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2026 DAILYLAW 629 (KER)

Aleena Alex W/o Amrutharaj v. State of Kerala

2026-06-05

Soumen Sen, Syam Kumar V M

body2026
JUDGMENT : SOUMEN SEN, CJ. 1. “The jurisdiction of suspicion” is invoked by the writ petitioner, the wife of the detenu, in view of the order of detention passed by the District Collector & District Magistrate of Pathanamthitta District under Section 3(3) of the Kerala Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007 (in short the “Act”). The detenu was directed to be detained and kept in Central Prison, Viyyur, is the subject matter of challenge in this habeas corpus petition. 2. The learned brother Justice Syam Kumar V.M. has elaborately discussed the matter, both in respect of fact and law, with which I fully concur. 3. I would like to summarise my views without elaborating on the facts in support of the conclusion arrived at by my brother Judge. 4. The detenu was accused in 7 number of cases, out of which, 6 cases are bailable and the last case was a case registered under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (NDPS) Act, 1985, in which he was granted bail on 17.11.2025. The relevant portion of the bail order is mentioned herein: “(1) Executing a bond for Rs.50,000/- (Rupees Fifty Thousand only) with two solvent sureties for the like sum. (2) Subject to the condition that the accused shall not influence witnesses or tamper with evidence. (3) The accused shall appear before the Investigating Officer as and when required in writing.” 5. The Detaining Authority directed preventive detention by placing reliance upon the past incidents of the detenu and was of the view that the Hon’ble Court had taken a lenient view as regards the bail conditions which appear to be the basis of the said order. The Advisory Committee had concurred with the views of the Detaining Authority, but curiously, it did not consider the last case, i.e., the NDPS case. 6. The grounds of challenge in this habeas corpus petition against the preventive detention of the detenu are two fold – firstly, the non-supply of few legible documents statutorily and mandatorily required to be supplied to the detenu for making an effective representation and secondly, there is a reasonable time gap between the date of the order passed against the detenu releasing him from incarceration and the order passed by the Detaining Authority. The non- consideration of the sufficiency of the bail conditions was also urged. 7. Heard Sri. M.H. Hanis, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, and Sri. The non- consideration of the sufficiency of the bail conditions was also urged. 7. Heard Sri. M.H. Hanis, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, and Sri. K.A Anas, learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the respondents. 8. The learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon four decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court so as to substantiate his contentions. He firstly relied upon paragraphs 34 and 35 of the decision in Pramod Singla v. Union of India,  2023 SCC OnLine SC 374 , which read as follows: “ 34. In cases where illegible documents have been supplied to the detenue, a grave prejudice is caused to the detenue in availing his right to send a representation to the relevant authorities, because the detenue, while submitting his representation, does not have clarity on the grounds of his or her detention. In such a circumstance, the relief under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India and the relevant statutory provisions allowing for submitting a representation are vitiated, since no man can defend himself against an unknown threat. 35. In Harikisan v. State of Maharashtra [1962 SCC OnLine SC 117 : 1962 Supp (2) SCR 918: AIR 1962 SC 911 ], this Court held that in cases of preventive detention, as per the principles enshrined under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India , the detaining authority must explain the grounds of detention to the detenue, and must provide the material in support of the same and in the language understood by the detenue. The relevant paragraph of the said judgment is being reproduced herein: “…The grounds in support of the order served on the appellant ran into fourteen typed pages and referred to his activities over a period of thirteen years, beside referring to a large number of court proceedings concerning him and other persons who were alleged to be his associates. Mere oral explanation of a complicated order of the nature made against the appellant without supplying him the translation in script and language which he understood would, in our judgment, amount to denial of the right of being communicated the grounds and of being afforded the opportunity of making a representation against the order…”(Emphasis supplied) 9. Similarly, in the case of Joyi Kitty Joseph v. Union of India and Others, (2025) 4 SCC 476 , relied upon by the petitioner, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as follows: “26. Similarly, in the case of Joyi Kitty Joseph v. Union of India and Others, (2025) 4 SCC 476 , relied upon by the petitioner, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as follows: “26. The jurisdictional Magistrate released the detenu on bail vide order dated 16-4-2024 on certain conditions. The order of the Magistrate is extracted in the impugned judgment [Joyi Kitty Joseph v. Union of India, 2024 SCC OnLine Del 7548]. The contentions raised by the DRI regarding the all-pervasive role of the detenu and his propensity to indulge in such smuggling activities, detrimental to the interest of the nation was considered in juxtaposition with the contention raised by the accused; on the basis of the investigation carried out thus far. The specific ground raised by the prosecution of apprehension of involvement in similar type of smuggling activity was reckoned by the jurisdictional Magistrate while granting bail and imposing conditions to prevent the detenu from engaging in such smuggling activities. The various conditions are revealed from the order extracted and have been referred to in para (xxii) of the detention order. 27. However, nothing is stated by the detaining authority as to why the conditions are not sufficient to prevent the detenu from engaging in further activities of smuggling; which was the specific ground on which the conditions were imposed while granting bail. 30. Ameena Begum v. State of Telangana [ (2023) 9 SCC 587 : (2023) 3 SCC (Cri) 754] held that the observations in Rekha v. State of T.N. [ (2011) 5 SCC 244 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 596]; that preventive detention is impermissible when the ordinary law of the land is sufficient to deal with the situation was per incuriam to the Constitution Bench decision in Haradhan Saha v. State of W.B. [ (1975) 3 SCC 198 : 1974 SCC (Cri) 816], in the limited judicial review available to constitutional courts in preventive detention matters. The courts would be incapable of interference by substituting their own reasoning to upset the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority, especially since preventive detention law is not punitive but preventive and precautionary. 31. The courts would be incapable of interference by substituting their own reasoning to upset the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority, especially since preventive detention law is not punitive but preventive and precautionary. 31. In Ameena Begum [ (2023) 9 SCC 587 : (2023) 3 SCC (Cri) 754], this Court was concerned with the true distinction between a threat to “law and order” and acts “prejudicial to public order”, which was not to be determined merely by the nature or quality of the act complained of, but was held to lie, in the proper degree and extent of its impact on the society. It was held that there could be instances where “disturbance of public order” would not be attracted but still, would fall within the scope of maintenance of “law and order”. It was held that: (SCC p. 621) “47. … preventive detention laws—an exceptional measure reserved for tackling emergent situations—ought not to have been invoked in this case as a tool for enforcement of “law and order”. (sic para 47)”especially when the existing legal framework to maintain law and order is sufficient to address the offences under consideration. 32 . Likewise, in the present case, we are not concerned as to whether the conditions imposed by the Magistrate would have taken care of the apprehension expressed by the detaining authority; of the detenu indulging in further smuggling activities. We are more concerned with the aspect that the detaining authority did not consider the efficacy of the conditions and enter any satisfaction, however subjective it is, as to the conditions not being sufficient to restrain the detenu from indulging in such activities. 33. Ameena Begum [ (2023) 9 SCC 587 : (2023) 3 SCC (Cri) 754], noticed with approval Vijay Narain Singh v. State of Bihar [ (1984) 3 SCC 14 : 1984 SCC (Cri) 361] and extracted para 32 from the same [Vijay Narain Singh v. State of Bihar, (1984) 3 SCC 14 : 1984 SCC (Cri) 361]: (SCC pp. 35-36) “32. … It is well settled that the law of preventive detention is a hard law and therefore it should be strictly construed. Care should be taken that the liberty of a person is not jeopardised unless his case falls squarely within … not be used merely to clip the wings of an accused who is involved in a criminal prosecution. … It is well settled that the law of preventive detention is a hard law and therefore it should be strictly construed. Care should be taken that the liberty of a person is not jeopardised unless his case falls squarely within … not be used merely to clip the wings of an accused who is involved in a criminal prosecution. It is not intended for the purpose of keeping a man under detention when under ordinary criminal law it may not be possible to resist the issue of orders of bail, unless the material available is such as would satisfy the requirements of the legal provisions authorising such detention. When a person is enlarged on bail by a competent criminal court, great caution should be exercised in scrutinising the validity of an order of preventive detention which is based on the very same charge which is to be tried by the criminal court.”