2026:HHC:13236 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA CWP No.3906 of 2024 Decided on: 23.04.2026 Saurabh Kumar … Petitioner Versus State of Himachal Pradesh and others … Respondents Coram Hon’ble Mr. Justice Ajay Mohan Goel, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1Yes ____________________________________________________ _ For the petitioners: M/s Mohit Thakur and Aman Thakur, Advocates. For the respondents: Ms. Vandana Mishra, Advocate. Ajay Mohan Goel, Judge (Oral) By way of this petition, the petitioner assailed order dated 20.12.2022 (Annexure P-3), passed by the respondent-Board, in terms whereof, the services of the petitioner who was engaged with the respondent-Board as a Junior T-Mate on contact basis, were terminated with immediate effect on account of lodging of FIR against the petitioner under Sections 376 (2) (N), 376 (3), 506 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012, at Police Station, Dharampur, District, Mandi, Himachal Pradesh 2. Facts, necessary for the adjudication of this petition are that the petitioner was appointed as a Junior T-Mate on 08.03.2021 on contact basis. While serving as such, an FIR was registered against the petitioner, i.e. FIR No.97 of 2022, on 07.09.2022, under Sections 376 (2) (N), 376 (3), 506 of the Indian Penal Code and 1 Whether reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? 2 2026:HHC:13236 Section 6 of POCSO Act, 2012, at Police Station, Dharampur, District, Mandi, Himachal Pradesh. As a result of lodging of said FIR, as the petitioner was taken into police custody in terms Annexure P-3, his were terminated. Office Order dated 20.12.2022 (Annexure P-3) is quoted hereinbelow:- “OFFICE ORDER In compliance to contract policy of HPSEBL in-force vide notification No. HPSEBL (Sectt.)/R&E/106-10/2006- 86012-2013 dated 07-12.2007, whereas the offence with which Sh. Sourav Kumar, Jr. T/Mate on contract basis has been charged is of very serious and grave in the nature and he is continuously in Police/Judicial custody from the date he was arrested (w.e.f. 07.09.2022 at 11.35 PM) under the POCSO Act, and under Section 376 (2) (N) 506 IPC, working under Assistant Engineer, Electrical Sub-Division, HPSEBL, Sandhole. And whereas the said Sh. Sourav Kumar, Jr. T/Mate on contract basis was under Police custody w.e.f. 07.09.2022 at 11.35 PM, as per copy of Police report. The period detention of Police custody has exceeded Forty Eight Hours. Whereas the Executive Director (Pers.) HPSEBL, Vidyut Bhawan, Shimla-4 vide letter No. 46748-50 dated 16.12.2022 (copy enclosed) has directed to take action as per the terms and conditions of contract policy as framed by HPSEBL, since the Civil Service Rule are not applicable to the contract employees. Now, therefore, the said Sh. Sourav Kumar, Jr. T/Mate on contract basis is hereby terminated with immediate effect as per direction of the Executive Director 3 2026:HHC:13236 (Pers.) HPSEBL, Vidyut Bhawan, Shimla-4- vide his office letter No. HPSEBL/ (Sectt)/ FT-11/ 321-7/ T-Mate/ 2022- 86748-50 dated 16.12.2022 and terms and conditions of the contract agreement of Sh. Sourav Kumar, Jr. T/Mate on contract basis.” 3. The trial, which was conducted in the FIR lodged against the petitioner culminated into judgment dated 30.12.2023 (Annexure P-4) and in terms thereof, the petitioner has been acquitted of the offences alleged against him. It is in these circumstances that the petitioner has filed this petition with the reliefs prayed for. 4. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has drawn the attention of the Court to the termination order passed by the respondent-Board and also the judgment dated 30.12.2023, passed by the learned Special Judge, Fast Track Court (POCSO), Mandi, District Mandi, H.P. and submitted, that in light of the fact that the trial which was conducted in the FIR which was lodged against the petitioner, on account whereof, the services of the petitioner were terminated, has led to the acquittal of the petitioner. Therefore, as the foundation of the termination of services of the petitioner stands eroded, the termination order be set aside and the respondents be directed to re-engage the petitioner from the date of his termination with all consequential benefits. Learned counsel has also referred to the contents of the judgment passed by the Learned Special Judge and submitted that a perusal thereof would demonstrate that the acquittal of the petitioner per se is not on the ground that he has 4 2026:HHC:13236 been given benefit of