- 1 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:18870 WP No. 36681 of 2025 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 6TH DAY OF APRIL, 2026 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA WRIT PETITION NO. 36681 OF 2025 (GM-RES) BETWEEN: 1. SRI BHARATH R., S/O C. RAMU, AGED ABOUT 40 YEARS, RESIDING AT NO.11, FIRST STAGE, GELEYARA BALAGA, MAHALAKSHMIPURAM, BENGALURU – 560 086. 2. DR. UMA R., W/O DR.VENKATA REDDY, AGED ABOUT 43 YEARS, RESIDING AT NO.05, FIRST STAGE, GELEYARA BALAGA, MAHALAKSHMIPURAM, BENGALURU – 560 086. 3. SRI RAVINDRA, S/O LATE RAMAIAH, AGED ABOUT 47 YEARS, RESIDING AT NO.169, 2ND STAGE, GELEYARA BALAGA, MAHALAKSHMIPURAM, BENGALURU – 560 086. …PETITIONERS (BY SRI MURALIDHAR H.M., ADVOCATE) Digitally signed by SANJEEVINI J KARISHETTY Location: High Court of Karnataka - 2 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:18870 WP No. 36681 of 2025 AND: 1. STATE OF KARNATAKA BY RAJARAJESHWARI NAGAR POLICE STATION, REPRESENTED BY ITS PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA, BENGALURU – 560 001. 2. SRI M.R. SRINIVAS, S/O M.RAMAIAH, AGED ABOUT 60 YEARS, RESIDING AT NO.3, FLAT NO.405, DOLLARS SCHEME LAYOUT, NANDINI LAYOUT, BENGALURU – 560 096. …RESPONDENTS (BY SMT.SOWMYA R., HCGP FOR R-1; SRI N.UDAYAKUMAR, ADVOCATE FOR R-2) THIS WP IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO A. ALLOW THE WRIT PETITION, ISSUE WRIT IN THE NATURE OF CERTIORARI QUASHING THE CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS IN C.C NO.28373/2023 PENDING ON THE FILE OF THE XLVI ADDITIONAL CHIEF METROPOLITAN MAGISTRATE, BENGALURU, VIDE ANNEXURE-A. THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING, THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER: - 3 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:18870 WP No. 36681 of 2025 CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA ORAL ORDER Petitioners – accused Nos.1 to 3 are before this Court calling in question proceedings in C.C.No.28373/2023, pending before the XLVI Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bengaluru, for the offences punishable under Sections 341, 504 and 506 r/w. 34 of the IPC. 2. Heard Sri Muralidhar H.M., learned counsel for petitioners, Smt. Sowmya R., learned High Court Government Pleader for respondent No.1 and Sri N. Udayakumar N., learned counsel for respondent No.2. 3. Facts in brief, germane, are as follows: The petitioners are said to be the office bearers of Sri Lakshminarayana Rao Education Society (for short ‘the Society’) and the complainant is the erstwhile Secretary of the said Society. The squabble between the two, with regard to certain fabrication, leads the petitioners to pass orders on 19.09.2022 and 02.05.2023, removing respondent No.2 – complainant from the post of Secretary and his primary membership. These orders of removal are challenged before - 4 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:18870 WP No. 36681 of 2025 the Registrar by respondent No.2 - complainant. It transpires that the said complaint was challenged before the Registrar of the Societies and the Registrar of Societies is said to have recalled the said orders in favour of the complainant. The petitioners preferred a writ petition before this Court in W.P.No.20266/2023 against the order passed by the Registrar of Societies. A co-ordinate bench has also passed an order that the complainant should not interfere with the affairs of the Society, on 11.09.2023. 4. The issue in the lis is not with regard to the merit of the matter. A complaint comes to be registered on 29.12.2023, by respondent No.2 against the petitioners alleging that the petitioners attempted to prevent respondent No.2 from entering into the office of the Society. This becomes a crime in Crime No.329/2023, for the offences under Sections 341, 504 and 506 r/w. 34 of the IPC. The police after investigation file a charge sheet in C.C.No.28373/2023, for the afore-quoted offences. This has driven the petitioners to this Court in the subject petition. - 5 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:18870 WP No. 36681 of 2025 5. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners would submit that none of the ingredients of the offences so alleged i.e., Sections 341, 504 or 506 of the IPC is met in the case at hand. Permitting further proceedings would thus become an abuse of the process of the law. More so, in the light of the fact that the proceedings are pending before the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal and the order of the co-ordinate bench passed in W.P.No.20266/2023. He would seek quashment of the proceedings. 6. Learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2 - complainant would however refute the submissions to contend that the petitioners armed with the order of the Registrar of Co- operative Societies had sought to enter into his office but, he was not permitted to enter the office. Therefore, the ingredients of the offences are clearly met in the case at hand. Learned counsel submits that long before the order could be passed by the co-ordinate bench, the complainant was still in the post of the Secretary and therefore, the complainant wanted to enter the Society’s office. The petitioners restrained the complainant and therefore, the offences are clearly met. - 6 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:18870 WP No. 36681 of 2025 The learned counsel submits that the proceedings must be permitted to be continued. 7. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made by the learned counsel for the respective parties and have perused the material on record. 