(Emphasis supplied) 34. The criminal prosecution launched and the preventive detention ordered are on the very same allegations of organised smuggling activities, through a network set-up, revealed on successive raids carried on at various locations, on specific information received, leading to recovery of huge cache of contraband. When bail was granted by the jurisdictional court, that too on conditions, the detaining authority ought to have examined whether they were sufficient to curb the evil of further indulgence in identical activities; which is the very basis of the preventive detention ordered. 35. The detention order being silent on that aspect, we interfere with the detention order only on the ground of the detaining authority having not looked into the conditions imposed by the Magistrate while granting bail for the very same offence; the allegations in which also have led to the preventive detention, assailed herein, to enter a satisfaction as to whether those conditions are sufficient or not to restrain the detenu from indulging in further like activities of smuggling.” 10. The petitioner has also relied upon the decision in the case of Sneha Vijayan v. State of Kerala Represented by the Additional Chief Secretary to Government and Others,  2025 SCC OnLine Ker 695 wherein it was observed as follows: “9. The obligation of the detaining authority to furnish legible copies of relied – upon documents to the detenu is not a mere formality. The obligation of the detaining authority to furnish legible copies of relied – upon documents to the detenu is not a mere formality. Only when the said procedure is scrupulously complied with, the detenu can file an effective representation before the Advisory Board and the Government. The right of the detenue to file an effective representation before the Government as well as the Advisory Board is a constitutional right under Art.22(5) and also a statutory right. Therefore, it is the duty of the detaining authority to ensure that the copies of the impugned order as well as the relevant documents which are furnished to the detenu at the time of effecting his arrest are legible so as to enable him to approach the Advisory Board as well as the Government, to make an effective representation. 11. It is trite that something more than mere registration of an FIR is required to reckon a case that is under investigation, for the purpose of passing a detention order. In other words, apart from the FIR, there must be some additional materials to make a case qualified to be reckoned for passing a detention order. As already discussed, on verification by the Court, it is revealed that the copy of the records, including vital documents like FIS, mahazar etc., verified by the detaining authority during the course of its proceedings are not legible. The copies of the said documents furnished to the detenu are also established to be illegible. Therefore, the objective as well as the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority is apparently vitiated. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner, if the case registered with respect to the last prejudicial activity is eschewed from consideration, there would be a long delay between the registration of the last qualified case and the order of detention. On the said ground, Ext.P1 order warrants interference. 13. In the case at hand, it is established that the copies supplied on the detenu were not legible making him incapacitated to file an effective representation. The said serious lapse is a ground to interfere with the impugned order. An order of detention, under KAA(P) Act has wide ramifications as far as the personal as well as the fundamental rights of an individual are concerned. The said serious lapse is a ground to interfere with the impugned order. An order of detention, under KAA(P) Act has wide ramifications as far as the personal as well as the fundamental rights of an individual are concerned. Therefore, the detaining authority should have acted with much alacrity in ensuring that all the procedural formalities are adhered to.”(Emphasis supplied) 11. Per contra, the learned Public Prosecutor opposed the writ petition and contended that the detention order was validly issued under Section 3(1) of the Kerala Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007 (KAAPA) and was subsequently approved and confirmed by the Government for a period of six months from 12.12.2025. It was submitted that the detenu, Amrutharaj V.R. @ Shambu, was involved in seven crimes considered by the Detaining Authority, including a crime under the NDPS Act and that he has a total criminal antecedent of twelve cases. 12. It was further submitted that the Detaining Authority had rightly classified the detenu as a “Known Goonda” under the provisions of KAAPA. According to the learned Public Prosecutor, the criminal activities attributed to the detenu clearly satisfy the statutory requirements for such classification, and the materials placed before the Detaining Authority justified the subjective satisfaction arrived at for invoking the provisions of preventive detention. 13. Referring to the last prejudicial activity, namely Crime No.2110/2025 of Pathanamthitta Police Station registered under Section 20(b)(ii)(B) of the NDPS Act, it was argued that the detenu was apprehended from the spot on 17.09.2025 and was later granted bail on 17.11.2025. The learned Public Prosecutor pointed out that the Detaining Authority had specifically considered the bail order and the conditions imposed therein and had recorded satisfaction that the bail conditions were insufficient to prevent the detenu from indulging in further anti-social activities. 14. The learned Public Prosecutor further submitted that the detenu had consistently involved himself in subsequent criminal activities after securing bail in earlier cases. According to him, the fact that the detenu repeatedly committed offences despite being enlarged on bail demonstrated that the ordinary criminal law and the conditions imposed by criminal courts had failed to deter him from continuing his unlawful activities. Reliance was placed upon the decision in Anita Antony v. State of Kerala,  2025 KHC OnLine 1286 in support of the contention that preventive detention can validly be resorted to where bail conditions prove ineffective in preventing repeated criminal conduct. 15. Reliance was placed upon the decision in Anita Antony v. State of Kerala,  2025 KHC OnLine 1286 in support of the contention that preventive detention can validly be resorted to where bail conditions prove ineffective in preventing repeated criminal conduct. 15. With respect to the contention regarding the supply of illegible documents, the learned Public Prosecutor submitted that the argument was devoid of merit. It was pointed out that at the time of execution of the detention order, the detenu had acknowledged receipt of legible and readable copies of the relied-upon documents. It was further argued that the detenu had thereafter submitted an effective representation before the Government, which itself demonstrated that no prejudice had been caused to him on account of any alleged illegibility of documents. 16. The learned Public Prosecutor, therefore, contended that there was no violation of the constitutional safeguards guaranteed under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India . Reliance was placed upon the decisions in Usha Agarwal v. Union of India and Others, (2007) 1 SCC 295 and Molly v. State of Kerala and Others, judgment dated 22.07.2021 in WP (Crl) No. 133 of 2021 to contend that unless actual prejudice is established, the detention order cannot be invalidated on the ground of alleged defects in the copies supplied to the detenu. The relevant paragraph relied upon by the learned Public Prosecutor in the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Usha Agarwal (supra) is reproduced below: “19. The High Court has examined the copies that were furnished to the detenu. In regard to the grievance relating to illegible copies occurring between pp. 493 and 887 and the last page, the High Court found that these were copies of the documents which were supplied by the detenu himself, and the Department could do no better than to furnish the copies thereof. If the documents furnished by the detenu to the Department contained some portions or pages which were illegible, obviously the copies thereof furnished by the detaining authority to the detenu will also contain such illegible portions. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that if really any document furnished by the detenu was illegible, it could not have been used against the detenu. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that if really any document furnished by the detenu was illegible, it could not have been used against the detenu. But this contention overlooks the fact that a document may contain several sheets and illegibility of some sheets or parts of some sheets will not come in the way of the authorities making use of the legible portions of the documents furnished by the detenu, supplemented by other documents secured during investigation. There is nothing strange in the Department making use of partially legible documents furnished by detenu. Therefore, illegibility of portions of documents which are copies of documents furnished by the detenu, cannot be a ground for grievance by the detenu. Insofar as the allegation that some of the sheets between pp. 124 to 371B were illegible is concerned, the High Court after having gone through the copies of documents furnished to the detenu, has found no substance in the contention. In fact, while acknowledging the copies of documents, the detenu has made an endorsement that they were legible. 20. The entire issue of furnishing of illegible copies is with reference to the question whether the detenu's right to make an effective representation against his detention is hampered by non-supply of legible copies. The High Court after an examination of the copies of documents found that the detenu was not so hampered. Having gone through the representations made by the detenu against his detention, we also find that he was in no way hampered by the fact that a few of the sheets/copies of documents were partly illegible. We, therefore, find no merit in the second contention, nor any reason to interfere with the finding of the High Court in this behalf.” 17. Similarly, the relevant paragraphs in the case of Molly (supra) are as follows: “11. The learned Counsel for the petitioner raised a contention that certain documents served on the detenu were illegible copies and the specific pages were referred to. The reference made is concerning Crime Nos.2849/2016 and 1435/2019. In this context we are of the opinion none of these be reckoned, since for preventive detention of one year following earlier detention under KAA(P)A; there need be only one crime registered as is required under S.13(2). The reference made is concerning Crime Nos.2849/2016 and 1435/2019. In this context we are of the opinion none of these be reckoned, since for preventive detention of one year following earlier detention under KAA(P)A; there need be only one crime registered as is required under S.13(2). After revocation or expiry of a detention order if the detenu continues to be a 'known goonda' or 'known rowdy' under S.2(o) or S.2(p), then under S.13(2) and if he is involved in one single offence of the nature described in S.2(o) or (p), under Section 13(2)(i); there can be a subsequent detention order. In the circumstance under S.13(2)(i), the period can also extend upto one year as per S.12. In the present case, there is also a conviction entered for the offence committed after the earlier detention and there are numerous crimes committed by the detenu. S.7(4) provides that the order of detention shall not be deemed to be invalid because one or more of the facts or circumstances cited among the grounds are vague, non-existent, irrelevant or invalid for any reason whatsoever. The illegible copies if rendering invalid for consideration the two crimes referred; even then the remaining facts legitimize the detention. We reiterate that there is only need for one such offence after the earlier detention and in the present case there are six other cases registered. Even if the two crimes above referred are eschewed, there are six other crimes registered and also one conviction in one of such crimes registered, subsequent to the earlier detention.” 18. The learned Public Prosecutor further submitted that preventive detention is distinct from punitive detention and operates on the principle of preventing future prejudicial activities rather than punishing past conduct. It was argued that the jurisdiction exercised under preventive detention laws is based upon a reasonable anticipation of future conduct and the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority, and not upon proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Questions relating to the sufficiency of evidence are matters to be adjudicated by the criminal courts and not by the authorities exercising preventive detention powers. 19. Emphasising the gravity of the NDPS offence involved in the present case, it was submitted that the detenu was found in possession of 4.061 kilograms of ganja. Questions relating to the sufficiency of evidence are matters to be adjudicated by the criminal courts and not by the authorities exercising preventive detention powers. 19. Emphasising the gravity of the NDPS offence involved in the present case, it was submitted that the detenu was found in possession of 4.061 kilograms of ganja. According to the learned Public Prosecutor, drug trafficking poses a serious threat not merely to individual victims but to society as a whole, particularly affecting the younger generation. It was argued that the distribution of narcotic substances has far-reaching social consequences and adversely impacts numerous individuals and families, thereby justifying preventive action in the interest of public order and public health. 20. Reliance was also placed upon the observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Hira Singh and Another v. Union of India and Another, (2020) 20 SCC 272 , wherein the Court recognised the grave societal impact of drug trafficking and emphasised the necessity of dealing with such offences with utmost seriousness. It was submitted that the object of preventive measures under laws dealing with narcotic offences is not merely punitive but also preventive, aimed at safeguarding society from the menace of illicit drug trafficking. 21. The learned Public Prosecutor finally contended that the activities of the detenu squarely fall within the definition of “anti-social activity” under Section 2(a) of KAAPA, as such activities are likely to create insecurity, fear and danger among the public and adversely affect public health and public order. In the light of the detenu's persistent criminal conduct, repeated involvement in offences notwithstanding the grant of bail and the serious nature of the NDPS offence, it was submitted that the Detaining Authority had rightly invoked the provisions of KAAPA and that the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 22. In order to appreciate the grounds, we have called for the original records and have carefully perused the order of the Advisory Committee. It is needless to mention by me as it has been elaborated by my brother that there has been complete non-consideration by the Advisory Board with regard to the NDPS case and the bail conditions. It is also pertinent to mention that when the Advisory Board was considering the matter, there is nothing on record that the charge-sheet has been filed. 23. It is also pertinent to mention that when the Advisory Board was considering the matter, there is nothing on record that the charge-sheet has been filed. 23. The principles governing preventive detention and the primacy accorded to personal liberty were succinctly explained by the Division Bench in Heisnam Chaoba Singh v. Union of India and Others , 2021 SCC OnLine Cal 2691 in which one of us (Soumen Sen, J.) was the presiding Judge and had authored the judgment. On a review of catena of decisions, it was observed as follows: “ 24. Preventive detention would normally regard as anathema to liberty. 25. Personal liberty of an individual is precious, invaluable and to be jealously secured and protected. The word “preventive” is different from ‘punitive’ as said by Lord Finley in R.V. Haliday reported in [1917] A.C. 260. 26. The law of preventive detention operate harshly on the accused and, therefore, it should be strictly construed and should not be used merely to clip the wings of the accused who has involved in the criminal prosecution. Freedom from arbitrary arrest is a basic human right recognised over the years. This right has been preserved and respected whenever there has been cases of preventive detention unless there were compelling necessity or reasons. The courts have upheld the sanctity of the personal liberty and placed it over all other rights. In cases of habeas corpus there is a principle which “is one of the pillars of liberty”, that in English Law every imprisonment is prima facie unlawful and that it is for a person directing imprisonment to justify his act. (Observation of Lord Atkin in Liversidge v. Anderson; [1942] A.C. 206). This epoch making statement fearlessly expressed by Lord Atkin was confirmed in R v. Home Secretary ex p. Khawaza; [1984] A.C. 74 where Lord Wilberforce at page 105 and Lord Scarman at page 110 made a clear statement that a prisoner carries the initial burden of proof is difficult to understand, since the fact of imprisonment makes a prima facie case. The burden of proof of the existence of grounds for preventive detention is on the custodian and the aforesaid decision stated the principle plainly that since unjustified detention is a trespass to the person the custodian has to satisfy in a judicial review that its decision to take the person in custody by way of preventive detention was proper. The burden of proof of the existence of grounds for preventive detention is on the custodian and the aforesaid decision stated the principle plainly that since unjustified detention is a trespass to the person the custodian has to satisfy in a judicial review that its decision to take the person in custody by way of preventive detention was proper. The reason being that the individual would be in danger of being detained upon allegations which he may have no means of disproving. 