1 2026:CGHC:16827 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR SA No. 416 of 2020 Jagdamba Prasad S/o Kishanlal Agrawal, Aged About 65 Years Caste Agrawal, R/o Village Pendra, Tahsil And P.S. Pendra, District Bilaspur Now Gaurela Pendra Marwahi (Chhattisgarh), Chhattisgarh ... Appellant versus 1 - Ishwar Farmaniya S/o Banarasidas Farmaniya, Aged About 62 Years Caste Agrawal, R/o Village Pendra, Tahsil And P.S. Pendra, District Bilaspur Now Gaurela Pendra Marwahi Chhattisgarh., Chhattisgarh 2 - Bhagwati Prasad, S/o Kishanlal Agrawal, Aged About 70 Years Caste Agrawal, R/o Village Pendra, Tahsil And P.S. Pendra, District Bilaspur Now Gaurela Pendra Marwahi Chhattisgarh., Chhattisgarh 3 - Durga Prasad, S/o Kishanlal Agrawal, Aged About 62 Years Caste Agrawal, R/o Village Pendra, Tahsil And P.S. Pendra, District Bilaspur Now Gaurela Pendra Marwahi Chhattisgarh., Chhattisgarh 4 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Collector, Bilaspur, District Bilaspur Now Gaurela Pendra Marwahi Chhattisgarh, Chhattisgarh --- Respondents ____________________________________________________ For Appellant : Mr. Manoj Paranjpe, Senior Advocate with Mr. Yogendra Chaturvedi , Advocate. For State/respondent : Mr. Anand Gupta, Dy.G.A. Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru, Judge Judgment on Board AMARDEEP CHOUBEY Digitally signed by AMARDEEP CHOUBEY Date: 2026.04.15 10:45:20 +0530 2 13.04.2026 1. By the present appeal under Section 100 of the CPC, the appellant/plaintiff challenging the impugned judgment and decree dated 04/03/2020 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Pendra Road, Dist: Bilaspur, C.G. in Civil Appeal No.10A/2019 (Jagdamba Prasad Vs Ishwar Farmaniya & Ors) arising out of the judgment and decree dated 26/10/2018 passed by the learned Civil Judge Class-I, Pendra Road, C.G. in Civil Suit No.122A/2005 (Jagdamba Prasad Vs Ishwar Farmaniya & Ors). 2. For the sake of convenience, the parties would be referred as per their status before the learned trial Court. 3. The plaintiff preferred a suit seeking for declaration of title and permanent injunction, pleading inter alia that the land situated in Village Pendra, Patwari Halka No. 26, R.I. Circle Pendra, Tehsil Pendra Road, District Bilaspur (C.G.), bearing Khasra No. 2054/1, area 9.10 acres, is the ancestral property of the plaintiff. The said land was recorded in the revenue records in the name of the plaintiff’s father (Defendant No. 2) as the landowner. Defendant No. 2, Kishanlal Agrawal (father of the plaintiff), had executed a family settlement deed on 09/08/1967 and got it registered, thereby transferring the said land to the plaintiff. At that time, the plaintiff was a minor. His grandmother, Smt. Singari Bai, acted as his guardian and took possession of the land on his 3 behalf. After attaining majority, the plaintiff has continued to remain in ownership and possession of the suit land. Defendant No. 2 had no right to sell the suit land, but on 18/10/2002, he sold a portion of the land (Khasra No. 2054/1, area 0.72 acres) to Defendant No.1. In the said sale deed, the market value is shown as ₹1,92,500, whereas the actual value is more than ₹15,00,000. Proper consideration was not paid, and the sale deed is merely a nominal and fraudulent document, hence Defendant No. 1 does not acquire any valid title. On 10/06/2004, Defendant No. 1 started demolishing the wall constructed on the suit land under the ownership and possession of the plaintiff and illegally got his name recorded in the revenue records. 4. (a) The defendant No. in his written statement, denied all the plaint averments. He submitted that the disputed land belonged to Defendant No. 2, Kishanlal. In the presence of his sons i.e. the plaintiff Jagdamba Prasad, Bhagwati Prasad, and Durgaprasad, a deal for the sale of the suit land was made and the land was lawfully sold to Defendant No.1. On 17/10/2002, after receiving the full sale consideration, a registered sale deed was duly executed in favor of Defendant No. 1, and possession of the land was also properly handed over to him. The alleged family settlement deed executed in favor of the plaintiff is stated to be forged, and no demolition of any wall belonging to the plaintiff took place on the disputed land. Rather, the disputed land is under the ownership and possession of Defendant No. 1 himself. 4 He submitted that due to the increase in the value of the disputed land, the plaintiff has filed this suit by relying on fabricated facts. (b) Defendant No. 1 has also submitted that on 16/10/2002, all the concerned persons appeared before the Sub-Registrar Office at Pendra Road. The contents of the written stamp document were read by Defendant No. 2 in the presence of his sons and witnesses. Defendant No. 2 himself presented it before the Sub- Registrar for registration. The Sub-Registrar also read out the contents of the document to all the persons present, and upon their consent, instructed his subordinate staff to affix the necessary seal and signatures at the appropriate places. After completion of all formalities, the registration process was completed, a receipt of registration fees was issued, and the signatures of the seller (Defendant No. 2) were obtained. Entries of signatures and thumb impressions were also made in the office register. After registration of the sale deed, an affidavit was also executed by Defendant No. 2 before a notary in favor of Defendant No. 1, in which his son Durgaprasad acted as the identifier. 