2026:HHC:12544 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MP(M) No. 489 of 2026 Reserved on: 6.4.2026 Date of Decision: 21.4.2026. Sukhwinder Singh …. Petitioner Versus State of HP …. Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Petitioner : Mr. Parikshit Rathour, Advocate. For the Respondent/State : Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, Additional Advocate General. For the victim : Mr. Ashok Kumar, Advocate. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioner has filed the present petition seeking pre-arrest bail in FIR No. 205 of 2025, dated 21.11.2025, registered in Police Station Shimla West, District Shimla, H.P., for the commission of offences punishable under Section 420, 120-B and 506 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). 2. It has been asserted that the informant, Jyoti Dashrath Sisodia, filed a complaint regarding the fraud of ₹28.00 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:12544 lakhs. She asserted that she had deposited ₹4.00 lacs in the account of the Eagle Advisory Agency on 12.12.2023 for sending her sister abroad. However, the agency did not contact the informant. The informant was travelling from Shimla to Chandigarh on 05.11.2024, and she met Radhika alias Manju Kumari and discussed the matter with her. Radhika alias Manju assured the informant that Inderjeet Singh was posted as a sub- Inspector in Police Station, Kharar, and he would assist the informant in tracing the agency. The informant contacted Inderjeet Singh and re-initiated the immigration proceedings for her sister. She deposited the money in the accounts of Radhika alias Manju Kumari and Inderjeet Singh on different occasions. They failed to honour their promise, and the informant made a complaint to the police. The police arrested Manju, and she disclosed that the real name of Inderjeet Singh was Sukhvinder Singh (petitioner), and some money was transferred into his account by Manju Kumari. The petitioner apprehends his arrest in the aforesaid FIR based on the statement made by Manju. There is no evidence against the petitioner except the statement made by the co-accused, which is inadmissible in evidence. 3 2026:HHC:12544 Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. 3. The petition is opposed by filing a status report asserting that the informant wanted to send her younger sister to Canada. She had paid ₹4.00 lacs to an agent on 12.12.2023. However, the agent ran away in April 2024. The informant was travelling to Chandigarh on 05.11.2024, and she met Radhika alias Manju Kumari on the way. She revealed that she was running an NGO in Chandigarh and asked the informant about any work in Chandigarh. The informant told Radhika alias Manju Kumari about the fraud committed by the agent. Radhika told the informant that Inderjeet Singh Grewal was posted as a sub- Inspector in Kharar Police Station, and he would assist the informant in recovering the amount. The informant talked to Inderjeet Singh Grewal, who told her that her sister had tried for immigration three times, nobody had visited the immigration ofÏce, and her VISA would be rejected. He assured to send the informant’s younger sister abroad and demanded ₹3-4 lakhs for this process. The informant handed over the documents and the passport to Inderjeet Singh Grewal. The informant had paid a total amount of ₹26 to ₹27 lakhs to Radhika and Inderjeet Singh 4 2026:HHC:12544 Grewal between 20.11.2024 and 20.02.2025. However, the immigration process was not completed. The informant made a complaint to the police, and the police registered the FIR. The police arrested Manju, who revealed during the interrogation that the real name of Inderjeet Singh Grewal was Sukhvinder Singh (the present petitioner). She had transferred ₹12.00 lakhs in the account of Sukhvinder Singh and had paid ₹4.00 lacs to him in cash. The police found that the account in which the money was transferred belonged to the petitioner’s father, who revealed during the enquiry that this account was being operated by the petitioner. The petitioner had obtained pre-arrest bail from the learned Trial Court, and he produced the passport of the informant’s younger sister, which was seized by the police. The petitioner had taken about ₹25.00 lakhs from the informant and his sister. He would indulge in the commission of a similar offence in case of his release on bail. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. 4. I have heard Mr Parikshit Rathour, learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional 5 2026:HHC:12544 Advocate General for the respondent/State and Mr Ashok Kumar, learned counsel for the victim. 5. Mr Parikshit Rathaur, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he was falsely implicated. There are discrepancies in the statement of the informant regarding the payment of the money, which makes the prosecution's case suspect. The petitioner would join the investigation as and when directed to do so; hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and that the petitioner be released on bail. 6. Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State, submitted that the petitioner is involved in an economic offence. He has criminal antecedents and is likely to indulge in the commission of similar offences in case of his release on bail. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 7. Mr Ashok Kumar, learned counsel for the victim, adopted the submissions made by Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General and prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 6 2026:HHC:12544 8. I have given a considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 9. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in P. Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2019) 9 SCC 24: (2019) 3 SCC (Cri) 509: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1143 that arrest is a part of the investigation procedure. The power of pre-arrest bail is extraordinary and should be sparingly exercised. It was observed: “69. Ordinarily, an arrest is a part of the procedure of the investigation to secure not only the presence of the accused but also several other purposes. Power under Section 438 Cr.P.C. is an extraordinary power, and the same has to be exercised sparingly. The privilege of pre- arrest bail should be granted only in exceptional cases. The judicial discretion conferred upon the court has to be properly exercised after application of mind as to the nature and gravity of the accusation; the possibility of the applicant fleeing justice, and other factors to decide whether it is a fit case for the grant of anticipatory bail. Grant of anticipatory bail to some extent interferes with the sphere of investigation of an offence, and hence, the court must be circumspect while exercising such power for the grant of anticipatory bail. Anticipatory bail is not to be granted as a matter of rule, and it has to be granted only when the court is convinced that exceptional circumstances exist to resort to that extraordinary remedy.” 10. This position was reiterated in Srikant Upadhyay v. State of Bihar, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 282, wherein it was held: 7 2026:HHC:12544 “25. We have already held that the power to grant anticipatory bail is extraordinary. Though in many cases it was held that bail is said to be a rule, it cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be said that anticipatory bail is the rule. It cannot be the rule, and the question of its grant should be left to the cautious and judicious discretion of the Court, depending on the facts and circumstances of each case. While called upon to exercise the said power, the Court concerned has to be very cautious, as the grant of interim protection or protection to the accused in serious cases may lead to a miscarriage of justice and may hamper the investigation to a great extent, as it may sometimes lead to tampering or distraction of the evidence. We shall not be understood to have held that the Court shall not pass interim protection pending consideration of such application as the Section is destined to safeguard the freedom of an individual against unwarranted arrest, and we say that such orders shall be passed in eminently fit cases.” 11. It was held in Pratibha Manchanda v. State of Haryana, (2023) 8 SCC 181: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 785 that the Courts should balance individual rights, public interest and fair investigation while considering an application for pre-arrest bail. It was observed: “21. The relief of anticipatory bail is aimed at safeguarding individual rights. While it serves as a crucial tool to prevent the misuse of the power of arrest and protects innocent individuals from harassment, it also presents challenges in maintaining a delicate balance between individual rights and the interests of justice. The tightrope we must walk lies in striking a balance between safeguarding individual rights and protecting public interest. While the right to liberty and presumption of innocence are vital, the court must also consider the gravity of the offence, the impact on society, 8 2026:HHC:12544 and the need for a fair and free investigation. The court's discretion in weighing these interests in the facts and circumstances of each case becomes crucial to ensure a just outcome.” 12. It was held in Devinder Kumar Bansal v. State of Punjab, (2025) 4 SCC 493: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 488 that pre-arrest bail can be granted in exceptional circumstances where the Court is of the view that the petitioner was falsely implicated in the case, and the presumption of innocence cannot be a reason to grant bail. It was observed on page 501: “21. The parameters for the grant of anticipatory bail in a serious offence like corruption are required to be satisfied. Anticipatory bail can be granted only in exceptional circumstances where the court is prima facie of the view that the applicant has been falsely implicated in the crime or the allegations are politically motivated or are frivolous. So far as the case at hand is concerned, it cannot be said that any exceptional circumstances have been made out by the petitioner-accused for the grant of anticipatory bail, and there is no frivolity in the prosecution. 