1 2026:CGHC:16319 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CR No. 288 of 2025 Cholamandalam Ms General Insurance Company Limited, Through Branch Manager, Branch Office At- Ward No. 25 (Guru Govind Singh Ward), Second Floor, Simran Towers, Pandri Road, In Front Of L.I.C. Office, Raipur, District- Raipur (C.G.) ... Applicant. versus 1 - Dinesh Kumar Nishad S/o Shri Maniram Nishad Aged About 39 Years Residence And Post- Konargarh, Police Station- Mulmula, District- Janjgir- Champa (C.G.) (Claimant) 2 - Rajesh Kumar Soni S/o Kashi Prasad Soni Aged About 33 Years Residence And Post- Devrikhurd (Atal Awas Colony), Torwa, Police Station, Torwa, Tehsil And District- Bilaspur (C.G.) (Driver) 3 - Ashish Kumar Pahunchal S/o Durgesh Pahunchal Residence- Shiv Mandir Gali, Old Power House, Devridih Torwa, Police Station- Torwa, Tehsil And District Bilaspur (C.G.) (Owner) ... Respondent(s) For Applicant : Ms. Aditi Diwan, Advocate. Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad Order on Board 09/04/2026 1. The applicant being Insurance Company has called in question the legality, propriety and correctness of the proceedings initiated and order dated 10.09.2025 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunals, Bilaspur C.G. AVINASH SHARMA Digitally signed by AVINASH SHARMA Date: 2026.04.16 10:38:57 +0530 2 in relation to MACT No.1923 of 2023 preferred under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short, ‘M.V. Act’) by the Respondent No.1 whereby, application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act preferred by the Respondent No.1 has been allowed and delay in filing the claim petition has been condoned. Whereas, application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC filed by the applicant Insurance Company has been rejected. 2. The core issue involved in the present case to the maintainability of claim petition filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation and the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to condone such delay. 3. The facts, in brief are that the claimants/Respondent No.1 instituted applications under Section 166 of the M.V. Act seeking compensation on account of injuries sustained in motor accidents. However, the said claim petition was filed beyond the statutory period prescribed under Section 166(3) of the M.V. Act. Upon such filing, the present applicant/revisionist i.e., the Insurance Companies and the vehicle owners, raised objections before the concerned Tribunals and preferred applications seeking rejection of the claim petitions on the ground that the same were barred by limitation and thus not maintainable. 4. The Tribunals, however, declined to accept the objections raised by the revisionists and proceeded to entertain the claim petition by condoning the delay in filing the same. While doing so, the Tribunals, in substance, invoked principles analogous to Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (for short, ‘Limitation Act’), and held that sufficient cause had been shown for 3 condonation of delay. 5. Consequently, the application preferred by the present revisionist under Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC seeking rejection of the claim petition came to be dismissed, giving rise to the present civil revision. 6. The applicant has assailed the impugned order primarily on the ground that the learned Tribunal has acted with material irregularity and illegality in assuming jurisdiction not vested in them by law. It is contended that the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, being a statutory forum constituted under the M.V. Act, is bound by the provisions of the said Act and cannot travel beyond the same. According to the applicants, there is no provision under the Act, particularly after the amendments brought into force, which empowers the Tribunal to condone delay in filing claim petitions under Section 166 of the M.V. Act, and therefore, the invocation of principles akin to Section 5 of the Limitation Act is wholly misconceived and impermissible. 7. It is further contended that the claim petition, having been instituted beyond the statutorily prescribed period, could not have been entertained at all, and the failure on the part of the learned Tribunals to reject such petition at the threshold amounts to a jurisdictional error. It has also been urged that, in several instances, the delay has been condoned without affording adequate and effective opportunity of hearing to the present revisionist, i.e., the Insurance Company thereby resulting in violation of the principles of natural justice. According to the applicant, the impugned order thus suffer from non-application of mind, patent illegality and jurisdictional infirmity, 4 warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. 8. It is further submitted that the issue relating to the scope, applicability and condonability of delay under Section 166(3) of the M.V. Act has been engaging consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a batch of proceedings, wherein interim protection has also been granted. In the said proceedings, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has, inter alia, directed that claim petitions ought not to be dismissed at this stage solely on the ground of limitation, thereby indicating that the issue is yet to attain finality and is under active consideration before the Apex Court. 