27. It may appear to be strange that amongst the loudest critics who were members of the independent movement and might have suffered preventive detention in British India without even being tried or convicted, however, were in favour of inserting preventive detention in the Constitution and thereafter in various legislation authorising detention without trial. The sweeping power given to executive to arrest and detaine a person for months together without even seeking the confirmation of the advisory board, however, has now been diluted due to various judicial pronouncements which uphold the constitutional rights of detenu notwithstanding the right of the detaining authority to issue order for preventive detention and similar legislation setting a time limit for such consideration. 28. Sardar Ballavbhai Patel, the first Home Minister of independent India moving the Bill which culminated in the preventive detention Act 1950 told parliament that it was directed against persons “whose avowed object is to create disruption, dislocation and tamper(ing) with communication, to suborn loyalty and make it impossible for normal Government based on law to function. 29. The intervention of judiciary to uphold the constitutional rights vis a vis the law of preventive detention since the time of Gopalan v. State of Madras reported at 1950 SCC 228: AIR 1950 SC 27 would show that the law of preventive detention would not be regarded “as unreasonable as the principle of natural justice in so far as they are compatible with detention laws are present” (Per Ray, CJ in Haradhan Saha v. State of West Bengal; (1975) 3 SCC 198 : AIR 1974 SC 2154 . However, in Gopalan (supra) Justice Mukherjee acknowledged that it is a drastic provision in the constitution which cannot but be regarded as a most “unwholesome encroachment upon the liberties of the people”. 30. However, in Gopalan (supra) Justice Mukherjee acknowledged that it is a drastic provision in the constitution which cannot but be regarded as a most “unwholesome encroachment upon the liberties of the people”. 30. Justice Vivian Bose a crusader of personal liberty in his dissenting judgment in S. Krishnan Koths v. State of Madras reported at 1951 SCC 499 : AIR 1951 SC 301 in the context of the validity of the Preventive Detention (Amendment) Act 1951, observed: “I cannot bring myself to believe that the framers of our Constitution intended that the liberties guaranteed should be illusory and meaningless or that they could be toyed with by this person or that. They did not bestow on the people of India a cold, lifeless, inert mass of malleable clay but created a living organism, breathed life into it and endowed it with purpose and vigour so that it should grow healthily and sturdily in the democratic way of life, which is the free way. In the circumstances, I prefer to decide in favour of the freedom of the subject. ……I am not speaking technically at the moment. I am viewing it broadly as the man in the street would. I am placing myself in the position of the detenu and looking at it through his eyes. The niceties of the law do not matter to him. He does not care about grammar. All that matters to him is that he is behind the bars and that Parliament has not fixed any limit in his kind of case and that local authorities tell him that they have the right to say how long he shall remain under detention. I cannot bring myself to think that this was intended by the Constitution”.(Emphasis supplied) 31. Justice Bose's dissent reflects his liberal approach to interpretation of Fundamental Rights in our constitution and his intellectual integrity. XX XXX XXXX 34. In the scheme of things detention order should not be made only in order to bypass a criminal prosecution which may be irksome because of the inconvenience of proving guilt in the court of law as observed by Justice Bhagwati, C.J. in Shiv Ratan Makim v. Union of India, (1986) 1 SCC 404 : AIR 1986 SC 610 and it would certainly be an abuse of the power of the preventive detention and the order of detention would be bad if such were the consideration. However, if the object of making the order of detention is to prevent the commission in future of activities injurious to the community it would be a perfectly legitimate exercise of power to make the order of detention.” 24. In the instant case, the order of preventive detention was passed after the learned Judge of the Pathanamthitta District and Sessions Court released the detenu on bail on 17.11.2025 and almost after one month the order of preventive detention was passed. 25. The two important requirements for an order of detention to sustain are satisfaction and opinion, which would go to show that in a judicial review, the courts have to look into such satisfaction, based on the materials made available to the Advisory Board with a view to ascertain whether the circumstances do exist and whether it is possible for the authority concerned to form an opinion therefrom suggestive of the person engaged in such illegal and illicit acts. 26. In Heisnam Chaoba Singh (supra), the Court emphasised that preventive detention is an exceptional measure affecting personal liberty, that the Detaining Authority's subjective satisfaction remains amenable to judicial scrutiny on recognised grounds and that preventive detention cannot be employed merely because a detenu has secured bail under the ordinary criminal law. The relevant observations read thus: “37. The legislature has used the word “satisfy” in Section 3 and “opinion” in Section 9(c) of the Act which goes to show that in a judicial review the courts are entitled to look into the materials to ascertain whether sufficient cause exists for detention of a person. The record must show that circumstances do exists and are such that it is possible for the authority concerned to form an opinion therefrom suggestive of the persons engaged in such illicit traffic. The court would not ordinarily interfere with the said formation of opinion and the subjective satisfaction regarded by the detaining authority unless it appears to the court on the basis of the available record that formation of such opinion was tainted with malafide, bad faith, improper, unreasonable and in colourable exercise of power. The test of reasonable person may be applied to ascertain if the exercise of power was proper and not arbitrary. 38. Preventive detention is an exceptional mechanism compromising on the personal liberty of individuals. The test of reasonable person may be applied to ascertain if the exercise of power was proper and not arbitrary. 38. Preventive detention is an exceptional mechanism compromising on the personal liberty of individuals. Therefore, the legal qualification of preventive detention laws ought to be interpreted strictly and preventive detention should not be permissible unless it absolutely qualifies all the necessary legal facets. The Hon'ble Courts have acknowledged the gravity and repercussions of preventive detention laws. Preventive detention is a tool in isolation which operates to curtail a person's personal liberty. Preventive detention is more excessive than normal measures of arrest, hence preventive detention cannot be misconstrued to be a direct alternative to the normative criminal prosecution. The Indian legal jurisprudence already has a set of pre-existing criminal law legislations which caters to the culpability of various modes of offences. Preventively detaining any person is an exclusive measure and operates separately than the Penal Code, 1860 or Code of Criminal Procedure . Therefore, preventive detention as a measure ideally should be utilised when the other existing criminal laws are inadequate and the preventive detention is squarely falling within the intention of the legislature to implement preventive detention. The Hon'ble Courts have looked down upon the practice of detaining a person under preventive detention when such person has been enlarged on bail in the same case. The intention with which courts have made such an observation is to ensure that preventive detention is not used as an added tool to curtail judicial decisions allowing bail of a person. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Vijay Narain Singh v. State of Bihar, (1984) 3 SCC 14 observed the following: “It is not intended for the purpose of keeping a man under detention when under ordinary criminal law it may not be possible to resist the issue of orders of bail, unless the material available is such as would satisfy the requirements of the legal provisions authorising such detention. When a person is enlarged on bail by a competent criminal court, great caution should be exercised in scrutinising the validity of an order of preventive detention which is based on the very same charge which is to be tried by the criminal court.” 39. When a person is enlarged on bail by a competent criminal court, great caution should be exercised in scrutinising the validity of an order of preventive detention which is based on the very same charge which is to be tried by the criminal court.” 