( 2026:JHHC:10810 ) 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI W.P.(C) No. 1427 of 2009 1. The Chief General Manager, Eastern Washery Zone, M/s BCCL, P.O., P.s. Sudamdih, District-Dhanbad 2. The Chairman-cum-Managing Director, M/s BCCL, Koyla Bhawan, P.O. and P.S. Koyla Nagar, District-Dhanbad 3. The Senior Sales Officer, Pathurdih Coal Washery, Eastern Washery Zone, M/s BCCL, P.O. Patherdih, P.S. Sudamdih, District-Dhanbad All petitioners being represented by Shri Harendra Kishore, son of Liladhar Sharma, Personnel Manager, ( Legal) IR, BCCL, resident of Koyala Nagar, P.O. Koyla Nagar, P.S. Saraidhella, District-Dhanbad. ……………Petitioners Versus Darya Singh, Proprietor, M/s Paradise Transporters Pvt. Ltd, at Surya Bhawan, 2nd Floor, Shastri Nagar, Bank More, District-Dhanbad ...... … Respondent -------- CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR DWIVEDI For the Petitioners :Mr. A.K. Mehta, Advocate For the Respondent : Mr. Lukesh Kumar, Advocate Mr. Praveen Shanker Prasad, Advocate ……….. 06/ 16.04.2026: Heard Mr. A.K. Mehta, learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr. Lukesh Kumar assisted by Mr. Praveen Shanker Prasad, learned counsel for the respondent. 2. This writ petition has been filed for under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for quashing the order dated 24.09.2008 passed by the learned Permanent Lok Adalat, Dhanbad in PL Case No. 117/2007 whereby the learned Permanent Lok Adalat has rejected the application filed by the petitioners and for passing any other appropriate order in the facts and circumstances of the case and for doing justice to the petitioners. 3. Mr. A. K. Mehta, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the Petitioners are the officers of M/s Bharat Coking Coal Limited, a Central Government Undertaking and registered under the Companies Act and has offices within the territorial jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court. He next submits that the sole respondent filed an application before the learned PLA ( 2026:JHHC:10810 ) 2 purportedly under section 22 C of the Legal Services Authorities Act against the petitioners being PL Case No. 117/07. He further submits that the sole respondent claimed that the respondent was allotted transportation contract work of transporting by the petitioners since the year 1992 and executed various transportation works vide Work Order No. GM (EWZ): Secretary F.7/2000/675-82 dated 18/20.01.09 and it was allotted transportation contract work of loading of Mindings from stocks on the Railway Sidlings into the Railway Wagons and transporting and loading Slurry into the rakes at Patherdih Coal Washery. He submits that out of total bill of Rs. 5,78,456.71 for the period April 1999 to May 1999, a sum of Rs. 2,09,000/- was deducted by the present petitioners and in this background the sole respondent moved before the permanent Lok Adalat. He further submits that on being noticed the petitioners appeared and contested the matter on various grounds including that the learned Permanent Lok Adalat has no jurisdiction to entertain the dispute and the nature of the case does not come within the ambit of the jurisdiction of the Permanent Lok Adalat and the dispute is time barred. He further submits that inspite of the specific objection of the petitioners to the jurisdiction of the learned PLA, the matter was kept for amicable compromise, however, the same could not succeed in as much as the deductions were legal, valid and proper and in light of the specific averments made by the petitioners in the Written Statement. By way of referring annexure-3, he submits that the petitioners herein have filed petition challenging the jurisdiction of the learned Permanent Lok Adalat so far disputed question is concerned and by the impugned order dated 24.09.2008 Permanent Lok Adalat rejected the same. He next submits that the said rejection order has not taken into consideration the spirit of Permanent Lok Adalat. He also submits that in light of Chapter VI-A of Legal ( 2026:JHHC:10810 ) 3 Services Authorities Act, 1987, only the public utility services can be subject matter before the Permanent Lok Adalat. He refers to relevant Sections of Chapter VI-A, particularly Sections 22-A and 22-B with respect to the definition of Public Utility Services. By way of referring Sections 22-A and 22- B of the Legal Services Authority Act, he submits that Permanent Lok Adalat does not have jurisdiction over any dispute, which is not within the ambit of Public