ORDER : 1. Under challenge in this revision petition is the conviction and sentence rendered against the revision petitioner under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (for short “N.I. Act”). 2. The revision petitioner is the accused in C.C. No. 96 of 2009 on the file of the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court–II, Vaikom. 3. The case of the complainant is that the accused, in discharge of her liability to the complainant, issued a cheque dated 03.11.2008 for Rs.3,00,000/- drawn on her account maintained with Union Bank of India, Vaikom Branch, in favour of the complainant. Upon presentation, the cheque was dishonoured on 16.02.2009 for insufficiency of funds. The complainant issued a statutory notice dated 17.02.2009 demanding payment of the cheque amount. Despite receipt of the notice, the accused failed to make payment. Hence, the accused is alleged to have committed an offence punishable under Section 138 of the N.I. Act. 4. During the trial, the complainant was examined as PW1. The documents produced on the side of the complainant were marked as Exts. P1 to P5. On the side of the defence, DW1 was examined and Exts. D1 to D5 were marked. 5. On appreciation of the evidence on record, the trial court found the accused guilty of the offence punishable under Section 138 of the N.I. Act and convicted her. The accused was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for one year and to pay a fine of Rs.3,00,000/-. In default of payment of the fine, the accused was directed to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one month. 6. Aggrieved by the said judgment, the accused preferred Crl.A. No. 191 of 2011 before the Sessions Court, Kottayam. Teh learned Additional Sessions Judge-V, Kottayam, who heard the appeal, allowed the same in part. While confirming the conviction, the appellate court modified the sentence and directed the accused to undergo imprisonment till the rising of the court and to pay a sum of Rs.3,00,000/- as compensation to the complainant under Section 357(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure . In default of payment of the compensation, the accused was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for one month. Aggrieved thereby, the revision petition has been filed. 7. Heard the learned counsel appearing for both sides and perused the records. 8. In default of payment of the compensation, the accused was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for one month. Aggrieved thereby, the revision petition has been filed. 7. Heard the learned counsel appearing for both sides and perused the records. 8. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner submitted that both the trial court and the appellate court erred in appreciating the evidence in its proper perspective and hastily convicted the accused. According to the learned counsel, the complainant failed to prove the transaction alleged in the case as well as the execution of Ext. P1 cheque. It is further submitted that the source of funds allegedly advanced by the complainant has also not been proved. It is therefore urged that the revision petitioner is entitled to be acquitted. 9. Per contra, the learned counsel for the 2nd respondent submitted that there is ample evidence to prove the transaction alleged in the case as well as the execution of Ext. P1 cheque, and therefore the presumption under Section 139 of the N.I. Act would operate in favour of the complainant. It is further contended that once such a presumption arises, the burden shifts to the accused to rebut the same by adducing cogent and convincing evidence or materials. However, no materials have been adduced by the accused to displace the said presumption. According to the learned counsel, no interference is therefore required in the impugned judgment. 10. Before entering into a discussion regarding the rival contentions, it is relevant to note that the scope of interference in a revision petition is very limited. It is well settled by a catena of judicial decisions that a court exercising revisional jurisdiction can interfere with the findings of the courts below only when such findings suffer from illegality, impropriety, or perversity. Unless it is demonstrated that the judgments of the trial court or the appellate court are perverse, unreasonable, or based on misreading or non-consideration of material evidence, interference in revision is not warranted. The revisional court cannot reappreciate the evidence as an appellate court or substitute its own view merely because another view is possible. 11. Unless it is demonstrated that the judgments of the trial court or the appellate court are perverse, unreasonable, or based on misreading or non-consideration of material evidence, interference in revision is not warranted. The revisional court cannot reappreciate the evidence as an appellate court or substitute its own view merely because another view is possible. 11. In State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, AIR 1999 SC 981 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held thus: “In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of Supervisory Jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an Appellate Court nor can it be treated even as a second Appellate Jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to gross miscarriage of justice.” 12. This is a case in which the complainant alleges commission of an offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 . The definite case of the complainant is that, towards discharge of a legally enforceable debt, the accused issued a cheque for Rs.3,00,000/- in favour of the complainant. Upon presentation for encashment, the cheque was dishonoured for the reason “funds insufficient”. According to the complainant, despite issuance and receipt of a statutory notice, the accused failed to make payment of the cheque amount, thereby committed the offence punishable under of the N.I. Act. 13. In order to prove the complainant’s case, the complainant was examined as PW1. During examination, PW1 had given evidence in tune with the averments contained in the complaint. Though PW1 was subjected to extensive cross-examination by the defence counsel, nothing material was elicited to discredit his version. 14. 13. In order to prove the complainant’s case, the complainant was examined as PW1. During examination, PW1 had given evidence in tune with the averments contained in the complaint. Though PW1 was subjected to extensive cross-examination by the defence counsel, nothing material was elicited to discredit his version. 14. Moreover, both the trial court and the appellate court have found that all statutory requirements for maintaining a prosecution under Section 138 of the N.I. Act has been duly complied with in the present case. After appreciating the evidence on record, both the courts further found that the complainant had succeeded in proving the transaction alleged in this case as well as the execution of Ext.P1 cheque. Undoubtedly, once the foundational facts are established, the presumption under Section 139 operates in favour of the complainant. It is well settled that the burden then shifts to the accused to rebut the said presumption by adducing cogent evidence. The presumption can be rebutted either by direct evidence or by demonstrating inherent improbabilities in the complainant’s case. However, in the present case, no such material has been placed on record by the defence to displace the presumption in favour of the complainant. 15. Turning to the defence version, the contention of the accused is that Ext. P1 cheque leaf was issued as a security in connection with a business transaction between the complainant and her husband, and the signed blank cheque has been misused to institute the present prosecution. Apart from making such an assertion, no convincing or acceptable material has been produced to substantiate the defence version. Further, the accused has admitted her signature on Ext. P1 cheque. Such admission of signature goes a long way in establishing the execution of the cheque. 16. From the judgments of the trial court and the appellate court, it is seen that both courts, mainly relying on the evidence of PW1, held that the complainant had succeeded in establishing the foundational facts necessary to raise the presumption under Section 139 of the N.I. Act, and accordingly convicted the accused after finding that she failed to rebut the said presumption. 17. In the above circumstances, I find no reason to interfere with the judgment of conviction or the order of sentence passed against the accused. The sentence imposed by the appellate court is also proportionate and in consonance with the nature of the offence committed. 17. In the above circumstances, I find no reason to interfere with the judgment of conviction or the order of sentence passed against the accused. The sentence imposed by the appellate court is also proportionate and in consonance with the nature of the offence committed. Consequently, no interference is warranted in the matter of sentence as well. Resultantly, the revision petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. The revision petitioner shall appear before the trial court on 05.10.2026 to receive the sentence. Needless to say, if the revision petitioner has deposited any amount before the trial court pursuant to the directions issued by the appellate court or this Court, the same shall be treated as part of the compensation amount ordered to be paid by the accused. The compensation amount shall be disbursed to the complainant forthwith.