JUDGMENT : T.R.RAVI, J. The appeal has been filed by the plaintiff in OS No.41 of 2009 on the file of the Sub Court, Thiruvalla against the dismissal of a suit for injunction restraining defendants 1 and 2 from selling plaint A schedule properties pursuant to the notice issued on 20.02.2009 and for a declaration that A and B schedule properties are released from the liabilities to the defendant Bank. Parties are referred to as per their status in the suit. The short facts pleaded by the plaintiff are as follows: 2. The plaintiff is a shareholder of the 3 rd defendant company. The company availed a loan of Rs. 100 lakhs from the 1 st defendant Bank on 22.02.2001. Three items of properties were offered as collateral security to the loan. The plaintiff was a guarantor along with several others. According to the plaintiff, he had deposited the title deeds relating to plaint A and B schedule properties with the Bank, much earlier to the granting of the loan on 22.02.2001 and the purpose of deposit of the title deeds was not for securing the loan that was availed of by the 3 rd defendant on 22.02.2001. According to the plaintiff, the liabilities to the Bank for which plaint A and B schedule properties were furnished as security had been discharged. Another specific contention that is taken in the plaint is that, the title deed of the plaint B schedule property was deposited in the Bank as collateral security for a facility availed by St. Mary's Motors. The 1 st defendant filed O.P.No.30 of 2004 before the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Ernakulam for recovery of the amounts advanced. On 11.07.2007, the 1 st defendant issued notice under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act to the plaintiff and other guarantors. One of the guarantors named Boby Kuriakose had alleged that the equitable mortgage was created at a time when he was abroad and had also filed a complaint before the Police which was registered as Crime No.270 of 2008 by the Thiruvalla Police, which was under investigation. The sale notification was challenged by the plaintiff and others by filing S.A.No.87 of 2007 before the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Ernakulam on the ground that it was vitiated by fraud. It is alleged that the 1 st defendant was trying to misuse the title deeds, which had been deposited for a different purpose. 3. The sale notification was challenged by the plaintiff and others by filing S.A.No.87 of 2007 before the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Ernakulam on the ground that it was vitiated by fraud. It is alleged that the 1 st defendant was trying to misuse the title deeds, which had been deposited for a different purpose. 3. Defendants 1 and 2 filed written statement contending that the suit is not maintainable and is barred by limitation. It is contended that under Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act, the suit against the Bank is not maintainable in view of the overriding provisions in Section 35. It is stated that the plaintiff who is the 3 rd defendant in O.A. No.80 of 2004 pending before the DRT, Ernakulam had filed a written statement on 11.08.2005, wherein there is no allegation of fraud. It is stated that in the reply notice dated 24.12.2003, the plaintiff had admitted the liability to the Bank. It is further stated that in S.A.No.87 of 2007 filed by the plaintiff, the creation of the mortgage and the execution of the guarantee agreement have not been challenged by the plaintiff. There is a statement that the loan was sanctioned on 19.12.2000 and not on 22.02.2001, which has been relied on by the plaintiff to submit that there cannot be two dates of grant of the loan. The contention that the title deeds were deposited for a different purpose has been denied and the contention that the deposit of title deeds was for a facility enjoyed by St.Mary's Motors has also been denied. 4. PW1 and PW2 were examined on the side of the plaintiffs and Exhibits A1 to A20 were marked. On the side of the defendants, Exhibits B1 to B3 were marked. By judgment dated 29.11.2014, the trial court dismissed the suit. The following issues were framed for trial. 1. Whether the suit maintainable? 2. Whether the suit is properly valued? 3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to declaratory relief in respect of plaint 'A' and 'B' schedule properties? 4. Whether the injunction relief is allowable? 5. Reliefs and Costs? 5. The trial court found that the suit was not maintainable in view of the bar under Sections 17 and 34 of the SARFAESI Act and the provisions of the Debt Recovery Tribunal Act. 4. Whether the injunction relief is allowable? 5. Reliefs and Costs? 5. The trial court found that the suit was not maintainable in view of the bar under Sections 17 and 34 of the SARFAESI Act and the provisions of the Debt Recovery Tribunal Act. In view of the finding regarding the maintainability, issues 3 and 4 were also found against the plaintiff. The trial court found that there is no scope for filing a civil suit during the pendency of the proceedings before the DRT and there is an equally efficacious remedy available to the plaintiff. Aggrieved by the judgment, this appeal has been filed. 