39. While the drafters of the Constitution have laid emphasis on the role of the legislature in formulating instances regarding the application of preventive detention, but the application of the same is not beyond the scope of judicial scrutiny. It is true that no authority enjoys absolute sanction in terms of restricting a person's liberty. In this regard, O. Chinappa Reddy, J., concurring with the majority in the abovementioned judgment observed the following: “Our Constitution does not give a carte blanche to any organ of the State to be the sole arbiter in such matters. Preventive detention is considered so treacherous and such an anathema to civilised thought and democratic polity that safeguards against undue exercise of the power to detain without trial, have been built into the Constitution itself and incorporated as Fundamental Rights. There are two sentinels, one at either end. The Legislature is required to make the law circumscribing the limits within which persons may be preventively detained and providing for the safeguards prescribed by the Constitution and the courts are required to examine, when demanded, whether there has been any excessive detention, that is whether the limits set by the Constitution and the Legislature have been transgressed. Preventive detention is not beyond judicial scrutiny. While adequacy or sufficiency may not be a ground of challenge, relevancy and proximity are certainly grounds of challenge. Nor is it for the court to put itself in the position of the detaining authority and to satisfy itself that the untested facts reveal a path of crime. I agree with my brother Sen, J. when he says, “It has always been the view of this Court that the detention of individuals without trials for any length of time, however short, is wholly inconsistent with the basic ideas of our Government and the gravity of the evil to the community resulting from anti-social activities can never furnish an adequate reason for invading the personal liberty of the citizen except in accordance with the procedure established by law.” xx xxxx 42. In Yumman Ongbi Lembi Leima v. State of Manipur, (2012) 2 SCC 176 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court specifically adverted to when a preventive detention order would be bad, as recourse to the ordinary law would be sufficient in the facts of a given case, with particular regard being had to bail having been granted. The Court observed: “23. Having carefully considered the submissions made on behalf of the respective parties, we are inclined to hold that the (sic exercise of) extraordinary powers of detaining an individual in contravention of the provisions of Article 22(2) of the Constitution was not warranted in the instant case, where the grounds of detention do not disclose any material which was before the detaining authority, other than the fact that there was every likelihood of Yumman Somendro being released on bail in connection with the cases in respect of which he had been arrested, to support the order of detention.” 43. According to Durga Das Basu, “preventive detention is resorted to in such circumstances that the evidence in possession of the authority, is not sufficient to make a charge or to secure the conviction of the detenu by legal proofs but may still be sufficient to justify his detention on the suspicion that he [or she] would commit a wrongful act unless he [or she] is detained.” xx xxxxx 45. In a fairly recent decision in Union of India v. Dimple Happy Dhakad, 2019 Cri. L.J. 3735 (SC) concerning a case of smuggling of huge volume of gold in which the authority passed an order of detention after considering serious, impact of crime on the economy. 46. The law was discussed in the following paragraphs: “31. After reviewing all the decisions, the law on the point was enunciated in Kamarunnisa v. Union of India, (1991) 1 SCC 128 where the Supreme Court held as under:— “13. 46. The law was discussed in the following paragraphs: “31. After reviewing all the decisions, the law on the point was enunciated in Kamarunnisa v. Union of India, (1991) 1 SCC 128 where the Supreme Court held as under:— “13. From the catena of decisions referred to above it seems clear to us that even in the case of a person in custody a detention order can validly be passed (1) if the authority passing the order is aware of the fact that he is actually in custody; (2) if he has reason to believe on the basis of reliable material placed before him (a) that there is a real possibility of his being released on bail, and (b) that on being so released he would in all probability indulge in prejudicial activity and (3) if it is felt essential to detain him to prevent him from so doing. If the authority passes an order after recording his satisfaction in this behalf, such an order cannot be struck down on the ground that the proper course for the authority was to oppose the bail and if bail is granted notwithstanding such opposition, to question it before a higher court. What this Court stated in the case of Ramesh Yadav (1985) 4 SCC 232 was that ordinarily a detention order should not be passed merely to pre-empt or circumvent enlargement on bail in cases which are essentially criminal in nature and can be dealt with under the ordinary law. It seems to us well settled that even in a case where a person is in custody, if the facts and circumstances of the case so demand, resort can be had to the law of preventive detention.…….” 32. The same principle was reiterated in Union of India v. Paul Manickam, (2003) 8 SCC 342 where the Supreme Court held as under:— “14.……..Where detention orders are passed in relation to persons who are already in jail under some other laws, the detaining authorities should apply their mind and show their awareness in this regard in the grounds of detention, the chances of release of such persons on bail. The necessity of keeping such persons in detention under the preventive detention laws has to be clearly indicated. The necessity of keeping such persons in detention under the preventive detention laws has to be clearly indicated. Subsisting custody of the detenu by itself does not invalidate an order of his preventive detention, and the decision in this regard must depend on the facts of the particular case. Preventive detention being necessary to prevent the detenu from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State or to the maintenance of public order or economic stability etc. ordinarily, it is not needed when the detenu is already in custody. The detaining authority must show its awareness to the fact of subsisting custody of the detenu and take that factor into account while making the order. If the detaining authority is reasonably satisfied with cogent materials that there is likelihood of his release and in view of his antecedent activities which are proximate in point of time, he must be detained in order to prevent him from indulging in such prejudicial activities, the detention order can be validly made. Where the detention order in respect of a person already in custody does not indicate that the detenu was likely to be released on bail, the order would be vitiated. (See N. Meera Rani v. Govt. of T.N. (1989) 4 SCC 418 and Dharmendra Suganchand Chelawat v. Union of India, (1990) 1 SCC 746 ). The point was gone into detail in Kamarunnissa v. Union of India, (1991) 1 SCC 128 .……” [Underlining added] 33. Whether a person in jail can be detained under the detention law has been the subject matter for consideration before this Court time and again. In Huidrom Konungjao Singh v. State of Manipur (2012) 7 SCC 181 , the Supreme Court referred to earlier decisions including Dharmendra Suganchand Chelawat v. Union of India (1990) 1 SCC 746 and reiterated that if the detaining authority is satisfied that taking into account the nature of the antecedent activities of the detenu, it is likely that after his release from custody he would indulge in prejudicial activities and it is necessary to detain him in order to prevent him from engaging in such activities. 34. In Veeramani v. State of T.N. (1994) 2 SCC 337 , in para (6), the Supreme Court held as under:— “6. 34. In Veeramani v. State of T.N. (1994) 2 SCC 337 , in para (6), the Supreme Court held as under:— “6. From the catena of decisions of this Court it is clear that even in the case of a person in custody, a detention order can validly be passed if the authority passing the order is aware of the fact that he is actually in custody; if he has reason to believe on the basis of the reliable material that there is a possibility of his being released on bail and that on being so released, the detenu would in all probabilities indulge in prejudicial activities and if the authority passes an order after recording his satisfaction the same cannot be struck down.” 35. In the light of the well settled principles, we have to see, in the present case, whether there was awareness in the mind of the detaining authority that detenu is in custody and he had reason to believe that detenu is likely to be released on bail and if so released, he would continue to indulge in prejudicial activities. In the present case, the detention orders dated 17.05.2019 record the awareness of the detaining authority:— (i) that the detenu is in custody; (ii) that the bail application filed by the detenus have been rejected by the Court. Of course, in the detention orders, the detaining authority has not specifically recorded that the “detenu is likely to be released”. It cannot be said that the detaining authority has not applied its mind merely on the ground that in the detention orders, it is not expressly stated as to the “detenu's likelihood of being released on bail” and “if so released, he is likely to indulge in the same prejudicial activities”. But the detaining authority has clearly recorded the antecedent of the detenus and its satisfaction that detenus Happy Dhakad and Nisar Aliyar have the high propensity to commit such offences in future. 36. The satisfaction of the detaining authority that the detenu is already in custody and he is likely to be released on bail and on being released, he is likely to indulge in the same prejudicial activities is the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. 