22. In the aforesaid context, we may refer to a pronouncement in CBI v. V. Vijay Sai Reddy[CBIv.V. Vijay Sai Reddy, (2013) 7 SCC 452: (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 563], wherein this Court expressed thus: (SCC p. 465, para 34) “34. While granting bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusation, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of 9 2026:HHC:12544 the public/State and other similar considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for the purpose of granting bail, the legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy itself as to whether there is a genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge. It is not expected, at this stage, to have the evidence establishing the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt.” (emphasis in original and supplied) 23. The presumption of innocence, by itself, cannot be the sole consideration for the grant of anticipatory bail. The presumption of innocence is one of the considerations that the court should keep in mind while considering the plea for anticipatory bail. The salutary rule is to balance the cause of the accused and the cause of public justice. Over- solicitous homage to the accused's liberty can, sometimes, defeat the cause of public justice. 13. The present petition has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 14. The status report mentions that the petitioner had produced the informant’s younger sister's passport, which prima facie shows his involvement in the commission of the crime. The statements of account show that the informant had transferred money to Radhika alias Manju Kumari, who had transferred the money to the account of the petitioner’s father. The petitioner’s father specifically stated that the petitioner was operating his account. These circumstances prima facie 10 2026:HHC:12544 show the petitioner’s involvement in the commission of the crime. 15. It was submitted that the petitioner is being arrested based on a statement made by the co-accused, which is legally inadmissible in evidence. This submission will not help the petitioner. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India vs Khaliludeen 2022 Supreme SC 1247 that bail can be denied to the accused, who was named by the co-accused. It was observed: “8. The answer to said question could be the statement recorded by Md. Nizam Uddin. The statement of Md. Jakir Hussain, recorded under Section 67 of the act, has also named his owner Abdul Hai. We are conscious of the fact that the validity and scope of such statements under Section 67 have been pronounced upon by this Court in Tofan Singh vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (2021) 4 SCC 1. In State by (NCB) Bengaluru vs. Pallulabid Ahmad Arimutta and Another, 2022 Live Law (SC) 69, the rigour of law laid down by this Court in Tofan Singh was held to be applicable even at the stage of grant of bail. 9. However, going by the circumstances on record, at this stage, on the strength of the statement of Md. Nizam Uddin, though allegedly retracted later, the matter stands on a different footing. In our considered view, in the face of the mandate of Section 37 of the Act, the High Court could not and ought not to have released the accused on bail. We, therefore, allow these appeals, set aside the view taken by the High Court and direct that both the appellants be taken in custody forthwith”. 11 2026:HHC:12544 16. This position was reiterated in Union of India v. Ajay Kumar Singh, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 346, wherein it was held: “11. The information revealed by the above two accused persons indicated that both of them knew the respondent-accused and that they had connived with him to transport the illicit ganja, and that they were in direct contact with the respondent- accused all through his mobile number. The facts as unfurled from the complaint/FIR and the statements of the above two accused persons recorded under Section 67 of the NDPS Act reveal that the respondent-accused is the kingpin and the organiser of the illicit trade in ganja. Xxxx 17. The quantity of “ganja” recovered is admittedly of commercial quantity. The High Court has not recorded any finding that the respondent-accused is not prima facie guilty of the offence alleged and that he is not likely to commit the same offence when enlarged on bail; rather, his antecedents are indicative that he is a regular offender. In the absence of a recording of such satisfaction by the court, we are of the opinion that the High Court manifestly erred in enlarging the respondent-accused on bail. 17. It was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Samarth Kumar, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 2087, that the accused cannot be released on pre-arrest bail relying upon the judgment in Tofan Singh (supra). It was observed: “4. The High Court decided to grant pre-arrest bail to the respondents on the only ground that no recovery was effected from the respondents and that they had been implicated only on the basis of the disclosure statement of the main accused, Dinesh Kumar. Therefore, reliance was placed by the High Court in the majority judgment of this Court in Tofan Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2021) 4 SCC 1. xxxxx 12 2026:HHC:12544 8. In cases of this nature, the respondents may be able to take advantage of the decision in Tofan Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu (supra), perhaps at the time of arguing the regular bail application or at the time of final hearing after the conclusion of the trial. 