9. In this context, reference is made to the order passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in ICICI Lombard General Insurance Company Limited v. Ayiti Navaneetha and others (Special Leave to Appeal (C) Nos. 8412–8413/2023 and connected matters), wherein, vide order dated 04.11.2025, it has been specifically observed that the Tribunals and the High Courts shall not dismiss claim petitions on the ground that such petitions are barred by limitation under Section 166(3) of the M.V. Act. Taking note of the aforesaid interim directions, this Court had earlier directed the concerned Motor Accident Claims Tribunals to proceed with the claim cases, however, no final award shall be passed. 10. Further, in continuation thereof and in view of the subsequent order passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bhagirathi Dash v. Union of India and another (Writ Petition (Civil) No.166/2024) vide order dated 19.03.2026, whereby the matter has been directed to be listed for further hearing, this 5 Court is of the considered opinion that a balanced approach is required to be adopted. Accordingly, while the concerned Tribunals shall be at liberty to proceed with the adjudication of the claim petitions in accordance with law, it is directed that no final order shall be passed until the issue is finally settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 11.It is further clarified that in the event any order is passed which operates in favour of the Insurance Companies or the vehicle owners, it shall be open to them to bring such development to the notice of the concerned Tribunal, and upon such intimation, the Tribunal shall be at liberty to pass appropriate orders, strictly in accordance with law and subject to the final outcome of the proceedings pending before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 12.In view of the factual matrix as delineated hereinabove, particularly the interim directions issued by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in relation to the issue of limitation under Section 166(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, this Court finds that the principal grievance raised by the applicants i.e. Insurance Companies as well as vehicle owners, seeking outright rejection of the claim petitions on the ground of delay, cannot be countenanced at this stage. The directions of the Apex Court clearly mandate that such claim petitions ought not to be dismissed solely on the ground of limitation pending final adjudication of the issue. 13. Having bestowed anxious consideration to the submission of the applicant and upon perusal of the material available on record, this Court is of the considered opinion that the challenge laid by the applicant does not warrant 6 interference in exercise of revisional jurisdiction at this stage. The orders passed by the learned Tribunals, in so far as they proceed to entertain the claim petitions instead of rejecting them at the threshold, cannot be said to suffer from such jurisdictional error or material irregularity as would call for interference, particularly in light of the binding interim directions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 14.At the same time, considering the contention of the applicant with regard to lack of jurisdiction and the alleged improper exercise of discretion in condoning delay, it is deemed appropriate to balance the competing interests of the parties. While the claimants cannot be non-suited at the threshold on technical grounds of limitation, the rights and objections of the Insurance Companies and vehicle owners also deserve to be adequately safeguarded. 15. Accordingly, it is directed that the concerned Motor Accident Claims Tribunals shall proceed with the adjudication of the claim petitions in accordance with law. However, no final award shall be passed by the Tribunals until the issue relating to the applicability and condonation of delay under Section 166(3) of the M.V. Act is conclusively decided by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. It is further observed that all contentions of the parties, including those relating to limitation, jurisdiction, and the applicability of the provisions of the Limitation Act, are kept open to be urged at the appropriate stage, and the Tribunals shall consider the same independently, uninfluenced by any prima facie observations made in the 7 present proceedings. 16.Needless to say, in the event there is any subsequent development or authoritative pronouncement by the Hon’ble Supreme Court governing the field, it shall be open to either party to bring the same to the notice of the concerned Tribunal, which shall thereafter proceed to pass appropriate orders strictly in accordance with law and in consonance with such pronouncement. 17. In view of the aforesaid, the present civil revision stand disposed of. Any interim orders operating in these matters shall stand vacated forthwith, subject, however, to the directions issued hereinabove. 18.Pending interlocutory applications, if any, also stand disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs. Sd/- (Amitendra Kishore Prasad) Judge Avinash