36. The satisfaction of the detaining authority that the detenu is already in custody and he is likely to be released on bail and on being released, he is likely to indulge in the same prejudicial activities is the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. In Senthamilselvi v. State of T.N. (2006) 5 SCC 676 , the Supreme Court held that the satisfaction of the authority coming to the conclusion that there is likelihood of the detenu being released on bail is the “subjective satisfaction” based on the materials and normally the subjective satisfaction is not to be interfered with. 37. The satisfaction of the detaining authority that the detenu may be released on bail cannot be ipse dixit of the detaining authority. On the facts and circumstances of the present case, the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority that the detenu is likely to be released on bail is based on the materials. A reading of the grounds of detention clearly indicates that detenu Nisar Aliyar has been indulging in smuggling gold and operating syndicate in coordination with others and habitually committing the same unmindful of the revenue loss and the impact on the economy of the nation. Likewise, the detention order qua detenu Happy Dhakad refers to the role played by him in receiving the gold and disposing of the foreign origin smuggled gold through his multiple jewellery outlets and his relatives. The High Court, in our view, erred in quashing the detention orders merely on the ground that the detaining authority has not expressly recorded the finding that there was real possibility of the detenus being released on bail which is in violation of the principles laid down in Kamarunnisa and other judgments and Guidelines No. 24. The order of the High Court quashing the detention orders on those grounds cannot be sustained. xx xxxx 41. Observing that the object of preventive detention is not to punish a man for having done something but to intercept and to prevent him from doing so, in Naresh Kumar Goyal v. Union of India (2005) 8 SCC 276 , it was held as under:— “8. xx xxxx 41. Observing that the object of preventive detention is not to punish a man for having done something but to intercept and to prevent him from doing so, in Naresh Kumar Goyal v. Union of India (2005) 8 SCC 276 , it was held as under:— “8. It is trite law that an order of detention is not a curative or reformative or punitive action, but a preventive action, avowed object of which being to prevent the antisocial and subversive elements from imperilling the welfare of the country or the security of the nation or from disturbing the public tranquillity or from indulging in smuggling activities or from engaging in illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, etc. Preventive detention is devised to afford protection to society. The authorities on the subject have consistently taken the view that preventive detention is devised to afford protection to society. The object is not to punish a man for having done something but to intercept before he does it, and to prevent him from doing so………” 42. Considering the scope of preventive detention and observing that it is aimed to protect the safety and interest of the society, in State of Maharashtra v. Bhaurao Punjabrao Gawande (2008) 3 SCC 613 , it was held as under:— “36. Liberty of an individual has to be subordinated, within reasonable bounds, to the good of the people. The framers of the Constitution were conscious of the practical need of preventive detention with a view to striking a just and delicate balance between need and necessity to preserve individual liberty and personal freedom on the one hand and security and safety of the country and interest of the society on the other hand. Security of State, maintenance of public order and services essential to the community, prevention of smuggling and blackmarketing activities, etc. demand effective safeguards in the larger interests of sustenance of a peaceful democratic way of life. 37. In considering and interpreting preventive detention laws, courts ought to show greatest concern and solitude in upholding and safeguarding the fundamental right of liberty of the citizen, however, without forgetting the historical background in which the necessity-an unhappy necessity-was felt by the makers of the Constitution in incorporating provisions of preventive detention in the Constitution itself. 37. In considering and interpreting preventive detention laws, courts ought to show greatest concern and solitude in upholding and safeguarding the fundamental right of liberty of the citizen, however, without forgetting the historical background in which the necessity-an unhappy necessity-was felt by the makers of the Constitution in incorporating provisions of preventive detention in the Constitution itself. While no doubt it is the duty of the court to safeguard against any encroachment on the life and liberty of individuals, at the same time the authorities who have the responsibility to discharge the functions vested in them under the law of the country should not be impeded or interfered with without justification (vide A.K. Roy v. Union of India (1982) 1 SCC 271 , Bhut Nath Mete v. State of W.B. (1974) 1 SCC 645 , State of W.B. v. Ashok Dey (1972) 1 SCC 199 and ADM v. Shivakant Shukla (1976) 2 SCC 521 ).” [Underlining added]. 43. The court must be conscious that the satisfaction of the detaining authority is “subjective” in nature and the court cannot substitute its opinion for the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority and interfere with the order of detention. It does not mean that the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority is immune from judicial reviewability. By various decisions, the Supreme Court has carved out areas within which the validity of subjective satisfaction can be tested. In the present case, huge volume of gold had been smuggled into the country unabatedly for the last three years and about 3396 kgs of the gold has been brought into India during the period from July 2018 to March, 2019 camouflaging it with brass metal scrap. The detaining authority recorded finding that this has serious impact on the economy of the nation. Detaining authority also satisfied that the detenus have propensity to indulge in the same act of smuggling and passed the order of preventive detention, which is a preventive measure. Based on the documents and the materials placed before the detaining authority and considering the individual role of the detenus, the detaining authority satisfied itself as to the detenus' continued propensity and their inclination to indulge in acts of smuggling in a planned manner to the detriment of the economic security of the country that there is a need to prevent the detenus from smuggling goods. The High Court erred in interfering with the satisfaction of the detaining authority and the impugned judgment cannot be sustained and is liable to be set aside.”(Emphasis supplied) 47. In a very recent decision in Banka Sneha Sheela (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that if a person granted anticipatory bail/bail wrongly there are well known remedy in the ordinary law to take care of the situation. The State can always appeal against the bail order granted and/or apply for cancellation of bail. The mere successful obtaining of anticipatory bail/bail order being the real ground for detention the same cannot be sustained. The relevant observations are in paragraphs 15, 16, 28 and 29 of the said judgment which are reproduced below: “15. There can be no doubt that for ‘public order’ to be disturbed, there must in turn be public disorder. Mere contravention of law such as indulging in cheating or criminal breach of trust certainly affects ‘law and order’ but before it can be said to affect ‘public order’, it must affect the community or the public at large. “16. There can be no doubt that what is alleged in the five FIRs pertain to the realm of ‘law and order’ in that various acts of cheating are ascribed to the Detenu which are punishable under the three Sections of the Penal Code, 1860 set out in the five FIRs. A close reading of the Detention Order would make it clear that the reason for the said Order is not any apprehension of widespread public harm, danger or alarm but is only because the Detenu was successful in obtaining anticipatory bail/bail from the Courts in each of the five FIRs. If a person is granted anticipatory bail/bail wrongly, there are well-known remedies in the ordinary law to take care of the situation. The State can always appeal against the bail order granted and/or apply for cancellation of bail. The mere successful obtaining of anticipatory bail/bail orders being the real ground for detaining the Detenu, there can be no doubt that the harm, danger or alarm or feeling of security among the general public spoken of in Section 2(a) of the Telangana Prevention of Dangerous Activities Act is make believe and totally absent in the facts of the present case. “28. “28. Shri Ranjit Kumar, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the State of Telangana relied strongly upon Subramanian v. State of Tamil Nadu (2012) 4 SCC 699 , and in particular upon paragraphs 14 and 15 which read as follows: “14. It is well settled that the court does not interfere with the subjective satisfaction reached by the detaining authority except in exceptional and extremely limited grounds. The court cannot substitute its own opinion for that of the detaining authority when the grounds of detention are precise, pertinent, proximate and relevant, that sufficiency of grounds is not for the court but for the detaining authority for the formation of subjective satisfaction that the detention of a person with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to public order is required and that such satisfaction is subjective and not objective. The object of the law of preventive detention is not punitive but only preventive and further that the action of the executive in detaining a person being only precautionary, normally, the matter has necessarily to be left to the discretion of the executive authority. It is not practicable to lay down objective rules of conduct in an exhaustive manner. The satisfaction of the detaining authority, therefore, is considered to be of primary importance with certain latitude in the exercise of its discretion. 