Research › Search › Judgment

Gauhati High Court · body

2026 DAILYLAW 5996 (GAU)

KENLI NYORAK v. MARPHY ETE LOLLEN

Crl.Pet./977/2018 · 2026-05-20

Mitali Thakuria

body2026

Judgment text

Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.

Page No.# 1/8 GAHC010214282018 2026:GAU-AS:7057 THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH) Case No. : Crl.Pet./977/2018 KENLI NYORAK S/O. LT. MOKEN NYORAK, R/O. GAUR HILL, AALO, P.O. AND P.S. AALO, DIST. WEST SIANG, ARUNACHAL PRADESH-791001. VERSUS MARPHY ETE LOLLEN ADVOCATE, WEST SIANG DISTRICT BAR ASSOCIATION, AALO, P.O. AND P.S. AALO, DIST. WEST SIANG, ARUNACHAL PRADESH-791001. Advocate for the Petitioner : MR. P BORA, MS. M KECHII,MR. M SAHEWALLA Advocate for the Respondent : MR. A DHAR, MS. D GHOSH,MD F FARIDI BEFORE HON’BLE MRS. JUSTICE MITALI THAKURIA O R D E R Date : 21.05.2026. Heard Mr. P.J. Saikia, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Ms. M. Kechi, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. A. Dhar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent/complainant. This is an application under Section 482 read with Section 483 of the CrPC, Page No.# 2/8 1973 for quashing of the proceeding in C.R. Case No.20/2018, pending in the Court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Aalo in West Siang District in Arunachal Pradesh. It is submitted by Mr. Saikia, the learned Senior Advocate that as per the complaint, the respondent is a registered practicing Advocate in District Court of West Siang at Aalo and on the day of incident while she was discussing some topics with her client, the present petitioner suddenly came and talked her rudely, shouted her in front of her clients and also raised his hand to punch her. With the above allegation, the complaint was lodged and as the petitioner was in the campus of the Court, he was immediately taken into custody and sent to judicial custody. However, the petitioner got the order of bail from the Court. Mr. Saikia, the learned Senior Advocate further submitted that it is a fact that on the day of incident, the respondent was talking with her clients, when the petitioner requested the respondent to call his engaged counsel from the court campus but as the respondent did not listen to his request, there was an altercation between them. That apart, there was no such incident took place on the day of incident, though the complaint has been lodged by the respondent and on the basis of which, the cognizance is also taken by the learned Trial Court. The learned Senior Advocate further submitted that the petitioner was an accused in the Aalo P.S. Case No.70/2016, under Sections 279/337/338 of the IPC and in that context only, he visited the court premises to have a discussion with his engaged counsel. He further submitted that from the plain reading of the complaint as well as the statement made by the respondent, it reveals that no prima facie case reveals Page No.# 3/8 against the petitioner to take cognizance against him under Sections 294/506/509 & 354 of the IPC. He further submitted that there is no mention about any outraging of modesty or using criminal force for outraging modesty against the respondent to attract Section 509 or 354 of the IPC. More so, there is no mention about as to what kind of language or obscene language was used by the petitioner to attract even Section 294 of the IPC. Further, there is also no ingredients to prima facie reveal a case under Section 506 of the IPC against the petitioner. To substantiate his argument, Mr. Saikia, the learned Senior Advocate relied upon the following decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court viz. (1) Naresh Aneja @ Naresh Kumar Aneja vs. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in AIR 2025 SC 582 and (2) Madhushree Dutta vs. State of Karnataka and others, reported in (2025) 2 SCR 187. In para 12 in the case of Naresh Aneja @ Naresh Kumar Aneja (Supra) had expressed the view that to reveal a case under Section 354 IPC, the offence must be committed against a woman, criminal force must be applied against her and such application of force must be with the intent to outrage her modesty. But here in the instant case, there is no mention about any intention of the petitioner to outrage modesty nor there is any ingredients that he tried to outrage the modesty or used any criminal force for outraging her modesty. Further, to substantiate his argument that there are no ingredients of Section 294/506 of the IPC, the learned Senior Advocate Mr. Saikia also relied in para 20 —25 and 27—32 of the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Madhushree Dutta (Supra) which are quoted here-in-below for ready reference: Page No.