p. 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA, CUTTACK W.P. (C) No.4883 of 2026 An application under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India; --------------- Abinash Nanda … … Petitioner -Versus- Sagarika Mishra … … Opp. Party Advocates appeared in the case: For Petitioner : Mr. Rajkishore Swain, Advocate For Opp. Party : ------------------ CORAM: THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE MRUGANKA SEKHAR SAHOO J U D G M E N T ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Decided on 12th February, 2026 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ PER MRUGANKA SEKHAR SAHOO, J. 1. The writ petition has been filed challenging the attachment and execution proceeding (and seeking stay of further proceeding) arising out of order dated 15.09.2025 passed in CMC No.122 of 2023 pending before the court of learned Additional Civil Judge-cum- p. 2 J.M.F.C.-III, Bolangir till disposal of the petitioner’s stay application in CRLA No.10 of 2025. The order dated 15.09.2025 was passed by the learned Additional Civil Judge-cum-J.M.F.C., Balangir in CMC Case No.122 of 2023 under section 23 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (in short “P.W.D.V. Act”). 2. The husband works as a Judicial Magistrate First Class and opposite party in the CMC Case. It is stated by the learned counsel for the petitioner that he earns about Rs.1,30,000/- as salary which is also common knowledge. The direction was for payment of Rs.15,000/- as interim monthly maintenance for survival of aggrieved party along with minor child born from the wedlock from 07.07.2023 i.e. date of application. 3. In view of the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Rajnesh v. Neha and another1 i.e. guidelines/directions issued on maintenance awarded to wife in the marriage referring to Article 15(3) of the Constitution of India, the learned counsel for the petitioner was asked whether the petitioner will secure the amount that remains unpaid since 07.07.2023 till date (12.02.2026)( i.e. for 30 months the amount comes to Rs.4,50,000/-); learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that he wants to seek instruction from the petitioner and accordingly, the matter was passed over to be taken up later. 1 2020 INSC 631: (2021) 2 SCC 324 p. 3 4. After about half an hour the matter was called again. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that he has received instruction that the petitioner will not secure the defaulted amount of Rs.4,50,000/-, however, he can deposit upto Rs.1,00,000/- for securing the decree. 5. This has led to a situation before this Court (High Court) where a Judicial Magistrate being defaulter in a decree granted by the court of proper jurisdiction which is in the nature of a money decree in view of Rajnesh v. Neha, does not want to secure the decree to challenge the order on merits. 6. When this Court expressed its view that the petitioner cannot bargain to suggest an amount of Rs.1,00,000/- to secure the decree for challenging the same, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that though he does not have instruction he being the conducting counsel wants to withdraw the petition. 7. The learned judge in the impugned order dated 15.09.2025 has considered the relevant aspects to arrive at conclusion. The relevant paragraphs from the impugned judgment which are considered and emphasized by this Court are reproduced herein: “Heard from both the sides. Perused the case record. Firstly, before dealing with the provision of Section 23 of P.W.D.V. Act, it must be seen that whether the aggrieved is entitle to file an application under this Act. As per Section 2 (a) of P.W.D.V. Act "aggrieved person" means any woman who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship with the respondent and who alleges p. 4 to have been subjected to any act of domestic violence by the respondent. On perusal of record, it is found that it is an admitted fact that aggrieved party is the wife of the OP no.l and she had been living with O.P.1. Thus, entitlement to file an application under this Act is not in question. Now it is required to see whether the aggrieved has right to get the benefit of the Section-23 of the P.W.D.V. Act. I have gone" through the provision U/s.23(2) of P.W.D.V Act which clearly provides that " if the Magistrate is satisfied that an application prima facie discloses that the respondent is committing, or has committed an act of domestic violence or that there is a likelihood that the respondent may commit an act of domestic violence, he may grant an ex-parte order on the basis of the affidavit in such form, as may be prescribed, of the aggrieved person under section 18, section 19, section 20, section21 or, as the case may be, section 22 against the respondent. "On perusal of the affidavit, it is forthcoming that the aggrieved is staying in her paternal house since the date of filing of the application and since then she along with the female child are dependent upon her father. The affidavit clearly shows the precarious conditions of the aggrieved party. She has been deprived of all economic or financial resources to which she is entitled to meet the house hold necessities for her and for her child. Further the welfare of the child is the paramount consideration. It should be ensured that the interest of the child is protected in all matrimonial disputes. P.W.D.W. Act is enacted with an aim to provide protection to the women, who are the victims of the domestic violence of any kind occurring within the family. Here, from the application of the petitioner, it appears that she has been subjected to many hardship and the plight of the petitioner compels her to file a case against her husband and other respondents. So, to protect the status and dignity p. 5 of the petitioner along with her child and to save them from being distressed, this Court thinks it just and proper to allow the prayer of the petitioner for the ends of justice. Hence ordered. ORDER The O.P no.1 is directed to pay Rs.l5,000/- (Rupees Fifteen thousand) only as interim monthly maintenance to the petitioner for the survival of aggrieved party along with her minor child who has not made a party in this case till further order. I he OP No.1 is directed to pay the said monthly maintenance from 07.07.2023 i.e., the date of application. The monthly allowance shall be paid within the second week of each succeeding English calendar month failing which the petitioner is at liberty to execute the order through process of law. Supply free copy of this order to the aggrieved person as well as to the opposite party.” 