doubt, though it is so mentioned in Para-56 of the judgment, but the same would demonstrate that the petitioner has been acquitted as the prosecution failed to prove its case against the petitioner. Accordingly, it is submitted that as the acquittal of the petitioner is honourable for all intents and purposes, the petition be allowed, as prayed for. 5. Opposing the prayer, learned Counsel for the respondent-Board has drawn the attention of the Court to Annexure R-A/3, appended with the reply filed by the Board and submitted that herein the act of the respondent-Board of terminating the service of the petitioner was a bona fide one. She argued that it is not as if the services of the petitioner were terminated by the Board out of any bias against the petitioner or as an act of colourable exercise of power. She submitted that in the backdrop of the fact that an FIR was lodged against the petitioner for allegedly committing a heinous offence, the services of the petitioner were terminated while he was in police custody, as stands explained in the termination order also. She further submitted that otherwise also, in terms of Annexure RA-3, as on account of the petitioner being in custody, he was un-authorisedly absenting himself from duty, therefore, the same otherwise also would have had automatically led to the termination of the contract and this is exactly what has been done by the Board in terms of the impugned order. She, thus submitted that as there is no error apparent in the impugned order, in terms 5 2026:HHC:13236 whereof, the services of the petitioner were terminated, the petition deserves dismissal. Learned Counsel also referred to the judgment passed by the learned Special Judge and submitted that in terms of Para-56 of the judgment, the acquittal is not an honourable one, but the petitioner has been given benefit of doubt. 6. I have heard learned Counsel for the petitioner as also Learned Counsel for the respondent-Board and have also carefully gone through the pleadings and the documents attended therewith, including Annexure P-3, i.e. the order of termination and judgment dated 30.12.2023 (Annexure P-4), passed by the Learned Special Judge. 7. On a query put to the learned Counsel for the parties, the Court stands informed that the judgment, dated 30.12.2023, passed by the learned Special Judge, Fast Track Court (POCSO), Mandi, District Mandi, H.P., was not challenged by the State and the same has attained finality. 8. It is a matter of record that the petitioner who was engaged on contract basis as a Junior T-Mate, was terminated from service with immediate effect vide Office Order dated 20.12.2022 (Annexure P-3), as a result of an FIR being registered against him on 07.09.2022, details whereof are not being repeated. It is also a matter of record that in terms of judgment dated 30.12.2023 (Annexure P-4), passed by the learned Special Judge, Fast Track Court (POCSO), Mandi, District Mandi, H.P., the petitioner has been 6 2026:HHC:13236 acquitted. 9. In Para-56 of the judgment passed by the Learned Special Judge, the following has been held:- “56. To recapitulate the above discussion, it is held that the prosecution has failed to prove the charges framed against the accused Saurab Kumar beyond reasonable doubt. As such, Point no.ll is decided in favour of accused and against the prosecution.” 10. Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Ram Lal Versus State of Rajasthan & Ors., Civil Appeal No.7935 of 2023 (Arising out of SLP ( C) No.33423 of 2018), decided on 04.12.2023, has been pleased to hold that Expressions like “benefit of doubt” and “honorably acquitted”, used in judgments are not to be understood as magic incantations. Hon’ble Supreme Court also held that a Court of law will not be carried away by the mere use of such terminology. Hon’ble Supreme Court also held that the conclusion that the acquittal in the criminal proceeding was after full consideration of the prosecution evidence and that the prosecution miserably failed to prove the charge can only be arrived at after a reading of the judgment in its entirety and the Court in Judicial Review is obliged to examine the substance of the judgment and not go by the form of expression used. 11. In the backdrop of the said judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, if one peruses judgment dated 30.12.2023, of acquittal passed by the learned Special Judge, Fast Track Court 7 2026:HHC:13236 (POCSO), Mandi, District Mandi, H.P., one finds therein that after discussing the evidence which