# 4/8 “20. The next question for determination is, whether the mere assertion of "filthy language" allegedly used by the appellants in scolding the complainant, is sufficient to establish commission of offences under Sections 504 and 509 of the IPC. 21. In the above context, it would be apt to consider the provisions contained in Section 504 of the IPC. 22. A perusal of Section 504 of the IPC reveals that a mere act of insulting someone does not fulfill its requirements; the insult must be of such a nature that it provokes the person insulted to breach the public peace or engage in criminal conduct. Therefore, to establish the ingredients of Section 504 of the IPC, it must be demonstrated, based on the available material, that there was intentional insult with the intent or knowledge that such insult would provoke either disturbance of the public peace or the commission of any other offence. 23. We may, at this juncture, profitably refer to the decision of this Court in Fiona Shrikhande v. State of Maharashtra & Anr., 13 wherein Section 504 of the IPC came up for interpretation and it was held as under: "13. Section 504 IPC comprises of the following ingredients. viz., (a) intentional insult, (b) the insult must be such as to give provocation to the person insulted, and (c) the accused must intend or know that such provocation would cause another to break the public peace or to commit any other offence. The intentional insult must be of such a degree that should provoke a person to break the public peace or to commit any other offence. The person who intentionally insults intending or knowing it to be likely that it will give provocation to any other person and such provocation will cause to break the public peace or to commit any other offence, in such a situation, the ingredients of Section 504 are satisfied. One of the essential elements constituting the offence is that there should have been an act or conduct amounting to intentional insult and the mere fact that the accused abused the complainant, as such, is not sufficient by itself to warrant a conviction under Section 504 IPC. 14. We may also indicate that it is not the law that the actual words or language should figure in the complaint. One has to read the complaint as a whole and, by doing so, if the Magistrate comes to a conclusion, prima facie, that there has been an intentional insult so as to provoke any person to break the public peace or to commit any other offence, that is sufficient to bring the complaint within the ambit of Section 504 IPC. It Page No.# 5/8 is not the law that a complainant should verbatim reproduce each word or words capable of provoking the other person to commit any other offence. The background facts, circumstances, the occasion, the manner in which they are used, the person or persons to whom they are addressed, the time, the conduct of the person who has indulged in such actions are all relevant factors to be borne in mind while examining a complaint lodged for initiating proceedings under Section 504 IPC." (emphasis supplied) 24. In the instant case, the chargesheet states that the appellants used "filthy language" while scolding the complainant; however, no such allegation is made against the appellants in the complaint. Furthermore, it is nowhere alleged that this act of using filthy language and insulting the complainant by the appellants, has provoked the complainant to commit breach of public peace or to commit any other offence. Therefore, from the materials on record, the ingredients of the offence under Section 504 of the IPC, as explained in the abovesaid decision, are not satisfied. 25. For ascertaining whether, prima facie, the provision of Section 509 of the IPC was attracted, it is essential to first understand the meaning of the term "modesty", to determine whether modesty has been insulted. While modesty is not explicitly defined in the IPC, this Court has addressed the essence of a woman's modesty in the decision in Ramkripal v. State of Madhya Pradesh. 14 Excerpts from the decision read as under: "12. What constitutes an outrage to female modesty is nowhere defined in IPC. The essence of a woman's modesty is her sex. The culpable intention of the accused is the crux of the matter. The reaction of the woman is very relevant, but its absence is not always decisive. Modesty in this Section is an attribute associated with female human beings as a class. It is a virtue which attaches to a female owing to her sex..." 26. …………………………….. 27. The conclusion that emerges from the above discussion is that it will be essential for this Court to carefully assess the evidence presented, in order to determine whether there is sufficient material to establish the intention and knowledge on the part of the appellants, to insult the modesty of the complainant or, to put it pithily, whether any act was intended to shock the sense of decency of the complainant being a woman. 28. The term "filthy language," when examined in isolation, and without any contextual framework or accompanying words, indicating an intent to insult the complainant's modesty, Page No.