8. This Court has to and takes note that in Rajnesh v. Neha1 (supra) the following has been laid down (INSC print). “Given the backdrop of the facts of the present case, which reveal that the application for interim maintenance Under Section 125 Cr.P.C. has remained pending before the Courts for seven years now, and the difficulties encountered in the enforcement of orders passed by the Courts, as the wife was constrained to move successive applications for enforcement from time to time, we deem it appropriate to frame guidelines on the issue of maintenance, which would cover overlapping jurisdiction under different enactments for payment of maintenance, payment of Interim Maintenance, the criteria for determining the quantum of maintenance, the date from which maintenance is to be awarded, and enforcement of orders of maintenance. W.P. (C) No.4883 of 2026 Page 6 of 9 Guidelines/Directions on Maintenance Maintenance laws have been enacted as a measure of social justice to provide recourse to dependant wives and children for their financial support, so as to prevent them from falling into destitution and vagrancy. Article 15(3) of the Constitution of India provides that: “Nothing in this Article shall prevent the State from making any special provision for women and children.” Article 15 (3) reinforced by Article 39 of the Constitution of India, which envisages a positive role for the State in fostering change towards the empowerment of women, led to the enactment of various legislations from time to time.” xxx xxx xxx “Prior to the amendment of Section 125 in 2001, there was a ceiling on the amount which could be awarded as maintenance, being Rs. 500 "in the whole". In view of the rising costs of living and inflation rates, the ceiling of Rs. 500 was done away by the 2001 Amendment Act. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Amendment Act states that the wife had to wait for several years before being granted maintenance. Consequently, the Amendment Act introduced an express provision for grant of "interim maintenance". The Magistrate was vested with the power to order the Respondent to make a monthly allowance towards interim maintenance during the pendency of the petition. Under Sub-section (2) of Section 125, the Court is conferred with the discretion to award payment of maintenance either from the date of the order, or from the date of the application. Under the third proviso to the amended Section 125, the application for grant of interim maintenance must be disposed of as far as p. 7 possible within sixty days' from the date of service of notice on the Respondent.” [Underlined to supply emphasis] 9. At paragraph 20 of the decision rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Shamima Farooqui v. Shahid Khan2, the following has been laid down regarding scope of interference in an application seeking revision of an order directing payment of maintenance. The present application though under Article 227 of Constitution of India has to be considered by applying the criteria as elaborated in Shamima Farooqui (supra). Paragraphs 19 and 20 of Shamima Farooqui (SCC online web edition print), which are relied upon, followed and applied are reproduced herein: “19. From the aforesaid enunciation of law it is limpid that the obligation of the husband is on a higher pedestal when the question of maintenance of wife and children arises. When the woman leaves the matrimonial home, the situation is quite different. She is deprived of many a comfort. Sometimes her faith in life reduces. Sometimes, she feels she has lost the tenderest friend. There may be a feeling that her fearless courage has brought her the misfortune. At this stage, the only comfort that the law can impose is that the husband is bound to give monetary comfort. That is the only soothing legal balm, for she cannot be allowed to resign to destiny. Therefore, the lawful imposition for grant of maintenance allowance. 20. In the instant case, as is seen, the High Court has reduced the amount of maintenance from Rs.4000 to Rs.2000. As is manifest, the High Court p. 8 2 (2015) 5 SCC 705 has become oblivious of the fact that she has to stay on her own. Needless to say, the order of the learned Family Judge is not manifestly perverse. There is nothing perceptible which would show that order is a sanctuary of errors. In fact, when the order is based on proper appreciation of evidence on record, no Revisional Court should have interfered with the reason on the base that it would have arrived at a different or another conclusion. When substantial justice has been done, there was no reason to interfere. There may be a shelter over her head in the parental house, but other real expenses cannot be ignored. Solely because the husband had retired, there was no justification to reduce the maintenance by 50%. It is not a huge fortune that was showered on the wife that it deserved reduction. It only reflects the non- application of mind and, therefore, we are unable to sustain the said order. [Underlined to supply emphasis] 10. Though the case is listed for fresh admission, in considered opinion of this Court for issuing notice to the opposite party-wife, this Court has to apply the propositions laid down in Shamima Farooqui (supra) and has to prima facie satisfy itself regarding the impugned order dated 15.09.2025 that: (i) whether the order passed by the learned Family Judge is manifestly perverse; (ii) whether there is anything perceptible which is to show that the order is sanctuary of errors; (iii) whether the order is based on proper appreciation of evidence on record; p. 9 (iv) the revisional Court should not interfere because the revisional Court would arrive at a different or another conclusion; (v) whether substantial justice has been done by the learned court which has passed the order. 11. Now considering the case at hand the answer has to be and is ‘no’ for all the five propositions as indicated above. Rather, it is found that the order passed by the learned court which is impugned is based on proper appreciation of evidence on record and substantial justice has been done. Further as stated by the learned counsel for the petitioner is not inclined to secure the amount directed to be paid to the opposite party-wife and child during pendency of this petition. 12. In view of the discussions above it has to be and it is held that the petition is devoid of any merit and is dismissed. Copy of this order shall be forwarded to the learned Additional Civil Judge-cum-J.M.F.C., Balangir before whom the execution case is pending. (Mruganka Sekhar Sahoo) Judge Orissa High Court, Cuttack The 12th February, 2026/Jyostna