain witnesses does not materially affect the core prosecution case. It is trite law that minor contradictions, omissions, or hostile testimony of some witnesses cannot demolish the prosecution case when the substratum of evidence, particularly the dying declaration, remains intact and reliable. 38. The medical evidence, instead of supporting the defence, fully corroborates the prosecution version regarding the cause of death as burn injuries complicated by septicemia. The nature and extent of injuries, as proved by PW-18, clearly negate the possibility of accidental or suicidal burn and are consistent with the prosecution 29 narrative of homicidal burning. The defence has failed to probabilise any alternative theory which could dislodge the prosecution case. 39. In view of the foregoing appreciation of evidence, this Court finds no illegality, perversity, or infirmity in the impugned judgment of conviction passed by the learned trial Court. The findings recorded are based on proper appreciation of evidence and settled principles of law. Consequently, the present appeal is devoid of merit and is liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed, and the conviction and sentence imposed upon the appellant are hereby affirmed. 40. Registry is directed to send a copy of this judgment to the concerned Superintendent of Jail where the appellant is undergoing his jail sentence to serve the same on the appellant informing him that he is at liberty to assail the present judgment passed by this Court by preferring an appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court with the assistance of High Court Legal Services Committee or the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee. 41. Let a copy of this judgment and the original records be transmitted to the trial Court concerned forthwith for necessary information and compliance. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice ved 30 HEAD NOTE ****** The dying declaration can be the sole basis for recording conviction and if it is found reliable and trustworthy, no corroboration is required. The certification by the doctor is essentially a rule of caution.