# 6/8 does not fall within the purview of Section 509 of the IPC. Had there been references to specific words used, contextual details, or any gestures-whether preceding. succeeding, or accompanying these words-that could demonstrate a criminal intent to insult the modesty, and it might have assisted the prosecution in establishing the case against the appellants. 29. In considering the term "filthy language" objectively, in the overall conspectus of the case, we are of the view that the appellants' actions do not demonstrate the requisite intent or knowledge that would reasonably lead to the conclusion that their conduct could provoke such a severe emotional response as to constitute an insult to a woman's modesty. 30. Be that as it may, it goes without saying that each case must be assessed having regard to the specific facts and circumstances, not only of the case itself, but also of the individuals involved in the alleged incident. It is undisputed that the complainant and the appellants were positioned as an employee and senior officials, respectively. Moreover, it is evident from the case presented by both parties that a dispute existed between them with regard to the employment in question. 31. To reiterate, in the present case, the complaint does not indicate that the appellants used language towards the complainant that would warrant an offence under Section 509 of the IPC. However, the chargesheet alleges that the appellants scolded the complainant using "filthy language." Notably, this allegation is also absent in the FIR. 32. In light of the employer-employee relationship between the appellants and the complainant; the existing dispute between them relating to the employment; the absence of any references to specific words used, contextual details, or accompanying gestures-whether preceding or succeeding the alleged words the failure to mention the use of any "filthy language" in the complaint; and the fact that this allegation is only found in the chargesheet: there are serious concerns regarding the claim of insulting modesty of the complainant by the appellants. Considering the materials available on record, we are of the view that prima facie ingredients of an offence under Section 509 of the IPC have not been disclosed.” Accordingly, Mr. Saikia, the learned Senior Advocate submitted that it is a fit case to set aside and quash the entire criminal proceeding pending against the present petitioner by invoking the power under Section 482 of the CrPC. He further submitted that even if the proceeding is allowed to be continued, the possibility of conviction is very remote. Rather, it will abuse the process of the Court. Mr. Dhar, the learned counsel for the respondent submitted in this regard that at Page No.# 7/8 the relevant point of time, due to pressure by the other Bar Members, the complainant lodged the complaint against the present petitioner but at present she is not interested to proceed with the case any further and thus, she has no objection if the present petition for quashing is allowed by setting aside and quashing the entire proceeding, pending against the present petitioner. He further submitted that at the point of time, out of anger and as insisted by the other Bar Members, she lodged the complaint but at present she has no grievance against the present petitioner. Hearing the submissions of learned counsel for both sides, I have also perused the case records and annexure filed along with the present criminal petition. Accordingly, it is seen that as per the complaint, respondent only brought the allegation that the petitioner had shouted in front of her clients and also about to punch her. That apart, there is no other allegation to constitute an offence under Sections 294/509/354 of the IPC. Further the ingredient which requires to constitute an offence under Section 506 of the IPC is also not found available in her statement as well as the complaint lodged by the complainant. But without going into other detail in the merit of the case, it is seen that the respondent is not interested to proceed with the case any further, which was lodged by her only on the pressure from the Bar Members or her colleague and hence, even if the case is allowed to proceed against the present petitioner, there is no probability of adducing evidence against him and in that case, it will be nothing but the abuse of the process of the Court. In view of this and considering all circumstances vis-à-vis the view expressed by Page No.# 8/8 the Hon’ble Apex Court as referred above, this Court is of the opinion that it is a fit case to quash the criminal proceeding pending against the present petitioner, in C.R. Case No.20/2018, in the Court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Aalo in West Siang District in Arunachal Pradesh. Accordingly, this criminal petition stands allowed and disposed of. JUDGE Comparing Assistant