2026:JHHC:9621 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI W.P.(S). No. 1867 of 2026 ---------- Saraswati Kumari, aged about 46 years, wife of Mahendra Thakur, R/o. Village Konara, P.O. & P.S. Barhi, Dist. Hazaribagh. ………. Petitioner Versus 1. State of Jharkhand. 2. The Secretary, Primary Education, Govt. of Jharkhand, Project Building, Dhurwa, P.O. & P.S. Dhurwa, Dist. Ranchi. 3. The District Education Officer-cum-District Program Officer, Jharkhand Education Project, P.O., P.S. & Dist. Hazaribagh. 4. The Block Education Extension Officer, Barhi-3, P.O. & P.S. Barhi, Dist. Hazaribagh. ………. Respondents --------- CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK ROSHAN ----------- For the Petitioner : Mr. Sanjay Kr. Sinha, Advocate For the Respondents : Ms. Aditee Dongrawat, AC to GP-V ---------- 04/ 06.04.2026 The instant application has been preferred by the petitioner for quashing of the memo No. 519 dated 07.12.2023, issued by the 4th respondent; whereby the salary of the petitioner for the period of termination has been stopped on the basis of “no work, no pay” and also 3 increments have been withheld without cumulative effect. 2. From the record, it appears that the petitioner has approached this Court earlier in W.P.(S). No. 6119 of 2019, praying therein for quashing the order of punishment dated 23.11.2017, whereby the petitioner was terminated from service. The said writ application was disposed of vide order dated 26.04.2023, passed by a Co- ordinate Bench of this Court. The relevant paragraphs of the said order are extracted herein below: “5. Controverting the submissions of learned counsel for the petitioner, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-State as well as respondent-JEPC submits that a complaint was made before the office of Hon’ble Lokayukta, Jharkhand against the petitioner. Thereafter, the matter was investigated and finally having found the charges proved against the petitioner, the order of termination was issued. Since there is no procedural laches in the enquiry proceeding, the contract of petitioner as Para-Teacher has been terminated. However, they submit that the petitioner has deposited the entire 2026:JHHC:9621 2 amount along with interest with the Village Education Samiti. Learned counsel further submits that even if the entire amount has been refunded by the petitioner, it does not mean that the petitioner may be left scot free. As such, the writ petition is fit to be dismissed. 6. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and having gone through the entire materials available on record, it appears that admittedly the petitioner has withdrawn the Government money, which was kept for students’ scholarship. It is also not in dispute that the entire amount along with interest has been deposited by the petitioner before issuance of order of termination dated 23.11.2017. However, this fact of returning back the amount before the order of termination has not been mentioned in the impugned order. It also appears from the impugned termination order dated 23.11.2017 itself that it is a case of discrimination. It is mentioned in the impugned that there was similar allegation of defalcation of money against one Damodar Sao, who is also a Para-Teacher, but he has been left free. Therefore, it can comfortably be inferred that the order passed against the petitioner is disproportionate to the charges levelled against her. The respondent-authorities before passing the impugned order, ought to have considered that after passing of the impugned order, the livelihood of the petitioner is at stake and as such, respondents should reconsider the matter on the quantum of punishment, as it appears from the charge and the act of the petitioner is not as grave as it warrants dismissal from service. 7. Since this Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot substitute its own conclusion on the quantum of punishment to that of the disciplinary authority. Hence, it would be appropriate to remit back the matter to the disciplinary authority on the quantum of punishment. 8. As a sequitur to the aforesaid rules, regulations, guidelines and judicial pronouncements, the impugned order contained in Memo No. 422 dated 23.11.2017 issued by Block Education Extension Officer, Barhi, Hazaribagh (respondent no.4) is hereby quashed and set aside. The matter is remitted back with the direction to the disciplinary authority to consider the case of the petitioner for grant of lesser punishment other than an order of removal or dismissal, considering the aforesaid facts and situation, in accordance with law. Let the entire exercise be undertaken by the respondents within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt / production of a copy of this order.” 3. Thus, the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court had remitted the matter to the respondents to consider the case of the petitioner for grant of lesser punishment. Pursuant thereto, memo No. 519 dated 07.12.2023 (Annexure-2) has been issued, whereby the salary of the petitioner for the period of termination has been stopped on the basis of ‘no work, no pay’ and also 3 increments have been withheld without cumulative effect. 4. So far as the punishment with regard to ‘no work, no pay’ is concerned; this Court is of the view that since it was the fault of 2026:JHHC:9621 3 the petitioner that he could not work; in other words, the respondents were not liable in stopping his work in view of the fact that in the 2nd round of litigation also, he has been punished and the same requires no interference. 5. Further, so far as the 2nd part of punishment i.e. withholding of 3 increments without cumulative effect is concerned, this Court does not feel that it is a harsh punishment as canvassed by the petitioner. Certainly, the order of termination was harsh that is the reason that the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the previous round of litigation had remitted the matter back to the respondents for passing a fresh order on the quantum of punishment and thereafter, Annexure-2 has been issued. 6. After going through the punishment order, I do not find any error in the same. Accordingly, no relief can be granted to the petitioner. 7. As a result, the instant writ application stands dismissed. However, no cost. (Deepak Roshan, J.) 6th April, 2026 Kunal/- Uploaded on 16.04.2026