was produced before the learned Special Judge, following findings were returned by the learned Trial Court while holding that the prosecution was not able to prove its case:- “48. The RFSL report Ext.P-19/PW3 is very important piece of evidence and raises serious doubt to the case of the prosecution that the child victim was sexually assaulted by the accused Sourabh Kumar and resultantly the child victim became pregnant and gave birth to a baby. The RFSL report Ext.P-19/PW3 reveals the DNA result of the baby of the child victim. The RFSL report Ext.P-19/PW3 clearly mentions that "the human male DNA profile identified in Exhibit-9 (blood sample on FTA card, Saurabh Kumar) of related report no.1513 RFSL DMNA(36)2022 did not match with one of the two alleless in the genotype obtained at all the 21 Autosomal STR loci- examined from Exhibit-3(blood sample on FTA card, newly born baby of victim) which was inconsistent with Saurabh Kumar as biological father of the newly born baby of victim. 49. The RFSL report Ext.P-19/PW3 states that DNA of the newly born baby of child victim was inconsistent with accused Saurab Kumar as biological father of the newly born baby of the child victim. This RFSL report is also very important in view of the fact that there is no evidence either medical or any other oral or documentary evidence that would suggest or even give support to the prosecution case that in fact the child victim was sexually assaulted by the accused in the month of February 2022 8 2026:HHC:13236 and resultantly the child victim became pregnant with the baby of the accused. 50. PW23 SI Sandeep Kumar 1.0 of the case. The IO has deposed the entire case of the prosecution in his own words which shall not be repeated for the sake of repetition. The Investigation as carried out by the 1.0 in the present case has born no fruitful result in favour of the prosecution to prove either the rape of the child victim by the accused nor the 1.0 has been able to bring any evidence before the court to prove that the child victim was threatened by the accused. 51. It has been argued by the Ld. SPP for the State that the statement of the child victim in itself is sufficient evidence against the accused and such statement does not require any corroboration. Such statement is accepted as an argument, however, does not hold good in the facts and circumstances of the present case where for the observations herein above the statement of child victim and the other evidence of the prosecution does not instill the trust of the court. It was held in Lalmalsom Kaipeng v. state of Tripura, 2021CriLJ 3307(Trip) (DB) that "an onerous duty is cast on the trial court to ensure a more careful scrutiny of evidence especially, when the evidence let in is the nature of oral testimony of the victim alone and not corroborated by any other evidence, oral, documentary and medical". 52. It has further been argued by the Ld.SPP for State that the prosecution evidence remains as unrebutted and the accused person despite opportunity did not lead any evidence and hence as per Section 29 of the POSCO Act, there is a presumption regarding the guilt of the accused 9 2026:HHC:13236 person. Such submissions are also not acceptable in the facts and the circumstances of the present case where the evidence as led by the prosecution is found insufficient and also not reliable to establish the foundational facts in favour of the prosecution. It is said that the statutory presumption is raised once the foundation of the prosecution case is laid by leading legally admissible evidence. In the present case in hand for the observations herein above while discussing the evidence of the prosecution the prosecution has however, failed to establish either of the foundational facts I) That the alleged Incident has taken place. II) That the accused person has committed the offence. The accused person have been able to shatter the testimonies of the witnesses of the prosecution as discussed herein above by way of the effective cross-examination. 53. It was held in Shahid Hussain Biswas v. State of West Bengal,2007(3)AICr.LR86(Cal) that "however, the aforesaid statutory presumption cannot be read to mean that the prosecution version is to be treated as gospel truth in every case. The presumption does not take away the essential duty of the court to analyse the evidence on record in the light of the special features of a particular case, eg patent absurdities or inherent infirmities in the prosecution version or existence of entrenched enmity between the accused and the victim giving rise to an irresistible inference of falsehood in the prosecution case while determining whether the accused has discharged his onus and established his innocence in the given facts of a case. To hold otherwise, would compel the court to mechanically accept the mere ipse dixit of the prosecution 10 2026:HHC:13236 and give a stamp of judicial approval to every prosecution, howsoever, patently absurd or inherently improbable it may be". 