1 2026:CGHC:6358 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPS No. 5731 of 2023 Rakesh Dewangan aged about 44 years, S/o Shri Salik Ram Dewangan, Ex Assistant Teacher Panchayat, Govt. Primary School Patpar, Block Sahsapur Lohara, District Kabirdhar Chhattisgarh. ... Petitioner versus 1 - State Govt. of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, School Education Department Ministry, Mahanadi Bhavan, New Raipur P.S. Rakhi Chhattisgarh. District Raipur Chhattisgarh. 2 - State of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary Department of Panchayat And Ruled Development Ministry Mahanadi Bhawan, New Raipur P.S. Rakhi, Chhattisgarh District Raipur Chhattisgarh. 3 - Collector, District Kabirdham Chhattisgarh. 4 - Zilla Panchayt Kabirdham, Through Chief Executive Officer, Kabirdham, District Kabirdham. 5 - Chief Executive Officer, Janpad Panchayat Sahaspur Lohara, District Kabirdham Chhattisgarh. 6 - District Education Officer, Kabirdham Chhattisgarh. 7 - Block Education Officer, Sahaspur Lohara District Kabirdham Chhattisgarh. ... Respondents (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Petitioner : Mr. Vinod Kumar Sharma, Advocate For State/Respondents No.1 to 3, 6 and 7 : Mr. Sangharsh Pandey, Government Advocate For Respondents No.4 & 5 : Mr. Aniruddha Shrivastava, Advocate on YOGESH TIWARI Digitally signed by YOGESH TIWARI Date: 2026.02.04 18:38:18 +0530 2 behalf of Mr. Shaleen Singh Baghel, Advocate Hon’ble Shri Amitendra Kishore Prasad, Judge Order on Board 04.02.2026 1. By filing the instant writ petition, the petitioner has prayed for following relief(s) :- “10.1 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to order quashing of impugned order dated 14-03-2023 of learned Commissioner Durg Division Durg and to cancel order dated 15-01-2016 of CEO Sahaspur Lohara and order dated 21-07-2016 of Collector and respondents may kindly be ordered to reinstate the petitioner with all consequential benefits. 10.2 That cost of litigation and any other relief which the Hon'ble Court deems fit may kindly also be awarded.” 2. Brief facts of the case, in a nutshell are that the petitioner was appointed to the post of Shiksha Karmi by order dated 29.07.2006 issued by the Chief Executive Officer, Zila Panchayat, Kabirdham, and since the date of appointment, the petitioner continuously discharged his duties sincerely and to the satisfaction of the authorities concerned. No adverse entry or misconduct was ever communicated to the petitioner during his long tenure of service. While the petitioner was in service, he was abruptly and arbitrarily removed from employment with effect from 15.01.2016 by order 3 passed by the Chief Executive Officer, Janpad Panchayat, Sahaspur Lohara. The said removal order was passed without initiating any departmental enquiry and in complete violation of Rule 7 of the Chhattisgarh Panchayat Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1999 (for short, ‘Rules of 1999’), which mandates issuance of a charge-sheet, holding of a regular enquiry, and granting reasonable opportunity of hearing to the delinquent employee. 3. The petitioner, being aggrieved by the arbitrary termination, preferred an appeal before the Collector, Kabirdham. However, the said appeal was dismissed by order dated 21.07.2016 in a mechanical and arbitrary manner, without considering the fundamental illegality committed by the Chief Executive Officer in violating Rule 7 of the Rules of 1999. 4. Thereafter, the petitioner approached this Court by filing W.P.(S) No. 5183 of 2016, which came to be disposed of by order dated 26.09.2016, granting liberty to the petitioner to file an appeal/revision before the competent authority. 5. Subsequently, the petitioner preferred a revision before the Commissioner, Durg Division Durg. However, the learned Commissioner, by order dated 14.03.2023, dismissed the revision solely on the ground of limitation, without examining the merits of the case or the grave illegality and contempt involved in the termination order. Hence, the present petition. 4 6. Mr. Vinod Kumar Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned action of the respondents is ex facie illegal, arbitrary and contemptuous of the binding judgments passed by this Court as well as the settled law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. It is submitted that the petitioner was removed from service without following the mandatory procedure prescribed under Rule 7 of the Rules of 1999, thereby violating the principles of natural justice and rendering the termination order void ab initio. It is vehemently contended that the impugned action is squarely covered by the judgment passed by this Court in WPS No. 984 of 2013 (Rohini Jha and another v. State of Chhattisgarh) decided on 20.04.2018, wherein this Court has categorically held that any termination from Panchayat service without strict adherence to Rule 7 of the Rules of 1999 is illegal and unsustainable in law. Despite the existence of a clear and binding precedent, the respondents have deliberately ignored the said judgment and have proceeded to pass and sustain orders which are not only illegal but also contemptuous in nature. 7. Mr. Sharma further submits that, in addition to the violation of statutory rules, the impugned action is also hit by the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. Krishna Pandey, AIR 1966 SC 1656, wherein it has been held that departmental proceedings cannot ordinarily be initiated after an unreasonable and unexplained delay of several years, and that disciplinary action initiated beyond a reasonable time is liable to be 5 quashed. In the present case, even assuming without admitting that some incident had occurred, the same pertained to a period more than four years prior to the alleged action. Consequently, any disciplinary action or termination founded on such stale allegations is grossly time-barred. Learned counsel submits that the petitioner has been subjected to continuous harassment by sustaining his wrongful termination with effect from 15.01.2016, despite the settled position of law. 8. Assailing the impugned order passed by the learned Commissioner, Durg Division, Durg, dated 14.03.2023 (Annexure P-1), Mr. Sharma submits that the revisional authority has failed to consider that the removal order carries serious civil consequences, affecting the petitioner’s livelihood, service career and future prospects. The learned Commissioner confined the decision solely to the issue of limitation and completely failed to examine the glaring illegality of the termination order, passed in blatant violation of statutory rules and binding judicial precedents. 