1 2026:CGHC:16111 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPS No. 5434 of 2022 * - Bhagwan Das Sahu S/o Late Shri Ramnath Sahu Aged About 58 Years Assistant Revenue Inspector, Nagar Panchayat Dhamdha, District : Durg, Chhattisgarh ... Petitioner Versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Secretary, Urban Administration And Development Department, Mahanadi Bhawan, Atal Nagar, Nawa Raipur, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh 2 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Deputy Secretary, Urban Administration And Development Department, Mahanadi Bhawan, Atal Nagar Nawa Raipur, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh 3 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Director, Urban Administration And Development Department, Indrawati Bhawan, Atal Nagar Nawa Raipur, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh 4 - Chief Municipal Officer Nagar Panchayat Dhamdha, District : Durg, Chhattisgarh 5 - Chhattisgarh Infrastructure Development Corporation Through The Managing Director, Shastri Chok, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh 6 - State Of Chhattisgrh Through Secretary, Department Of Transport, Mahanadi Bhawan, Atal Nagar Nawa Raipur, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh 7 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Director, General Administration Department, Mahanadi Bhawan, Atal Nagar Nawa Raipur, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh ... Respondents For Petitioner : Mr. Khulesh Sahu, Advocate For Respondents No.1 to 3, 6 & 7/State For Respondent No.4 For Respondent No. 5 : : : Mr. Rishabh Chandra Singh Deo, Panel Lawyer Mr. Raghvendra Verma, Advocate Mr. Anup Majumdar and Mr. Vibhor Goverdhan, Advocates Digitally signed by RAMESH KUMAR VATTI Date: 2026.04.15 15:06:38 +0530 2 Hon’ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey Order on Board 08/04/2026 1. The petitioner has filed this petition seeking the following relief(s):- “10.A To kindly direct the respondent authorities to consider the case of the Petitioner for absorption of service of the Petitioner according to the decision taken by the State Government with respect to absorption of the employees of erstwhile MPSRTC who are working under CIDC and in deputation. 10.B To quash/set aside the order dated 30.03.2022/Annexure P/1, issued by Deputy Secretary of Urban Administration and Development Department of the Government of Chhattisgarh, and 10.C Any other relief(s) in favour of Petitioner as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper under the facts and circumstances of the case with cost. ” 2. Mr. Khulesh Sahu, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit the petitioner was working in the erstwhile M.P.S.R.T.C., however after creation of the State of Chhattisgarh a separate Road Transport Corporation was not constituted in the State of Chhattisgarh, therefore, his services were placed in the control of respondent / Chhattisgarh Infrastructure Development Corporation (for short ‘C.I.D.C’). He would submit that the services of the petitioner were deputed with Municipal Council, Dhamdha from 23.09.2004 and since then he is working there on the post of Assistant Revenue Inspector. He would submit that the State Government has issued number of circulars with intent to absorb services of the employees working in the erstwhile M.P.S.R.T.C. He would contend that representations were made and when no heed was paid, WPS No.2960 of 2015 was filed and a direction was issued to the respondent authorities to consider the claim of the petitioner for absorption of services in light of the Circular dated 10.12.2007. He would submit that the representation so made by 3 the petitioner has been rejected by respondent No. 1 vide order dated 30.03.2022 on the ground that there is no vacant post of Assistant Revenue Inspector in Municipal Council, Dhamdha. Mr. Khulesh Sahu would further submit that as policy decision was taken by the State Government to absorb services of the employees transferred from M.P.S.R.T.C. to the State of Chhattisgarh, and posts are lying vacant with Municipal Corporations / Councils of State of Chhattisgarh, therefore, respondent authorities ought to have considered the name of the petitioner for absorption of services against any vacant and sanctioned post. He would submit that the State has created 05 supernumerary posts to adjust the similarly situated employees. He would contend that the petitioner is going to attain the age of superannuation in the month of May, 2026. Mr. Khulesh Sahu has placed reliance on the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Bhola Nath Vs. State of Jharkhand and Others reported in 2026 SCC OnLine SC 129. 3. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the respective respondents would oppose. They would submit that the petitioner has no right to claim absorption of his services as matter of right. They would contend that in absence of sanctioned and vacant post, the claim of the petitioner could not be considered. It is argued that the petitioner is an employee of Chhattisgarh Infrastructure Development Corporation, whereas at present he is working with Municipal Council, Dhamdha and his services cannot be absorbed in any other Corporation as he is an employee of a body corporate. They would submit that the petition is misconceived and deserves to be dismissed. 4 4. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents. 5. The services of the petitioner were allocated to the State of Chhattisgarh in the year 2002. Vide order dated 29.05.2004, the petitioner was sent on deputation from CIDC to Urban Administration Department on the post of Assistant Revenue Inspector and thereafter the petitioner has been posted on the said post in Municipal Council Dhamdha pursuant to order dated 23.09.2004. A policy decision was taken by the State to absorb the services on 10.12.2007. The petitioner approached the respondent authorities, but no heed was paid, therefore, a writ petition was filed and direction was issued to the respondent authorities to consider the claim of the petitioner for absorption. Respondent No. 1 vide order dated 30.03.2022 rejected the claim of the petitioner. 6. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Bhola Nath (supra) while dealing with the issue of absorption / regularization considered legitimate expectation of the employee and limits on contractual engagement and held in para- 13 as under:- “13. Another facet requiring consideration in the case of contractual employees, such as the present appellants, is the doctrine of legitimate expectation. Where employees have continued to discharge their duties on contractual posts for a considerable length of time, as in the present case, it is but natural that a legitimate expectation arises that the State would, at some stage, recognize their long and continuous service. It is in this belief, bolstered by repeated extensions granted by the Executive, that such employees continue in service and refrain from seeking alternative employment, notwithstanding the contractual nature of their engagement. At this juncture, it is thus apposite to advert to the principles governing the doctrine of legitimate expectation as enunciated by this Court in Army Welfare Education Society v. Sunil Kumar Sharma, wherein it was held as follows:- 5 “63. A reading of the aforesaid decisions brings forth the following features regarding the doctrine of legitimate expectation: 63.1 First, legitimate expectation must be based on a right as opposed to a mere hope, wish or anticipation; 63.2 Secondly, legitimate expectation must arise either from an express or implied promise; or a consistent past practice or custom followed by an authority in its dealings; …… 63.5 Fifthly, legitimate expectation operates in the realm of public law, that is, a plea of legitimate action can be taken only when a public authority breaches a promise or deviates from a consistent past practice, without any reasonable basis. …… 64. The aforesaid features, although not exhaustive in nature, are sufficient to help us in deciding the applicability of the doctrine of legitimate expectation to the facts of the case at hand. It is clear that legitimate expectation, jurisprudentially, was a device created in order to maintain a check on arbitrariness in State action. It does not extend to and cannot govern the operation of contracts between private parties, wherein the doctrine of promissory estoppel holds the field.” (emphasis laid) It is, therefore, not difficult to comprehend the expectation with which such contractual employees continue in the service of the State. The repeated conduct of the employer-State in expressing confidence in their performance and consistently granting monetary upgrades & tenure extensions reasonably nurtures an expectation that their long and continuous service would receive further recognition. 13.1 Another Constitution Bench in State of Karnataka v. Umadevi, cautioned that the doctrine of legitimate expectation cannot ordinarily be extended to persons whose appointments are temporary, casual or contractual in nature. The relevant extract of the judgment reads as follows: - “47. When a person enters a temporary employment or gets engagement as a contractual or casual worker and the engagement is not based on a proper selection as recognised by the relevant 6 rules or procedure, he is aware of the consequences of the appointment being temporary, casual or contractual in nature. Such a person cannot invoke the theory of legitimate expectation for being confirmed in the post when an appointment to the post could be made only by following a proper procedure for selection and in cases concerned, in consultation with the Public Service Commission. Therefore, the theory of legitimate expectation cannot be successfully advanced by temporary, contractual or casual employees. It cannot also be held that the State has held out any promise while engaging these persons either to continue them where they are or to make them permanent. The State cannot constitutionally make such a promise. It is also obvious that the theory cannot be invoked to seek a positive relief of being made permanent in the post.” (emphasis laid) However, this Court in Umadevi (supra) clarified that the bar against invocation of the doctrine of legitimate expectation applies only to those temporary, contractual or casual employees whose engagement was not preceded by a proper selection process in accordance with the extant rules. Consequently, where such engagement is made after following a due and lawful selection procedure, there is no absolute bar in law preventing such employees from invoking the doctrine of legitimate expectation. Limits on Perpetual Contractual Engagements: 13.2 In the present case, the respondent-State had engaged the services of the appellants on sanctioned posts since the year 2012. It was only towards the end of the year 2022 that the respondents communicated that no further extension of the appellants’ engagement was likely to be granted. 