6. Heard Sri Joseph Kodianthara, Senior Advocate, instructed by Sri Abraham Joseph Markos for the appellant, Sri Thomas T. Varghese for respondents 1 and 2 and Sri Santhosh Mathew, Senior Advocate, instructed by Sri K.N. Radhakrishnan (Thiruvalla) for the additional 4 th respondent. 7. The main contention is that fraud has been played by the Bank and properties which were not actually mortgaged were being proceeded against. Several documents have been produced in the appeal, which are not seen produced before the trial court. 8. The counsel placed reliance on the decisions in Mardia Chemicals Ltd. & Ors. V. Union of India & Ors. [ (2004) 4 SCC 311 )] , Nahar Industrial Enterprises Limited V. Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation [ (2009) 8 SCC 646 )] , Indiabulls Housing Financ Ltd. V. Uma Maheswari (2014 SCC OnLine Mad 2960) , R. Gopalakrishna V. The Karnataka State Financial Corporation & Anr. (ILR 2008 Kar. 2034) and Central Bank of India V. Prabha Jain [ (2025) 4 SCC 38 )] 9. The counsel for respondents 1 and 2 submitted that the plaintiff had filed written statement in OA No.80 of 2004 before the DRT admitting the mortgage. It is submitted that the notice under the SARFAESI Act was issued later and even to the said notice, no objection was filed stating that there was no mortgage. It is submitted that the plaintiff thereafter filed S.A.No. 87 of 2007 along with others before the Debt Recovery Tribunal and when no interim orders were granted, the suit was filed in 2009. 10. A detailed counter affidavit has been filed to IA No.1 of 2019 producing Annexures R1 to R5. Annexure R2 is the judgment of this Court in F.A.O.No.174 of 2009. 10. A detailed counter affidavit has been filed to IA No.1 of 2019 producing Annexures R1 to R5. Annexure R2 is the judgment of this Court in F.A.O.No.174 of 2009. Annexure R3 is an order passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in S.L.P.No.21027 of 2009. Annexure R4 is the judgment dated 04.01.2017 in O.P(DRT) No.24 of 2014 which was after the filing of this appeal. Annexure R5 is the copy of S.A.No.87 of 2007 filed by the plaintiff and others before the DRT-II, Ernakulam. Annexure R1 is a letter dated 16.08.2000 from the plaintiff and others to the 1 st defendant, wherein it is stated that the property owned by the plaintiff and others is being offered as security to the mortgage. 11. I have considered the documents produced before this Court as well as the judgment and decree of the court below and the arguments advanced by the counsel on either side. 12. In Mardia Chemicals (Supra) , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that a full reading of Section 34 shows that the jurisdiction of the civil court is barred in respect of matters which a Debts Recovery Tribunal or an Appellate Tribunal is empowered to determine in respect of any action taken “or to be taken in pursuance of any power conferred under this Act”. The Court further held that to a very limited extent jurisdiction of the civil court can also be invoked, where for example, the action of the secured creditor is alleged to be fraudulent or his claim may be so absurd and untenable which may not require any probe whatsoever or to say precisely to the extent it is permissible to bring an action in civil court in the cases of English mortgages. In Nahar Industrial Enterprises (supra) , the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated the principle that jurisdiction of the civil court is barred only in respect of matters which strictly come within the purview of Section 17 and not beyond the same. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the Tribunal was constituted for a specific purpose as is evident from the statement of objects and the preamble of the Act, with a limited jurisdiction, and no independent proceedings can be initiated before it by a debtor. The Court held that the Tribunal would not be a civil court. 13. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the Tribunal was constituted for a specific purpose as is evident from the statement of objects and the preamble of the Act, with a limited jurisdiction, and no independent proceedings can be initiated before it by a debtor. The Court held that the Tribunal would not be a civil court. 13. In Indiabulls Housing Financ (Supra) , a learned Single Judge of the High Court of Madras considered a case where allegations of fraud have been made in the plaint with regard to a matter relating to recovery of loan by a secured creditor. The Court found that there are sufficient allegations of fraud which would justify the filing of a civil suit and particularly since in the opinion of the court, a case of fraud had been made out. 14. In R.Gopalakrishna (Supra) , a Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court considered the bar of suit under the Karnataka Public Moneys (Recovery of Dues) Act, 1979. The Court held that jurisdiction of Civil Court gets barred only if the Special Statute provides an adequate and satisfactory alternate remedy to a party aggrieved and since a declaratory relief and consequential injunction cannot be granted by a Special Tribunal, the Civil Court's jurisdiction cannot be said to be ousted. 