Utility Service. He next submits that the said claim was with regard to the contract and deduction which is disputed questions of fact and that can be subject matter of the suit only. He submits that learned Permanent Lok Adalat can conciliate in the light of section 22-C sub-section 7 and when conciliation fails subject to the matter of public utility service it can be adjudicated in the light of Section 22(c)(8). He submits that Permanent Lok Adalat has wrongly assumed the jurisdiction and rejected the petition filed by the petitioners. He also submits that Permanent Lok Adalat inherently lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter, passed the said order, that too, in a case arising out of contractual obligation. He next submits that it is well settled that even with consent, jurisdiction can’t be conferred upon any Court. 4. On above grounds, he submits that the impugned order may kindly be quashed. 5. On the other hand, Mr. Lukesh Kumar, learned counsel for the sole respondent submits that Permanent Lok Adalat is having the jurisdiction to conciliate and decide the issue in the light of Section 22(c) (8). He further submits that it was simple transportation contract and in view of that it has come within the meaning of public utility services as such the Permanent Lok Adalat has rightly rejected the petition filed by the petitioners. On these grounds, he submits that writ petition may kindly be ( 2026:JHHC:10810 ) 4 dismissed. 6. In para 5 of the petition filed before the Permanent Lok Adalat the sole respondent has stated that vide letter dated 18/20.01.2000 vide Work Order No. GM EWZ)-Secretary F.7/2000/675-82 period from April 1999 to May 1999 the applicant/petitioner was assigned/awarded a contract for loading of Middlings from stocks on Railway Siding into the Railway Wagons and transporting and loading of Slurry into the rakes at Patherdih Coal Washery for detail reference may be taken from the letter dated 04.04.1999 which was annexed. 7. In view of said statement it is crystal clear that the case is arising out of contract. In course of the argument, learned counsel for the sole respondent has produced the said agreement wherein scope of work, payment of bills, forfeiture of security deposit, refund of security deposit, procedure to be followed for transportation, Bills, contractor’s responsibilities, suspension of work, clauses along with other clauses are already there. Clause 6 speaks that if the performance is less than 50% of the target assigned for any month the contract may be terminated within 24 hours notice with forfeiture of S.D. or as deem fit by the Management. 8. It further suggests that it was not a simple transportation services but it was the agreement subject to the condition put therein in the sake of various clauses to execute the said work. 9. The questions remain in the aforesaid background as to whether the said order can be quashed by this Court or not and further the dispute in question can be subject matter of Permanent Lok Adalat or not? 10. Chapter VI-A of the Legal Services Authority Act of 1987 speaks about pre-litigation, conciliation and settlement. Section 22-A of the Act, 1987 reads as under: ( 2026:JHHC:10810 ) 5 “22A. Definitions. - In this Chapter and for the purposes of sections 22 and 23, unless the context otherwise requires- (a) "Permanent Lok Adalat means a Permanent Lok Adalat established under sub-section (1) of section 22B; (b) "public utility service" means any- (i) transport service for the carriage of passengers or goods by air, road or water; or (ii) postal, telegraph or telephone service; or (iii) supply of power, light or water to the public by any establishment; or (iv) system of public conservancy or sanitation; or (v) service in hospital or dispensary; or (vi) insurance service and includes any service which the Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be, in the public interest, by notification, declare to be a public utility service for the purposes of this Chapter." 11. Looking into the said definition, it is crystal clear that only public utility service can be subject matter before the Permanent Lok Adalat, whereas in the case in hand, on the basis of a contract, the said work was being executed. The said contract is relating to composite contract of loading of coal, transportation, unloading and again loading. 