Research › Search › Judgment

Kerala High Court · body

2026 DAILYLAW 612 (KER)

Kerala Minerals and Metals Limited v. Rajesh Krishnan R. S/o Rugmini Amma

2026-06-01

Basant Balaji, Devan Ramachandran

body2026
JUDGMENT : DEVAN RAMACHANDRAN, J. 1. This Appeal has been preferred by the Kerala Minerals and Metals Ltd. (‘KMML’) and its General Manager, against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P(C)No.13953/2021. 2. Through the impugned judgment, the learned Single Judge directed the appellants to consider engaging the 1 st respondent/writ petitioner as a Direct Contract Worker (‘DCW’), relying upon Ext.R2(c) - Minutes of a meeting, chaired by the Hon’ble Minister for Industry, Sports and Youth Affairs, Kerala and involving the representatives of the appellants and their workers ('Minutes'). 3. Shorn of unnecessary details, the 'Minutes' provided that the earlier arrangement of engaging workers through contract, through the 3 rd respondent – Land Acquired Peoples Association (‘LAPA’), which is stated to be a Society, was discontinued and employees who had been working for the company under them for a long time, were agreed to be directly engaged as ‘DCW’. 4. The case of the 1 st respondent is that his mother’s property had been acquired for the purposes of the ‘KMML’, and hence that he was included in ‘preferential category’ as per Ext.P3 – Government Order, thus to be given engagement by the 3 rd respondent – ‘LAPA’, as a contract worker in the ‘KMML’. He says that, though he was willing to work for any period of time and days as required, it was denied by the ‘LAPA’; thus forcing him to seek other employment. He says that this was taken advantage by the ‘LAPA’ by not recommending his name to the ‘KMML’ thereby, excluding him from consideration for engagement as a ‘DCW’. 5. Dr.Satheesan, learned Senior Counsel, instructed by Sri.B.Mohan Lal – learned counsel for the 1 st respondent, submitted that his client has been going through a long and arduous litigative journey, solely because he wants to find moorings in his life through proper employment. He pointed out that, initially, this Writ Petition was allowed by a learned Judge of this Court, directing the ‘KMML’ to engage him as a 'DCW'; but that it was then reversed in Appeal by a learned Division Bench in WA No.1591/2021, with the matter being remitted to the learned Single Judge for a fresh consideration, leading to the impugned judgment. He impressed upon us that, consequent to the first judgment of the learned Single Judge mentioned above in the Writ Petition, his client was engaged by the ‘KMML’; but that, when the judgment in WA No.1591/2021 was delivered, such period was construed to be only temporary employment for a period of 179 days; and resultantly, all issues were left open to be decided again by the learned Single Judge. He argued that the learned Judge has gone into all the factual factors and materials, to thus hold that his client is entitled to be engaged as ‘DCW’; and prayed that, therefore, this Appeal be dismissed. 6. Sri.K.Anand, learned Senior Counsel, instructed by Smt.Latha Anand – learned counsel for the appellants, in response, submitted that his client has no objection in engaging any person, provided his credentials fall within the ambit of the Scheme formulated for such purpose. He took us through Ext.R2(c) – 'Minutes', to show us that two essentials are required to be met by a candidate: namely, that he/she should have had long-time experience working with the company; and, secondly, that he/she should have been engaged by the ‘LAPA’ for such purpose. He argued that, even going by the admitted case of the 1st respondent, he had worked in the company only for a few days in the years 2012, 2013 and 2014 and hence that none of the criteria mentioned in the ‘Minutes’ would be applicable to him. He concluded the submissions, asserting that, though his client has no particular objection against the 1st respondent, they have been persuaded to file this Appeal because he cannot be found to be a person entitled to be engaged as a ‘DCW’, since he lacks the mandated credentials. 7. When we proceed to evaluate the rival submissions, it is rather limpid that, on facts, there are not many contentious issues between the parties. 8. That the 1 st respondent’s mother surrendered her property for the purpose of the ‘KMML’ resultantly, he having been included as an ‘evictee’ is admitted. It is also undisputed that the 3 rd respondent - Association was formed with the objective of securing employment opportunities for such evictees. 9. 8. That the 1 st respondent’s mother surrendered her property for the purpose of the ‘KMML’ resultantly, he having been included as an ‘evictee’ is admitted. It is also undisputed that the 3 rd respondent - Association was formed with the objective of securing employment opportunities for such evictees. 