13.3 In our considered opinion, the aforesaid action is not only vitiated by arbitrariness but is also in clear derogation of the equality principles enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution. The respondent-State initially engaged the appellants in their youth to discharge public duties and functions. Having rendered long and dedicated service, the appellants cannot now be left to fend for themselves, particularly when the employment opportunities that may have been available to them a decade ago are no longer accessible owing to age constraints. 13.4 We are unable to discern any rational basis for the respondent-State’s decision to discontinue the appellants after nearly ten years of continuous service. We are conscious that the symbiotic-relationship between the 7 appellants and the respondent-State was mutually beneficial, the State derived the advantage of the appellants’ experience and institutional familiarity, while the appellants remained in public service. In such circumstances, any departure from a long-standing practice of renewal, particularly one that frustrates the legitimate expectation of the employee, ought to be supported by cogent reasons recorded in a speaking order. 13.5 Such a decision must necessarily be a conscious and reasoned one. An employee who has satisfactorily discharged his duties over several years and has been granted repeated extensions cannot, overnight, be treated as surplus or undesirable. We are unable to accept the justification advanced by the respondents as the obligation of the State, as a model employer, extends to fair treatment of its employees irrespective of whether their engagement is contractual or regular. 13.6 This Court has, on several occasions, deprecated the practice adopted by States of engaging employees under the nominal labels of “part-time”, “contractual” or “temporary” in perpetuity and thereby exploiting them by not regularzing their positions. In Jaggo v. Union of India, this Court underscored that government-departments must lead by examine in ensuring fair and stable employment, and evolved the test of examining whether the duties performed by such temporary employees are integral to the day-to-day functioning of the organization. 13.7 In Shripal v. Nagar Nigam and Vinod Kumar v. Union of India, this Court cautioned against a mechanical and blind reliance on Umadevi (supra) to deny regularization to temporary employees in the absence of statutory rules. It was held that Umadevi (supra) cannot be employed as a shield to legitimise exploitative engagements continued for years without undertaking regular recruitment. The Court further clarified that Umadevi itself draws a distinction between appointments that are “illegal” and those that are merely “irregular”, the latter being amenable to regularization upon fulfilment of the prescribed conditions. 13.8 In Dharam Singh v. State of U.P., this Court strongly deprecated the culture of “ad-hocism” adopted by the States in their capacity as employers. The Court criticised the practice of outsourcing or informalizing recruitment as a means to evade regular employment obligations, observing that such measures perpetuate precarious working conditions while circumventing fair and lawful engagement practices. 8 13.9 The State must remain conscious that part-time employees, such as the appellants, constitute an integral part of the edifice upon which the machinery of the State continues to function. They are not merely ancillary to the system, but form essential components thereof. The equality mandate of our Constitution, therefore, requires that their service be reciprocated in a manner free from arbitrariness, ensuring that decisions of the State affecting the careers and livelihood of such part-time and contractual employees are guided by fairness and reason. 13.10 In the aforesaid backdrop, we are unable to persuade ourselves to accept the respondent-State’s contention that the mere contractual nomenclature of the appellants’ engagement denudes them of constitutional protection. The State, having availed of the appellants’ services on sanctioned posts for over a decade pursuant to a due process of selection and having consistently acknowledged their satisfactory performance, cannot, in the absence of cogent reasons or a speaking decision, abruptly discontinue such engagement by taking refuge behind formal contractual clauses. Such action is manifestly arbitrary, inconsistent with the obligation of the State to act as a model employer, and fails to withstand scrutiny under Article 14 of the Constitution. ” 7. With regard to creation of supernumerary posts, no provisions of law or the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court has been placed, therefore, no such direction can be issued. With regard to direction to the respondent authorities to consider the claim of the petitioner for absorption against any sanctioned and vacant post available with any of the Municipal Council appears to be just and proper. Therefore, this petition is disposed of with a direction to the respondent authorities to consider the claim of the petitioner for absorption in light of the Circular dated 10.12.2007 against any sanctioned and vacant post available with any of the Municipal Councils / Municipal Corporations of the State of Chhattisgarh. As the petitioner is going to retire in the month of May, 2026, the respondent authorities are directed to take appropriate 9 decision within a period of 45 days from the date of receipt of copy of this order. The order impugned dated 30.03.2022 is hereby quashed. 8. With the aforesaid observation(s) / direction(s), this petition is disposed of. Sd/- (Rakesh Mohan Pandey) Judge vatti