2026:JHHC:10633 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI Acquittal Appeal No.08 of 2024 [Against the judgment dated 06.04.2019 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, East Singhbhum, Jamshedpur in Criminal Appeal No.243 of 2018] ---- Indian Overseas Bank represented through Rajesh Kumar S/o Nand Kishore, aged about 45 years, Chief Manager, Indian Overseas Bank, Main Branch, Bistupur, P.O.+P.S.- Bistupur, Town Jamshedpur, District – East Singhbhum. …. …. Appellant(s) Versus 1. The State of Jharkhand 2. Manoranjan Thakur, S/o Ram Chandra Thakur, Owner of M/s P.S.S. Enterprises 3. Puspa Thakur W/o Manoranjan Thakur Both resident of Ramchandra Niwas, New Green City, Baliguma, Mango, P.O.+P.S.-Mango, Town Jamshedpur, District – East Singhbhum. …. …. Respondent(s) ---- PRESENT HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH KUMAR ---- For the Appellant(s) : Mr. Shashi Shekhar Sahay, Adv. For the State : Mrs. Mohua Palit, A.P.P. For the Resp. No.2 & 3 : Mr. Vishal Kr. Trivedi, Adv. ---- By Court: 1. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant(s) and learned counsel for the State. 2. The present appeal has been filed against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 06.04.2019 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, East Singhbhum, Jamshedpur in Criminal Appeal No.243 of 2018 wherein the judgment dated 31.08.2018 passed by the J.M.1st Class, Jamshedpur in C/1 Case No.1841 of 2012 had been set aside and the accused/respondent Nos.2 & 3 have been acquitted of the charges levelled against them. 3. The brief facts of the case, as emerging from the complaint petition, are as follows: 2026:JHHC:10633 Page | 2 Acquittal Appeal (C) No.08 of 2024 “as per complaint case i.e C/1 Case no.1841/2012 the opposite party namely Manoranjan Thakur opposite Party no.2 has availed of cash credit facility to the extent of Rs 50,00,000/- from the complainant bank as being distributor for Airtel DTH instrument. It is further alleged that Manoranjan Thakur OP No.2 and Smt Pushpa Thakur OP No. 3 for discharging the liability issued cheque no-584172 dated 18.06.2012 of State Bank of India, Agrico, Branch Jamshedpur for sum of Rs 2,00,000/- in favour of the complainant bank which was dishonoured on 18.06.2012 for insufficiency of fund. The complainant bank informed about dishonour of cheque to the opposite parties no-2 and 3 then the said opposite parties requested the complainant bank to present the cheque on 20.06.2012 but on presentation the said cheque on 20.06.2012 it was again dishonoured for insufficiency of fund. It is further alleged that the complainant Bank sent a notice through Advocate on 22.06.2012 through registered post with A/D on correct address of OP No.2 & 3. It is further alleged that inspite of demand notice they did not pay the cheque amount. So the complainant filed the Complaint case i.e C/1 Case no. 1841/2012 on 20.07.2012 for redressal of grievance.” 4. The relevant dates, as emerging from the pleadings and arguments advanced on behalf of the parties, are as follows: It appears that the cheque in question was issued on 18.06.2012. The said cheque was presented for encashment on 20.06.2012 and was dishonoured on the same day on account of insufficiency of funds. Thereafter, a legal notice was issued on 22.06.2012 through registered post. The complaint case was ultimately instituted on 20.07.2012. 5. The factual matrix relevant for determination in the present appeal pertains to the presumption regarding service of legal notice. The learned trial court has proceeded on the basis that service of notice is to be presumed within a period of seven days upon the drawer of the cheque. However, the learned appellate court has taken a contrary view and has considered a longer reasonable period, relying upon the interpretation of Section 27 of the General Clauses Act by the Hon’ble Apex Court, as reported in (2008) 13 SCC 689 in the case of Subodh S. Salaskar v. Jayprakash M. Shah. Thus, the determination hinges upon whether the presumption of service is to be taken as seven days, in which event the trial court judgment would be sustainable, or whether a longer period is to be presumed, in which case the appellate court judgment would be justified. 6. The above issue which is involved in the present appeal has already been settled by the Hon’ble Apex Court (supra) in the case of Subodh S. 2026:JHHC:10633 Page | 3 Acquittal Appeal (C) No.08 of 2024 Salaskar. The relevant paragraph of the said judgment are quoted hereinbelow: “22. In terms of the provisions of the General Clauses Act, a notice must be deemed to have been served in the ordinary course subject to the fulfillment of the conditions laid down therein. Section 27 of the General Clauses Act reads as under: "27. Meaning of service by post.