12. It is well settled in law that Lok Adalats have no adjudicatory or judicial function. Their functions relate purely to conciliation. A Lok Adalat determines the reference on the basis of a compromise or settlement between the parties and puts it seal of confirmation by making the award in terms of compromise. It is further well known that if any party wants to challenge the award based on settlement, the same can be examined in a writ petition under Article 226 and / or 227 on a very limited ground. In Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan reported in (1954) 1 SCC 710, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that as a judgment or a decree obtained by playing fraud on the Court is a nullity and non-est in the eyes of law and its invalidity can be challenged even in collateral proceedings. Similar view has been taken in S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) by L.Rs versus Jagannath (dead) by L.Rs (1994) 1 SCC 1. In the case of P.T. Thomas V. Thomas Job, 2005 (6) SCC 478, it has been held that the award of a ( 2026:JHHC:10810 ) 6 Lok Adalat is not a result of a contest on merit, just as a regular suit by a Court in a regular trial is, however, it is as equal and on par with a decree on compromise and will have same binding effect and be conclusive. It is trite law that validity of a compromise decree can be challenged on the ground that if it was obtained by playing fraud. In this regard, reference may be made to the judgment passed by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of A.A. Gopalakrishnan V Cochin Devaswom Board, 2007 (7) SCC 482. 13. Since the jurisdiction aspect has been challenged at the very initial stage, the learned Permanent Lok Adalat was required to give answer in the light of spirt of the Act. 14. In light of the above facts and discussions, what is emerging now that in light of Section 22-A of the Act, 1987 is required to be read along with Section 22-A and 22-A (a) and (b) of the said Act, wherefrom, it is evident that the Permanent Lok Adalat can be established only for exercising jurisdiction in respect of one or more public utility services justifying under Section 22-A. In light of the provisions made therein, Permanent Lok Adalat is not having jurisdiction with respect to any matter other than public utility services as defined under Section 22A (b) under Chapter VI-A of the said Act, which deals with pre-litigation, conciliation and settlement. The Permanent Lok Adalat is having no jurisdiction in respect of the matter, which is pending in the court or it is arising out of a contract. 15. In light of the above, the subject matter of dispute it has no connection with the public utility service, for which Permanent Lok Adalat are established and only over which the permanent Lok Adalat is having jurisdiction as defined under Section 22A(b) of the said Act. The permanent Lok Adalat in light of the above has got no jurisdiction at all to entertain the matter arising out of a contract. ( 2026:JHHC:10810 ) 7 16. In the case of Harshad Chiman Modi Vs. DLF Universal Ltd. and another reported in (2005) 7 SCC 791 in paras 30, 32 and 33 it has been held as under:- “30. We are unable to uphold the contention. The jurisdiction of a court may be classified into several categories. The important categories are (i) Territorial or local jurisdiction; (ii) Pecuniary jurisdiction; and (iii) Jurisdiction over the subject matter. So far as territorial and pecuniary jurisdictions are concerned, objection to such jurisdiction has to be taken at the earliest possible opportunity and in any case at or before settlement of issues. The law is well settled on the point that if such objection is not taken at the earliest, it cannot be allowed to be taken at a subsequent stage. Jurisdiction as to subject matter, however, is totally distinct and stands on a different footing. Where a court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit by reason of any limitation imposed by statute, charter or commission, it cannot take up the cause or matter. An order passed by a court having no jurisdiction is nullity. 32. In Bahrein Petroleum Co., this Court also held that neither consent nor waiver nor acquiescence can confer jurisdiction upon a court, otherwise incompetent to try the suit. It is well-settled and needs no authority that 'where a court takes upon itself to exercise a jurisdiction it does not possess, its decision amounts to nothing.' A decree passed by a court having no jurisdiction is non-est and its validity can be set up whenever it is sought to be enforced as a foundation for a right, even at the stage of execution or in collateral proceedings. A decree passed by a court without jurisdiction is a coram non judice. 