15. In State Bank of Patiala V. Mukesh Jain [ 2017(1) SCC 53 ] , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that no writ court can entertain any suit challenging proceedings initiated under Section 13 of the Act. That was a case in which a civil suit was filed on receiving notice under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act. In Central Bank of India (Supra) , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has considered the issue elaborately and held that the civil court's jurisdiction is ousted only in respect of those matters which the Debts Recovery Tribunal or the Appellate Tribunal is empowered by or under the SARFAESI to determine. The Apex Court noted the decision in Electrosteel Castings Ltd. v. UV Asset Reconstruction Co. Ltd. [(2022) 2 SCC 573] , wherein it was held that mere allegations of fraud in the plaint will not overcome the bar under Section 34. The relevant portion of the judgment is extracted below: “9. The Apex Court noted the decision in Electrosteel Castings Ltd. v. UV Asset Reconstruction Co. Ltd. [(2022) 2 SCC 573] , wherein it was held that mere allegations of fraud in the plaint will not overcome the bar under Section 34. The relevant portion of the judgment is extracted below: “9. Having considered the pleadings and averments in the suit more particularly the use of word “fraud” even considering the case on behalf of the plaintiff, we find that the allegations of “fraud” are made without any particulars and only with a view to get out of the bar under Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act and by such a clever drafting the plaintiff intends to bring the suit maintainable despite the bar under Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act, which is not permissible at all and which cannot be approved. ... ... ..." 16. In the case on hand, the facts would reveal that the loan had been availed prior to 2001. Though a contention is raised that Plaint A and B schedule properties were mortgaged towards a different loan facility availed by a different entity, no materials were placed before the trial court to substantiate such a case. The pleadings do not contain any indication as to the loan which had been availed by such an entity. No details regarding the day on which the equitable mortgage was created over the properties to secure the alleged loan have been stated in the plaint. There are also no details as to how the said loan was discharged. At the same time, the materials placed before this Court would show that on 16.08.2020 the title deeds had been pledged before the Bank along with a statement about the intention to create an equitable mortgage. The judgment in F.A.O.No.174 of 2009 has considered the contentions raised in this appeal, though at an interlocutory stage. The Court had noticed the fact that no attempt had been made from the side of the plaintiff to prove the allegation that the deposit of his title deeds in respect of the plaint schedule properties was for an entirely different transaction. The Court found that the plea of fraud, concoction and manipulation alleged by the plaintiff cannot be accepted at that stage. The Court found that the plea of fraud, concoction and manipulation alleged by the plaintiff cannot be accepted at that stage. A Special Leave Petition filed before the Hon'ble Supreme Court against the judgment in F.A.O.No.174 of 2009 was dismissed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on 06.12.2013. S.A.No. 87 of 2007, which had been filed by the plaintiff before the Debt Recovery Tribunal as early as in 2007 does not state anything about the validity or otherwise of the mortgage. In paragraph 1 of the statement of facts, the applicants before the Debt Recovery Tribunal had clearly admitted the fact that an equitable mortgage had been created over their properties to secure the loans. The loan referred to is the credit facility of Rs. 1 Crore availed from the 2 nd defendant Bank. Reference has been made to the sanction letter dated 22.02.2001. The application speaks about disputes between the shareholders of the company and about fraud in removing machineries and selling them. No case of fraud in the creation of the equitable mortgage or in the execution of the guarantee agreement has been stated anywhere. As such, it cannot be treated as a case where there is a fraud made out from the pleadings which would justify the filing of the civil suit. I do not find any reason to interfere with the judgment and decree of the trial court. The appeal fails and is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs, in the circumstances of the case.