--Where any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act authorises or requires any document to be served by post, whether the expression `serve' or either of the expression `give' or `send' or any other expression is used, then, unless a different intention appears, the service shall be deemed to be effected by properly addressing, pre- paying and posting by registered post, a letter containing the document, and, unless the contrary is proved, to have been effected at the time at which the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post." 23. Thirty days' time ordinarily must be held to be sufficient for service of notice. In fact when the service of notice is sought to be effected by Speed Post, ordinarily the service takes place within a few days. Even under Order V, Rule 9(5) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, summons is presumed to be served if it does not come back within thirty days. In a situation of this nature, there was no occasion for the Court to hold that service of notice could not be effected within a period of thirty days. 24. Presumption of service, under the statute, would arise not only when it is sent by registered post in terms of Section 27 of the General Clauses Act but such a presumption may be raised also under Section 114 of the Evidence Act. Even when a notice is received back with an endorsement that the party has refused to accept, still then a presumption can be raised as regards the valid service of notice. Such a notice, as has been held by a Three-Judge Bench of this Court in C.C. Alavi Haji v. Palapetty Muhammed and Another [(2007) 6 SCC 555] should be construed liberally, stating : (SCC p. 565, para 17) "17. It is also to be borne in mind that the requirement of giving of notice is a clear departure from the rule of criminal law, where there is no stipulation of giving of a notice before filing a complaint. Any drawer who claims that he did not receive the notice sent by post, can, within 15 days of receipt of summons from the court in respect of the complaint under Section 138 of the Act, make payment of the cheque amount and submit to the court that he had made payment within 15 days of receipt of summons (by receiving a copy of complaint with the summons) and, therefore, the complaint is liable to be rejected. A person who does not pay within 15 days of receipt of the summons from the court along with the copy of the complaint under Section 138 of the Act, cannot obviously contend that there was no proper service of notice as required under Section 138, by ignoring statutory presumption to the contrary under Section 27 of the GC Act and Section 114 of the Evidence Act. In our view, any other interpretation of the proviso would defeat the very object of the legislation. As observed in Bhaskaran case if the "giving of notice" in the context of Clause (b) of the proviso was the same as the ‘receipt of notice’ a trickster cheque drawer would get the premium to avoid receiving the notice by adopting different strategies and escape from legal consequences of Section 138 of the Act. [Emphasis supplied] " 25. The complaint petition admittedly was filed on 20.04.2001. The notice having been sent on 17.01.2001, if the presumption of service of notice within a reasonable time is raised, it should be deemed to have been served 2026:JHHC:10633 Page | 4 Acquittal Appeal (C) No.08 of 2024 at best within a period of thirty days from the date of issuance thereof, i.e., 16.02.2001. The accused was required to make payment in terms of the said notice within fifteen days thereafter, i.e., on or about 2.03.2001. The complaint petition, therefore, should have been filed by 2.04.2001.” 7. Thus, it is well settled that in absence of cogent material regarding actual service, a presumption of deemed service is to be drawn in accordance with the ordinary course of post, and only thereafter the statutory period of fifteen days is to be computed for the purpose of accrual of cause of action. 8. Admittedly, in the present case, the legal notice was issued on 22.06.2012. Applying the aforesaid legal presumption, the service of notice would be deemed to have been effected within a reasonable period in the ordinary course of post, which, as considered by the appellate court, would extend up to 30 days. Consequently, the deemed date of service would fall on 21.07.2012, and thereafter the statutory period of fifteen days for making payment would expire on 06.08.2012. Thus, the cause of action for filing the complaint would arise only after 06.08.2012. However, in the present case, the complaint has been instituted on 20.07.2012, i.e., prior to accrual of cause of action and without affording the mandatory statutory period to the accused, which is a condition precedent for fastening criminal liability. 9. In view of above discussion of the factual matrix and the settlement of the issue by the Hon’ble Apex Court, this Court finds that the appellate court judgment is justified and it requires no interference. Accordingly, the judgment of acquittal dated 06.04.2019 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, East Singhbhum, Jamshedpur in Criminal Appeal No.243 of 2018 is hereby sustained. 10. In the result, the present acquittal appeal stands dismissed. (Rajesh Kumar, J.) The Jharkhand High Court at Ranchi Dated: 15th April, 2026 Amar/NAFR Uploaded on 18.04.2026