15. The next contention on behalf of the detenu, assailing the detention order on the plea that there is a difference between “law and order” and “public order” cannot also be sustained since this Court in a series of decisions recognised that public order is the even tempo of life of the community taking the country as a whole or even a specified locality. [Vide Pushpadevi M. Jatia v. M.L. Wadhawan [ (1987) 3 SCC 367 : 1987 SCC (Cri) 526], SCC paras 11 & 14; Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar [ AIR 1966 SC 740 : 1966 Cri LJ 608: (1966) 1 SCR 709 ]; Union of India v. Arvind Shergill [ (2000) 7 SCC 601 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 1422], SCC paras 4 & 6; Sunil Fulchand Shah v. Union of India [ (2000) 3 SCC 409 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 659], SCC para 28 (Constitution Bench); Commr. of Police v. C. Anita [ (2004) 7 SCC 467 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1944], SCC paras 5, 7 & 13.]” “29. of Police v. C. Anita [ (2004) 7 SCC 467 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1944], SCC paras 5, 7 & 13.]” “29. The statement made by this Court in paragraphs 14 and 15 were on facts which were completely different from the facts of the present case as reflected in paragraphs 16 and 17 thereof which read as follows: “16. We have already extracted the discussion, analysis and the ultimate decision of the detaining authority with reference to the ground case dated 18-7-2011. It is clear that the detenu, armed with “aruval”, along with his associates, armed with “katta” came to the place of the complainant. The detenu abused the complainant in filthy language and threatened to murder him. His associates also threatened him. The detenu not only threatened the complainant with weapon like “aruval” but also damaged the properties available in the shop. When the complainant questioned the detenu and his associates, the detenu slapped him on his face. When the complainant raised an alarm for rescue, on the arrival of general public in and around, they were also threatened by the detenu and his associates that they will kill them. 17. It is also seen from the grounds of detention that because of the threat by the detenu and his associates by showing weapons, the nearby shopkeepers closed their shops out of fear and auto drivers took their autos from their stand and left the place. According to the detaining authority, the above scene created a panic among the public. In such circumstances, the scene created by the detenu and his associates cannot be termed as only law and order problem but it is public order as assessed by the detaining authority who is supposed to safeguard and protect the interest of public. Accordingly, we reject the contention raised by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant.” This was obviously a case in which ‘public order’ was directly affected and not a case in which ‘law and order’ alone was affected and is thus distinguishable, on facts, from the present case.” 27. The procedural lapses in the preventive detention proceedings have been viewed seriously by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dr. Rahmatullah v. State of Bihar and Another, (1981) 4 SCC 559 and Mohinuddin v. District Magistrate, Beed and Others, (1987) 4 SCC 58 . In Dr. The procedural lapses in the preventive detention proceedings have been viewed seriously by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dr. Rahmatullah v. State of Bihar and Another, (1981) 4 SCC 559 and Mohinuddin v. District Magistrate, Beed and Others, (1987) 4 SCC 58 . In Dr. Rahmatullah (supra), the unexplained delay of 24 days of non-consideration of the representation was found to be fatal in the light of Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India in respect of the alleged detenu who was detained under Section 3(2) of the National Security Act, 1980. The lapses on the part of the State Government were explained in paras.5 to 8 therein which read thus: “ 5. The normal rule of law is that when a person commits an offence or a number of offences, he should be prosecuted and punished in accordance with the normal appropriate criminal law; but if he is sought to be detained under any of the preventive detention laws as may often be necessary to prevent further commission of such offences, then the provisions of Article 22(5) must be complied with. Sub-article (5) of Article 22 reads: “When any person is detained in pursuance of an order made under any law providing for preventive detention, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, communicate to such person the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order.” 6. This sub-article provides, inter alia, that the detaining authority shall as soon as may be communicate the grounds of detention and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order. The opportunity of making a representation is not for nothing. The representation, if any, submitted by the detenu is meant for consideration by the appropriate authority without any unreasonable delay, as it involves the liberty of a citizen guaranteed by Article 19 of the Constitution. The non-consideration or an unreasonably belated consideration of the representation tantamounts to non-compliance of sub-article (5) of Article 22 of the Constitution. 7. The representation, if any, submitted by the detenu is meant for consideration by the appropriate authority without any unreasonable delay, as it involves the liberty of a citizen guaranteed by Article 19 of the Constitution. The non-consideration or an unreasonably belated consideration of the representation tantamounts to non-compliance of sub-article (5) of Article 22 of the Constitution. 7. The law is well-settled that in case of preventive detention of a citizen, the obligation of the appropriate government is two-fold: (i) to afford the detenu the opportunity to make a representation and to consider the representation which may result in the release of the detenu, and (ii) to constitute a Board and to communicate the representation of the detenu along with other materials to the Board to enable it to form its opinion and to obtain such opinion. The former is distinct from the latter. As there is a two-fold obligation of the appropriate government, so there is a two-fold right in favour of the detenu to have his representation considered by the appropriate government and to have the representation once again considered by the Government in the light of the circumstances of the case considered by the Board for the purpose of giving its opinion. (See Narendra Purshotam Umrao v.B.B. Gujral [ (1979) 2 SCC 637 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 557: (1979) 2 SCR 315 ] and Pankaj Kumar Chakrabarty v. State of W.B. [ (1969) 3 SCC 400 : (1970) 1 SCR 543 ]) 8. In the instant case, the State Government did not discharge the first of the two-fold obligation and waited till the receipt of the Advisory Board's opinion. There was, as pointed out above, an unexplained period of twenty- four days of non-consideration of the representation. This shows there was no independent consideration of the representation by the State Government; on the contrary they deferred its consideration till they received the report of the Advisory Board. This is clear non-compliance of Article 22(5) as interpreted by this Court. The order of detention is, therefore, liable to be quashed on this ground alone.” 28. Similarly, in Mohinuddin (supra) , the unexplained delay in disposal of the representation was held to be fatal. In the aforesaid decision, the stringent conditions of pleadings have been relaxed. This is clear non-compliance of Article 22(5) as interpreted by this Court. The order of detention is, therefore, liable to be quashed on this ground alone.” 28. Similarly, in Mohinuddin (supra) , the unexplained delay in disposal of the representation was held to be fatal. In the aforesaid decision, the stringent conditions of pleadings have been relaxed. In para.4 it was held that rule of proper and perfect pleadings and the writ petitions which are decided on the basis of the affidavits may not squarely apply to a petition for the grant of a writ of habeas corpus. It is enough for the detenu to say that he is under wrongful detention and the burden lies on the Detaining Authority to satisfy the Court that the detention is not illegal or wrongful. 29. In the instant case admittedly, it was after one month from the date of the order granting bail, that the order of preventive detention was passed. Apart from the above case, it was clearly admitted by the learned Public Prosecutor that some of the pages were illegible. We have inspected the original file, and the contention of the petitioner regarding the illegibility of such documents thereby preventing him from making proper and effective representation is clearly established. It is trite law that the Detaining Authority is required to supply legible copies in order to enable the detenu to make an effective representation. Even on this score, the order of detention cannot be sustained. The order of detention is valid till 12.06.2026. However, in view of the aforesaid, the detenu has to be immediately released from custody. Syam Kumar V.M., J. 1. This Writ Petition is directed against the order of detention dated 11.12.2025 (produced as Exhibit P1) against Amrutharaj V.R. alias Shambu, aged 25 years, detained under Section 3(1) of the KAA(P)A. Petitioner herein is the wife of the detenu. The said order of detention stands confirmed by the Government Order dated 11.02.2026 (Exhibit P2), whereby the detenu has been ordered to be detained for a period of six months from the date of detention. 