9. To grant anticipatory bail in a case of this nature is not really warranted. Therefore, we are of the view that the High Court fell into an error in granting anticipatory bail to the respondents.” (Emphasis supplied) 18. These judgments were followed by this Court in Rajesh Kumar v. State of H.P., Cr.MP(M) No. 458 of 2025, decided on 25.3.2025, and it was held that the pre-arrest bail can be denied to a person named by the co-accused to enable the police to interrogate the petitioner. An SLP No. 55547 of 2025 titled Rajesh Kumar Vs. State of H.P. against this order was withdrawn on 21.4.2025. It was held by this Court in Jatinder Pal Singh vs. State of HP 2025:HHC:20446 that a person named by the co-accused is not entitled to pre-arrest bail. This order was upheld by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Jatinder Pal Singh vs. State of HP, Petition for Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No. 9629/2025 decided on 10.07.2025. 19. Thus, the submission that the statement made by the co-accused is inadmissible and the petitioner is entitled to pre- arrest bail cannot be accepted. 13 2026:HHC:12544 20. In the present case, the police have relied upon the financial transaction between the informant, the co-accused, and the petitioner’s father, who claimed that the petitioner was operating his account, and the recovery of the passport at the petitioner’s instance, to show his involvement. Therefore, it is not correct to say that the petitioner is being arrayed as an accused based on a statement made by the co-accused. 21. The status report shows that the petitioner is to be interrogated. The petitioner had obtained pre-arrest bail and had not co-operated with the investigation. The petitioner is involved in an economic offence, and his custodial interrogation is necessary to proceed further. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State Versus Anil Sharma (1997) 7 SCC 187 that where custodial interrogation is required, pre-arrest bail should not be granted. It was observed: “6. We find force in the submission of the CBI that custodial interrogation is qualitatively more elicitation- oriented than questioning a suspect who is well- ensconced with a favourable order under Section 438 of the Code. In a case like this, effective interrogation of a suspected person is of tremendous advantage in disinterring much useful information and also materials which would have been concealed. Success in such interrogation would elude if the suspected person knows that he is well protected and insulated by a pre-arrest bail 14 2026:HHC:12544 order during the time he is interrogated. Very often, interrogation in such a condition would reduce to a mere ritual. The argument that the custodial interrogation is fraught with the danger of the person being subjected to third-degree methods need not be countenanced, for such an argument can be advanced by all accused in all criminal cases. The Court has to presume that responsible Police OfÏcers would conduct themselves in a responsible manner and that those entrusted with the task of disinterring offences would not conduct themselves as offender” 22. A similar view was taken by the Delhi High Court in Mukesh Khurana v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2022 SCC OnLine Del 1032, wherein it was observed: - “13. One of the significant factors in determining this question would be the need for custodial interrogation. Without a doubt, custodial interrogation is more effective to question a suspect. The cocoon of protection afforded by a bail order insulates the suspect, and he could thwart interrogation, reducing it to futile rituals. But it must also be kept in mind that while interrogation of a suspect is one of the basic and effective methods of crime solving, the liberty of an individual also needs to be balanced out.” 23. It was held in P Chidambaram (supra) that the grant of pre-arrest bail may hamper the investigations. It was observed: “83. Grant of anticipatory bail at the stage of investigation may frustrate the investigating agency in interrogating the accused and in collecting useful information, and also the materials which might have been concealed. Success in such interrogation would elude if the accused knows that he is protected by the order of the court. Grant of anticipatory bail, particularly in economic offences, would definitely hamper the effective investigation. Having regard to the materials said to have been collected by the respondent Enforcement Directorate and 15 2026:HHC:12544 considering the stage of the investigation, we are of the view that it is not a fit case to grant anticipatory bail.” 24. It was submitted that there are discrepancies in the prosecution's case because the money was paid to the co-accused before the informant had met her. This submission will not help the petitioner. The Court has to see a prima facie case while deciding the bail petition, and it is impermissible to conduct a mini-trial at this stage. SufÏce it to say that the police have collected sufÏcient material to connect the petitioner to the commission of the crime, and the effect of the contradiction would be seen at the time of the trial. 25. No other point was urged. 26. In view of the above, the present petition fails, and it is dismissed. 27. The observations made hereinabove are regarding the disposal of this petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 21st April, 2026 (Chander)