1 2026:CGHC:15944-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WA No. 279 of 2026 Smt. Santoshi Chouhan W/o Shri Ashok Kumar Chouhan Aged About 30 Years (Daughter of Anil Kumar Chouhan) Working As Aagan Badi Worker R/o Village Bhawanipur Tahsil Lailunga District - Raigarh (C.G.) ... Appellant versus 1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through Secretary, Department of Women And Child Development Mahanadi Bhawan Mantralaya New Raipur District - Raipur (C.G.) 2 - Chief Executive Officer Janpad Panchayat Lailunga District - Raigarh (C.G.) 3 - Smt. Bhagyawati Chouhan Daughter of Babulal Chouhan R/o Village Bhawanipur Tahsil Lailunga District - Raigarh (C.G.) ... Respondents For Appellant(s) : Mr. Viprasen Agrawal and Mr. Shashi Kumar Kushwaha, Advocates. For Respondent Nos.1 & 2/State : Mr. Prasun Bhaduri, Dy A.G. For Respondent No.3 : Ms. Bulbul Agrawal, Advocate. Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal , Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice 08.0 4 .202 6 1. Heard Mr. Viprasen Agrawal and Mr. Shashi Kumar Kushwaha, learned counsel for the appellants. Also heard Mr. Prasun Bhaduri, leaned Deputy Government Advocate, appearing for ROHIT KUMAR CHANDRA Digitally signed by ROHIT KUMAR CHANDRA 2 respondent Nos.1 and 2/State and Ms, Bulbul Agrawal, learned counsel for respondent No.3. 2. This writ appeal is presented against an order dated 02.01.2026 passed by the learned Single Judge in WPS No. 1038 of 2025 (Smt. Santoshi Couhan vs. State of Chhattisgarh and others), whereby the writ petition filed by the writ petitioner/appellant herein has been dismissed by the learned Single Judge. 3. The brief facts of the case is that the appellant was appointed as Aanganbadi Karyakarta pursuant to an advertisement dated 23.12.2015 issued by the Chief Executive Officer, Janpad Panchayat Lailunga, District Raigarh (C.G.), and was selected and appointed vide order dated 29.12.2016, though respondent No.3, who was also an applicant, initially challenged the said appointment by filing Writ Petition (S) No. 1178/2017, which was withdrawn with liberty to file an appeal before the competent authority. Thereafter, respondent No. 3 preferred an appeal before the Collector on 25.04.2017, beyond the prescribed limitation period of 30 days under the Chhattisgarh Panchayat (Appeal and Revision) Rules, 1995, without filing any application for condonation of delay, however, the appellate authority condoned the delay and allowed the appeal, holding that after marriage the appellant ceased to be a resident of village Bhawanipur and consequently quashed her appointment, directing appointment of the next eligible candidate. Aggrieved thereby, the appellant preferred a revision under Section 91 of the Chhattisgarh 3 Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam, 1993 before the Commissioner, Bilaspur Division, contending inter alia that the appeal was time- barred, that she was residing in Bhawanipur even after marriage as confirmed by enquiry, and that she was more qualified than respondent No.3, however, the revisional authority, vide order dated 17.01.2025, dismissed the revision, affirming the finding that the appellant was a resident of Katkaliya and not Bhawanipur, and upheld the appellate order. Being aggrieved by the same, the appellant preferred writ-petition bearing WPS No.1038 of 2025 before this Court which was dismissed by the learned Single Judge vide impugned order dated 02.01.2026. Hence, this appeal. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the impugned order dated 02.01.2026 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P. (S) No. 1038/2025 is wholly illegal, erroneous and contrary to the settled principles of law, and therefore, the same is liable to be set aside. He further submits that the learned Single Judge has erred in paragraph 7 in holding that the contention of the appellant regarding non-filing of an application for condonation of delay has lost significance, and that the appellate authority was justified in condoning the delay pursuant to the liberty granted by the High Court, whereas, in fact, the High Court had merely granted liberty to the private respondent to approach the appellate authority and had neither directed nor deemed the delay to be condoned, and therefore, it was incumbent upon the private respondent to file a 4 proper application seeking condonation of delay along with the appeal. He also submits that it is a settled position of law that an application for condonation of delay must be considered and decided at the threshold, thereby affording an opportunity to the opposite party to contest and, if necessary, challenge the same; however, in the present case, in absence of any such application, the appellate authority has condoned the delay at the final stage and proceeded to decide the appeal on merits, which has caused serious prejudice to the appellant by depriving her of the valuable right to oppose and challenge the condonation of delay. 5. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.3 opposed the submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellant and submits that the learned Single Judge after considering all the aspects of the matter has rightly dismissed the writ petition filed by the writ appellant / appellant herein, in which no interference is called for. 6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the impugned order and other documents appended with writ appeal. 7. Upon hearing learned counsel for the parties and perusing the record, it emerges that the primary grounds of challenge raised by the appellant relate to (i) condonation of delay by the appellate authority in absence of a formal application, and (ii) determination of the appellant’s residential status affecting her eligibility for appointment as Aanganbadi Karyakarta. 5 8. So far as the issue of limitation is concerned, it is not in dispute that respondent No.3 had initially approached the High Court and was granted liberty to avail the statutory remedy of appeal. Pursuant thereto, the appeal was filed before the competent authority, which proceeded to entertain the same and condoned the delay. Though no formal application for condonation of delay was filed, the appellate authority, taking into consideration the background in which liberty had been granted, exercised its discretion to condone the delay and adjudicate the matter on merits. The learned Single Judge has rightly observed that in the peculiar facts of the case, the technical objection regarding non- filing of a formal application for condonation of delay does not vitiate the proceedings, particularly when no substantial prejudice is demonstrated to have been caused to the appellant. 9. On merits, the concurrent findings recorded by the appellate authority as well as the revisional authority establish that the appellant, after marriage, was not a resident of village Bhawanipur but of village Katkaliya, thereby rendering her ineligible for appointment to the post in question. These findings are based on appreciation of material available on record and do not suffer from perversity or jurisdictional error warranting interference under writ jurisdiction. The learned Single Judge has rightly declined to re- appreciate such findings of fact. 10. It is a settled principle that in exercise of appellate jurisdiction, interference is not warranted where the findings are concurrent, 6 well-reasoned, and based on evidence, unless shown to be manifestly arbitrary or illegal. No such infirmity has been pointed out in the present case. 11. Accordingly, this Court is of the considered opinion that the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge does not call for interference. 12. The appeal, being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Chandra