33. In Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan, (1955) 1 SCR 117: AIR 1954 SC 340, this Court declared; "It is a fundamental principle well established that a decree passed by a court without jurisdiction is a nullity and that its invalidity could be set up whenever and it is sought to be enforced or relied upon, even at the stage of execution and even in collateral proceedings. A defect of jurisdiction strikes at the very authority of the court to pass any decree, and such a defect cannot be cured even by consent of parties." 17. In the above judgment it has been held that with consent or waiver or acquiescence, jurisdiction can not be conferred upon any court, if the court is incompetent to try the suit. 18. In the case of Kanwar Singh Saini V. High Court of Delhi ( 2026:JHHC:10810 ) 8 reported in (2012) 4 SCC 307 it has been held that if in absence of any jurisdiction, order has been passed that will be amount to nullity. The para22 22 of the said judgment is quoted as under:- “22.There can be no dispute regarding the settled legal proposition that conferment of jurisdiction is a legislative function and it can neither be conferred with the consent of the parties nor by a superior court, and if the court passes order/decree having no jurisdiction over the matter, it would amount to a nullity as the matter goes to the roots of the cause. Such an issue can be raised at any belated stage of the proceedings including in appeal or execution. The finding of a court or tribunal becomes irrelevant and unenforceable/inexecutable once the forum is found to have no jurisdiction. Acquiescence of a party equally should not be permitted to defeat the legislative animation. The Court cannot desire jurisdiction apart from the Statute.” 19. In the case of Corona Ltd. V. Parvathy Swaminathan & Sons reported in (2007) 8 SCC 559 it has been held that the existence of a jurisdictional fact is thus a sine qua non or condition precedent to the assumption of jurisdiction by a court of tribunal. Paras 27 and 28 of the said judgment, which are as under:- “27. Stated simply, the fact or facts upon which the jurisdiction of a Court, a Tribunal or an Authority depends can be said to be a 'jurisdictional fact'. If the jurisdictional fact exists, a Court, Tribunal or Authority has jurisdiction to decide other issues. If such fact does not exist, a Court, Tribunal or Authority cannot act. It is also well settled that a Court or a Tribunal cannot wrongly assume existence of jurisdictional fact and proceed to decide a matter. The underlying principle is that by erroneously assuming existence of a jurisdictional fact, a subordinate Court or an inferior Tribunal cannot confer upon itself jurisdiction which it otherwise does not posses. 28. In Halsbury's Laws of England, (4th Edn.), Vol.1, 2026:JHHC:8242 8 para 55, p.61; Reissue, Vol.1(1), para 68, pp.114- 15, it has been stated: "Where the jurisdiction of a tribunal is dependent on the existence of a particular state of affairs, that state of affairs may be described as preliminary to, or collateral to the merits of the issue. If, at the inception of an inquiry by an inferior tribunal, a challenge is made to its jurisdiction, the tribunal has to make up its mind whether to act or not and can give a ruling on the preliminary or collateral issue; but that ruling is not conclusive". The existence of a jurisdictional fact is thus a sine qua non or ( 2026:JHHC:10810 ) 9 condition precedent to the assumption of jurisdiction by a Court or Tribunal.” 20. In the light of above discussions and further coming to the present case arising out of a contract which can be subject mater of the suit only. This is not simple of transportation service with regard to goods or passengers. This is arising out of complete contract and for that dispute, only civil suit is remedy and that is not coming under the definition of public utility services. 21. In view of above facts, reasons and analysis, the Court finds that the order dated 24.09.2008 passed by the learned Permanent Lok Adalat, Dhanbad in PL Case No. 117/2007 cannot be sustainable in the eye of law and accordingly, the same is hereby quashed. 22. The writ petition is allowed and disposed of in above terms. 23. It is open to the sole respondent if so advised, may approach the competent court of civil jurisdiction for deciding the said dispute. Dt.16.04.2026 Satyarthi/A.F.R. ( Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi, J.)