8. The afore-narrated facts lie in a narrow compass, as the dispute is between the erstwhile Secretary and the office bearers of the aforesaid Society. The allegations galore between the parties, both of whom are before the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal in a proceeding instituted by respondent No.2 - complainant. The petitioners prefer a writ petition in W.P.No.20266/2023, challenging the order of the Registrar of Societies. The co-ordinate bench passed the following order: “Sri.R.S.Kedaresh, learned counsel has entered appearance for respondent No.1 by filing a caveat petition. Learned Additional Government Advocate is directed to take notice for respondent No.2. Learned counsel for the petitioner is directed to serve a copy of the writ petition along with annexures on the learned Additional Government Advocate. The grievance of the petitioner-Society is that although respondent No.2-Deputy Registrar of Co- operative Societies rejected the application/proposal for amendment of the bye-laws which were submitted at the - 7 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:18870 WP No. 36681 of 2025 hands of respondent No.1 claiming to be the Secretary of the petitioner-Society, nevertheless, when action has been taken by the petitioner-Society to remove respondent No.1 from the Primary membership of the Society, the impugned order at Annexure-A has been passed holding that the principles of natural justice were not followed before removing respondent No.1 from the primary membership of the Society. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that when the respondent No.2-Deputy Registrar of Co- operative Societies found in the earlier order dated 09.01.2023 at Annexure M that respondent No.1 had fabricated the resolution passed by the Board of the petitioner-Society and had submitted a concocted resolution and thereafter, action is taken by the Society to remove respondent No.1, since it was obvious that respondent No.1 has indulged in illegal and irregular conduct which is not in the interest of the petitioner- Society, the order of removal could not have been set aside only on the ground of not following the principles of natural justice. Per contra, the learned counsel for respondent No.1-caveator submits that respondent No.1 has also questioned the earlier order dated 09.01.2023 before the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal. It is the contention of respondent No.1 that he did not manipulate or tinker with the original resolution passed by the Board of the Society. Nevertheless, respondent No.1 is hereby directed not to do anything in the matter of the petitioner- Society, until further orders. Two weeks' time is granted at the request of learned counsel for the respondents to file statement of objections.” (Emphasis supplied) In the interregnum or even before the said proceeding would get concluded, the criminal law is set into motion by respondent No.2 - complainant on the score that he was not - 8 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:18870 WP No. 36681 of 2025 permitted to enter his chamber’s of the Society and therefore, the offence under Section 341 of the IPC is alleged against the petitioners. It is necessary to quote Section 341 of the IPC. It reads as follows: “341. Punishment for wrongful restraint.— Whoever wrongfully restrains any person shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month, or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both.” Section 341 of the IPC has its ingredients in Section 339 of the IPC. “339. Wrongful restraint.—Whoever voluntarily obstructs any person so as to prevent that person from proceeding in any direction in which that person has a right to proceed, is said wrongfully to restrain that person. Exception.—The obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of this section.” (Emphasis supplied) Section 339 of the IPC mandates that the victim must not be allowed to move in any direction and there should not be any direction or should be blocked from every direction. It is only then it would become a criminal restraint upon the movement of the victim. The purport of this provision need not - 9 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:18870 WP No. 36681 of 2025 detain this Court for long or delve deep into the matter. The Apex Court in KEKI HORMUSJI GHARDA v. MEHERVAN RUSTOM IRANI reported in (2009) 6 SCC 475 has held as follows: “11. It is in the aforementioned backdrop of events, the statement made by the first respondent that Accused 1 to 5 were managing the affairs of the Company and had instigated Accused 6 to construct the road must be viewed. It is one thing to say that the Company had asked Accused 6 to make construction but only because Accused 1 to 5 were its Directors, the same, in our opinion, would not be sufficient to fasten any criminal liability on them for commission of an offence under Section 341 IPC or otherwise. 12. “Wrongful restraint” has been defined under Section 339 IPC in the following words: “339. Wrongful restraint.—Whoever voluntarily obstructs any person so as to prevent that person from proceeding in any direction in which that person has a right to proceed, is said wrongfully to restrain that person. Exception.—The obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of this section.” The essential ingredients of the aforementioned provision are: (1) Accused obstructs voluntarily; (2) The victim is prevented from proceeding in any direction; - 10 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:18870 WP No. 36681 of 2025 (3) Such victim has every right to proceed in that direction. 13. Section 341 IPC provides that: “341. Punishment for wrongful restraint.