9. The controversy in this case begins when the 'Minutes' referred to as Ext.R2(c) was settled; in which, the stipulation was that the ‘LAPA’ will recommend all those persons who had been engaged to work in the company under them for a long duration, thus acquiring sufficient experience. The 'Minutes' also provided, in Clause 7 thereof, that, except those who are already included in the ‘preferential category’, no others would be so included in the future. 10. The specific case of the 1 st respondent is that he was sponsored by the ‘LAPA’ to work as contract labour under them, with the ‘KMML’ in the year 2012; and that he did so for about four years. He specifically alleges that the ‘LAPA’ did not sponsor him further and hence that he had to find other avocation for his livelihood. 11. Interestingly, when the 1 st respondent approached this Court earlier, certain directions had been issued; consequent to which, through Ext.P10 letter, the ‘KMML’ specifically mentioned that the 1 st respondent had worked for four years under the ‘LAPA’, but that his name had not been sponsored by them - though a list of 733 other employees had been so furnished. 12. The afore led the ‘KMML’, to address the ‘LAPA’ and Ext.P11 was the reply issued by the latter, saying that, since the 1 st respondent had stopped working under them for many years prior to the 'Minutes', he had not been included in the list furnished by them; further clarifying that the said list includes only those persons who are ‘currently working’, namely as on 01.03.2020. 13. However, a reading of the “Minutes” do not indicate that only those persons who had been working with “LAPA” on the date on which it was entered into, alone would be entitled to the benefit of being sponsored by it; but those, who had obtained experience by working for long periods with “KMML” under them. Further, it, through Clause 7, speaks about the rights of those, who are in the “preferential category” making it limpid that no further persons will be included. 14. Further, it, through Clause 7, speaks about the rights of those, who are in the “preferential category” making it limpid that no further persons will be included. 14. Therefore, the essential question before us is whether the 1 st respondent can be construed to be a person who ought to have been sponsored by the “LAPA”; and whether his exclusion by them was incorrect and illegal, solely because he had not been working under them as on 01.03.2020, as mentioned by them in Ext.P11. 15. We do not think that it would brooke any doubt that the “Minutes” do not mention any cut–off date of 01.03.2020, as mentioned by the “LAPA”, particularly when the same were settled only on 16.03.2020. Further, it does not say that only the existing workers under the “LAPA” would be sponsored; but explicitly that all those who had experience of working for long periods with the “KMML” ought to be given such benefit. 16. Going by Ext.P10 letter issued by the “KMML” to the Principal Secretary to the Government of Kerala, they expressly admit that the 1 st respondent had worked under the “LAPA” for four years, but that he was still not included in the list furnished by them. As said above, it is to this, that the “LAPA” replied, saying that they did not do so because the 1 st respondent was not working with them as on 01.03.2020. 17. The case of the 1 st respondent is one of a kind because, even though he admittedly belongs to the “preferential category”, being “evictee”, he has been denied the opportunity of being considered by the company for being engaged as “DCW” solely since he was not working under the “LAPA” as on 01.03.2020. It is also admitted that he had worked only for four years in the past; but his explanation, that he was denied employment thereafter by the “LAPA”, thus forcing him to take up other employment, has not been adverted to, or controverted. 18. In any event, the stand of the appellants in Ext.P10 is rather unmistakable that, if the “LAPA” is to furnish an additional list including the name of the 1 st respondent, they would consider him for engagement as a “DCW”, taking into the account the factum of him having worked in the past with them during a four year period. 19. 19. Pertinently, the 3 rd respondent – “LAPA” has refused to respond to the summons issued by this Court and, in fact, has returned the same citing the reason that its registration number is incorrect. We had even attempted to serve copy on them through the officials of the department of Co-operation, but which has also been in vain. In fact, we are told by the learned Senior counsel for the appellants that the “LAPA” has now stopped functioning and is redundant, particularly after the “Minutes”, since they have no other function left. 20. We see that the learned Single Judge has considered and evaluated the factual factors as afore, to find in favour of the writ petitioner / 1 st respondent. 21. In conspectus, we see no reason to intervene and consequently, dismiss this appeal. 22. The above being so ordered, we clarify that our observations and directions are confined solely to the 1 st respondent/writ petitioner, on account of the peculiar and singular circumstances presented, especially Ext.P10 letter. We, therefore, order that our observations cannot be construed as a precedent in any other case.