1 2026:CGHC:16834 NAFR HIGH COURT of CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPS No. 6107 of 2021 Chandan Singh Patel S/o Shri Pyari Lal Patel Aged About 45 Years R/o Village Bansajhar, Block Dharamjaigarh District Raigarh Chhattisgarh ... Petitioner versus 1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Department of Panchayat And Rural Development, Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Atal Nagar Nawa Raipur District Raipur Chhattisgarh. 2 - The Secretary, Department of School Education, Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Atal Nagar Nawa Raipur District Raipur Chhattisgarh. 3 - Director Panchayat Directorate Indravati Bhavan, Atal Nagar Mantralaya, Naya Raipur District Raipur Chhattisgarh. 4 - Director, Public Instruction, Indravati Bhavan, Atal Nagar, Mantralaya, Naya Raipur District Raipur Chhattisgarh. 5 - Collector Raigarh District Raigarh Chhattisgarh. 6 - Chief Executive officer Zila Panchayat Raigarh District Raigarh Chhattisgarh. 7 - District Education officer Raigarh, District Raigarh Chhattisgarh. 8 - Chief Executive officer - Janpad Panchayat Dharamjaigarh, District Raigarh. Chhattisgarh. 9 - Block Education officer Dharamjaigarh, District Raigarh Chhattisgarh. ... Respondent(s) For Petitioner : Mr. Jeet Patel, Advocate For State : Mr. Vivek Siddharth Ojha, Panel Lawyer For Respondent No.8 : Mr. Ajit Kumar Singh, Advocate Hon’ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey Order on Board 13/04/2026 1. Heard on admission. 2. The petitioner has filed this petition seeking the following relief(s):- Digitally signed by NADIM MOHLE 2 “10.1 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to call for the entire records in relates to the case of the petitioner from the possession of respondents for its kind perusal. 10.2 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to direct the concerned respondents to give appointment and posting to the petitioner under respondents department to the post of teacher with all consequently benefit, in the interest of interest. 10.3 That, the Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to direct the respondents to early decide the petitioner's representation. 10.4 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to grant any other relief/relief's in favour of the petitioners, which the Hon'ble Court deemed fit & just in the facts and circumstances of the case, including awarding of the costs to the petitioner.” 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the petitioner was appointed on the post of Guruji under the Shiksha Gauranty Scheme on a fixed honorarium of Rs. 500/- per month, vide order dated 02.09.1997. He would contend that without holding any enquiry and without affording any opportunity of hearing, his services were discontinued by an oral order; thus, he is seeking a direction to the respondent authorities to consider the claim of the petitioner. 4. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the respondent(s) would oppose the submissions made by counsel for the petitioner and submit that the petitioner was appointed as Guruji at Education Guarantee Center, Bhansajhar, Pradhanpara by the concerned Panchayat, and the said center was closed in the year 1999. Subsequently, the services of the petitioner were discontinued. They would contend that the services of the petitioner were discontinued in the year, 1999, but he approached this Court by filing this petition on 3 06.10.2021; therefore, this petition is hit by the principle of delay and laches. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents. 6. Admittedly, the petitioner was appointed on the post of Guruji under the Shiksha Gauranty Scheme on a fixed honorarium of Rs. 500/- per month, vide order dated 02.09.1997. The petitioner was appointed at Education Guarantee Center, Bhansajhar, Pradhanpara, and the said center was closed in the year, 1999, and thereafter, services of the petitioner were discontinued. 7. The petitioner preferred this petition on 06.10.2021, and in para 7, the petitioner has declared that there is absolutely no delay in filing the present petition. 8. Though the petitioner has stated that there is no delay in filing this petition, but there is inordinate delay of 21 years. 9. The Supreme Court in the matter of Union of India and others v. Tarsem Singh reported in (2008) 8 SCC 652 summarized the settled principles in the following manner:- “7. To summarise, normally, a belated service related claim will be rejected on the ground of delay and laches (where remedy is sought by filing a writ petition) or limitation (where remedy is sought by an application to the Administrative Tribunal). One of the exceptions to the said rule is cases relating to a continuing wrong. Where a service related claim is based on a continuing wrong, relief can be granted even if there is a long delay in seeking remedy, with reference to the date on which the continuing wrong commenced, if such continuing wrong creates a continuing source of injury. But there is an exception to the exception. If the grievance is in 4 respect of any order or administrative decision which related to or affected several others also, and if the reopening of the issue would affect the settled rights of third parties, then the claim will not be entertained. For example, if the issue relates to payment or re fixation of pay or pension, relief may be granted in spite of delay as it does not affect the rights of third parties. But if the claim involved issues relating to seniority or promotion,etc.., affecting others, delay would render the claim stale and doctrine of laches/limitation will be applied. Insofar as the consequential relief of recovery of arrears for a past period is concerned, the principles relating to recurring/successive wrongs will apply. As a consequence, the High Courts will restrict the consequential relief relating to arrears normally to a period of three years prior to the date of filing of the writ petition.” 10. Recently, Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of H. Guruswamy & Ors. Versus A. Krishnaiah Since Deceased by Lrs.1 held courts cannot use a "liberal approach" to condone inordinate, unjustified delays caused by a party's own negligence. Relevant paras of the aforesaid judgment are reproduced herein below :- “13. We are at our wits end to understand why the High Court overlooked all the aforesaid aspects. What was the good reason for the High Court to ignore all this? Time and again, the Supreme Court has reminded the District judiciary as well the High courts that the concepts such as "liberal approach", "Justice oriented approach", "substantial justice" should not be employed to frustrate or jettison the substantial law of limitation. 16. The length of the delay is definitely a relevant matter which the court must take into consideration while 1. [2025] 1 SCR 764 5 considering whether the delay should be condoned or not. From the tenor of the approach of the respondents herein, it appears that they want to fix their own period of limitation for the purpose of instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the case, he cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations. While considering the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay. 17. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. No court should keep the 'Sword of Damocles' hanging over the head of litigant for an indefinite period of time.” 11. Taking into consideration the facts discussed above and the law, in the opinion of this Court, the petitioner has not explained the delay properly, therefore, the instant petition is liable to be and is hereby dismissed at the admission stage itself. No order as to cost(s). Sd/- Rakesh Mohan Pandey JUDGE Nadim