5. The learned Trial Court, after framing the issues and upon due consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced by both parties, as well as the material available on record, dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff. The Court observed that in the presence of witnesses, and upon receipt of consideration, 5 Defendant No. 2 executed a registered sale deed on 17/10/2002 in favor of Defendant No. 1 at the Sub-Registrar Office, Pendra Road, in the presence of his sons and witnesses. In this regard, as per paragraph 4 of the affidavit of the plaintiff’s witness, Lalchand Vaishya, he stated that at the time of execution of the sale deed dated 18/10/2002 in favor of Defendant No. 1, he was present in the registration office along with the witnesses Ramniwas Tiwari and Satyanarayan Tiwari. According to him, the plaintiff’s father, Shri Kishanlal Agrawal, had agreed to execute a nominal sale deed without receiving consideration and without delivering possession of the suit land, merely to fulfill the needs of Defendant No.1. However, as per the sale deed dated 18/10/2002 (Exhibit P-04), the amount of consideration is clearly mentioned, and it is also recorded that possession was delivered to the purchaser. Therefore, the oral testimony of the plaintiff’s witness Lalchand Vaishya cannot be accepted in this regard. 6. Against the said judgment and decree, the plaintiff filed the Civil Appeal before the learned Appellate Court who by the judgment and decree impugned, dismissed the Civil Appeal by maintaining the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court. Thus, this appeal by the appellant/plaintiff. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff submits that the learned Trial Court failed to properly appreciate and examine the documentary as well as oral evidence on record. It is further 6 submitted that both the Courts below have erred in holding that the sale deed dated 18/10/2002 executed by Defendant No. 2 in favour of Defendant No. 1 was merely a nominal document and not binding on the plaintiff, despite the existence of a registered family settlement deed in favour of the plaintiff in respect of the same property, to which the plaintiff was not a party (Ex. P-4). It is further contended that both the Courts have wrongly held that the plaintiff has no right over the suit land, notwithstanding the execution of a registered family arrangement/gift deed (Exhibit P- 3A) in his favour by his father, Kishanlal (Defendant No. 2). 8. I have heard learned counsel for the appellant, perused the material available on record. 9. In the present case, the plaintiff relies upon a family settlement deed dated 09/06/1967 (Exhibit P-3) to claim ownership over the suit land. However, even assuming its execution, the plaintiff has failed to establish any subsequent steps taken to mutate his name in the revenue records or to assert uninterrupted legal title in accordance with law, which casts serious doubt on his exclusive ownership claim. Further, the plaintiff’s own conduct is inconsistent with his pleaded case. During the pendency of the suit, 11 decimals of land from Khasra No. 2054/1 were sold to Rajkumar Agrawal under a registered sale deed dated 25/11/2008, in respect of which the plaintiff admittedly gave his consent and signed as a consenting party. Such conduct is 7 wholly inconsistent with the assertion that he had exclusive ownership and possession over the entire suit land by virtue of the alleged settlement deed. Moreover, the plaintiff’s contention that the sale deed dated 18/10/2002 (Exhibit P-4) executed by Defendant No. 2 in favour of Defendant No. 1 was a nominal transaction without consideration or delivery of possession cannot be accepted. 10. Even otherwise, the scope of interference in a Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure is extremely limited. Interference is permissible only when the appeal involves a substantial question of law. Concurrent findings of fact recorded by both the Courts cannot be interfered with unless such findings are shown to be perverse, based on no evidence, or contrary to settled principles of law. 11. In the present case, both the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court have concurrently recorded findings, on the basis of evidence available on record, that the appellant/plaintiff failed to establish its case by placing cogent and sufficient material. The appellant has failed to demonstrate any perversity, illegality, or misapplication of law in the findings so recorded. 12. The questions sought to be raised in the present Second Appeal essentially relate to re-appreciation of evidence and challenge to concurrent findings of fact. Such questions do not give rise to any substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 100 of 8 the Code of Civil Procedure. 13. It is well established that when there is a concurrent finding of fact, unless it is found to be perverse, the Court should not ordinarily interfere with the said finding. 14. In the matter of State of Rajasthan and others Vs. Shiv Dayal and another, reported in (2019) 8 SCC 637, reiterating the settled proposition, it has been held that when any concurrent finding of fact is assailed in second appeal, the appellant is entitled to point out that it is bad in law because it was recorded de hors the pleadings or based on misreading of material documentary evidence or it was recorded against any provision of law and lastly, the decision is one which no Judge acting judicially could reasonably have reached. 15. Be that as it may, the argument advanced by learned counsel for the appellant and the proposed question of law cannot be regarded as satisfying the test of being ‘substantial question of law’ within the meaning of Section 100 of CPC. These questions, in my view, are essentially question of facts. The appellants failed to raise any substantial question of law which is required under Section 100 of the CPC. In any event, the Second Appeal did not involve any substantial question of law as contemplated under Section 100 of the CPC, no case is made out by the appellant herein. The judgments impugned passed by the learned trial Court as well as by the learned First appellate Court are just and 9 proper and there is no illegality and infirmity at all. 16. Accordingly, the present appeal is liable to be and is hereby dismissed. SD/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) Judge Gowri/Amardeep