54. It was further held in David vs. State of Kerala, 2020 CrL.J3995(Ker): (2020)5KLT92 that Presumption under Section 29 does not affect obligation of the prosecution to proove its case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The provisions of section 29 needs to be interpreted in a manner which does not affect any of the constitutional and other established rights of the accused". 55. Hence, In the present case in hand for the observations hereinabove while discussing the evidence of the prosecution, the prosecution has failed to establish the foundational facts. II. That the alleged Incident has taken place. III. That the accused has committed the offence, Hence, Points no.Il Is decided against the prosecution. CONCLUSION: 56. To recapitulate the above discussion, it is held that the prosecution has failed to prove the charges framed against the accused Saurab Kumar beyond reasonable doubt. As such, Point no.ll is decided in favour of accused and against the prosecution. FINAL ORDER: 57. The accused Saurab Kumar is acquitted of the offences punishable under Sections 376(2) (n),376(3),506(ii) of IPC 452, 3540,509 of IPC and section 6 of POCSO Act 2012. S The accused Saurab Kumar is son bail. The bail bonds of accused and sureties stand 11 2026:HHC:13236 discharged. The case property, if any, is ordered to be disposed of in accordance with law after the statutory period of limitation for filing appeal and in the event of appeal, it be dealt with as per the orders of the Hon'ble Appellate Court. The file file aft after its due completion, be consigned to the record Room.” 12. In the considered view of this Court in the light of the findings that have been returned by the learned Special Judge from Para-48 onwards, it can be concluded that the acquittal of the petitioner by the learned Special Judge is in fact an honourable one. This is for the reason that when the allegation against the petitioner was that the alleged sexual assault by the petitioner on the child victim resulted in pregnancy, but the DNA result of the baby of the child victim did not match with the DNA of the petitioner, this indeed eroded the very foundation of the case that was set up by the prosecution against the petitioner. That being the case, as observed hereinabove, this Court can obviously safely draw the conclusion that the acquittal indeed was an honourable one. 13. In this backdrop, obviously as the services of the petitioner were terminated on account of the lodging of an FIR, allegations made wherein could not be proved against the petitioner by the prosecution, said termination can not be sustained in law after the judgment of the acquittal in favour of the petitioner by the learned Special Judge. This Court again reiterates that the only reason for termination of the service of the petitioner was the lodging 12 2026:HHC:13236 of the FIR and as observed hereinabove, as the prosecution could not prove its case against the petitioner and as indeed the petitioner was acquitted on merit, the termination can no more be sustained in law and the petitioner cannot be made to suffer any further on account of lodging of the said FIR against him. 14. Accordingly, in light of the above discussion, this petition is allowed. Impugned termination order dated 20.12.2022 (Annexure P-3) is quashed and set aside. The petitioner is ordered to be reinstated in service from the date his services were terminated. As with regard to the period during which the petitioner remained out of service, on account of the termination order which today stands quashed by this Court, the said period shall be notionally counted towards service benefits including seniority, but the petitioner will not claim any actual benefit with regard to the said period from the Board. As from the date of the judgment dated 30.12.2023, the petitioner is held entitled to all consequential benefits. 15. The petition stands disposed of. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any also stand disposed of accordingly. (Ajay Mohan Goel) Judge April 2 3 , 2026 (Rishi)