2. The said order of detention stands confirmed by the Government Order dated 11.02.2026 (Exhibit P2), whereby the detenu has been ordered to be detained for a period of six months from the date of detention. 2. A perusal of Exhibit P1 reveals that, taking note of the repeated involvement of the detenu in around seven different crimes, all of which have been registered in the Pathanamthitta Police Station, a proposal was submitted to the District Police Chief seeking initiation of proceedings against the detenu under Section 3(1) of the KAA(P)A before the jurisdictional authority i.e., the 2 nd respondent. For the purpose of initiation of the proceedings, the detenu was classified as a “Known Goonda”, as defined under Section 2(o) of the KAA(P)A. 3. After noting that the detenu had been involved in a total of seven cases, the jurisdictional authority rendered Exhibit P1 detention order treating Crime No.2110 of 2025 of Pathanamthitta Police Station alleging commission of offences under Sections 20(b), 11B and Section 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (NDPS) Act, 1985 as the last prejudicial activity. Exhibit P2 confirmation followed. 4. We heard Sri. M.H Hanis, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, and Sri. K. A. Anas, the learned Public Prosecutor. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that Exhibits P1 and P2 orders are illegal, arbitrary, vitiated by errors apparent on the face of the records and are hence liable to be quashed. Non-application of mind to relevant materials is also alleged while issuing the impugned orders. The principal objection regarding the sustainability of Exhibit P1 and Exhibit P2 raised by the petitioner is that no legible copy of the relevant records leading to the detention Order had been served on the petitioner, thereby seriously prejudicing his rights to know and understand the nature of allegations raised against him and to prefer a representation controverting the same. It is further contended that Exhibit P3 representation preferred by the detenu within the specified time had not been considered within the statutorily envisaged period of time, and there had been inordinate delay in the said respect. As regards the finding of six months' detention arrived at by Exhibit P1 and confirmed by Exhibit P2 order, it is submitted that the authority did not take note of the sufficiency of the bail conditions, as the detenu was on bail when the detention order was issued. As regards the finding of six months' detention arrived at by Exhibit P1 and confirmed by Exhibit P2 order, it is submitted that the authority did not take note of the sufficiency of the bail conditions, as the detenu was on bail when the detention order was issued. The non-consideration of the bail conditions and consideration of their sufficiency, it is submitted, vitiates the orders issued. Further, the fact that statutory bail had been granted to the petitioner in the last prejudicial activity reveals that the detention of the petitioner invoking the provisions of KAA(P)A was not warranted at all. The learned counsel also relies on non- compliance with the time period stipulated under the Act for placing the documents before the KAA(P)A Board for its opinion. The delay in considering the representation preferred by the petitioner and the fixation of the maximum period of six months under Section 11 of KAA(P)A is also challenged. 6. Elaborating on the said main contentions, it is the specific case of the learned counsel of the petitioner that the jurisdictional authority had passed the impugned order of detention without taking note of the fact that the detenu had been released on bail in the crime registered with respect to the last prejudicial activity, as the police had failed to submit the Final report in time. The fact that default bail had been granted also ought to have weighed with the jurisdictional authority. The conditions imposed on him at the time of granting bail were sufficient to deter the detenu from engaging in further criminal activities, and this aspect was lost sight of. It is submitted by the learned counsel that the detenu is totally innocent of the allegations in the last case registered against him insofar as he was only a traveller in a vehicle and was only the second accused in the said crime, and the jurisdictional authority ought not to have considered the case as relevant for arriving at its subjective as well as objective satisfaction. On the said premises, the learned counsel argued that Exhibit P1 is liable to be set aside and Exhibit P2 confirmation issued subsequent thereto is also fit to be set aside. 7. On the said premises, the learned counsel argued that Exhibit P1 is liable to be set aside and Exhibit P2 confirmation issued subsequent thereto is also fit to be set aside. 7. Per contra the learned Public Prosecutor asserted that the jurisdictional authority had passed Exhibit P1 after taking note of the fact that the detenu was on bail in connection with the last prejudicial activity and after being satisfied that the bail conditions imposed while granting the bail to the detenu were not sufficient to prevent him from being involved in the criminal activities. The learned Public Prosecutor denies the contraventions pointed out in compliance with the procedure envisaged under KAA(P)A and submits that the detention order passed by the jurisdictional authority after due consideration of the relevant aspects and hence does not warrant any interference. Reliance is placed on the dictum in Anita Antony v. State of Kerala,  2022 SCC Online Ker 3371; Usha Agarwal v. Union of India, (2007) 1 SCC 295 , Molly v. State of Kerala & Ors. [WP (Crl.) No. 133 of 2021] 8. We have heard both sides in detail. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner, and as is apparent from the original documents produced before us pursuant to our direction in a sealed cover, certain pages of the Exhibit P1 order that had been furnished to the detenu were illegible and could not be read. The specific reference made by the learned counsel to page Nos.33, 34 and 35 of Exhibit P1 in the W.P.(Crl.) being illegible and unreadable is found to be factually correct upon our perusal of the original records produced before us. It is trite and settled that unless a legible copy is provided to the detenu, he may not be able to exercise his right to respond to the same by way of a representation/explanation validly and adequately. Reliance placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner on the dictum laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in this respect is valid and tenable. Reliance placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner on the dictum laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in this respect is valid and tenable. As regards the contention that sufficiency of the bail conditions had not been looked into before rendering Exhibit P1 and Exhibit P2, we note that default bail had been granted to the detenu and the very fact that the final report had not been filed within proper time thus entitling the petitioner to a default bail, itself speaks volumes regarding the eagerness and earnestness or the lack of it displayed by the State when it comes to proceeding against the detenu in the NDPS case. The Detaining Authority has also not applied its mind to the aspect of sufficiency of the bail conditions or its stringedness, and nothing is forthcoming from Exhibit P1 as to whether a detention was necessary insofar as the detenu had already been on bail in the crime registered against him, which is noted as the last prejudicial activity. 9. We note that though seven different cases had been pointed out and explained in Exhibit P1 all the crimes enumerated as 1 to 6 were bailable offences, and it is only with respect to the seventh crime, which is noted as a last prejudicial activity attracting the NDPS Act, that the jurisdictional authority had relied on for the purpose of ordering detention under KAA(P)A. Nothing is forthcoming from the impugned orders regarding the threat perception or the reasons for continuing the detention of the petitioner. We find the reliance placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner on the dictum laid down in Rahamatullah v. State of Bihar and another, (1981) 4 SCC 559 in this respect to be valid and proper. The detenu is thus entitled to be released immediately from custody. In view of the above, we find valid grounds exist to interfere with Exhibits P1 and P2 orders. As a result, this Writ Petition is allowed, and Ext.P1 order of detention and Ext. P2 Confirmation are set aside. The Superintendent of Central Prison, Viyyur, is directed to release the detenu, Sri. Amrutharaj VR @ Shambhu, forthwith, if his detention is not required in connection with any other case. The Registrar (Judicial) shall communicate the operative portion of this judgment to the Superintendent of Prisons. P2 Confirmation are set aside. The Superintendent of Central Prison, Viyyur, is directed to release the detenu, Sri. Amrutharaj VR @ Shambhu, forthwith, if his detention is not required in connection with any other case. The Registrar (Judicial) shall communicate the operative portion of this judgment to the Superintendent of Prisons. The Superintendent of Prisons shall act on the basis of the operative portion of the judgment by immediately sending it to the jail authorities.