9. Mr. Sharma further submits that the Commissioner has dismissed the revision preferred by the petitioner against the order dated 21.07.2016 passed by the Collector only on the ground that the revision was barred by a delay of about six years and that no satisfactory explanation had been furnished. It is submitted that the revisional authority has failed to take into consideration the substantive grievance of the petitioner, namely that he was 6 removed from service without holding any departmental enquiry and without following the mandatory procedure under Rule 7 of the Rules of 1999, thereby violating the basic principles of natural justice. He further submits that the delay in filing the revision was neither deliberate nor intentional. The petitioner had earlier approached this Court by filing WPS No. 5183 of 2016, challenging the order of the Collector. The said writ petition came to be dismissed as withdrawn with liberty to avail the alternative statutory remedy of revision before the competent revisional authority. The petitioner thereafter acted bona fide and pursued the statutory remedy. The period spent by the petitioner in diligently prosecuting the writ petition before this Court constitutes a bona fide and sufficient explanation for the delay in filing the revision. 10. It is fairly conceded by Mr. Sharma that the application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act may not have been drafted with due precision or elaboration. However, it is submitted that technical deficiencies in drafting ought not to defeat substantive justice. Learned counsel contends that the Commissioner, being a quasi- judicial authority, was duty-bound to adopt a liberal, pragmatic, and justice-oriented approach while considering the application for condonation of delay, particularly in a service matter involving termination and serious civil consequences. In such circumstances, the revisional authority ought to have condoned the delay and adjudicated the revision on merits instead of 7 rejecting it on a hyper-technical ground of limitation. He further highlights the discriminatory approach adopted by the learned Commissioner, Durg Division. In an identical matter concerning one Dhansay, whose writ petition was also withdrawn from this Court to avail the alternative remedy, the learned Commissioner entertained the case and allowed the same vide order dated 06.07.2023, without dismissing it on the ground of limitation. However, in the case of the present petitioner, the revision was dismissed on the ground of limitation by order dated 14.06.2023, thereby treating similarly situated persons unequally. Such arbitrary and discriminatory action is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 11. Finally, Mr. Sharma submits that the arbitrary and illegal removal order dated 15.01.2016, passed by the Chief Executive Officer, Janpad Panchayat, Sahaspur Lohara, which forms the genesis of the present litigation, is wholly unsustainable in the eyes of law and deserves to be quashed with all consequential service and monetary benefits. 12. On the other hand, Mr. Sangharsh Pandey, learned State counsel appearing for respondents No.1 to 3, 6 and 7 has vehemently opposed the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner and submits that the writ petition is devoid of merit and deserves to be dismissed. He further submits that the petitioner has himself averred that in the case of Dhansay, the 8 Commissioner, Durg Division passed an order dated 06.07.2023, whereas in the present case the petitioner’s revision was dismissed vide order dated 14.06.2023 on the ground of delay. It is contended that each case is required to be decided on its own facts and circumstances and merely because in another case the delay was condoned, the petitioner cannot claim condonation of delay as a matter of right. 13. It is further submitted by Mr. Pandey that similarly situated petitioners, including the present petitioner, had earlier preferred W.P.(S) No. 5183 of 2016 before this Court challenging the appellate order dated 21.07.2016 passed by the Collector. The said writ petition came to be dismissed vide order dated 26.09.2019, in view of availability of an alternative statutory remedy under the Chhattisgarh Panchayat (Appeal and Revision) Rules, 1995, whereupon learned counsel for the petitioner sought withdrawal of the writ petition with liberty to prefer a revision before the competent revisional authority. In compliance of the said liberty granted by this Court, the petitioner preferred a revision, which was duly considered by the learned Commissioner, Durg Division, Durg. However, on account of inordinate delay in preferring the revision, the same was dismissed vide order dated 14.03.2023. He further submits that the revisional authority, i.e. the Commissioner, Durg Division, Durg, passed the impugned order (Annexure P-1) after considering the available material on record and examining the relevant aspects of the matter. It is contended that the 9 Commissioner has applied judicial mind to the issue involved and has passed a reasoned and speaking order while exercising quasi-judicial powers. Therefore, the said order is just, proper and legal, warranting no interference by this Court. 