— Whoever wrongfully restrains any person, shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month, or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both.” 14. The word “voluntary” is significant. It connotes that obstruction should be direct. The obstructions must be a restriction on the normal movement of a person. It should be a physical one. They should have common intention to cause obstruction. 15. The appellants herein were not at the site. They did not carry out any work. No overt act or physical obstruction on their part has been attributed. Only because legal proceedings were pending between the Company and Bombay Municipal Corporation and/or with the first respondent herein, the same would not by itself mean that the appellants were in any way concerned with commission of a criminal offence of causing obstructions to the first respondent and his parents. 16. We have noticed hereinbefore that despite of the said road being under construction, the first respondent went to the police station thrice. He, therefore, was not obstructed from going to the police station. In fact, a firm action had been taken by the authorities. The workers were asked not to do any work on the road. We, therefore, fail to appreciate that how, in a situation of this nature, the Managing Director and the Directors of the Company as also the Architect can be said to have committed an offence under Section 341 IPC. …… …… …… - 11 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:18870 WP No. 36681 of 2025 19. Even as regards the availability of the remedy of filing an application for discharge, the same would not mean that although the allegations made in the complaint petition even if given face value and taken to be correct in its entirety, do not disclose an offence or it is found to be otherwise an abuse of the process of the court, still the High Court would refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 20. Indisputably, there might have been some delay on the part of the appellants in approaching the High Court but while adjusting equity the High Court was required to take into consideration the fact that in a case of this nature the appellants would face harassment although the allegations contained in the complaint petition even assuming to be correct were trivial in nature. The High Court furthermore has failed to take into consideration the fact that in the first information report no allegation in regard to acts of common intention or common object on the part of the appellants was made out. The appellants were not named as accused therein. It is, therefore, really difficult to appreciate as to on what basis the complaint petition was filed. 21. For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment and order of the High Court is set aside. The appeal is allowed. The order summoning the appellant is quashed.” (Emphasis supplied) It is the case of the complainant that he was not allowed to enter the office of the Society. Non-allowing or preventing entry of respondent No.2 into the office of the Society would not amount to voluntary restraint by use of criminal force. - 12 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:18870 WP No. 36681 of 2025 Therefore, the said offence cannot be laid against the petitioners or it is loosely laid against the petitioners. 9. The other two offences alleged are the ones punishable under Sections 504 and 506 of the IPC, the ingredients of which are found in Section 503 of the IPC. The interpretation of what should be the ingredients of the said offences need not detain this Court for long or delve deep into the matter. The Apex Court in the case of MOHAMMAD WAJID AND ANOTHER v. STATE OF U.P. reported in 2023 SCC OnLine SC 951 considering the very offences has held as follows: “SECTIONS 503, 504 AND 506 OF THE IPC 24. Chapter XXII of the IPC relates to Criminal Intimidation, Insult and Annoyance. Section 503 reads thus:— “Section 503. Criminal intimidation. — Whoever threatens another with any injury to his person, reputation or property, or to the person or reputation of any one in whom that person is interested, with intent to cause alarm to that person, or to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do, as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat, commits criminal intimidation. Explanation.—A threat to injure the reputation of any deceased person in whom the person threatened is interested, is within this section. - 13 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:18870 WP No. 36681 of 2025 Illustration A, for the purpose of inducing B to resist from prosecuting a civil suit, threatens to burn B's house. A is guilty of criminal intimidation.” 25. Section 504 reads thus:— “Section 504. Intentional insult with intent to provoke breach of the peace.—Whoever intentionally insults, and thereby gives provocation to any person, intending or knowing it to be likely that such provocation will cause him to break the public peace, or to commit any other offence, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.” 26. Section 506 reads thus:— “Section 506. Punishment for criminal intimidation. —Whoever commits, the offence of criminal intimidation shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both; If threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, etc.—And if the threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, or to cause the destruction of any property by fire, or to cause an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years, or to impute unchastity to a woman, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, or with fine, or with both.” 27. An offence under Section 503 has following essentials:— 1) Threatening a person with any injury; (i) to his person, reputation or property; or (ii) to the person, or reputation of any one in whom that person is interested. 