14. It is further submitted by Mr. Pandey that a mere perusal of the reliefs sought and the pleadings would reveal that the primary grievance of the petitioner pertains to the order dated 14.03.2023 passed by the Commissioner while exercising revisional powers under the provisions of the Chhattisgarh Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam, 1993. The learned revisional authority afforded due opportunity of hearing to the parties and passed a well-reasoned order. Hence, no further comment is required on behalf of the answering respondents, as the correctness of the impugned order is evident from its own contents and therefore, no interference is warranted. 15. Mr. Aniruddha Shrivastava, learned counsel for respondents No.4 and 5 submits that the appeal preferred by the petitioner against the order dated 15.01.2016 was dismissed by the Collector, Kabirdham vide order dated 21.07.2016, and thereafter the petitioner approached the Commissioner, Durg Division by filing a revenue appeal as late as on 25.02.2022, after an inordinate delay of nearly six years, without furnishing any satisfactory explanation. It is contended that such gross delay clearly attracts the principles of delay and laches and disentitles the petitioner from invoking the 10 discretionary jurisdiction of this Court. Reliance is placed on the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in U.P. Jal Nigam v. Jaswant Singh, (2006) 11 SCC 464 and Gulam Rasul v. State of J&K, (2009) 15 SCC 321, wherein it has been categorically held that stale and dead claims cannot be revived after long delay. He further submits that the petitioner was appointed as Shiksha Karmi Grade-III and pursuant to complaints alleging that the petitioner had secured appointment on the basis of forged and fabricated higher secondary mark-sheet, a departmental inquiry was initiated. During the inquiry, the petitioner failed to produce the original mark-sheet, claiming the same to be missing. The Inquiry Officer, after due verification, submitted an inquiry report dated 18.01.2013, recording findings that the petitioner’s mark-sheet appeared to be forged and fabricated. Even thereafter, the petitioner was issued a show-cause notice dated 07.12.2015 and granted adequate opportunity, but failed to satisfactorily rebut the allegations. 16. It is submitted by Mr. Shrivastava that after following due process of law and upon obtaining approval of the General Administrative Committee, the appointment of the petitioner was cancelled vide order dated 15.01.2016. The said order was unsuccessfully challenged before the Collector as well as before the Commissioner and has rightly been sustained. He further submits that the plea of discrimination raised by the petitioner by referring to the case of Dhansay is misconceived, as each case is required 11 to be adjudicated on its own facts and circumstances and no negative parity can be claimed as a matter of right. The order dated 14.03.2023 passed by the Commissioner is a reasoned, quasi-judicial order passed after due consideration of the material on record and does not call for any interference. 17. I have heard learned counsel for the respective parties at length and have carefully perused the pleadings, documents filed along with the petition, and the impugned order passed by the Commissioner, Durg Division, Durg. 18. Upon perusal of the record, it emerges that the petitioner was removed from Panchayat service while working as a Shiksha Karmi. The order of removal is not a simpliciter administrative action but one which undoubtedly entails serious civil consequences, as it adversely affects the petitioner’s service career, livelihood, and future prospects. An order resulting in such grave consequences is required to be examined on merits rather than being rejected at the threshold on technical grounds, particularly when the explanation for delay indicates bona fide conduct on the part of the petitioner. 19. It is also evident from the material on record that the petitioner had earlier invoked the writ jurisdiction of this Court and pursued the said remedy bonafidely. The writ petition was dismissed as withdrawn with liberty to avail the alternative statutory remedy of revision. The time consumed by the petitioner in prosecuting the 12 remedy before this Court cannot be said to be a product of negligence or inaction and, therefore, constitutes a sufficient cause within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 20. Though it is true that the application for condonation of delay may not have been drafted with precision or in an elaborate manner, it is well settled that procedural lapses and defects in drafting should not defeat substantial justice, especially in service matters where the consequences of dismissal or removal are drastic and enduring. The power to condone delay is discretionary in nature and is required to be exercised in a liberal, pragmatic, and justice- oriented manner when refusal to condone the delay would result in miscarriage of justice. 21. In the considered opinion of this Court, the revisional authority ought to have adopted a lenient and equitable approach and should have proceeded to decide the revision on merits instead of non-suiting the petitioner solely on the ground of limitation. Ends of justice would, therefore, be better served by condoning the delay and directing adjudication of the revision on its own merits. 22. Accordingly, taking a very lenient view in the matter and in the interest of justice, the delay in filing the revision is hereby condoned. The impugned order passed by the Commissioner, Durg Division, Durg is set aside to the extent it dismisses the revision on the ground of limitation. The Commissioner, Durg Division, Durg is directed to reconsider and decide the revision 13 filed by the petitioner afresh on its own merits, in accordance with law, after granting due opportunity of hearing to all concerned parties. 23. With the aforesaid observations/directions, the writ petition stands disposed of. Sd/- (Amitendra Kishore Prasad) Judge Yogesh