2) The threat must be with intent; (i) to cause alarm to that person; or - 14 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:18870 WP No. 36681 of 2025 (ii) to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat; or (iii) to cause that person to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat. 28. 28. Section 504 of the IPC contemplates intentionally insulting a person and thereby provoking such person insulted to breach the peace or intentionally insulting a person knowing it to be likely that the person insulted may be provoked so as to cause a breach of the public peace or to commit any other offence. Mere abuse may not come within the purview of the section. But, the words of abuse in a particular case might amount to an intentional insult provoking the person insulted to commit a breach of the public peace or to commit any other offence. If abusive language is used intentionally and is of such a nature as would in the ordinary course of events lead the person insulted to break the peace or to commit an offence under the law, the case is not taken away from the purview of the Section merely because the insulted person did not actually break the peace or commit any offence having exercised self control or having been subjected to abject terror by the offender. In judging whether particular abusive language is attracted by Section 504, IPC, the court has to find out what, in the ordinary circumstances, would be the effect of the abusive language used and not what the complainant actually did as a result of his peculiar idiosyncrasy or cool temperament or sense of discipline. It is the ordinary general nature of the abusive language that is the test for considering whether the abusive language is an intentional insult likely to provoke the person insulted to commit a breach of the peace and not the particular conduct or temperament of the complainant. - 15 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:18870 WP No. 36681 of 2025 29. Mere abuse, discourtesy, rudeness or insolence, may not amount to an intentional insult within the meaning of Section 504, IPC if it does not have the necessary element of being likely to incite the person insulted to commit a breach of the peace of an offence and the other element of the accused intending to provoke the person insulted to commit a breach of the peace or knowing that the person insulted is likely to commit a breach of the peace. Each case of abusive language shall have to be decided in the light of the facts and circumstances of that case and there cannot be a general proposition that no one commits an offence under Section 504, IPC if he merely uses abusive language against the complainant. In King Emperor v. Chunnibhai Dayabhai, (1902) 4 Bom LR 78, a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court pointed out that:— “To constitute an offence under Section 504, I.P.C. it is sufficient if the insult is of a kind calculated to cause the other party to lose his temper and say or do something violent. Public peace can be broken by angry words as well as deeds.” (Emphasis supplied) 30. A bare perusal of Section 506 of the IPC makes it clear that a part of it relates to criminal intimidation. Before an offence of criminal intimidation is made out, it must be established that the accused had an intention to cause alarm to the complainant. 31. In the facts and circumstances of the case and more particularly, considering the nature of the allegations levelled in the FIR, a prima facie case to constitute the offence punishable under Section 506 of the IPC may probably could be said to have been disclosed but not under Section 504 of the IPC. The allegations with respect to the offence punishable under Section 504 of the IPC can also be looked at from a different perspective. In the FIR, all that the first informant has stated is that abusive language was used by the accused persons. What exactly was uttered in the form of abuses is not stated in - 16 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:18870 WP No. 36681 of 2025 the FIR. One of the essential elements, as discussed above, constituting an offence under Section 504 of the IPC is that there should have been an act or conduct amounting to intentional insult. Where that act is the use of the abusive words, it is necessary to know what those words were in order to decide whether the use of those words amounted to intentional insult. In the absence of these words, it is not possible to decide whether the ingredient of intentional insult is present.” (Emphasis supplied) If the elucidation of the law by the Apex Court in the afore-quoted judgment is pitted against the facts obtaining in the case at hand, it would not meet the ingredients as is observed by the Apex Court. In that light, permitting further proceedings against these petitioners on the aforesaid score would run foul on the afore-quoted judgments and result in miscarriage of justice. 10. For the aforesaid reasons, the following: ORDER a. The writ petition stands allowed. b. The proceedings in C.C.No.28373/2023, pending before the XLVI Additional Chief Metropolitan - 17 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:18870 WP No. 36681 of 2025 Magistrate, Bengaluru, qua the petitioners, stand quashed. c. The observations made in the course of the order would not come in the way of any proceedings pending before the concerned Court / tribunal or influence any proceeding pending between the parties before any other fora. Sd/- (M.NAGAPRASANNA) JUDGE NVJ List No.: 2 Sl No.: 43